Extensive biography and media appearances of Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn

Robert Lawrence Kuhn Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist and investment banker, and a renowned expert on China. He is a commentator on the BBC, CNN, CGTN, CCTV, CNBC, Fox Business, Bloomberg, and other media; senior political/economics commentator on China Global Television Network (CGTN); and a columnist in China Daily and South China Morning Post. For 30 years, Dr. Kuhn has worked with China’s state leaders and advised the Chinese government. He spoke at the launch ceremony of President Xi Jinping’s book, The Governance of China; he provided live commentary on CNN for Xi’s policy address during his U.S. state visit (2015); and he introduced to foreign audiences Xi as “core” of the CPC (2016). He is interviewed extensively on US-China relations, including the trade war (2018). For the 19 th CPC National Congress (October 2017) and 13 th National People’s Congress (March 2018), Dr. Kuhn was interviewed extensively, including 24 times on CNN and BBC World News / BBC World Service, and he was quoted in newspapers and websites in U.S., Hong Kong, Italy, India, etc. His full-page, in-depth analyses of the 19 th CPC National Congress were featured in China Daily to open the CPC Congress (“Historical Starting Point for New Stage of Development“) and to close the CPC Congress (“New Era on the Road to 2050”). His essay at the opening of the Party Congress was published in People’s Daily. Dr. Kuhn is the author of How China’s Leaders Think (featuring President Xi), and The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin (China’s best-selling book of 2005). He wrote the Introduction for Understanding the CPC, the book series by China’s ruling party, the Communist Party of China (2015). Shanghai Media Group and Dr. Kuhn are co-creators and co-producers of the award-winning, fivepart series China’s Challenges, broadcast internationally (PBS stations in the U.S.) and in China. Dr. Kuhn is writer and host; Peter Getzels is director. China’s Challenges won first prize in China News Awards twice (2013, 2018). A second season won an Emmy Award (Los Angeles, 2016). A third season (on “Xi Jinping Thought” and China 2020 / China 2050) is broadcast in late 2018. Dr. Kuhn is the creator, co-producer and host of “Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn” on CGTN (China Global Television Network, co-created by Adam Zhu), the weekly series with unique access that features China’s thought leaders and decision makers, broadcast globally and in China. Closer To China focuses on China’s politics and government, CPC/Party, economics and society, reform and development, and international affairs and relations, with emphasis on Xi’s policies and philosophy. A special documentary on President Xi’s “targeted poverty alleviation” campaign, co-produced by CGTN, Dr. Kuhn and Adam Zhu, is in production. Dr. Kuhn is host and writer. Peter Getzels is director. Dr. Kuhn was one of only two Americans, with Henry Kissinger, named as the first “China Visionaries”. He was selected by Oriental Outlook magazine (Xinhua News Agency) as one of the all-time, top-ten influential supporters of China’s ruling party/CPC (he is the only one living). An international corporate strategist and investment banker, Dr. Kuhn works with major multinational corporations, CEOs and C-Suite executives, in formulating and implementing China strategies by applying his “politico-strategic framework”. He was president/co-owner of the largest middle-market M&A firm in the U.S. (sold to Citigroup in 2000). Dr. Kuhn is creator, writer and host of Closer To Truth (produced and directed by Peter Getzels), the long-running PBS/public television series on science and philosophy (broadcast continually since 2000, over 275 TV episodes; more are in production). Dr. Kuhn is author or editor of over 30 books on China, corporate strategy, finance, science and philosophy (including, with the philosopher John Leslie, The Mystery of Existence: Why is there Anything At All). Dr. Kuhn is chairman of The Kuhn Foundation which supports new knowledge in science and philosophy, classical music, and informed relations between the United States and China. The Kuhn Foundation produced the feature documentary “Khachaturian” on the life and music of the Armenian-Russian composer Aram Khachaturian, which won the Best Documentary award at the Hollywood Film Festival. Dr. Kuhn has a B.A. Human Biology (Johns Hopkins); Ph.D. Anatomy/Brain Research (University of California at Los Angeles, UCLA); MBA (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MIT). CNN – Quest Means Business Future of U.S.-China Trade Relations Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 27, 2018 1 CNBC Squawk on the Street US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 22, 2018 1 FOX BUSINESS Mornings with Maria (Maria Bartiromo) US-China Tariffs - US-China Trade War Robert Lawrence Kuhn, August 23, 2018 1 BBC World News President Xi Jinping-NPC Closing Session Robert Lawrence Kuhn March 20, 2018 HOST: Well joining me now from Beijing is Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, advisor to the Chinese government and author of the book How Chinese Leaders Think. Thanks so much for joining us here on the program. Usually the NPC is seen as sort of a choreographed event: we know what to expect. But this time it felt very different. RLK: It certainly was different. You have to look at this year’s National People’s 1 Congress - and the so-called Two Sessions - as part of the “political season” which begins with the party congress in October and goes now to the government sessions in March. And normally there is a predictability and what happens at the National People’s Congress is not very significant. RLK: This year is different: China talks about a “New Era” – and this is not just words, it is really the case. If we look at the vision that Xi Jinping gave at the party congress, what we see here at the National People’s Congress we see as the implementation of that vision across a very broad front. 2 RLK: People have focused on term limits - understandably so - but the change is only for the presidency. Xi Jinping by having been made “Core” of the Party in October 2016 - actually with that designation undermined “collective leadership” - and when Xi’s name was put into the Party Constitution as the contemporary arbiter of Marxism - on which the Party is based and the Party rules the country - he then became the overarching leader, no matter what position he would hold. 3 CNN International President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 12, 2018 HOST: Let’s talk about President Xi Jinping with our gues,t Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a longtime advisor to the Chinese government, the author of How China’s Leaders Think, and the host of Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn on the China Global Television Network. Thanks for being with us. RLK: Hi Natalie. Interesting day we’re having. HOST: Isn’t it, though? So, I guess the first question would be to follow up on your book title, how China’s leaders think. What is Xi Jinping thinking with this move? RLK: First of all, we have to understand it in context. There are twenty-one different clauses in this Constitutional Amendment, and the whole point of it is to strengthen the governance system of China. Now China is a party-state system where the party controls the state. Everyone is focusing on the abolition of term limits, and it is important, but we need to understand the context within this party-state system. In October of 2016, Xi Jinping was made “Core” of the Party, which meant the collective leadership of the past was no longer operative; that X was, in essence, for the Party, the decision maker. Then just this last October at the 19th CPC National Congress, his name was put into the Party Constitution as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,”… it’s a big phrase. RLK: But what it means is that Xi is the arbiter of Marxism and party theory. That means in terms of being the Core ot the Party and the interpreter of Marxism that gives him ultimate power. He doesn’t even need a formal position when has those two and the Party continues to run the country. HOST: Is that a good thing? How can it be a good thing for the country when one person has the ultimate power? RLK: There are two issues. One is how it happened: Now the abolition of presidential term limits coordinates with the Party and military, together the three largest positions. So they’re now coordinated because he already had that power in the Party and the military. 2 Amanpour on CNN President Xi Jinping, China, Term Limits Robert Lawrence Kuhn – Minxin Pei March 5, 2018 HOST: When it comes to trade, one country more than any other has been the target of Trump’s rhetorical wrath, and that’s China. But my next guest tells me that the promised tariffs won’t bother China much, as we’ve been discussing. In any way, they in China are dealing with much more important things, like the proposal for the rubber stamp Party Congress which starts its new session today to change the Constitution, and lift all term limits on President Xi Jinping, effectively making him president for life. Now, I’ve been talking to Minxin Pei: he’s a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in California, and to Robert Lawrence Kuhn, who is the author of How China’s Leaders Think, and he is the host of a show on the government-run CCTV news channel in Beijing. Gentlemen welcome to you both. Let me start by asking you, Robert Lawrence Kuhn there in Beijing. From the Chinese government perspective, these tariffs that the president of the United States has announced, how much does it concern Beijing? RLK: Well certainly it’s a concern, but I would call it a minor annoyance as opposed to something extremely serious. They have a lot on their plate here. The last thing they want is a trade war with the U.S., but they have to react. If the U.S. does something, there has to be something that they will do in retaliation. They will ratchet it down. They will signal, as you do, that they do not want to accelerate this, but to save face and to be appropriate, they’ll have to match it. HOST: To you Minxin Pei, how do you see this playing out? MP: If the investigations find China at fault, or guilty of some practices, then the US has a wide range of options to punish China on a trade front. And if these things happen, then US-China trade war will take place. Another thing I want to say is that US-China relations have turned a corner. This is a relationship that has headed toward a long period of confrontation, and adversarial relationships. So what is going to happen on the trade front is part of a much larger picture of geopolitical rivalry, if not competition. 2 Bloomberg TV Worldwide President Xi, China, Economy Robert Lawrence Kuhn – March 5, 2018 HOST: You were there at the Great Hall of the People. What was your main takeaway from what some have described as Li Keqiang’s impossible challenge: how to deleverage, how to take away stimulus, and still keep 6.5% growth? RLK: I don’t take the 6.5% growth as the primary objective here. I mean you have to look at what these National Peoples Congresses are. They’re not setting the vision and the strategy. That was set at the party congress in October. What we’re dealing here is the implementation of the policies. If you attend these every year you know they all look and sound the same because it’s the same structure, same kind of structure of numbers, so what you do is look for the differences. What are those subtle differences between one year and another. That’s what I focus on at these congresses. HOST: What’s the main difference you saw? 1 BBC World News Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee Robert Lawrence Kuhn October 25, 2017 HOST: We’re going to put a question to Robert Lawrence Kuhn, who’s a long-time advisor to the Chinese government. Robert, great to see you again. You were with us at the very beginning of the Party Congress and you were at the Congress today when it finished. Did you have any vision, any inkling that President Xi Jinping would take on so much authority? Also, what about the fact that there is no successor candidates among the new leaders? RLK: I was interviewed in early 2012 by a well-known American television network and the question put to me, in January of that year, was, “isn’t Xi Jinping going to be a very weak leader because he was not appointed by Deng Xiaoping and he has no strong base of support?” 1 CNN International Xi Jinping and the New Politburo Standing Committee Robert Lawrence Kuhn - October 26, 2017 HOST: The author of How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of Past, Current and Future Leaders, Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a longtime advisor to the Chinese government. He comes to us once again from Beijing. We talked this time yesterday. Good to have you back. And we discussed yesterday what we would learn about that lineup of the standing committee. It hadn’t been revealed at that point that we spoke, but we now know and is it correct to say the most significant thing is no sign of a leader in waiting? RLK: I think the most significant sign is who the people are and how they relate to each other. It’s a group that actually respects traditional norms. RLK: There was thought that Wang Qishan, for example, might violate norms by being on the Standing Committee after the traditional retirement age and that’s not the case. There is balance among the member in terms of their geographies, even their political affiliations within the party which internally are important. Two are from Shanghai, two are from the Communist Youth League - one is actually from Shanghai and the Youth League as well but he’s really from Shanghai - two have a long relationship with General Secretary Xi. And then of course General Secretary Xi has the overarching power as everyone says - and that is correct and will be correct for a long time to come. CHINA DAILY Tuesday, January 23, 2018 VISION CHINA 7 Observers offer fresh insight for new era Intellectual hails progress made in past while warning of challenges that lie ahead By LI YANG [email protected] Robert Lawrence Kuhn has many titles, ranging from investment banker to anatomy researcher. But he is better known in China as a specialist who knows the country inside out. Over the past 29 years, he has visited almost every provincial region and spoken with people from all walks of life, including some who have gone on to become State leaders. “It’s been a great gift to my life to be able to learn so much about China’s rich civilization, political theories and the whole development,” he said. Kuhn, who is from the United States, learns as an outsider but communicates as an insider. In his talk show Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn on the China Global Television Network, he presents China’s complex story to the world through candid, intimate discussions with the country’s decision-makers. In a hotel suite in Wangfujing, downtown Beijing, one busy lunchtime last week, Kuhn shared his thoughts on Chinese politics with China Daily, between exercising and a meeting of the Communist Party of China, which he had been invited to attend as an observer. He spoke passionately about the 19th CPC National Congress, which was held in Beijing in October, describing it as “a milestone congress that set the agenda for more than 30 years”. The Party proposed two new concepts at the congress — “a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, which has been written into the Party Constitution. “To understand China today, it is critical to appreciate what the new era means. … I like to understand new era in two categories: its characteristics at home and abroad, and its timeline,” Kuhn said. He has obviously developed his own way of explaining terms with Chinese characteristics. That is to break down the characteristics, domestically and internationally, rather than delve into the term. He listed a number of challenges in China’s new era, from pollution to medical care, among which he said the biggest is the rising expectations of the people at home, because “now that the people have some, they want more”. The complex international environment is the main characteristic of the new era, as the world is fragmented by diverse problems and challenges, he said. While explaining what he called the timeline of the new era (2017, 2021, 2049) and expounding his understanding of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era — which he broke down into three categories: serve the people, national rejuvenation, and governance modernization — Kuhn showcased his knowledge of the Party’s files, which he has clearly learned by heart. He recited almost every key point of the 68-page report Xi delivered to the congress in October. More important, he made connections between these points, presenting them in a vivid way, seasoned with personal experiences and thinking. When asked about the effects of the anti-corruption campaign, he immediately listed 10 objectives. That’s his style of approaching Chinese issues — divergent thinking and a vigilance not to lose sight of the connections between different points. British journalist tells China’s story to the world By LIU XUAN [email protected] Broadcaster sees choice and confidence in rising nation By YANG WANGLI [email protected] For 20 years, Liu Xin has had a singular goal: to build a bridge of understanding between China and the outside world. The television presenter began working for China Central TV, the State broadcaster, in 1997, two years after becoming the first Chinese to take part in — and win — the International Public Speaking Competition. Early last year, her desire to share China’s story received a major boost when she was chosen to host The Point, a prime-time discussion show that airs weekdays on the China Global Television Network. She said that China entering a new era means three things: opportunities, challenges and responsibilities. “My winning speech in that 1995 national competition was about choice,” she said. “After 15 years of reform and opening-up, we Chinese now enjoy an abundance of choice in our daily lives.” After listening to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s report at the opening of I like to understand new era in two categories: its characteristics at home and abroad, and its timeline.” Robert Lawrence Kuhn, investment banker and anatomy researcher Q&A | ROBERT LAWRENCE KUHN You hold multiple titles now. How have you managed to master so many different fields? Do they have anything in common? There’s one word to describe the commonality, that is “passion”. Whatever I’ve done I want to have passion for it. To expand that a bit, it’s the passion to learn. I’m not here to teach, I love to learn. When I write a new book, it’s something I want to learn about. I use that vehicle to learn. So passion about learning is the common denominator. China has given me a hugely rich life because of everything I’ve learned here. the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Liu said she was impressed with his use of the word “confidence”. “It’s the confidence China has developed through knowing that our system works. The confidence about who we are as a people, as a culture. And it’s the confidence about our future role in the world,” she said. “As media workers, we believe we have a great story to tell. In the past, people relied on a few correspondents or experts for information and opinions on China. But more people are tuning in to Chinese media for information, both traditional platforms such as TV and online.” As more questions emerge in the minds of those watching from outside China, Liu said the opportunities to tell stories from inside the country are growing. However, so too are the challenges. “Because of the ideological differences between China and the West, China has always been the subject of Western media criticism, which is often downright bashing based on falsehoods,” she said. From left: Zhao Jianguo, head of the international communication bureau of the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee; Jiang Qingzhe, Party chief of the University of International Business and Economics; China Daily reporter Andrew Moody; Guo Weimin, vice-minister of the Information Office of the State Council; speakers Robert Lawrence Kuhn and Liu Xin; Zhou Shuchun, publisher and editor-in-chief of China Daily; and Zhang Jianmin, head of translation and interpretation for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pose for a photo at the inaugural Vision China event on Monday at UIBE. FENG YONGBIN / CHINA DAILY Now that China has defied all kinds of predictions of a collapse or economic hard landing, Western observers are having a hard time explaining the China phenomenon, she said, adding that the result is an ignorance-based superiority complex mixed with bewilderment and iced with jealousy. During her 30-minute program, Liu conducts live interviews with guests in the studio or via satellite link to get a Chinese perspective on two to three topics that affect people around the world. “I understand the urgency to be more assertive, but I believe we always need to be aware of the danger of putting feelings before reason, putting opinions before facts,” she said. “Nationalism is my biggest enemy. “President Xi has said we need to improve the quality and effect of development. I believe this also applies to China’s international communication. The Chinese people will work hard toward a community of a shared future, regardless of how others view us.” Meanwhile, Liu has a job to do. “As a journalist, our duty is to tell China’s story as it is, one topic at a time, one show at a time,” she added. The real fun of reporting in China is the closeness to the actual story, the big fascinating story of China merging into the 21st century.” Andrew Moody, China Daily senior reporter China has always been the subject of Western media criticism, which