Philosophical discussion on altruism, principle vs. strategy, and moral intuition

Morality Games 297 1990), avoidance of guilt (Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014; Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006; DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012), anticipation of reputational benefits or reciprocity (as Plato’s Glaucon suggests, when he proffers that even a pious man would do evil if given a ring that makes him invisible; Trivers, 1971). At the extreme, this amounts to asking if saintly individuals such as Gandhi or Mother Teresa were motivated thus, or if they were “authentic” altruists who did good without anticipat- ing any reward and would be altruistic even in the absence of such rewards. Certainly, religions advocate doing good for the “right” reasons. In the Gospel of Matthew, Chapter 6, Jesus advocates, “Be careful not to practice your righteousness in front of others to be seen by them. If you do, you will have no reward from your Father in heaven,’ after which he adds, “But when you give to the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, so that your giving may be in secret. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you.” The Envelope Game suggests authentic altruism is indeed possible: By focusing entirely on the benefits to others and ignoring the benefits to themselves, authentic altruists are trusted more, and the benefits from this trust outweigh the risk of, for example, dying a martyr’s death. Moreover, this model helps explain why we think so highly of authentic altruists, as compared to others who do good, but with an ulterior motive (consider, as an example, the mockery Sean Penn has faced for showing up at disaster sites such as Haiti and Katrina with a photographer in tow). Principles. Why do we like people who are “principled” and not those who are “strategic”? For example, we trust candidates for political office whose policies are the result of their convictions and are consistent over time and distrust those whose policies are carefully constructed in consultation with their pollsters and who “flip- flop” in response to public opinion (as caricatured by the infamous 2004 Republican presidential campaign television ad showing John Kerry windsurfing and tacking from one direction to another). CWOL offers the following potential explanation. Someone who is strategic considers the costs and benefits to themselves of every decision and will defect when faced with a large temptation, whereas someone who is guided by principles is less sensitive to the costs and benefits are to themselves and thus less likely to defect. Imagine our flip-flopping politician was once against gay marriage but supports it now that it is popular. This indicates the politician is unlikely to fight for the cause if it later becomes unpopular with constituents or risks losing a big donor. Moreover, this model may help explain why ideologues that are wholly devoted to a cause (e.g., Hitler, Martin Luther King, and Gandhi) are able to attract so many followers. Don’t Use People. Recall Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.” In thinking this through, let’s again consider dwarf tossing. Many see it as a violation of dwarfs’ basic dignity to use them as a means for amusement, even though they willingly engage in the activity for economic gain. Our aversion to using people may explain many important aspects of our moral intuitions, such as HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_015509