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d-30510House OversightOther

Philosophical discussion on ethical decision‑making frameworks for AGI

Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #013129
Pages
2
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0
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Summary

The passage is an abstract, academic‑style exposition on moral inference networks and AGI cognition. It contains no specific individuals, institutions, financial transactions, or actionable allegation Explores how complex inference networks could enable case‑dependent ethical actions. Distinguishes between infantile, egoist, socialized, and formal cognition stages. Argues that equal moral treatmen

This document is from the House Oversight Committee Releases.

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agi-ethicscognitive-stageshouse-oversightdecision-theoryphilosophy
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12.4 Ethical Synergy 213 good” dichotomous decision making, but also the ability to develop moral decision networks which do not require that all situations be solved through resolution of a dichotomy. When more than one person is being affected by an ethical decision, making a decision based on reducing two choices to a single decision can often lead to decisions of dubious ethics. How- ever, a sufficiently complex uncertain inference network can represent alternate choices in which multiple actions are taken that have equal (or near equal) belief weight but have very different particulars — but because the decisions are applied in different contexts (to different groups of individuals) they are morally equivalent. Though each individual action appears equally be- lievable, were any single decision applied to the entire population one or more individual may be harmed, and the morally superior choice is to make case-dependent decisions. Equal moral treatment is a general principle, and too often the mistake is made by thinking that to achieve this general principle the particulars must be equal. This is not the case. Different treatment of different individuals can result in morally equivalent treatment of all involved individuals, and may be vastly morally superior to treating all the individuals with equal particulars. Simply taking the largest population and deciding one course of action based on the result that is most appealing to that largest group is not generally the most moral action. Uncertain inference, especially a complex network with high levels of resource access as may be found in a sophisticated AGI, is well suited for complex decision making resulting in a multitude of actions, and of analyzing the options to find the set of actions that are ethically optimal particulars for each decision context. Reflexive cognition and post-commitment moral understanding may be the goal stages of an AGI system, or any intelligence, but the other stages will be passed through on the way to that goal, and realistically some minds will never reach higher order cognition or morality with regards to any context, and others will not be able to function at this high order in every context (all currently known minds fail to function at. the highest order cognitively or morally in some contexts). Infantile and concrete cognition are the underpinnings of the egoist and socialized stages, with formal aspects also playing a role in a more complete understanding of social models when thinking using the social modalities. Cognitively infantile patterns can produce no more than blind egoism as without a theory of mind, there is no capability to consider the other. Since most intelligences acquire concrete modality and therefore some nascent social perspective relatively quickly, most egoists are instrumental egoists. The social relationship and systems perspectives include formal aspects which are achieved by systematic social experimentation, and therefore experiential reinforcement learning of correct and incorrect social modalities. Initially this is a one-on-one approach (relationship stage), but as more knowledge of social action and consequences is acquired, a formal thinker can understand not just consequentiality but also intentionality in social action. Extrapolation from models of individual interaction to general social theoretic notions is also a formal action. Rational, logical positivist approaches to social and political ideas, however, are the norm of formal thinking. Contractual and committed moral ethics emerges from a higher- order formalization of the social relationships and systems patterns of thinking. Generalizations of social observation become, through formal analysis, systems of social and political doctrine. Highly committed, but grounded and logically supportable, belief is the hallmark of formal cognition as expressed contractual moral stage. Though formalism is at work in the socialized moral stages, its fullest expression is in committed contractualism. Finally, reflexive cognition is especially important in truly reaching the post-commitment moral stage in which nuance and complexity are accommodated. Because reflexive cognition is necessary to change one’s mind not just about particular rational ideas, but whole ways of

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