is often downright bashing based on falsehoods.” Liu Xin, host of The Point on China Global Television Network Q&A ANDREW MOODY How do you overcome the challenges of showing the real China to the world, especially to those who have biases against China? It’s a long-term thing, and you cannot change this overnight. There are negative perceptions about China. It’s about engagement. If China has much more interactions with the rest of the world, then people will see China as it actually is. One of the 2035 objectives is to better increase China’s soft power. Organizations like China Daily can actually play a role in improving China’s soft power. But I do think it’s a long-term process, and China doesn’t need to be too sensitive toward criticism. Despite living and working in China for a decade, Andrew Moody’s ability to speak Mandarin is still at a basic level. Yet that has not stopped the award-winning journalist from interpreting China’s story for the world. Moody joined China Daily nine years ago and is now a senior correspondent. He has written more than 150 cover stories for the paper’s European Weekly and African Weekly, examining a wide range of issues including the Belt and Road Initiative. The job has provided him with firsthand experience of how China is developing as well as the chance to record reactions from the outside world, especially in the West, toward the nation’s growth and changes. He was at the Great Hall of the People to hear General Secretary Xi Jinping deliver a report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in October, when the concept of a “new era” was first mentioned. “The consensus of the various people I spoke to in the hours after the speech was that China’s entering a new era could be a momentous turning point in world history,” Moody said. According to his interviews, he said, people believe that a more confident China is striding into a world that it also is helping to shape. Moody has his own understanding of the new era. With 40 years of reform and opening-up, he said China has reached a point where it can move on in many ways, such as in foreign policy, global governance and domestic reforms. “China has reached a new junction and has to move forward.” The British journalist has written many stories that explain China to the rest of the world, and these have brought him many honors, including being named a State High-End Project Foreign Expert. “I like reporting on China because it’s perhaps the 21st century’s most fascinating story,” he said. “The real fun of reporting in China is the closeness to the actual story, the big fascinating story of China merging into the 21st century, the stories that maybe Western media don’t really have the chance to interview.” Moody sees his task as communicating China to a global audience, and there are still a number of things that need to be done, he said. “I go back to the UK quite a lot, and I still don’t think that people are aware of the impact of a much bigger Chinese economy and China’s being a more significant player in the world,” he said. “All I can do is to report and do stories one by one.” Q&A | LIU XIN As a professional journalist, what do you think China’s mainstream media could do to better report China to the outside world in such a media transformation age? It’s challenging. I think we need to be aware of new technology. And the content is very important. If we’re more confident, we can really be more sincere, be more at ease with our problems and our achievements. So let’s have a sincere conversation, not shy away from the problems we’re facing. That’s why I say let’s tell the China story as it is. It’s not 100 percent about achievements. Every day we see mixed news, we have mixed feelings, so let’s be factual, let’s be sincere and let people decide whether they want to watch us or not. This is going to take time, but I think if we follow the right philosophy, the right steps, we’re going to make it. What they say Vision China is the first highend event organized by China Daily and UIBE after the two sides launched a partnership. By telling China’s stories in an objective and rational manner, it aims to help students get to know a real China and an objective world, and to understand China in the new era. Wang Jiaqiong, president of the University of International Business and Economics I’ve learned a lot from Vision China today. What impressed me most is how to eliminate bias against China when telling China’s stories. The three experts shared a common opinion, which is to show a true China and not care too much about comments from the outside world. The sincerest story is often the most touching one. Zhu Yue, a senior student majoring in international politics from Beijing International Studies University It was an interesting lecture. It was good to understand certain aspects about China. It would be good to have things like this abroad because it’s about China. You don’t have to explain China to the Chinese people, but you need to explain it to the outside world. Nektarios Palaskas, science and technology counselor for the Swiss embassy This event was very interesting. You invited distinguished speakers, and all of them are of global thinking and have a vision about China. China is booming, and everyone is interested. I enjoyed hearing the speakers’ ideas about how China will be in the future. I came here with an open mind. Ratthawoot Nanthaikuakool, first secretary of Thai embassy A12 Saturday, March 10, 2018 CONTACT US Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at [email protected] If you have an idea for an opinion article, email it to [email protected] Power with purpose Robert Lawrence Kuhn explains why abolishing presidential term limits may well be good for China To interview delegates and officials at the annual National People’s Congress in Beijing, interspersed with being interviewed in the international media about China abolishing term limits for its president, is to inhabit parallel universes. Delegates and officials focus on clusters of issues from controlling financial risk and reducing pollution to scientific innovation and business stimulation, plus enhancing and institutionalising China’s anti-corruption campaign with a powerful National Supervision Commission. The international media, no surprise, focus on the constitutional amendment ending term limits, assuming President Xi Jinping will now serve in a for-life dictatorship, reminiscent of Mao’s China, the Soviet Union, the Kim family in North Korea and some African countries. It is no challenge to explain why abolishing term limits is bad for China – dependency on one human being who is not omniscient but is hostage to fortune, fewer and weaker checks and balances, forced conformity in a complex society with no easy answers, etc. The system begins stronger in that hard choices can be made and consistency maintained, but it could become brittle in that officials are more wary and may say things they do not believe. It is a challenge to explain why abolishing term limits is good for China, so that’s what I will do. First, some background. There are three separate issues being conflated: the significance of ending term limits, the intended consequences and the unintended consequences. Though terminating the two-term limit for China’s presidency captures headlines, it is more the symbolic, final step ratifying Xi’s near-absolute power than the big breakthrough itself. Many expect this experiment to end badly for China. It is indeed an experiment but its end is not set Xi’s prior designation as “core” of the Communist Party in October 2016 and the inscribing of “Xi Jinping Thought...” into the party constitution in October 2017 were more meaningful. Moreover, the Politburo Standing Committee, the highest authoritative body in China, unambiguously supports Xi. China watchers see the front page of People’s Daily – published the day after the new Standing Committee marched out on stage – which featured Xi’s photo on top, many times larger than the smaller, subservient photo of all seven members lined up on the bottom. All this reconfirms that, in a system where the party controls the state – especially where the party is Marxist and ideology is its basis for being – Xi, as core of the party, with his name inscribed in the constitutions of party and state as the contemporary arbiter of Marxism, will be the uncontested, overarching leader of China for the rest of his sentient life. For intended consequences, the official line is that the purpose is national cohesion brought about when the three top leadership positions – general secretary of the party, chairman of the Central Military Commission and president of the republic – are aligned temporally and held by a single person. This makes sense, but as a primary, proximal motivation, it is not entirely persuasive. The current structure has existed for decades without outcry or angst (not to mention that the three positions could be unified by installing term limits on the other two). The “new era”, marked by economic, social and global complexities, is said to require firm and consistent leadership, making moot inner party struggles and even mitigating political gossip, facilitating focus on the tasks of governance and development. Specifically, because advancing reform has become more difficult, with entrenched interest groups resisting change, the message must now go forth that all must get with the programme, because you can’t outwit or outwait Xi. Because, it is said that only Xi has the vision, experience, competence and character to bring about “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people”, especially from 2020 to 2035 and ultimately to 2050 – bringing China to global centre stage – Xi’s unimpeded leadership is deemed essential. China cannot afford “downtime” to accommodate a change of leadership, and after Xi’s success at the 19th National Party Congress came the time to make clear that he will call the shots for the foreseeable future. Some argue that doing away with term limits shows the superiority of the Chinese system as it allows flexibility in matching leadership to requirements (though what national leader, when extending his reach, has not claimed “current requirements” as justification?). The party-run Global Times stated that ending term limits does not mean China has reverted to president-for-life tenure. (But who can deny that however long Xi holds the top positions seems largely up to him?) As for the unintended consequences, the almost unanimous, disparaging foreign reaction – other than US President Donald Trump’s – did not burnish China’s international image. More worrisome would be a reluctance by officials to offer constructive opposing views on central policies. By stressing term limits, the international media misses fundamental changes going on in China – this year, innovation, streamlining of government, facilitation of business (cutting bureaucracy and reducing taxes), rural revitalisation and rural land reform. The 13th National People’s Congress shows how the grand vision and mission of the 19th National Party Congress is translated into specific strategies and policies. If one sees only term limits, one cannot visualise the big picture. As for Xi maintaining the presidency perpetually, it doesn’t actually matter much – this is the deep insight of how China’s party-state system works. Xi as core of the party and “Xi Jinping Thought...” as the party’s (and now the state’s) guiding principle means that Xi can transfer titular party leadership and/or the presidency to others and still maintain his overarching power. It may well be that, after serving two or even three more terms, rather than trying to find and install another leader like himself, he will move to bring about true democracy within the party. Here’s the best case. Xi will not be leader-for-life, but leader long enough to bring about China’s national rejuvenation and establish a Chinese kind of democratic norms. Could Xi continue until around 2035, when China plans to have “basically” achieved full modernisation, heading towards, by mid-century, 2050, a “great modern socialist country”? Many expect this experiment to end badly for China. It is indeed an experiment but its end is not set. It may be a race between achieving Xi’s grand vision and some untoward perturbation that could cause fracture. All factors considered, I am not saying abolishing term limits is absolutely good for China. I am saying it may be good – because of China’s special conditions and Xi’s special capabilities – but if it is good, it’s just for this once, and it’s just for so long. That’s the best case. I’m rooting for Xi. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist and investment banker, and China expert/commentator. He is the author of How China’s Leaders Think Private clubs deserve ‘cushy’ rental deals Edith Terry says private recreational clubs are part of Hong Kong’s heritage and have contributed to nurturing less popular sports, as well as a unique hybrid culture In 1964, a young German, fresh off the plane at his first job, went in search of a social group. He found a home away from home in Hong Kong’s oldest private recreational club, newly relocated from a prime location on Victoria Harbour, where City Hall is today, to a modest flagstone boathouse beneath Island Road on Hong Kong’s south side. Fifty-five years later, Frank Pfeiffer, a Zen Buddhist and mountain climber, is still an active member of the Victoria Recreation Club, established in 1849. He has watched it ring the changes from Hong Kong’s colonial society in the 1960s, when it had only two Chinese members and no female members, to the hybrid institution it is today, under its first Hong Kong Chinese chairman, Wu Kam Shing. Its membership is a spectrum of Hong Kong’s diverse and athletically minded middle class. There is the Hong Kong Chinese court reporter who visits the club in Deep Water Bay every morning at 6am on her way from home in Ap Lei Chau to her workplace in Sha Tin. There are her fellow swimmers, many elderly, who swim out to the buoys, rain or shine, hot or cold, every day. Some 100-150 “paddlers” use the club as a base for outrigger canoeing, dragon boating and paddle boarding. Some of the sports were unknown to Hong Kong before the club nurtured them, others, like dragon boating, are deeply traditional. In the current debate over the future of the 67 private recreational clubs that pay minimal rents to the government, history has been swept aside. True, they were designed on a colonial template, in which the diverse ethnic groups were given separate retreats. Membership at the pinnacle clubs was reserved primarily for the British. For other ethnic groups, there was a Chinese Recreation Club, a Club de Recreio, a Filipino Club, an Indian Recreation Club, and so on. Hong Kong’s colonial rulers reviewed the lease system for the private clubs in 1968 and 1979, and in the run-up to the handover in 1997 when leases were restricted to 15-year terms. At the handover, a number of leases were extended to ensure a so-called smooth transition. The sceptic would argue that this was a dodge, and indeed, in 2011, during the first post-1997 review of private recreational leases by the Legislative Council, most of the clubs seemed oblivious to public concerns as well as new requirements for “opening up” The government argued that subsidies were needed because use of land for sports and recreation would never trump commercial utilisation What the Western belt and road sceptics are missing Wenshan Jia says there are opportunities for the whole world to benefit from China’s initiative China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”is an original plan to carry out a new type of “collaborative globalisation” above and beyond US-led type. It was proposed five years ago by President Xi Jinping after the tapering off of US-led globalisation in 2008. Xi offered three principles: mutual consultation, joint construction and shared benefits. China has since then fully executed 101 agreements with 86 countries, and total investment in the 24 countries along the belt and road regions has amounted to US$50 billion, resulting in 75 industrial and trade zones, and 200,000 jobs. With its focus on infrastructure, the initiative is a model not only for developing countries, but also industrialised ones in Europe and North America, where ageing infrastructure needs replacing. It also adapts to each local, national or regional condition, situation and need. It is proving very democratic, more so than the lopsided US-led globalisation that spurred a populist, isolationist backlash across the Western world. China has done a proper job of explaining to the West what the initiative is and extended a sincere invitation to each country to join. Many think tank scholars and major media outlets in the West have found it potentially lucrative and expressed relatively strong support. Yet, instead of appreciating China’s efforts to both inherit the liberal agenda of globalisation and forge a new path for global development, many Western political elite, led by the US, have started a campaign to resist the initiative. From Australia to the US , and the UK to Germany, there are calls for the West to cut interactions with China to minimise or resist its so-called “sharp power”. The labels typically applied to China include “authoritarian” and “predatory”, citing Beijing for not upholding “freedom, democracy and individual rights”, the core values of the West. This attitude towards the initiative reveals not only a contradiction in the Western mind, but also the narrowing or even closing of minds. Isn’t it beneficial to meet the goals of forging connectivity and cooperation, as articulated in Xi’s effort to enrich and expand the meaning of the “free world” by liberating humankind from geographical, financial, political and cultural barriers? The world is no longer the West versus the rest, as we already live in a world connected by the internet. The initiative seeks to make the world more interconnected for both the West and the rest, contributing to the construction of a human community with a shared future. Recently, the initiative has inspired and spawned a push for localisation, particularly the Indo-Pacific strategy led by the so-called “Quad” of the US, India, Japan and Australia. Some Western media view it as a rival or alternative to China’s belt and road. But I would argue that it can be part of China’s initiative as long as the three Chinese principles (mutual consultation, The anti-China smear campaign must be replaced by a discourse involving consultation and communication joint construction and shared benefits) are observed in the Quad strategy. The belt and road was created to be an all-inclusive platform, so Beijing has no need to fear localisation as long as such strategies do not seek to contain China or disrupt its plan. It would be wise for the Quad and China to look for ways to collaborate. Quad countries need not take an antagonistic stance towards China; the anti-China smear campaign must be replaced by a discourse involving consultation and communication. The world has experienced more than enough damaging talk, not to mention wars. The core principles of Xi’s belt and road strategy must be always applied in China’s interactions with local strategies. If China is, as German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel told the Munich Security Conference in February, “the only country in the world with any sort of genuinely global, geostrategic concept”, then Western leaders should cultivate a genuinely global strategy in line with China’s vision, for the betterment of all humankind. Wenshan Jia, PhD, is a professor in the School of Communication, at Chapman University (California) and a research fellow at the National Academy of Development and Strategy, Renmin University of China to schools and community organisations. Following the last well-publicised review in 2013 and the current investigation seeking new venues for public housing, they are no longer complacent. Should the private clubs have got their cushy rental deals in the first place? At the time of the reviews 50 years ago, the government argued that subsidies were needed because use of land for sports and recreation would never trump commercial utilisation. What was true then is even more so today. The high cost of land in Hong Kong is a drag on innovation and creativity. The existence of the private recreational clubs means it has been less of a drag on sports. Most of the clubs with government leases are framed around core sports – golf, tennis, horse racing, swimming, sailing and rowing, to name a few. Hong Kong athletes whose development was supported by these clubs have gone to the Olympics and other international competitions. In the 1940s, the Victoria Recreation Club was the driving force behind Hong Kong’s participation in the International Olympic Committee and the Hong Kong Sports Federation. Public pressure on the clubs to forge community ties and contribute to Hong Kong through “opening up” schemes is appropriate – but not the pressure to convert their land to high-rise estates. The loss is not only to the core sports they represent but also to their unique DNA, which is the foundation of Hong Kong – diverse, cosmopolitan and adventurous. If you want to look for a Hong Kong that is not just about money, one place to look is here. Edith Terry is the honorary secretary of the Victoria Recreation Club. She writes in a personal capacity Stand-up paddlers participate in an event held at the Victoria Recreation Club. Photo: Jonathan Wong CHINA DAILY Wednesday, December 27, 2017 VIEWS 9 2017 YEAR-END: Politics Robert Lawrence Kuhn Watching China’s year for history When future historians reconstruct the long history of China, they will likely circle 2017 as a year of significance. I’ve seen it all this year, and attended or even participated in the major events. I’ve conversed with Chinese leaders and experts, and searched for meaning. I didn’t appreciate the opportunity I’ve had until I began reviewing the year from China’s domestic