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Case File
d-27077House OversightOther

NSA Bulk Telephone Records Collection Under Section 215 and Keith Alexander's Role

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #019611
Pages
1
Persons
1

Summary

The passage outlines how the NSA leveraged Section 215 of the Patriot Act to amass a massive database of telephone billing records, describing the legal interpretation that enabled this bulk collectio Section 215 was interpreted by the Bush and Obama administrations to allow bulk collection of all U. The FISA court could issue warrants to telecom companies for these records deemed "relevant" to te

This document is from the House Oversight Committee Releases.

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Persons Referenced (1)

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fisa-courtgovernment-surveillancetelecommunicationsbulk-data-collectionpolicy-interpretationsurveillance-lawlegal-exposurehouse-oversightnsasection-215patriot-act
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