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Case File
d-35970House OversightFinancial RecordDOJ and SEC case study on U.S. bank’s Shanghai joint‑venture real‑estate deal
Date
November 11, 2025
Source
House Oversight
Reference
House Oversight #022563
Pages
2
Persons
0
Integrity
No Hash Available
Summary
The passage describes a compliance failure involving a U.S. financial institution and a Chinese government‑linked partner, but it contains no specific high‑profile individuals, novel financial flows, U.S. bank partnered with a Shanghai district‑level state‑owned real‑estate arm via two SPVs. A Chinese official secretly owned ~50% of the second SPV, used for corrupt payments. Bank’s compliance pro
This document is from the House Oversight Committee Releases.
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61
Compliance Program Case Study
Recent DOJ and SEC actions relating to a financial institution’s real estate transactions with a government agency
in China illustrate the benefits of implementing and enforcing a comprehensive risk-based compliance program. The
case involved a joint venture real estate investment in the Luwan District of Shanghai, China, between a U.S.-based
financial institution and a state-owned entity that functioned as the District’s real estate arm. The government entity
conducted the transactions through two special purpose vehicles ("SPVs”), with the second SPV purchasing a 12%
stake in a real estate project.
The financial institution, through a robust compliance program, frequently trained its employees, imposed a
comprehensive payment-approval process designed to prevent bribery, and staffed a compliance department with
a direct reporting line to the board of directors. As appropriate given the industry, market, and size and structure of
the transactions, the financial institution (1) provided extensive FCPA training to the senior executive responsible for
the transactions and (2) conducted extensive due diligence on the transactions, the local government entity, and the
SPVs. Due diligence on the entity included reviewing Chinese government records; speaking with sources familiar
with the Shanghai real estate market; checking the government entity's payment records and credit references;
conducting an on-site visit and placing a pretextual telephone call to the entity’s offices; searching media sources;
and conducting background checks on the entity's principals. The financial institution vetted the SPVs by obtaining
a letter with designated bank account information from a Chinese official associated with the government entity (the
“Chinese Official”); using an international law firm to request and review 50 documents from the SPVs’ Canadian
attorney; interviewing the attorney; and interviewing the SPVs’ management.
Notwithstanding the financial institution’s robust compliance program and good faith enforcement of it, the
company failed to learn that the Chinese Official personally owned nearly 50% of the second SPV (and therefore a
nearly 6% stake in the joint venture) and that the SPV was used as a vehicle for corrupt payments. This failure was
due, in large part, to misrepresentations by the Chinese Official, the financial institution’s executive in charge of
the project, and the SPV’s attorney that the SPV was 100% owned and controlled by the government entity. DOJ
and SEC declined to take enforcement action against the financial institution, and its executive pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s internal control provisions and also settled with SEC.
compliance program and commitment to ethical and law-
ful business practices and, where appropriate, whether it
has sought assurances from third parties, through certifica-
tions and otherwise, of reciprocal commitments. These can
be meaningful ways to mitigate third-party risk.
Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation
An effective compliance program should include a
mechanism for an organization’s employees and others to
report suspected or actual misconduct or violations of the
company’s policies on a confidential basis and without fear of
retaliation? Companies may employ, for example, anony-
mous hotlines or ombudsmen. Moreover, once an allegation
is made, companies should have in place an efficient, reliable,
and properly funded process for investigating the allegation
and documenting the company’s response, including any
disciplinary or remediation measures taken. Companies will
want to consider taking “lessons learned” from any reported
violations and the outcome of any resulting investigation to
update their internal controls and compliance program and
focus future training on such issues, as appropriate.
Continuous Improvement: Periodic Testing and
Review
Finally, a good compliance program should constantly
evolve. A company’s business changes over time, as do the
environments in which it operates, the nature of its custom-
ers, the laws that govern its actions, and the standards of its
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