perspective, seeking themes and trends, discerning from what we know about the recent past to what we might forecast about the near-term future. It takes no flash of insight to see the leadership and vision of President Xi Jinping headlining almost every event. Following is the review of the meaningful events of 2017. January: Xi began the year with a memorable speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, mounting a roaring defense of globalization, free trade, and Robert Lawrence Kuhn economic openness and liberalization. It was the first-ever speech by China’s head of state at Davos and, as commentators the world over noted with amazement and irony, as the United States under President Donald Trump was apparently retreating from the world and abrogating global leadership, China under President Xi was apparently defending the international order and promoting global governance. March: The annual “two sessions” of the National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee, the top political advisory body, seemed to radiate more energy than usual, perhaps in anticipation of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in the fall. A highlight was the adoption of the draft general provisions of civil law, a step closer to a long-needed unified civil code. I sensed delegates’ growing confidence and assertiveness to represent their particular sectors in the competitive marketplace of public ideas and government funding, a competition that is vital for the development of China’s kind of consultative democracy. This was especially true of the CPPCC National Committee, whose members are often leading experts in their fields, such that even though they do not have legal authority to pass laws, they have moral authority to exert pressure and affect change. It did not escape notice that, throughout the “two sessions”, Xi was recognized repeatedly as “core” of the CPC Central Committee and of the whole Party. Belt and Road to the fore May: The first “Belt and Road Summit” (the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation), held in Beijing, was the diplomatic highlight of the year in China. Some 130 countries participated, including 29 heads of state and government. The goal was no less than the transformation of the economic structure of the developing world: building infrastructure and connectivity, stimulating development, alleviating poverty, reducing severe imbalances, promoting South-South cooperation, and revitalizing globalization. Xi called the Belt and Road Initiative “the project of the century”. July: China celebrated the 20th anniversary of Hong Kong’s return to the motherland. It was a time of reflection for the cosmopolitan city, long a global leader in economic freedom and competitiveness. Hong Kong had flourished: its way of life preserved, its economy dynamic. But times change. With Shanghai and Shenzhen on the rise, and with some claiming the “one country, two systems” principle is in decline, Hong Kong faces new challenges. August: The People’s Liberation Army celebrated its 90th anniversary. In a move both practical and symbolic, the PLA established its first overseas logistics base in Djibouti, situated strategically on the Horn of Africa. Xi Jinping, who is also chairman of the Central Military Commission, said the PLA is becoming “strong” informationized armed forces. “The Chinese people love peace,” Xi said. “We will never seek aggression or expansion, but … No one should expect us to swallow the bitter fruit that is harmful to our sovereignty, security or development interests”. Foreigners are wondering: what is the PLA’s long-term plan for operating overseas? What will be the impact of the PLA’s modernization and reform, especially its burgeoning blue-water navy with multiple aircraft carriers? August: China hosted the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, East China’s Fujian province. The five BRICS countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa — have increasing influence on global economy and politics, but does BRICS as an organization make sense? China certainly thinks so, and promoted the BRICS Summit as representing a new kind of multilateral global governance. There are complexities: political instabilities in Brazil and South Africa; the growing, comprehensive cooperation between Russia and China; the sensitive, multifaceted relationship between India and China. Throughout the year, events on the Korean Peninsula continued to intrude. While China continued to call for denuclearization and dialogue, just hours before Xi gave the opening speech at the BRICS Summit, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea detonated its most powerful nuclear bomb ever. 19th Party Congress and the New Era October: The highlight of the year was, as expected, the 19th CPC National Congress. Not quite expected were the far-reaching proclamations and, taken together, the magnitude of their significance. I witnessed history and see six highlights. First, Xi’s name and thought were written into the CPC Constitution — “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. Xi is now, officially, the overarching creator and arbiter of political thought, and combined with his designation as “core” of the CPC, he is now the undisputed, unimpeded leader with singular authority. Xi Jinping “thought” is built on the twin pillars of people orientation and national rejuvenation, with the new concept of development (innovation, coordination, green, open, sharing) driving a new kind of economic growth. Second, the “New Era”, which is intended as a policy-energizing game changer, is a conceptual lens with which to view the range of goals, strategies and concepts that compose Xi’s way of thinking and the Party’s new direction. The “New Era” is envisioned in three temporal segments: (i) from now until the fulfillment of China’s first centenary goal of a “moderately prosperous society” in 2020 (2021 being the 100th anniversary of the CPC); (ii) from 2020 to 2035, when the CPC states it will build on the foundation of the moderately prosperous society so that, after “15 years of hard work”, the country will “basically” realize “socialist modernization”; and (iii) from 2035 to 2050, when the CPC states it will “work hard for a further 15 years” and “develop China into a country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful”. Realizing this vision at mid-century, around 2050, with China being respected as a great, modern, socialist country, is the second centenary goal (2049 being the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China). Third, the new “principal contradiction” in China’s “New Era” is between “unbalanced and inadequate development” and “the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life”, which includes increasingly broad demands for “democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment”. From now on, this new-era principal contradiction, replacing quantitative GDP growth with qualitative improvement of life, is what will guide China’s domestic affairs and policies. Fourth, the Party’s leadership role in governing the country is expanding and the Party’s stringent approach to governing itself is intensifying. The Party will be more deeply embedded within agencies of government and sectors of society (including private companies, foreign businesses and educational institutions), and by reforming and purifying itself, the Party’s governance will be stricter and more comprehensive. The anti-corruption campaign, not only continues, it has been enhanced. Fifth, the “New Era” has China moving closer to center stage of the world and making greater contributions to humanity, offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese solutions” for world problems. China’s diplomacy will be proactive, championing the development of a community with a shared future for humanity and encouraging the evolution of the global governance system. Sixth, I watched the new senior leaders of China, the seven members of the new Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, walk out on stage, ending months, really years, of speculation and rumor. Because everything in China reports to a Political Bureau Standing Committee member, and because of the Party’s principle of collective leadership, their personalities, composition and balance determine the vision, strategies and policies that shape China. The importance of the Political Bureau Standing Committee remains true today, but its importance frankly is also less true today. It is hard to overstate the consequences of Xi’s name written into the Party Constitution, thus inscribing into perpetuity his predominant status and assuring his continuing pre-eminence in the coun- try’s political life. Following the 19th Party Congress, some might have expected a respite, a slower November and December. They were anything but. Form is substance November: The “state visit-plus” of US President Donald Trump came at a delicate moment. Amid pomp and pageantry, including a personal tour of the Palace Museum (Forbidden City), $253 billion in business deals were signed, a world record, though critics complained it was all transactional, nothing structural. The number, some said, was more form than substance, but here, perhaps, form was substance. Both Xi and Trump hailed the visit as “successful and historic”. Yet, on sensitive topics, one could be forgiven for seeing sunlight between their positions. On trade, Xi lauded the business deals and market access, “which will deliver great benefits for the two peoples”. Trump sought improved trade with China based on “a level playing field for our workers” and solving the “massive trade distortion” — which, characteristically, Trump blamed on past US administrations, not on China. On the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Xi reiterated China’s firm commitment for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and direct communications, while Trump said that they “agreed not to replicate failed approaches of the past” and he called for “increased economic pressure until North Korea abandons its reckless and dangerous path”. Subsequent to Trump’s visit, China announced revised regulations that were indeed structural. China will reduce or eliminate (over time) limits on foreign ownership of financial services sectors, including insurance, commercial banking, securities, futures, and asset management. Significantly, the State Council, China’s Cabinet, established a Financial Stability and Development Committee to oversee financial stability and boost risk prevention (including close monitoring of “shadow banking” and corporate debt). This new supra-ministry commission will be empowered to make decisions related to reform and development, coordinate issues concerning monetary policy, and establish financial policies and related fiscal and industrial policies, thus improving the financial regulatory system. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders’ Meeting in Vietnam, Xi strengthened his themes of making economic globalization more open, balanced and inclusive; lauded regional multilateralism for promoting common interests; and stressed the Belt and Road Initiative for advancing global connectivity. What struck me in Xi’s speech was what he inserted about poverty: “To lift all the remaining poor people out of poverty is a solemn commitment made by the Chinese government to the people. It is uppermost in my mind, and I have spent more energy on poverty alleviation than on anything else.” “Upper most in my mind?” “More energy on poverty alleviation than on anything else?” An extraordinary statement from the president! Although Xi has been making high-profile visits to numerous poor counties and villages, relentlessly championing “targeted poverty alleviation” for realizing the “moderately prosperous society”, this was his clearest statement that poverty alleviation is his highest priority. Main contradiction reinforced Two unpleasant events in Beijing reinforced the new “principal contradiction”, highlighting “the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life” as that surprisingly powerful lens for viewing Chinese society. The first was alleged child abuse at a kindergarten. The second was a fire in which 19 migrant workers died. In both cases, netizens reacted with anger: in the alleged child abuse, anger about a perceived coverup; in the fire, anger for the disorderly and inconsiderate way of evacuating migrant workers. When Xi first announced the new principal contradiction at the 19th Party Congress, some dismissed it as arcane Partyspeak. Public reaction to the alleged child abuse and to the fire revealed its prescient and perspicacious wisdom. The second volume of Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, a collection of 99 of Xi’s speeches, conversations, instructions and letters, was published. The book offers a resource to follow the development of Xi’s ways of thinking and ideas and to understand China’s new guiding philosophy and the specific elements that compose it. The month ended with what may seem a light touch when Xi called for China to upgrade its toilets. Toilets among the year’s highlights? Xi was serious and his point is probative. For China to become a more civilized society, the hygiene of the people must be improved (especially in rural areas), and for China’s tourism industry to blossom, better bathrooms are needed. Although China’s leader talking toilets elicits smiles, and some say it downgrades his dignity, it demonstrates, above all, Xi’s intrinsic commitment to improve the quality of life for the Chinese people. December: In the first nine days of the month, Xi engaged with four international events, stressing common commitment to build a community of a shared future for all humanity. The four engagements SHI YU / CHINA DAILY To the “CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting”, Xi described four views of the future: a world that is safe and free of fear; prosperous and free of poverty; open, inclusive and free of isolation; and environmentally clean and beautiful. At the “Fourth World Internet Conference”, Xi asserted how the internet posed new challenges for sovereignty, security and development. At the “2017 Fortune Global Forum”, Xi called for openness and innovation to enhance global economic growth, pledging to liberalize and facilitate trade and foreign investment in China. And at the “South-South Human Rights Forum”, Xi emphasized that “human rights must and can only be promoted in light of specific national conditions and people’s needs”. The CPC’s Dialogue with World Political Parties was path-setting in that it put the world on notice that a transformed CPC under Xi is reaching out globally with pride and confidence — explaining, especially to developing countries, the developmental benefits of party leadership and party building. The point of debate, as it were, has shifted from whether the China model of a perpetually ruling party (with all that entails) is good for China to how the China model is good for other countries. At a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Xi directed authorities to improve digital infrastructure, promote the integration and sharing of digital resources, and protect data security, in order to better serve the nation’s economic and social development as well as to improve people’s lives. The big vision is to turn China into a world leader in big data and a global innovation hub for artificial intelligence by 2030. The last major event of the year was the annual Central Economic Work Conference, which identified “three tough battles” for the next three years: preventing and defusing risks (especially financial risks), eliminating absolute poverty (China’s 2020 goal), and curbing pollution (for instance, encouraging investment in environmental projects). Setting three-year targets was itself an innovation (over the traditional one-year targets), thereby strengthening long-term thinking, reducing pressures to make hasty decisions, and giving markets stable expectations. The priority of reducing absolute debt was modified to controlling a rise in borrowing, such that China’s debt-to-GDP ratio does not further deteriorate. This signaled that growth would not be jeopardized and (to the disappointment of some) debt-driven growth would continue. To contain financial risk, China will crackdown on irregular and illegal activities in its chaotic financial industry and intensify regulatory scrutiny; continue supply-side structural reform (reducing overcapacities); and maintain a proactive fiscal policy, a prudent and neutral monetary policy, and a basically stable yuan exchange rate. Resisting arguments for shrinking Stateowned enterprises, China will make SOEs “stronger, better and bigger”; and the government will seek efficiencies by becoming more of an investor and less of an operator. China pledged to open up its markets further and to balance trade by boosting imports (US pressures, expressed vividly by Trump, were not mentioned). Theoretical foundation After five years of “practice”, the theoretical foundation of China’s economic development is now labeled, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialist Economy with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, paralleling the phrase added to the Party Constitution two months earlier. The “thought” is based mainly on Xi’s new concept of development — innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development — which has been the core of his economic philosophy. For the first time at this annual conference, topics other than economics were on the agenda. Diverse public concerns were addressed, such as burdensome homework for schoolchildren, sex discrimination in the workplace, and online scams. This was a clear consequence of how China’s new “principal contradiction” in the “New Era” now drives domestic policy; as Chinese citizens seek a “better life”, the government must respond. To pick one message to characterize the year, it is this. In 2017, under the leadership of Xi, China set the trajectory, in all vital areas, of the country’s domestic development and international engagement for the next 30-plus years, to mid-century, to 2050. Every year brings challenges. For China, no doubt, big ones lie ahead. In 2018, China will celebrate the 40th anniversary of reform and opening-up. The world is watching. The author is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist and investment banker, and China expert/commentator. He is co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and host of CGTN’s Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn and “The Watcher” commentaries. October 28-29, 2017 5 COMMENT OPINION ChinaDaily chinadaily.com.cn/opinion Robert Lawrence Kuhn New era on the road to 2050 Iwitnessed history sitting in the Great Hall of the People during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. I listened raptly to Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, when he delivered his new-era-defining report. I heard the amendment to the Party Constitution that enshrined “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. I watched members of the new Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee walk out on stage. I was awed by the presence of the leadership, past and present. And I was overawed by Xi’s grand vision for China and the country’s increasing, radiating confidence. Most of all, I marveled at the remarkable and historic transformation of China, which means so much to the Chinese people and which in this new era will mean so much to the rest of the world. Having departed the Great Hall of the People, I reflected how I, an American, found myself caught up in the welling Chinese patriotism of the 19th CPC National Congress. Certainly, I was experiencing firsthand this inflection point in Chinese history, when China envisions itself becoming a fully modernized country and taking proactive part in international affairs, and regaining its leading seat at the high table of great nations. What have I just witnessed? Following are some personal observations. A general consensus describes four primary outcomes of the 19th Party Congress: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; a new “contradiction” that defines China’s principal social challenge; a China that takes “center stage in the world”; and the Party enhancing its leadership of society, including maintaining, indeed intensifying, its anti-corruption campaign. To me, however, a highlight was the specificity of Xi’s vision of China, not only establishing policies for the next five years, but also framing the agenda and setting the strategies for the next 30 years. This congress, Xi said, is the “confluence” of the “Two Centenary Goals”: a moderately prosperous society by 2020 (2021 being the 100th anniversary of the CPC), which will likely be fulfilled within the term of the 19th Party Congress, and a great, modern, socialist country by 2050 (2049 being the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China), which is being planned by the 19th Party Congress. In a multi-meaning refinement, the path to mid-century is now designed in two stages. In the first stage, from 2020 to 2035, the Party states it will build on the foundation of the moderately prosperous society such that, after “15 years of hard work”, the country will basically realize “socialist modernization”. In the second stage, from 2035 to 2050, the CPC states it will build on a basically achieved modernization, “work hard for a further 15 years” and “develop China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful”. China portrays its mid-century self as a global leader in every area of human consequence: economics and trade, science and technology, military and defense, culture and governance. But Chinese leaders, and officials in general, seem to have a different highlight. While the “Two Centenary Goals” are certainly vital, especially with new stages and specificity, they focus on the amendment to the Party Constitution: “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”. “The (Xi’s) thought is the biggest highlight of the 19th National Congress of the CPC and a historic contribution to the Party’s development,” said Zhang Dejiang, the third-ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee. Liu Yunshan, the fifth-ranking member, said the elevation of Xi’s thought to the Party’s guiding principle is of great political, theoretical and practical significance. I take a closer look at Xi’s thought: first by examining each of its elements, then by considering its unified significance. “Xi Jinping” is the “core” of the CPC Central Committee and of the whole Party, and he thereby at the top level provides the “centralism” of the Party’s cardinal principle of democratic centralism. The “Thought” is the totality of Xi’s fundamental principles. I see four broad categories: people orientation, national rejuvenation, comprehensive development, and Party leadership. In his report, Xi listed 14 categories: Party leadership over all aspects of society; people-centered policies; deepening reform comprehensively; new concept of development (innovation, coordination, green, open, and sharing); people as masters of the country; adherence to rule of law, comprehensively governing the country by law; socialist value system and cultural confidence; protecting and improving people’s livelihoods; harmonious coexistence of man and nature (ecological civilization); national security; the Party’s absolute leadership over the military; “one country, two systems” and promoting reunification with Taiwan; international community of a shared future for all humanity; and comprehensive and strict Party governance. The term “thought” in Chinese has special meaning because before this it had been associated only with Mao Zedong — “Mao Zedong Thought”. “Socialism” is a set of political ideas with a complex history, unified by public or common ownership of the means of production and concern for the masses. “Chinese characteristics” is the phrase, originating with Deng Xiaoping, that adapts Marxism to China’s special conditions — the Sinicization of Marxism in modern China — which includes the market playing a decisive role in the allocation of resources and the encouragement of non-public, for-profit businesses, while at the same time State-owned enterprises still playing a dominant role. “New Era” is a new idea in the constitutional amendment, and it is designed to profoundly transform the essence of socialism with Chinese characteristics into the vision, concepts and strategies that compose Xi’s way of thinking. The more I reflect, the more I see “New Era” as a conceptual lens with which to view the 19th Party Congress. Semi-official Party analysts say the new era answers five questions. Robert Lawrence Kuhn What “road” to take? Socialism with Chinese characteristics under new historical conditions. What kind of country to build? First, a moderately prosperous society and then a modernized socialist country. What development to realize? Better life and common prosperity for all. What goal to achieve? The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. What contribution to make? Facilitate world peace and prosperity (exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative of building infrastructure in developing countries). Thus, Xi Jinping joins only Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in having his name affixed to a political philosophy in the Party Constitution, a blazing sign lost on no one. It then would follow that the “New Era” into which China is now entering is the third era of the CPC and by extension of the People’s Republic of China. A seemingly subtle but significant change is the Party’s judgment of what constitutes the fundamental “contradiction” in Chinese society. (“Contradiction” is a Marxist term expressing a particular way of political thinking — dialectical materialism — which identifies “dynamic opposing forces” in society and seeks to resolve the resulting tensions). The principal contradiction has evolved from one between the ever-growing material and cultural needs of the people and backward social production to that between “unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life,” Xi said. The needs for the people to live a better life are increasingly broad and have to be met. Not only have their material and cultural needs grown; their demands for democracy, rule of law, fairness and justice, security, and a better environment are increasing. This “New-Era” contradiction, replacing quantitative GDP growth with qualitative improvement of life, is what will drive China’s policy. The mission of a CPC congress is to review and assess achievements of the previous five years, and to forecast challenges and set targets for the subsequent five years (and beyond). Overall, for the 19th Party Congress, the ambition of the goals and the comprehensiveness of the categories were clear, amplified by the commitment to deepen reform. Here, by category, are what stood out. The Party and the fight against corruption. Confidence in socialism and the increasing role of the Party in managing all aspects of the country is unequivocal, and the increasingly strict governance of the Party, by reforming and purifying itself, is unambiguous. Moreover, the anti-corruption campaign not only continues but also will be enhanced. Economy. After more than three decades of rapid growth, China’s economy has been transitioning to slower but higher-quality growth. Supply-side structural reform has been written into the Constitution. No GDP growth targets are set. The country focuses on the real economy (as opposed to speculation, such as in the real estate sector). China is not backing away from State-owned enterprises, rather it will support State capital in “becoming stronger, doing better, and growing bigger, thereby turning Chinese enterprises into world-class, globally competitive firms”. Consumption is fundamental in driving economic growth. The framework of regulations must be improved, prudent macroeconomic and monetary policy maintained, and interest and exchange rates made more market-based. For economic development, innovation leads, especially in science and technology. Poverty alleviation. Xi has made the elimination of extreme poverty in China by 2020 a cornerstone of his domestic policy. After all, how could China claim to have achieved a moderately prosperous society by 2020 if millions of its citizens would be still living in extreme poverty? Opening-up. China reasserts its commitment to become more open, including easing market access and protecting the rights and interests of foreign investors. China’s economists see foreign competition as upgrading the quality and cost efficiency of Chinese companies, thus better serving Chinese consumers. Rule of Law. Strengthening and institutionalizing the rule of law, and weakening arbitrary rule of officials, is a priority. Reflecting Xi’s commitment, the Party is setting up a central leading group for advancing law-based governance in all areas, coordinating the activities of judicial organs. The goal is to complete the transformation of China’s legal system by 2035 with theoretical foundations and practical enforcement. Ecology. Beautiful China is one of the country’s main descriptions for its second centenary goal by the middle of the century. This modernization is characterized by harmonious coexistence between humanity and nature (such as nature parks) and it requires substantial bolstering of regulatory agencies and their enforcement powers. Armed forces. China’s goal is to transform the People’s Liberation Army into a world-class military by mid-century, basically completing military reform and modernization by 2035, with information technology/cyber applications and strategic capabilities prioritized. Especially significant for Xi’s mission are the two “anti’s” — anti-corruption and antipoverty — the former to support the Party’s continuing leadership, the latter as a prime example of what the Party has delivered. Xi does not downplay a realistic appraisal of problems, including social imbalances, industrial overcapacities, financial system risks, endemic pollution. “Achieving national rejuvenation will be no walk in the park,” Xi said, an example of his plainspoken candor. “It will take more than drum-beating and gong-clanging to get there.” The speculations of China watchers, and the focus of the international media, have been on the new Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. Because everything in China reports to a standing committee member, composition and balance determine the vision, strategies and policies that will shape China. This remains true today, but less true today. It is hard to overstate the significance of Xi Jinping’s name written into the Party Constitution. Xi is now, officially, the originating designator and overarching arbiter of “Thought” as it relates to “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, which is the guiding political theory of China and encompasses, essentially, everything in China. For Xi to be named in the CPC Constitution is the ultimate in authority, surpassing even “core” (which already had superseded all other leaders), thus setting into perpetuity Xi’s predominant status and assuring his preeminence in the country’s political life. That said, to know China is to know the members of the Standing Committee. They are a highly competent, highly experienced group: six of the seven have run provinces or province-level municipalities, many of which, in terms of population and GDP, are the equivalent of major nations. Traditional norms of balance and age are respected. It’s a diverse group — by geography, education and political career. They ZHAI HAIJUN / FOR CHINA DAILY have worked together, in various combinations, for years. With much now being written about each member, I’ll just offer some personal reflections. First, of course, is Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, whose prior experience included governor of Fujian province and Party secretary of Zhejiang province and Shanghai. In 2005, I was advised to study the “Zhejiang model”, which promotes entrepreneurship to generate economic development. I met Xi, who was then Zhejiang provincial Party secretary, and he recommended that I study China both “horizontally” across diverse regions and “vertically” through the history of its development. “To understand our dedication to revitalize the country, one has to appreciate the pride that Chinese people take in our glorious ancient civilization,” Xi said. “This is the historical driving force inspiring people today to build the nation. The Chinese people made great contributions to world civilization and enjoyed long-term prosperity,” he said. “Then we suffered over a century of national weakness, oppression and humiliation. So, we have a deep self-motivation to build our country. Our commitment and determination is rooted in our patriotism and pride.” But he cautioned that pride in China’s recent achievements should not engender complacency. Second, premier of the State Council, is Li Keqiang, who was Party secretary of Henan and Liaoning provinces. When I visited Li in Liaoning, he explained the complex challenges of revitalizing State-owned enterprises while creating a fertile environment for private businesses. Li shared the same experience of Xi as educated youths in the countryside in the 1970s. The experience gave them the chance to know better rural China and the lives of rural people and thus fostered their people-orientation. The following members are new: Li Zhanshu, who was governor of Heilongjiang province and Party secretary of Guizhou province, has been director of the general office of the CPC Central Committee since 2012. Wang Yang, vice-premier, is former Party secretary of Chongqing municipality and Guangdong province. At the height of the global financial crisis in early 2009, he argued it was imperative to restructure Guangdong’s economy, so that it can move up the ladder of industrialization and promote more knowledge-based, high-tech, lowpolluting businesses. Wang Huning, secretariat, is director of the Policy Research Office of the CPC Central Committee. Wang is well known for providing intellectual vision and sophistication in support of practical strategies and policies, ranging from political philosophy to international relations. Zhao Leji, new chairman of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has served as head of the CPC Organization Department, and before that, as Party secretary of Qinghai and Shaanxi provinces. In addition to his responsibilities for Party and government officials, Zhao provided strong support for the poverty-alleviation mission. Han Zheng is Party secretary of Shanghai. Under his leadership, Shanghai has become a recognized leader in trade, logistics and finance. What is the impact of all this on China’s international relations? There is no need to speculate. Xi himself, in his report, openly and boldly tells all who will listen. China, he says, “has become a great power in the world”. China’s global engagement is proactive, confident and growing. Economics and trade drive China’s power, exemplified by the much-needed Belt and Road Initiative, but diplomacy, the soft power of culture and media, and the hard power of a blue-water navy projecting power, are developing rapidly. As Xi said, the new era sees “China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind”. The country is now offering “Chinese wisdom” and “Chinese solutions” to the international community — the experiences and lessons of China’s remarkable development, especially to developing countries. Regarding Taiwan, which exemplifies Chinese sovereignty, Xi painted a bright red line. “We will resolutely uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a divided country,” Xi emphasized. “We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot.” China has asserted again that it is no threat to any country. No matter how powerful China becomes, China’s leaders say it will never seek hegemony or pursue expansionism. Nonetheless, some foreigners remain suspicious, wary of China’s long-term ambitions. Who knows future circumstances, they worry? Who knows how China may change? Although I fear self-fulfilling prophecy, I am encouraged that China appreciates such sensitivities and works to build confidence. The 19th Party Congress, especially Xi’s report, is an epic narrative of what China has accomplished, what China has yet to achieve, and what China envisages as necessary to be a great nation. Xi, now, carries the authority; he also bears the burden. Setting that new target date of 2035 for China to achieve basic modernization, Xi sees China as standing at a new historic starting point and socialism with Chinese characteristics as exploring new horizons. China has entered a new era and the road ahead leads, apparently, to great nation status by 2050. The author is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist, and China expert/ commentator. He is co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and the host of China Global Television Network’s Closer to China with R.L.Kuhn. CONTACT US China Daily 15 Huixin Dongjie Chaoyang, Beijing 100029 News: +86 (0) 10 6491-8366; [email protected] Subscription:Ā+86 400-699-0203; [email protected] Advertisement:Ā+86 (0) 10 6491-8631; [email protected] Phone app: chinadaily.com.cn/iphone China Daily USA 1500 Broadway, Suite 2800, New York, NY 10036 +1 212 537 8888 [email protected] China Daily Asia Pacific China Daily Hong Kong Room 1818, Hing Wai Centre 7 Tin Wan Praya Road Aberdeen, Hong Kong +852 2518 5111 [email protected] [email protected] China Daily UK 90 Cannon Street London EC4N 6HA +44 (0) 207 398 8270 [email protected] China Daily Africa P.O.Box 27281-00100, Nairobi, Kenya +254 (0) 20 522 3498 (Nairobi) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] CHINA DAILY Wednesday, October 18, 2017 VIEWS 11 Five years on Robert Lawrence Kuhn Historical starting point for new stage of development The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which begins on October 18, will set the leadership and establish the policies for the next five years, at least. While Party national congresses are always seminal events in the political life of the country, there is reason to expect that this congress will have even greater and longer-reaching impact. The context of the 19th CPC National Congress is the grand vision for China presented by CPC Central Committee General Secretary Xi Jinping, who is now the “core” of Robert Lawrence Kuhn “the CPC Central Committee and of the whole Party”. It is an epic narrative of what China has remarkably achieved, what China has yet to do, and what China envisages as necessary to become a great nation. Xi’s grand vision is famously expressed as “the Chinese Dream”, described as “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, which has personal and national implications. It is specified by two overarching goals: the two centenary goals of establishing a moderately prosperous society by 2020 — the 100th anniversary of the CPC is 2021 — and establishing China as a “fully modernized, socialist nation” by the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. The first goal, which includes the total elimination of extreme poverty in the country, will likely be achieved within the fiveyear term of the 19th CPC National Congress. It is the second goal that is of special interest at this time, because in drawing the roadmap and formulating the policies to achieve China’s mid-century goal, this Congress may set the agenda for the next 30-plus years. The CPC national congresses are the highest authority of CPC governance and decision-making. The CPC constitutional provision of holding congresses every five years was reaffirmed by Deng Xiaoping in the early days of reform (in part to establish order and collective responsibility after a period of chaos and political vicissitudes), and since 1982, Party congresses have been held scrupulously on schedule. The congresses establish the senior leadership of the Party and hence the nation by electing the CPC Central Committee, which in turn elects all top Party positions, and also the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection; review and assess the achievements and challenges over the five years since the previous Party Congress; set the vision, goals and objectives, agenda and priorities for the subsequent five years; revise the Party constitution (to keep up with the times); and project an image of unified purpose and direction to engender national confidence and commitment. The review and assessment of the previous five years and setting the agenda and priorities for the subsequent five years are formally presented in the Report, delivered by the general secretary representing the outgoing Central Committee and thus reflecting the consensus view of the Party leadership. Ratified by the congress (after minor modifications), it becomes the guiding document that drives policy for the incoming Central Committee. On the day following a congress, the first plenum of the new 19th Central Committee is convened to elect the Party’s new senior leadership, including the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (to which, in essence, everything in China reports), and the general secretary of the Central Committee. Also approved are the Central Military Commission (which oversees the People’s Liberation Army), the Secretariat (which runs Party daily operations), and the head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. The planning for the national Party Congress follows similar patterns. Beginning more than a year in advance, it involves both formal and informal processes. The formal process includes the election or appointment of about 2,300 delegates (2,280 delegates at the 19th National Congress) from among the Party’s over 89 million members, at all levels and in all sectors, and the preparation of the Report via an elaborate system of extensive research in targeted areas (involving thousands of experts), solicitation of broad input, drafts (or sections) circulated to numerous Party experts and officials for comments, and iterative intense reviews by higher bodies and senior leaders. In addition, smaller groups are assigned the more sensitive tasks of amending the Party constitution and recommending candidates for the new Central Committee and senior leadership positions. Final decisions for this year’s congress, as well as final edits of the Report, were made at the Seventh Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee, held on Oct 11 to 14, days prior to the opening ceremony of the 19th CPC National Congress. To understand the position and role of CPC Central Committee General Secretary Xi at the 19th Party National Congress, we should appreciate what it means for Xi to be the core. It was in October 2016, at the Sixth Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee, that Xi was designated the “core” of the CPC Central Committee and of the entire Party. The appellation was an unambiguous assertion that China requires strong leadership to maintain stability and ensure development given China’s unprecedented, complex challenges: domestically, slower growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, unbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and internationally, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes. Moreover, because China must deepen reform to achieve the goal of being a moderately prosperous society, the resistance of entrenched interest groups must be overcome. In fact, the necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability and expedite reform was a primary factor relating to Xi’s elevation to be the core. In addition, not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation; he is also accountable for it. He has shown courage in combating rampant practice of graft, bribery and illicit patronage. Xi’s relentless anti-corruption campaign is altering how officials in government and managers in industry work, and even how they think. And let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Xi as the core does not change the Party’s cardinal principle of “democratic centralism”. The Party says it is encouraging the democratic solicitation of input and feedback from Party members, lower-ranked officials, and the general public; and strengthening centralism through Xi’s core leadership. In a complex world, given the diverse interests and forces in Chinese society, the Party asserts that the Chinese Dream cannot be realized without unity. Strong leadership is required to build and maintain unity for China to continue its development. When Xi received the core appellation, he was already general secretary of the Party, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and president of the country — the three highest leadership positions in China — so how does being the “core” augment his perceived stature or actual power? The 2016 Party plenum communique confirmed that “the collective leadership system … must always be adhered to”. Nonetheless, there must have been shifts in terms of both the setting of the agenda and making final decisions — or else making Xi the core would have little meaning. When foreigners dismiss the political aphorisms of China’s leaders as simplistic sloganeering, they miss an opportunity to enrich their understanding. Chinese officials certainly hold Xi’s frameworks in high esteem. Xi’s thought for the Party, the inner-Party directives, include the “eight regulations” (against waste and perks); “four self-confidences” (in the country’s development path, The China model, Xi said, successful at home, also broadens the way for developing countries to modernize, thus providing Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for problems facing mankind. theories, systems, culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics); opposing the “four evil winds” (formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, decadence); the “four greats” (struggles, projects, enterprises, dreams). The combined intent is to make Party members, especially Party and government officials, more dedicated, committed, competent and loyal, with exemplary moral standards of probity and rectitude. It is no small order. The Party’s unremitting anti-corruption campaign, unprecedented under Xi, has won strong public support and will certainly continue. But some foreign analysts mistakenly see Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as largely a tool of political power, thus reflecting a superficial and one-dimensional understanding of China. Befitting the size and complexity of the country, for almost every decision of importance, China’s leaders have multiple motivations. For the anti-corruption campaign, these motivations include respect for the rule of law and judicial impartiality; effective functioning of the Party devoid of personal interests; public trust in the Party; efficient economic resource allocations (corruption distorts markets); expediting reform (by breaking up “interest groups” that resist reform); maintaining national unity (by removing officials with non-standard political ambitions); elevating morality of Chinese society; restoring ethical standards of Chinese civilization; and facilitating China’s emergence as a world-business center and global role model. Xi’s thought for the country — his new ideas, new strategies, new initiatives set forth over the past five years — can be encapsulated as the overall vision of the “Five in One” construction (economic, political, cultural, social, ecological); governance of the country via his “Four Comprehensives” (a moderately prosperous society; deepening reform, strengthening the rule of law, strictly governing the Party); and renewed economic development via the Five Major Development Concepts (innovation, coordination, green, open, sharing), plus “supply-side structural reform”. SHI YU / CHINA DAILY Xi’s thought for national rejuvenation includes a grand vision for global governance, consisting of eight big diplomatic concepts: a global community of shared destiny and future; win-win cooperation; economic globalization; fairer global governance; a new kind of major power relationship; expanding cooperation while managing differences; multilateralism; and people-topeople exchanges. Moreover, Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative — facilitating economic development in developing countries, especially by building much-needed infrastructure — is China’s “project of the century”. China recognizes it has international responsibilities and seeks to uphold a common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security strategy. China’s own requirement is to protect the country’s three sacrosanct “core interests” — its political system, economic development, and national sovereignty (territorial integrity). China appreciates that to be a major country, with its political influence reflecting its economic strength, and also to protect its own core interests, its diplomacy must be pro-active. China does not claim that its “China model” can be adopted by other countries, but the world should understand Xi’s principles of governance as optimally suited for China’s domestic conditions. Party congresses have similar styles and to casual observers, they can all seem much the same. But they do have differences, which are usually subtle and often meaningful. For the 19th National Congress, some of the things to look out for are: Are political frameworks and policies stated in their expected forms? If so, confidence in political and economic stability is reinforced. How is General Secretary Xi Jinping’s status as “core” further stressed, as expected? Who are the members of the new Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and what are their portfolios? Assuming the Party Constitution is amended to include Xi’s new ideas, new strategies, new initiatives, will they be given an overarching label? What is the composition of the new Central Committee? In listing the essential economic, political, cultural, social and ecological policies, are there shifts of emphasis that, however nuanced, suggest changing priorities? For deepening reform, surely stressed, what targets are specified? For example, what will be stated explicitly about Stateowned enterprise reform? Environmental protection is a high priority, but what specific regulations and enhanced enforcements distinguish the fight against pollution under Xi from those of previous congresses? Many social areas will be highlighted — for example, education, healthcare, rural land reform, migrant worker residencies — but do any stand out? As already affirmed, the anti-corruption campaign will continue, but will its intensity or direction change in any manner, will it be institutionalized? How will the forthcoming National Supervisory Commission work? What is the relative prominence of military reform and modernization? What is the relative prominence of international affairs, given the high-profile Belt and Road Initiative and China’s intense, pro-active diplomacy? Forecasting the 19th CPC National Congress is not all guesswork and triangulating rumors. Following tradition, Xi offered to Party leaders a preview of his Report. Speaking on July 26, he outlined China’s achievements since the previous national congress: new concepts of development, deepened reform, enhanced rule of law, strengthened environmental protection, and a more capable military. China, Xi said, has, after suffering century-long hardships and tribulations, taken three historic leaps, from standing-up to becoming better-off to becoming stronger. Xi called for a comprehensive, strategic and forward-looking action program, highlighting the success and vitality of socialism with Chinese characteristics, the increasing strength of the Party, and China’s expanding circle of friends in the international community. In China, he stressed, political legitimacy is founded on competence and accomplishment. Significantly, Xi asserted that China’s development stands at a new historic starting point and that socialism with Chinese characteristics is entering a new development stage. The CPC cannot rest on its laurels, he stressed. The country faces daunting challenges. He warned the Party against self-satisfaction and blind optimism. Xi’s comments resonated with his core values and bear witness to his consistency. In 2006, then Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi told me that China should be proud of its successes, but its “achievements should not engender complacency”, adding “we need to assess ourselves objectively”. Preparing for the upcoming congress, Xi recognizes that the people’s desire for a happier life is stronger than ever. They want better education, higher incomes, stable jobs, reliable social insurance, higher quality healthcare, more comfortable living conditions, a more beautiful environment and a richer cultural life. And there has been an inflection point in China’s international perspective, reflecting the nation’s consequential global engagement. The China model, Xi said, successful at home, also broadens the way for developing countries to modernize, thus providing Chinese wisdom and Chinese solutions for problems facing mankind. The influence of the 19th CPC National Congress and the impact of Xi Jinping’s thought seem for decades to come. The author is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist, and China expert/commentator. He is co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and host of CGTN’s Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn. 16 Wednesday March 21, 2018 FORUM CPC-led system a political innovation Editor’s Note: The Two Sessions, the annual meetings of China’s top legislative and advisory bodies, have been under global spotlight for the past few weeks. This year’s Two Sessions are of extraordinary importance as they have adopted the constitutional amendments, restructured government institutions and elected the new national leadership. To understand what the institutional changes mean for China’s future, as well as the policy agenda for the coming year, Global Times (GT) Washingtonbased correspondent Hu Zexi talked to Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn (Kuhn) who is a long-time China observer, and author and editor of over 25 books. Kuhn has been invited to Beijing to take a closer look at this year’s Two Sessions. GT: What kind of policy issues are you following during the Two Sessions? Kuhn: The proposed amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China give a road map of areas deemed critical. Several of the provisions strengthen the stability, continuity and robustness of governance. Beyond these, I looked for any deviations from expectations, for example, on State-owned enterprise reform or local government financing. I also looked for any reaction to the increased push-back against China’s rising global capabilities from certain countries. GT: In recent years, the Chinese government has made more efforts to make Two Sessions’ agenda better meet public expectations. For example, the government will cooperate with media websites to conduct surveys about top policy areas that the public wants the Two Sessions to address. How do you evaluate such efforts? Kuhn: Irrespective of the nature of the political system or ideology, transparency in governance is the best way for government to deliver effective, efficient programs, and enhance credibility. The Chinese government has been striving to increase transparency, which deserves praise. The Two Sessions are a vehicle for the government to communicate with the people and engage them through media in dealing with all the critical issues. TWOSESSIONS 2018 GT: How do you see the political belief of China that democracy should meet the real or fundamental needs of the public? Kuhn: Government performance and democracy are not the same. The former is indeed assessed by alleviating poverty, reducing pollution, improving healthcare and the like. Democracy is the public participation of common people in the complex process of governance. Thus, true democracy is much broader than one-person-one-vote. It includes, primarily, the capacity to provide substantive input on complex Illustration: Liu Rui/GT issues and to provide oversight in the management of officials. GT: China for long has argued that democracy or any other political mechanism should be developed on the basis of a country’s specific condition. How do you see this belief, as well as its practice? Kuhn: Certainly, political systems differ, even between countries that have the same ideology. Nonetheless, there are great commonalities in the goals and objectives shared by all countries and people. I suspect that over time, measured in not less than decades and perhaps even centuries, there will be a convergence of systems toward what I call with a smile, “Optimizationism” – leaders, officials, executives making myriad decisions every day to optimize outcomes without thinking of the ideology. GT: There’s talk about China’s unique system of multiparty cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the Two Sessions. How do you observe this system? Kuhn: The benefits of a one-party-rule are apparent: the coherence of policies, rapid decision-making and formulation of strategies that require long-term consistency for long-term commitment. But all systems of governance have trade-offs, and two challenges of oneparty-rule are assuring that all rational points of view, including dissenting ones, are included in the decision-making process; and systemic checks and balances for oversight of officials at all levels of government. China’s system of multi-party cooperation and consultation, led by the CPC, is a political innovation in including inputs and ideas from diverse segments of society, while still maintaining harmony of spirit and consistency in policies. But because of its scale and power, the CPC, which is the ruling party, has a higher obligation to pay attention to other parties and voices. A true democracy is measured by how the majority treats the minority. GT: As a decades-long observer of China, what do you think the constitutional amendment will bring to the country? Kuhn: This constitutional amendment is all about strengthening China’s system of governance, especially the Party’s leadership of the country and President Xi Jinping’s leadership of the Party and the nation. Going by the whiplash of Western reactions, one could be forgiven for assuming that the amendment is all about abolishing term limits of the president and vice president. In fact, there are 21 clauses in the constitutional amendment and to understand where China is going, one must gauge the meaning and intent of all of them. Xi has been consistent in respecting, indeed in championing, China’s Constitution, and by now amending it, he underscores the congruity between the realities of how China is governed and what the Constitution says – thus bolstering Xi’s commitment to the Rule of Law. Establishing the National Supervisory Law and Commissions, expanding the anti-corruption campaign to all public organs and organizations, reaffirms Xi’s commitment to enhancing the rule of law. As for term limits, it is not that Xi will hold the formal titles of leadership for life, but that he will hold real leadership long enough to bring about China’s national rejuvenation and establish Chinese type democratic norms. All factors considered, because of China’s special conditions and Xi’s special capabilities, abolishing term limits may be good for China. It is commonly said that China’s system of governance can ensure stability and consistency, which is a necessary requirement for advancing reform. GT: What do you see as the underlying reason for the institutional restructuring of the government passed during the Two Sessions? Kuhn: The sweeping restructuring of the Chinese government streamlines the bureaucracy, eliminates institutional conflicts of interest between government bodies, aligns authority with responsibility, and, significantly, enhances the leadership of the Party in the management as well as the oversight of the government. Although the restructuring has multiple motivations, a prime driver is to support China’s continuing development under complex conditions – a slowing economy, uncertain financial risk, unacceptable pollution, the special demands of innovation. Given China’s challenges at home and abroad the government restructure is timely. Some media outlets describe it as a “reshuffle,” as if the random rearrangement of a deck of cards. I beg to differ. This restructuring is as deliberate as it is far-reaching – and planned precisely to address a host of contradictions. The outcome is to strengthen CPC’s leadership throughout the country. In fact, deepening reform is now defined, for state as well as for Party institutions, as strengthening the CPC’s leadership in every sector. The aim is consistency and uniformity in implementing policy. The announcement of the restructuring followed swiftly after the adoption by the National People’s Congress of the constitutional amendment, and although both were long in the works, their rapid-fire sequence serves to underscore the preeminence of President Xi in setting the new agenda, and the power of the Party in implementing the new policies. GT: Environment has always been a heated topic at the Two Sessions. How do you see the prospect of green development in China? Kuhn: I have been following China’s environmental problems for over two decades, and until recent years under President Xi. While officials would of course decry pollution, it only became progressively worse. Companies flouted the law. The minuscule fines were a small price for not worrying about the cost of controlling pollution. Officials were loath to risk impeding economic growth. Today is dramatically different. President Xi has raised ecology and environment to the highest category of national priorities. Ecological progress is among the five top goals (along with economic, political, cultural and social progress). Green is the third of the New (Five Major) Concepts of Development. The change in attitudes toward pollution is stunning. For example, fines for corporate pollution now hurt. Page Editor: [email protected] Monday, November 21, 2016 A11 Core strength Robert Lawrence Kuhn says those who see China’s designation of Xi Jinping as core leader to be a variation of strongman rule misunderstand its significance for a people navigating their way through huge challenges When, at a recent party plenum, President Xi Jinping (���) was designated as “core” of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, some Western media were quick to condemn the rise of a new “strongman”. While recognising the significance of Xi as the core was correct, conjuring up visions of an emerging dictator was not. I recalled my meeting with Xi years earlier, when he was still party secretary of Zhejiang (��) province. Even then he was criticising “empty talk” and advising, “We should never overestimate our accomplishments or indulge ourselves in our achievements”. I took note of how Xi stressed, “We need to assess ourselves objectively”. Hardly, in retrospect, the ruminations of a gestating dictator. To understand why Xi is now the core, one must appreciate the complex challenges of our times. China is now facing multiple challenges: domestically – slow growth, industrial overcapacity, endemic pollution, imbalanced development, income disparity, social injustice, social service demands; and, internationally – wars, regional conflicts, sluggish economies, volatile markets, trade protectionism, ethnic clashes, terrorism, geopolitical rivalries, and territorial disputes in the South and East China seas. Most critically, because China must deepen its reforms to achieve its oft-promised goal of a “moderately prosperous society” by 2020, the resistance of entrenched interest groups must be overcome. More subtly, there is what some call a pervasive “soft resistance” – local officials who do not do their job and economic elites who migrate. If reform had been progressing smoothly, then why strengthen central authority by investing Xi with the status of core leader? Xi has encountered obstacles; if there were no obstacles, there would be no need for a core leader. I have been speaking to party officials and theorists about Xi as core leader. In fact, the necessity of having a leadership core to maintain stability and expedite reform is the first and foremost of what I found to be four factors relating to Xi’s elevation. A second factor is that not only does Xi have the responsibility for China’s transformation, he is also accountable for it. Moreover, he has shown courage in confronting and dismantling a vast, corrupt system of bribery, patronage and illicit wealth accretion. A third factor is that Xi as the core does not end, and even may not di- minish, the cardinal principle of Xi Jinping as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals Bring down the curtain on this idiotic political drama If you’re tired of all the politics, I feel you. It’s draining, to say the least, especially when the melodrama in Hong Kong is dragging out; it has become downright dreadful when we know there is no respite in sight. We were supposed to have a brief break after last September’s Legislative Council polls, before the next big event. Even though a large number of people will be unable to cast a vote in the Election Committee subsector elections, less than a month away, and in the chief executive election, scheduled for late March next year, the city should by now be focusing on what’s ahead. But, thanks to the two recently disqualified lawmakers, who lacked the necessary knowledge, ability and respect for oath-taking, our (albeit dysfunctional) legislature has basically been shut down for a month. The ugly politics that should have been insulated within “democratic centralism”. The party bolsters each of the concepts: encouraging the democratic solicitation of input and feedback from members, lower-ranked officials, and the public; and strengthening centralism through Xi’s leadership of the principal levers of power (his positions as party general secretary, head of state, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and head of the “leading groups” on reform, national security and internet security). A fourth factor is that a core is required to manage the party more strictly and thereby give members and the public more confidence. Witness Xi’s relentless and unprecedented anti-corruption campaign, which is altering how government officials and industry managers work and even think. Let no one assume that Xi’s battle against corruption has been risk-free. Significantly, these four factors undergirding Xi as the core leader map onto his overarching political framework, his strategic blueprint called “The Four Comprehensives” – a moderately prosperous society, reform, rule of law, party discipline. Xi’s core status arises, we’re told, through the collective will of the party and the people. Becoming party core is not an automatic consequence of being general secretary; a core leader must fit the times and the status must be earned. Speaking at a press conference following the 18th Central Committee’s sixth plenum last month, Huang Kunming (���), executive vice-minister of the committee’s Publicity Department, said that the “central and local departments as well as the military all expressed their support” for Xi’s position as party core, adding that this decision Alice Wu has had enough of the brouhaha over the oath-taking by two lawmakers. Now that they’ve been disqualified, HK must focus on battles ahead the chamber once again spilled out onto our streets. And what should have been decided and concluded on September 4 is now dragging on indefinitely, with two or possibly more by-elections added to the election overload. Hell-raising politics is not going away any time soon, but the sheer stupidity of the localist pair’s actions really is one for the books – Macbeth, in fact: Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow, / Creeps in this petty pace from day to day, To the last syllable of recorded time, / And all our yesterdays have lighted fools The way to dusty death. Out, out, was “based on the valuable experience of the party and we feel keenly about it”. Huang explained that “a core is needed to ensure that the party will be the governing party”, describing it as significant for upholding the Central Committee’s authority and maintaining the central, unified leadership of the party and for its “staying true to its mission”. Therefore, party theorists explain, Xi as core leader is more a ratification of reality than a shift of fundamentals. What does Xi as core mean in a historical context? It was Deng Xiaoping (���) who introduced the concept when he designated Jiang Zemin (���) as “core of the third generation” of central leaders, bolstering Jiang’s stature following his unexpected appointment as party leader in 1989. At the time, China was facing the dual impediments of economic stagnation and social uncertainty at home, and economic quarantine and diplomatic isolation abroad. As Deng pointed out: “Any leading group should have a core; a leadership with no core is unreliable.” Only then did Deng retrospectively apply the novel term to Mao Zedong (���) and to himself, as core of the first and second generations, respectively. (Of course, Mao was so utterly dominant that calling him core during his lifetime would have seemed a demotion. Deng remained core even when he no longer held any official position.) Today’s world is more complex. China faces threats at home and abroad. Volatility grows and uncertainty abounds – the Middle East and Donald Trump are offered as evidence. The need to secure China’s stability is more essential than ever, and thus to strengthen brief candle! / Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player That struts and frets his hour upon the stage / And then is heard no more. It is a tale Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing. They were indeed full of sound and fury, and they did nothing for the common good. What they did opened the door for an invitation to the courts to intervene. What they did presented an opportunity for an interpretation of the Basic Law by the National People’s Congress Standing Committee. What they did, ultimately, may well become the precedent for other legislators to be similarly Xi’s authority is a primary reason, I’m told, for designating Xi as core leader. Party theorists say China “urgently” requires a political nucleus that is sophisticated and nuanced, attuned to contemporary times. Though conditions now differ from those in 1989, Deng’s admonition rings timelessly true. However, that a core leader is needed now does not mean one will always be needed. When China becomes a fully modernised nation, perhaps by mid-century, condi- tions may change again. True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests I hear frequently of the “painful lessons of China’s century of blood and tears” and that for China not to have a tested and authoritative leadership core would be “unthinkable”. Party inner talk says “Xi Jinping has passed the test of the people” to be China’s political core, leadership core, and a core of the times. Chinese scholars argue that “core” is a unique characteristic of Chinese political theory – however inapplicable (even inexplicable) in Western political theory. They call Western concerns that Xi as core leader means that “a new emperor is born” wildly unfounded, even paranoic. In feudal society, the emperor ruled unconditionally barred. And that is why the duo’s pledge to spend every penny – and lest we forget, this also means the mounting cost to the public purse – to “appeal at all costs” is beyond rich, coming from them. Clearly, they have yet to wrap their heads around the concept of “personal responsibility”. Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang is wrong in believing that their disqualification from Legco rendered the election meaningless. They have no one but themselves to blame for their defenestration. It is they who made the election meaningless. And, to add insult to the grave injury they brought on the rest of us, they are asking for donations. At some point – if we’re not there already – we must take serious offence to be taken as fools, again and again. The curtain must now be drawn on this overly played-out second act. The irony may be lost on the with arbitrary imperial power, and in such a “command-obey” system, goes the argument, there is simply no need for a core. Rather, given today’s party political structure, the concept of a core both strengthens cohesion and serves to prevent a personality cult, not to promote one. Having a core means acknowledging that the party system is not the “emperor system” – absolute power is rejected – and that the optimum system, at least for the foreseeable future, is a combination of concentrated centralism and democratic collective leadership. Corroborating this functional balance, in the communiqué issued following the sixth plenum, the “collective leadership system” is reconfirmed. It states: “The implementation of collective leadership and personal division of labour is an important component of democratic centralism and must always be adhered to.” And it stresses: “Any organisation or individual shall, under any circumstance, not be allowed to violate this system for any reason.” The three “any’s” seem no accident. Some analysts see contradictions. On the one hand, the communiqué calls for democracy and constructive criticism internally within the party. On the other, disobeying the central leadership is forbidden, backed by vigilant supervision and tough discipline. Yet to read these statements as contradictory is to misunderstand what is happening here. Xi appreciates the complex and arduous tasks that lie ahead. He told me so a decade ago, and it is obviously truer today than it was then. The statements are harmonised, first, by the party’s motivation to seek optimum policies for the country, and second, by keeping most of the divergent views internal. True loyalty is telling leadership in private what one really believes is in their best interests, not pandering and fawning by repeating what one thinks leadership wants to hear. Though there are concerns, no one here worries that Xi will become Mao. China is now the world’s largest trading nation and its second-largest economy. China’s diplomacy is expanding and its military is growing. From its Belt and Road initiative building infrastructure and facilitating trade in over 60 developing countries to its leading role in the UN peacekeeping forces, China, the “Middle Kingdom”, is involved in every meaningful matter of international affairs. So, what kind of China do we want? Certainly not one with weak central leadership and fragmented citadels of power. With its huge and imbalanced population, and its diverse culture and traditions, China today requires a leader with sufficient strength and prestige to secure social stability, drive economic reform, and guide it in being a responsible world power. Xi as core leader should be good for China and, thus, for the world. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, political/economics commentator, and an international corporate strategist. He spoke at the launch ceremony of President Xi Jinping’s book, The Governance of China, and is the host of Closer to China with R. L. Kuhn, a weekly show on CCTV News produced by Adam Zhu pair but it’s pretty obvious who has been played for total fools. In case they haven’t noticed, the lawmakers who served as the duo’s chaperones have stopped babysitting them because there is no value in being their keepers any more. Escorting the duo’s Legco gate-crashing attempts served their purpose: to usher the two straight to their political end, and the votes the two rendered meaningless are now political spoils. The two took the toxic brew and there will be no stay of execution that could stop those ready to contest their seats. We must fight our political fatigue. We can ill afford to be distracted by those who continuously try to foolishly make their own stupid mistakes our collective problem. Alice Wu is a political consultant and a former associate director of the Asia Pacific Media Network at UCLA The basic law of unintended consequences Mike Rowse says the continuing political tussles in HK illustrate the pain of being caught in a cycle of actions and reactions, and we must address the root cause of the grievances There has been a considerable focus recently on the Basic Law and the rule of law, and their interaction. Perhaps neglected in the process has been a different but relevant concept: the law of unintended consequences, whereby an action gives rise to outcomes unforeseen by the instigator. Hong Kong’s tortuous path towards political reform is a case in point. The first reference to the idea of universal suffrage for selection of the chief executive comes in Article 45 of the Basic Law, promulgated back in 1990. Looking towards 1997, its purpose was to reassure. Naturally, attention turned to the subject in the early part of this century. While people understood that the move towards universal suffrage had to be in accordance with the “principle of gradual and orderly progress”, the reform package put forward in 2014 was widely perceived as disappointing; the plan to stick with an unrepresentative nominating committee deciding who could enter the race was unpalatable. The State Council’s white paper on the governance of Hong Kong, intended to set things straight, only stirred things up and led to the Occupy Central protests. The government let the action linger, hoping public anger would pay dividends in the 2016 Legislative Council election. While the 79 days of disruption did bring the protesters momentary opprobrium, memories quickly faded. In the election, the pro-government share of the vote actually fell, and the attack on the idea of independence led directly to a near 20 per cent share of the vote for a localist faction. This was surely not the objective. Now the government is trying to overturn the election outcome. The practice of banning some potential candidates from standing, then using all means at hand to unseat some of those elected, is a tactic more usually associated with third-world countries following a military coup. Has something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we need an interpretation of the interpretation In the short term, the judicial review sought by the chief executive against the decision by Legco president Andrew Leung Kwan-yuen to give Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching another opportunity to take the oath has been successful. Mr Justice Thomas Au Hing-cheung ruled in the High Court that their oaths were invalid, they should not be given a second chance and their positions should immediately be vacated. Many observers thought he might decline to rule at all, and simply refer the matter back to the Legco president. The problem with one arm of the administration delving too deeply into the processes of another is that it inevitably generates more requests to do so. And, sure enough, we now have legal challenges against more legislators, plus a challenge against the chief executive himself. Given that, in the past, other Legco members who had politicised their swearing-in and then done it properly second time round were permitted to take up their seats, did Leung and Yau have a “legitimate expectation” that they would enjoy similar treatment? The Legco president certainly thought so, hence his original ruling. Now it is for a higher court to decide. Meanwhile, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee has sought to clarify Article 104 of the Basic Law, which requires all people concerned to “swear to uphold the Basic Law of the Hong Kong special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China and swear allegiance” to it. But the interpretation is different: it talks of “a legal pledge … to the People’s Republic of China and its Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (emphasis added). Has something been lost in translation here? Perhaps we need an interpretation of the interpretation. If, at the end of the day, there are two (or more) vacant Legco seats, then we are in by-election territory. I don’t think the people are fooled for one minute about what is going on. In each constituency, an impeccable opposition candidate will stand, win a majority, and take the oath impeccably. Unfortunately, this tragedy – or farce – will continue until the government starts to address the underlying grievances over the lack of meaningful political reform instead of just hammering the symptoms, which generates new grievances in the process. Mike Rowse is the CEO of Treloar Enterprises and an adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. [email protected] > CONTACT US: Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at [email protected]. If you have an idea for an opinion article, email it to [email protected] A yellow umbrella, a symbol of the Occupy movement, is used in a recent protest against Beijing. Photo: Reuters Wednesday, April 25, 2018 A11 CONTACT US Agree or disagree with the opinions on this page? Write to us at [email protected] If you have an idea for an opinion article, email it to [email protected] Looming tech war Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the ZTE showdown points to a misunderstanding over motives As someone who works for US- China understanding and roots for US-China partnerships, I’ve been concerned, but not worried, over what others have called “a looming trade war”. I’ve not worried because tariffs don’t work; they are blunt instruments in a globalised economy, penalising American companies and consumers as much as Chinese. Most American experts oppose tariffs, and President Donald Trump likes to make big deals after making big threats. But I am now worried over what I will call “a looming tech war”, because the structural imperatives go deeper. As everyone who follows China knows, the US Department of Commerce has imposed a denial of export privileges against ZTE, China’s second-largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer, thus prohibiting US companies from selling essential electronic components and software to ZTE, a crippling sanction. China has responded resolutely, with actions that seem selected from expert scenario planning, and with rhetoric, both indignation and nationalistic bravado. From China’s perspective, according to its Ministry of Commerce, “If the United States attempts to curb China's development … it miscalculates. The action targets China; however, it will ultimately undermine the US itself,” affecting tens of thousands of jobs and hundreds of related US enterprises. “Targeting technology is like throttling the neck of the Chinese enterprises,” wrote China Daily. “The ZTE case should remind China's decision-makers of the urgency to become self-sufficient in core technologies.” President Xi Jinping has been prescient about domestic control of core technologies, especially related to the internet and more recently to artificial intelligence. Since taking office in 2012, he has stressed the “hidden risks” that come with core technologies not being mastered domestically. He said, “Heavy dependence on imported core technology is like building our house on top of someone else's walls: no matter how big and how beautiful it is, it won’t remain standing during a storm.” Innovation is the first of Xi’s “five major concepts of development”. Beijing also claims that the country itself is a victim of discriminatory policies From the US perspective, according to its Department of Commerce, the prohibition against ZTE is punishment for ZTE violating US sanctions against Iran and North Korea, making false statements and obstructing justice, and then after reaching a settlement agreement, violating it. The United States claims it is not resisting China’s rise, but rather the country’s unfair or illegal means to achieve it. The US action enumerated four such practices as rationale for imposing punitive tariffs, all relating to technology or intellectual property: foreign firms in China are required to form joint ventures and transfer knowledge, as well as license technology with below-market terms and conditions, while the state supports Chinese enterprises in acquiring foreign hi-tech assets, and sanctions commercial cyber theft. President Trump is wildly unpopular among American elites, especially among policy experts, who do not need much of an excuse to criticise him – note the fusillade of attacks on Trump’s tariffs. But these elites are not criticising Trump on US moves to counter what they, with unusual consensus, perceive to be China’s unfair policies, and in some cases unlawful programmes, to become a world leader in state-of-the-art technologies, especially AI, information technology, robotics, advanced manufacturing, new energy vehicles, aviation and biotechnology. China claims that it is still a developing country, so different rules apply, a foundational principle of the World Trade Organisation. Beijing also claims that the country itself is a victim of discriminatory policies restricting its imports of hi-tech products. Of course, China had to respond with appropriate actions as well as confident words, imposing heavy tariffs on US sorghum and signalling that additional agricultural tariffs were at the ready, along with barely veiled threats against US companies operating in China. Here’s my fear. While I have argued that most mainstream American experts are not motivated to impede China’s rise, as many in China believe, I can no longer make that argument persuasive. In the US, there has been a dark turn among experts that US policy towards China, calibrated over four decades to shepherd China’s rise, has failed: China, they have come to believe, has become a competitor and may become an adversary, and that US relations with China must now be managed as with an emergent adversary, not as with a developing partner. In China, nationalistic voices are on the rise, castigating the US for its self-serving motivation to impede China’s rise, and calling for China to become more self-reliant, more rapidly, especially in world-class semiconductors, so that the country would not be vulnerable to US “blackmail”. Welcome to the unhappy world of selffulfilling prophecy, where the actions of each side in response to a perceived threat from the other side increases the likelihood of that threat morphing from theoretical to actual. To both sides, I offer two pieces of advice. First, take a breath and a fresh look, because the road on which you are travelling will not lead to a happy place. Second, contemplate why the other side is misinterpreting your actions. To my American friends, what makes China think the US is resisting its rise? To my Chinese friends, what makes the US think that China is a competitor and may become an adversary? Projecting malevolent motives and seeing sinister conspiracies is the easy way out. It can solicit cheers and plaudits in one’s domestic media, but it will impede progress and is likely to be self-defeating. The US and China must each figure out how not to confirm the other’s self-fulfilling prophecy. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is a public intellectual, international corporate strategist and investment banker, and China expert and commentator. He is the author of How China’s Leaders Think and a co-creator (with Adam Zhu) and host of CGTN’s “Closer to China with R.L. Kuhn” and “The Watcher” commentaries Older people still have lot to offer in the workplace Paul Yip says measures to ensure Hong Kong retirees remain active through employment may help prevent poverty and partially offset the impact of a declining birth rate Employment is the most robust method for keeping people out of poverty. In Hong Kong’s latest poverty situation report, for those with a job, the poverty rate is only 12.3 per cent, compared to 77.4 per cent among those not working. Among older adults with a job, it is 12.9 per cent, compared with 48.2 per cent among those without employment. Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung Kin-chung has recently raised the possibility of promoting workforce participation for those aged 50-64 and helping those aged 65-74 re-enter the job market. Hong Kong’s workforce participation rate among older adults is 17.7 per cent, lower than in Japan (22.7 per cent), Singapore (26.8 per cent) and Seoul (31.5 per cent). The Japanese government has been very active in promoting workforce participation among its older citizens, especially since 27 per cent of its population was aged 65 or over as of 2017. The population size has decreased, from 128 million in 2010 to 127 million in 2015, and the United Nations estimates that the number will continue to fall until 2061. The number of migrants moving to the country has not offset the population decrease, leaving no choice but to improve the labour participation and productivity rate, especially among older adults and married women with children. Though Hong Kong’s total fertility rate is only 1.2 per woman – less than the 1.4 in Japan – we have benefited from migration from the mainland to keep our population young. Our life expectancy is also very similar to Japan’s, at 81 for men and 87 for women. It is time to explore how to make better use of our older The most important thing is to provide an option for older adults to be active in the job market Greater effort is required to foster gender diversity Kevin Sneader and Anu Madgavkar say the Asia-Pacific region needs more women leaders Women’s representation in highranking positions in business and politics is a global issue, but an even more pressing one in Asia-Pacific. Across the region, only one in five people in leading roles is a woman. This waste of women’s talent comes at an economic cost. Many economies in the region are ageing and skills shortages are on the rise: making more of women’s potential can help meet such challenges. Businesses gain a great deal from supporting women. McKinsey’s 2018 report “The Power of Parity” found that companies in the top quarter for gender diversity on their executive teams are 21 per cent more likely to experience aboveaverage profitability. Even in developed economies in the Asia-Pacific, few women are getting to the top in business – in Japan, there are no female CEOs in the top 100 public companies. In Australia and Singapore, the share of women CEOs in 2016 was only 6 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The Philippines, a traditionally matriarchal society whose government has been proactive in tackling gender inequality, does better in senior positions overall, but only 3 per cent of CEOs and 15 per cent of board members are women. The lower share of women in leading positions within companies isn’t all about the glass ceiling – the point at which women’s careers appear to halt. Rather, women’s under-representation has its roots as far back as the education system. In India, only 44 per cent of students in tertiary education are female and many graduates don’t take up employment: only 25 per cent of entry-level positions in Indian companies are taken by women. In Japan, the share of women enrolled in college is higher, at 47 per cent, but women were only 28 per cent of students attending the top 10 universities. The share of women erodes sharply from entry-level to the boardroom, and the biggest “breakpoint” is motherhood. In a 2015 McKinsey survey, 45 per cent of Asian executives cited the “anywhere, anytime” performance model as the largest barrier to women moving into senior roles. In Japan, a survey found that three-quarters of women respondents said they were not interested in managerial positions, partly because promotion would mean working even longer hours. The second most cited factor behind women dropping out of work is the “double burden” of holding down a job while looking after the family. In China, 33 per cent of female respondents to a 2017 survey said that they had a lower salary when they returned to work after having a baby, and 36 per cent said they had to accept a demotion. Sixty-three per cent said they did not want a second child because this would hurt their career. Many women struggle to return to work because childcare options are limited or too expensive. In Australia, net childcare costs (paid by two-earner families) were 20 per cent of an average family’s income in 2015, compared with the 13 per cent average in OECD economies. The attrition of women from the talent pipeline starts even earlier than motherhood, as societal attitudes militate against women pursuing a career and prioritise looking after families. In India, 70 per cent of respondents to the 2010-2014 World Values Survey agreed with the statement, “When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.” More can be done to give women the freedom to choose a career as well as motherhood There has been some progress. The share of women on company boards has been rising, reflecting efforts by both governments and private-sector organisations. India has made it mandatory for companies to have at least one female director, and the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council tracks gender diversity in its constituent companies. Japanese pharmaceutical company Takeda hit its target of 30 per cent of new managers being women (from only 6.2 per cent in 2015) through a range of initiatives including flexible working hours. However, there is much more that can be done to give women the freedom to choose a career as well as motherhood. Narrowing the leadership gender gap will require concerted action by governments and companies from encouraging and helping girls to learn the right skills for a changing labour market and mentoring women in their careers, to shifting attitudes towards women’s roles through public-awareness campaigns to – perhaps most importantly – making work flexible. More help with childcare is urgently needed. Governments can use public spending to expand childcare provision and companies can set up nurseries. Flexible working practices in companies are vital. In Australia, financial services company Suncorp enables flexible working through “work at home hubs” that combine home work stations and working spaces in regional shopping centres. Such efforts are only likely to be effective with a root-and-branch shift in attitudes towards women’s roles in society. Governments can lead from the front, setting targets for women’s representation in business as Japan and Singapore have done, and more companies can push for true diversity within their ranks. Doing so is not only in the interests of their bottom line but the health of the economies in which they work. Kevin Sneader is chairman, Asia-Pacific, of McKinsey & Company. Anu Madgavkar is a partner at McKinsey Global Institute adults. We should create the right environment for raising the retirement age and extending employment beyond that age. Some issues, like excessive health and medical insurance costs for the older workforce, and long working hours, should be re-examined. The government can create a fund to protect against excessive increases in insurance costs, while introducing a more flexible working arrangement for the older workforce. The most important thing is to provide an option for older adults to be active in the job market, and give them the choice of whether to continue in a job. Those who have had enough could perhaps take on volunteer work in the community. For those who stay on with paid employment, more flexible time arrangements would better suit their needs, while their roles could be redefined so as not to stand in the way of the career advancement of younger workers. Some tangible support might be needed for the business sector, ideally through a tax-deductible arrangement rather than the proposed cash support. For some work, such as in teaching and research, the situation depends on individual ability. As in overseas countries, participants should be allowed to work as long as they meet expectations. At present, a vigorous review process takes place to determine whether to extend beyond retirement age. The education levels of Hong Kong’s older adults is not high and, among those with very low levels, most can only find work in low-skilled jobs such as cleaning and security duties. Nevertheless, these areas face a shortage of labour and can be a good fit. In such cases, people’s rights and pay should be better protected, to avoid companies exploiting this group of workers. Also, sometimes, older adults are not driven by money when seeking work. For some, finding meaning in their work can be sufficient. The Japanese experience shows that some older adults continue to work to maintain their independence and fitness. Such workers, whatever they do, display high levels of professionalism. Respecting the wishes of older adults and providing a quality choice in terms of working would be a winwin situation for the whole community. Paul Yip is chair professor (Population Health) in the Department of Social Work and Social Administration at the University of Hong Kong For some, finding meaning in work is important, as with these women who recycle used clothes to make bags. Comment›Insight & Opinion › United StatesUS-China trade US-China trade war could end with a ‘big deal’ through baby steps towards mutual understanding Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the US must accept China’s need to support technological development, while China should work with US policymakers who oppose tariffs but want the country to further open its markets and protect intellectual property rights PUBLISHED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 5:02am - UPDATED : Thursday, 30 August, 2018, 6:15am Robert Lawrence Kuhn President Xi Jinping Major Speech Seattle September 24, 2015 Robert Lawrence Kuhn Simultaneous Commentary Quest Means Business China’s Xi Jinping UN Speech Robert Lawrence Kuhn Interview September 28, 2015 CNN’S AMANPOUR – May 29, 2013 President Xi Jinping to meet President Barack Obama Interview with Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn, long-time adviser to China’s leaders. http://edition.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2013/05/29/exp-­‐race-­‐china-­‐us-­‐amanpour.cnn CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN HOST: Good evening. I'm Christiane Amanpour. There may officially be only one superpower today, but another is rapidly advancing. The United States and China jockey for position at the pinnacle of the world in what might just be called a race to the top. So how will the first tete-a-tete go between their leaders, the two most powerful men on Earth, U.S. President Barack Obama and China's leader, Xi Jinping, will meet just over a week from now in an informal setting at the aptly named Sunnylands Estate just outside Los Angeles. China is anxious and angry about Obama's much-touted “pivot” to Asia and about what China perceives to be the U.S. siding with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea. The United States, for its part, has a laundry list of concerns, everything from alleged Chinese hacking of even its most sensitive military secrets to its influence over North Korea and Pyongyang's nuclear saber-rattling. President Xi says the U.S.-China relationship is at a crucial juncture and he says that he wants to forge, "a new type of great power relationship." So what exactly will that look like? We need to know because this may just be the most important relationship in the world today. And in a moment, I will dig deeper with Robert Lawrence Kuhn, a long-time adviser to China's leaders. AMANPOUR: Robert Lawrence Kuhn has tremendous insight into China's leaders. He's a long-time adviser to the Chinese government; he's met President Xi several times and he's the author of the book, "How China's Leaders Think." That is a big title. Welcome to the studio. Fareed Zakaria GPS “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China” Robert Lawrence Kuhn October 5, 2014 FZ: What in the world is the leader of the second largest economy on the planet thinking? That’s a question many would love to know the answer to, but in a closed, secretive society, like China, it’s all but impossible to know. He rarely gives interviews, and the press in China is far from free. But now we have something to look at. Chinese President Xi Jinping has a new book, entitled The Governance of China, and it’s aiming for worldwide impact. State media there reports that the book has been published in nine languages: Chinese, English, French, Russian, Arabic, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Japanese. My next guest, Robert Lawrence Kuhn, says it is a milestone. Kuhn has advised the Chinese government for twenty-­‐five years, and is the author of How China’s Leaders Think. Welcome. KUHN: Pleasure to be here. FZ: First, give us a sense of who this man is for our viewers. Who is Xi Jinping, and why is he a little different from China’s ordinary leaders? KUHN: Xi Jinping has been involved in all aspects of what makes China today. His father was one of the founders of the country, truly a great revolutionary and a great reformer in the early days. Xi Jinping graduated from Tsinghua University [‘China’s MIT’], with a degree in chemical engineering. Then he went through more than two decades working at the local level. Starting in a county, and then a city, Xiamen, working his way up for many years in Fujian province, becoming the governor. Then for five years Xi was the Party Secretary of, the number one official responsible for, Zhejiang province, which is the center of entrepreneurship in China. So that gives him a great sense of business. And that was when I first met Xi Jinping, actually, in 2005, and then again in 2006, seeing him doing the real work of running a province, a local area. President Xi is a person, when you see him, who is unassuming; he’s big, he has a strong presence in a room, but you feel very comfortable with him. He doesn’t put on airs, he’s very warm and BBC World News Robert Lawrence Kuhn China’s Economy & Politics President Xi’s ‘Four Comprehensives’ August 25, 2015 HOST: Dr. Robert Lawrence Kuhn is an advisor to the Chinese government and author of How China’s Leaders Think and he joins me now from Beijing. A cut in interest rates today - but in China any economic decision is always colored with politics. RLK: Certainly people are concerned here, but you have to realize a 43% drop in the Shanghai stock market is still 25% above its 52-week lows, so what the economists, government, tries to do is to distinguish between the so-called real economy and the stock market. Most people realize China’s stock market was overvalued, but perception is reality, and if people have less money on paper, they’ll spend less, and so the fall will affect the real economy. And you’re right, the way to look at such situations in China is not just economically - you can’t look at China without looking at politics, and here there are two major areas. One is President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Washington. This has been a very tense time in Sino-US relations: South China Sea, cybersecurity, human rights, lots of issues. But what this economic uncertainty and volatility will do - I hope - is to make both presidents focus on what really affects human beings and human lives, focus on economic areas, because this is where there can be some commonality between China and the US. The contentious issues are real, but economics is more real for people. Domestically in China, it’s really interesting, because in recent days, there have been editorials in People’s Daily talking about extreme resistance to reform and older leaders who are still involved and maybe shouldn’t be, and so you have to look at domestic politics in terms of what Xi Jinping, who is China’s dominant leader, the president of the country, head of the party, head of the military, and other titles as well, and what his overarching policy is. It’s called the “Four Comprehensives.” We learn from each one. The first says that China wants to build a ‘moderately prosperous society’. That’s their shortterm goal. It’s not different than others have said in ⽇报周报杂志 ⼈民⽇报海外版 2017 年 05 ⽉ 08 ⽇星期⼀ 往期回顾 分类检索 返回⽬录 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 将成本世纪伟⼤故事 —— 专访美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩 本报驻美国记者张朋辉 《⼈民⽇报海外版》 ( 2017 年 05 ⽉ 08 ⽇第 01 版 ) 第 01 版 : 要闻 版⾯导航 下⼀版 罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛开幕前⼣ , 本报记者专访了美国库恩基⾦会主席罗伯特 · 劳伦斯 · 库恩。作为此次⾼峰论坛的嘉宾之⼀ , 库恩博⼠密切关注中国倡议的 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设 , 对 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设及 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 国际合作⾼峰论坛抱有很⾼期待。他认为 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议正当其时 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设将成为 21 世纪最伟⼤的故事之⼀。 中国找到了同世界的契合点库恩分析说 , “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 在世界这么受欢迎 , 是因为中国找到了⾃⾝发展经验同世界需要的契合点。他说 ,“ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议在全球许多国家受到热烈欢迎 , 主要有 3 个原因 : ⼀是基础设施是很多发展中国家的迫切需要 , 基础设施建设是 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 的重要关注点。⼆是世界上很多国家经济增长缓慢 , 他们希望通过参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬刺激经济增长。三是对于许多发展中国家来说 , 中国既是⼀个榜样 , 也是能够带来专长、经验和资本的国家 , 参与 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 建设项⽬是与中国加强合作的理想⽅式。 “ ⼀带⼀路 ” 倡议提出 3 年多来 , 成果超出预期 , 得到国际社会积极评价。库恩说 :“ 习近平主席关于合作共赢的全球化观念 , 从蓝图变成了路线图 , 从计划到付诸实践 , 从纸⾯的概念变成了地⾯的项⽬。过去 3 年 ,‘ ⼀带⼀路 ’ 建设项⽬遍地开花 , 我亲⾃见证了这⼀设想从愿景变成现实。 ” 库恩说 , 他更看重的成就是将正在进⾏的 “ 最 Interview: Xi's engaging, creative diplomatic approach to benefit China-U.S. ties: U.S. expert | 2015-09-10 21:06:53 | Editor: Tian Shaohui by Xinhua writer Luo Jun BEIJING, Sept. 10 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping, with an engaging and creative diplomatic approach, is likely to secure "a big success" in his visit to the United States later this month, said U.S. expert Robert Kuhn. In an exclusive interview with Xinhua, Kuhn, author of "The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin" and "How China's Leaders Think," recalled Xi's previous trip to California as president and to Iowa as vice president as "one of the best images as for China." (The photo shows Robert Lawrence Kuhn introducing "Xi Jinping: The Governance of China" at BookExpoAmerica in New York on May 29, 2015) "He went to sporting events and I was at one of the luncheons. You really had a wonderful, enriched feeling about China at that point," Kuhn said. Now with the United States entering a political season of presidential election, issues of contention with China and the lack of overall understanding of China's policy has been increasing, but Kuhn believes that low expectations can become an advantage as people may "get surprised on the positive 8 C H I N A D A I L Y . C O M . C N / O P I N I O N M O N D A Y, O C T O B E R 2 0 , 2 0 1 4 C H I N A D A I L Y Comment editorial • opinion THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE 18TH Central Committee of the Communist Party of China opens on Monday and will last for four days. The designated theme — governing through the rule of law — indicates how important this meeting will be for the future of both the Party and the country. That this is the first time in 17 years the Party has designated such a theme for a plenary session speaks volumes about the importance the new leadership attaches to it. It is high on the agenda. Yet, the more the concept of rule of law has been discussed, the more obvious it becomes that there is, today, much to be desired. More than 50 minister­level or higher officials have either been indicted or placed under investigation for abuse of power in the past year or so, underlining the fact that the rule of law is sorely needed. It is perhaps the only way to eliminate, once and for all, the most serious threat to good governance and to secure the blessings of prosperity and justice to the people. The fact that power today can effectively nullify the law, and that those in power can circumvent it, not only deprives the Party of its capacity to govern the country in a consistently fair and just manner but also disrupts the reasonable running of the marketplace. Abuse of power makes it impossible for fairness to prevail in the socialist market economy. Despite the great achievements China has made over more than three decades, it will be very difficult for its economy to grow in a sound manner — and neither will society progress in a healthy way — unless fair competition and mutual trust can be secured and ordinary people’s rights and interests can be guaranteed through the rule of law. If the country is to achieve further reforms in various fields and establish and maintain a fair and just society, the powerworshipping mentality among government and Party officials must be eliminated. This is a core goal of the leadership. Unless the overwhelming majority of Party and government officials not only respect the law, but follow it when making decisions, governing the country by the rule of law will amount to little but lip service. It will be no easy job, and it will take time for the power­oriented way of doing things to be transformed. But the new Party leadership has shown it has the courage to face the challenge. We therefore have reason to expect much from the current plenary session as they work to put the country on the right track. CONTACT US CHINADAILY A foundation of law O T H E R V I E WS Historic moment China Daily 15HuixinDongjieChaoyang, Beijing100029 News: +86(0) 106491­8366; [email protected] Subscription: +86400­699­0203; [email protected] Advertisement: +86(0) 106491­8631; [email protected] Phone app: chinadaily.com.cn/iphone China Daily USA 1500Broadway, Suite2800, New York, NY10036+12125378888 [email protected] China Daily Hong Kong (Asia) Room1818, HingWaiCentre7TinWan PrayaRoadAberdeen, HongKong +85225185111 [email protected] [email protected] E D I T O R I A L he convocation of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Com­ Party of China Central Committee, whose theme is Tmunist promoting the rule of law, embodies the CPC’s deepening perception on governance and the law. www.people.com.cn October 15. t is the first time that the CPC, as the ruling Party, will make a Icomprehensive plan on the rule of law in the form of a Party document. The session, which marks the ruling Party’s significant strategic layout on how to govern the nation in accordance with laws and the Constitution, illustrates its new exploration of socialism with Chinese characteristics. The CPC Central Committee will focus on discussions on how to promote rule of law in at a plenary session. ... It has only six years to 2020, the deadline set for the realization of a well­off society for China, and 35 years to 2049, the promised year for China to be a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist modern nation. All these mean China has entered a crucial stage of deepened reforms. Only by sticking to “governance of the nation according to laws” will China realize its historic mission. www.xinhuanet.com.cn October 19. he National People’s Congress, China’s top legislature, should Tplay a bigger role in the country’s efforts to promote the rule of law. For example, the NPC can push for deepened reforms within the framework of the Constitution and laws through legislation to realize a benign interaction between reforms and the rule of law. The deeper the water China’s reforms will enter, the more legal guidance and guarantees these reforms will need. The NPC enjoys a broad space for maneuvering in this regard. Beijing News October 17 I n the last three months, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee has held two conferences studying major issues related to comprehensively pushing for the rule of law. As the theme “Chinaruledbylaw” issetfortheFourthPlenarySessionof the 18th CPC Central Committee, the overall planning and prospect of a China governed by law will become increasingly explicit. Lianhe zaobao October 14 China Daily UK 90CannonStreetLondonEC4N6HA +44(0) 2073988270 [email protected] China Daily Africa P.O.Box27281­00100, Nairobi, Kenya +254(0) 205223498(Nairobi) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] R O B E RT L AW R E N C E KU H N Decoding Xi’s future vision President Xi’s new book reveals his thinking about the country’s governance and maps out a path for achieving the Chinese Dream The Governance of China, President Xi Jinping’s new book, is unprecedented. Can analyzing the book elucidate Xi’s thinking and illuminate China’s future? Consider seven frameworks or perspectives: publishing purposes, overarching themes, content analysis, chain of developmental causation, domestic goals, domestic means and global principles. Publishing Purposes: substance, symbol, signal. Substance means Xi’s political philosophy and wide­ranging policies — organizing 79 speeches and commentaries in 18 chapters — to discern how Xi intends to realize the Chinese Dream, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Symbol means recognizing Xi’s emergence as China’s leader, with greater authority, confidence and support than observers had expected when he first took office two years ago. Signal means communicating Xi’s way of thinking to global audiences in nine languages, an original and explicit outreach to engage the world on multiple levels. Overarching Themes: pride, stability, responsibility, vision. Pride expresses the yearning of the Chinese people for the “great rejuvenation”. Stability means maintaining the current political system (Socialism with Chinese characteristics and the Party’s leadership). Responsibility means “realizing a moderately prosperous society by the centenary of the Party in 2021”. Vision means “turning China into a prosperous, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious modern socialist country by the centenary of the People’s Republic of China in 2049”. Content Analysis. How does Xi impute importance to topics? By examining what’s in Xi’s book, can we explore what’s on Xi’s mind? Of the book’s 18 chapters, 11 relate to domestic affairs, seven to foreign affairs; six have political relevance; six concern standards of living; and four standards of L I M I N behavior. Categorizing the content, about a third is politics and people; another third on international relations; about 15 percent each on reform and development, and society and culture; and about 8 percent on national security and defense. Pervasive throughout is reform. Chain of Developmental Causation. The Chinese Dream is founded on political stability, which enables far­reaching reform, which in turn promotes economic development, and which, when combined with rule of law and Chinese values, strengthens China’s society, culture, ecology and even defense. Where is this “chain of causation” in Xi’s book? The first and last chapters affirm political stability: “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and “The CPC Leadership”, both of which assert the Party’s political primacy and thus assure social stability. “The Chinese Dream” is the second chapter, proclaiming the grand mission of national resurgence and personal well­being. Then, chapters on deepening reform and economic development, which lead to chapters on rule of law, advanced culture, social undertakings and ecological progress. Domestic Goals: values, morality, prosperity, fairness, happiness. Values: Xi’s vision is to inculcate China’s traditional values — “the thoughts of the ancient sages”, exemplified by Confucianism — into socialist core values. (“We must take traditional Chinese culture as the base.”) Morality: Derived from values, morality is described as “conscious law”, and “civic morality” is characterized as needing improvement, while “paragons of morality are important banners for building public ethics”. (“A gentleman takes morality as his bedrock” — a traditional virtue that Xi quotes.) Prosperity: “Common prosperity is the fundamental principle of Chinese socialism … We will accelerate China’s overall prosperity”. Fairness: Because the Chinese people have always had a perception that “inequality rather than want is the cause of trouble”, Xi says, China “should do a better job of promoting Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng arrived in the lobby of the European Commission’s headquarters at 9 o’clock on Saturday morning. He was led to the office of outgoing Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht, who has been a thorn in the side of Chinese businesses because of his protectionist attitude ever since he took over the job in 2010. De Gucht, 60, will be replaced in a few days by Swedish politician Cecilia Malmstrom, 46, when a newly constituted commission gets underway. In the afternoon, the Chinese side announced a long­awaited agreement in principle: Brussels will not launch an investigation into subsidies of China’s telecommunication imports into the European market. The EU side still needs to go through internal procedures for formal approval. The threat was mainly targeted at Chinese telecommunications equipment makers Huawei Technologies Co and ZTE Corp. While the big picture of relations has been a positive one, the Europeans have annoyed Beijing from time to time — for example, by allowing the Dalai Lama to visit, by attacking China on human rights and by imposing high trade barriers. Despite such irritants, Beijing has sent constructive signals. In the first half of this year, President Xi Jinping paid the first­ever visit of a Chinese president to the European Union’s headquarters. And last week, at the summit of Asian and European leaders in Milan, Italy, Premier Li Keqiang hosted a special dinner for Barroso and European Council President Herman Van Rompuy, thanking them for their contributions to positive relations. At the dinner, the leaders were thought to have touched on the telecommunication trade dispute, which involves about 1 billion euros ($1.26 billion) annually. The path to Saturday’s solution was similar to a pattern set earlier, in mid­2013, after both sides worked through an anti­dumping and anti­subsidy investigation involving China’s multi­billiondollar solar panel exports to the EU. Brussels began that investigation in 2012. Beijing was unhappy that there had been no high­level invitation to visit Brussels a year after the launch of the investigation. In May last year, Li made his first trip to Germany after taking office and won the support of the German government, which vetoed Brussels’ decision, following dozens of EU member states. Li made a last­minute call on Barroso the following month, as Brussels was about to vote on whether to end the solar panel dispute through amicable consultation. Li’s decisive role was crucial in preventing the escalation of a trade war. If Beijing had opted to deal with such disputes in an eye­for­eye, toothfor­tooth manner, both sides would have been losers, with the EU taking the brunt. It has already suffered two economic recessions, and its jobless rate has been in double digits for a few years now. Of course, with the trade volume between China and Europe expanding, and with investment pouring into Europe, China’s government, its businesses and its media must work to make the most of the rising economic tide. fairness and justice”. Happiness: The Chinese Dream, Xi says, is to “bring happiness to the Chinese people”, to “ensure the people greater happiness” — but, he cautions, “happiness does not fall from the sky, nor do dreams come true automatically.” (In Xi’s book, “values” occurs about 120 times, “morality” 24, “prosperity” 67, “fairness” 44 and “happiness’’ 16.) Domestic Means: close to the people, realism, stability, reform, rule of law, combating corruption. “Close to the people” is an all­encompassing way of thinking that shapes all decisions. Realism: “I have repeatedly said that the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation can in no way be realized easily,” Xi says. “While fully affirming our achievements, we should also be aware of our shortcomings.” Stability: The precondition for all else, stability is a recurrent and foundational theme (“stability” occurs 125 times). Reform: Those who wonder whether Xi is a “real reformer” should read “Explanatory Notes … Concerning Comprehensively Continuing Reform” (page 76). Examples: the market plays a “decisive role”; farmers given transactional property rights; the judicial system separate from the administrative system. Rule of Law: “A fundamental principle” and “the basic way to run the country” — the Fourth Plenary of the 18th CPC Central Committee, focusing on rule of law, is Xi’s call to action. Combating corruption is a hallmark of Xi’s administration, enhancing each of the five other domestic means. It is no accident that the chapter on combating corruption is positioned, significantly, between “Close Ties with the People” and “The CPC Leadership”. I bear witness to Xi’s consistency. In 2006, Adam Zhu (my long­term partner) and I met privately with then­Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi. He stressed that while China should be properly proud of its successes, “achievements should not engender complacency”. Xi said: “We need to assess ourselves objectively.” Global Principles. Consider five. Independence (China remains unaligned). Multi­polar world (no country dominates). One country, two systems (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan). Peaceful development (“We have made a solemn pledge to the whole world that we will never seek hegemony”). Multilateral affairs (cooperation with the global community). These five global principles drive China’s “new model of major country relations” (primarily with the US), “neighborhood diplomacy” (Japan, Vietnam, Koreas, etc.), and “cooperation with developing countries” (such as in Africa). The Silk Road economic belt (land route and maritime) is President Xi’s new initiative for multinational development. Here’s my blurb for Xi’s book: “This book is a milestone, both in substance and symbol, offering openly the political philosophy of President Xi Jinping and recognizing his emergence as China’s senior leader. While misunderstandings about China and its leadership abound, there is now no need to speculate about President Xi. Here is how he thinks, candidly and comprehensively.” It is the pride of a patriot. The author is an international corporate strategist and political/economics commentator. He is theauthorof How China’s Leaders Thinkanda biography of former president Jiang Zemin. He gave one of the speeches at the launching ceremonyfor Xi Jinping: The Governance of China,at theFrankfurtBookFaironOct8. F U J I N G Courtesy, not confrontation, best for Europe So far, there is no unified Chinese business council in Brussels to represent and lobby for Chinese investors in Europe. By contrast, a major US business organization reportedly has 300 staff members focusing on Brussels’ policymaking. A lack of communication and influence can easily lead to misunderstandings. Bureaucrats in Brussels usually follow Washington’s lead when making policies that affect China. Trade commission leaders need to make more field trips to member states to learn how Chinese businesses matter. Take China’s solar panel exports for example. The industry, which involves about 400,000 workers in China, has offered competitive products to thousands of European upstream companies and helped Europe achieve its status as a green energy leader. In telecom, Huawei and ZTE are deeply integrated with European partners. And, incidentally, Huawei is a steady job creator in Europe, where young people, in particular, have faced huge employment challenges. If De Gucht had kept the big picture in mind, he would not have made confrontational moves against China and its businesses. Overall, the EU recognizes China as strong strategic partner. This is the starting point for dispute control. Amicability helps both sides win. With confrontation, everyone loses. The author is China Daily chief correspondent in Brussels. [email protected] ������������� ������ ������� ��� ������ ������� �� ��� ��� ���� ����� P A G E 3 2 Last word C H I N A D A I L Y E U R O P E A N W E E K L Y J U L Y 1 3 - 1 9 , 2 0 1 2 The insider with an outside view strategist, Banker and author has intimate knowledge of China — and its leaders By Andrew Moody [email protected] Robert Lawrence Kuhn says the West often doesn’t understand the Chinese leadership’s key priorities for China. The 67-year-old American is seen by many as one of the few figures outside the world’s secondlargest economy who actually does. He is regarded as a knowledgeable insider, having been an adviser to a number of leading Chinese bodies since the late-1980s and knowing many of the country’s top political figures personally. “There is rarely alignment between what topics China’s leaders think are important about China and what the world thinks,” says Kuhn, also an international corporate strategist and investment banker. “Understanding China requires knowing the difference.” He was speaking recently in the five-star Grand Hyatt hotel in central Beijing, which is his home for 90 days a year. The rest of the time he divides between his three homes in the United States and traveling elsewhere. “They treat me very well here. Even when I travel around China, I keep a room here,” he says. The hotel is well placed near to China’s seat of government around Tian’anmen Square where he has an extensive network of contacts. His latest book, How China’s Leaders Think: The Inside Story of China’s Past, Current and Future Leaders, which is now out in paperback and more than 500 pages, goes into extensive detail about those who have the responsibility for shaping modern China. Kuhn, who cuts a dapper figure, says many in the West often have an outdated view about modern Chinese leaders. “The reality is that China’s leaders are meritocratic,” he says. “Many have strong academic backgrounds from top universities and all have significant experience, often having run two or more provinces or major municipalities as Party secretary, governor or mayor.” Kuhn, who is also a new China Daily columnist, is much in demand from major news organizations around the world, including TV appearances on BBC, CNBC, Euronews and Bloomberg TV, and says he has had complete freedom to express his opinions. “I have written three books about China, dozens of articles and columns; I’ve produced two major TV documentaries about China and given scores of media interviews — and never has anyone in China even requested to censor anything I’ve published or broadcast outside of China,” he says. Some in the West, however, have accused him of being too much of an insider and not giving the full picture about China because he was too close to the leadership. Robert Lawrence Kuhn says China’s growth is good for the world, but it cannot save the world. “I deem it vital, considering China’s importance in the world, that China’s leaders become more known to the world, and known not just via sound-bites and photo ops, but by seeing them up-close as real people — hearing their own words, listening to their stories, getting their ways of thinking. I’m pleased to facilitate some of this,” he says. “I also offer my own analysis. As for my accuracy and understanding, readers or viewers can judge for themselves.” Kuhn, who was born in New York, began his career as a scientist. After studying biology at John Hopkins University, he did a doctorate in anatomy and brain research at the University of California at Los Angeles in the 1960s. Brain science and consciousness remain major interests of his. His first involvement in China was through the scientific community in the late-1980s when he worked with scientists reforming China’s research and technology base. He received an invitation from Song Jian, then a State councilor and chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission. At the time he was developing a parallel business career and became president of The Geneva Companies, a leading US mergers and acquisitions company, which he eventually sold to Citigroup in 2000. At the same time he was cementing links with leading business and political figures in China. His organization, The Kuhn Foundation, with CCTV (China Central Television), produced the documentary In Search of China for PBS in the US, which was broadcast in 2000. He is now working on a new fivepart series China’s Challenges, which will be broadcast in China in the autumn and syndicated to PBS stations in the US next year. Perhaps Kuhn’s most significant project was writing a biography of former president Jiang Zemin, which was the best-selling book in China in 2005. How China’s Leaders Think was based on interviews with more than 100 leading Chinese political figures, some of whom he has known for more than a decade. “I know many personally and have worked with several for a number of years. When you hear them speak over a period of time, it gives you a sense of their personalities and character as well as their intellectual capabilities, leadership style and political progress,” he says. Kuhn sometimes likes to invoke humor to explain why there is sometimes friction between Chinese and American leaders. “Some people think it is because feng yongbin / China Daily of ideological, historical or cultural reasons that we have communication problems. As I once pointed out, perhaps it’s because China’s leaders, the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, were trained as engineers, and most American politicians were trained as lawyers. Maybe the problem is that lawyers and engineers can’t talk to one another!” Kuhn says the main focus in the West is often the Chinese economy and whether it will continue to motor ahead. “China should have 10 to 20 more years of what we should still call relatively high growth, driven by continuing the country’s unprecedented urbanization and modernization. “Growth rates will naturally ease from reform’s historic averages — probably to 6 to 8 percent per annum — which is less than we are used to, but which may be optimal because China can more effectively deal with its most severe problems, particularly economic and social imbalances and sustainable development. “However, China’s economy is fragile, vulnerable to exogenous shock. China’s growth is good for the world, but it cannot ‘save the world’,” he says. Kuhn says there is often a danger of China being misrepresented because it is seen through a narrow perspective. BIO Robert Lawrence Kuhn International corporate strategist, investment banker, senior adviser to multinational corporations and author Age: 67 Education: • Bachelor’s degree in human biology, Johns Hopkins University, 1964 • PhD in anatomy and brain research, University of California at Los Angeles, 1968 • Master of sciences in management, MIT Sloan School of Management, 1980 Career: • President and co-owner of The Geneva Companies, a US leading mergers and acquisitions company (sold to Citigroup in 2001) • Chairman, The Kuhn Foundation, which produces documentaries on scientific and philosophical questions as well as on China issues • Author of The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin and How China’s Leaders Think, as well as 25 books on business strategy, finance and investment banking Books: The Inflationary Universe: The Quest for a New Theory of Cosmic Origins by Alan H. Guth, Lake Views: This World and the Universe by Steven L. Weinberg, The Coherence of Theism by Richard Swinburne, and Infinite Minds: A Philosophical Cosmology by John Leslie. Books on consciousness by John R. Searle, David J. Chalmers and Colin McGinn. Film: Khachaturian (2003, directed by Peter Rosen; Dora Serviarian-Kuhn, executive producer) Music: Piano Concerto in D-flat Major by Aram Khachaturian (1903-78) played by Kuhn’s wife Dora Serviarian-Kuhn Food: “I eat tofu all the time. I appreciate the unbelievably different textures.” “Western media takes China’s very real problems and reports them as if they were, say, 80 percent of China’s story. I take the same problems — which are genuine and often intractable — and they consist of, say, 35 percent of my work,” he says. “It is not that Western media is conspiratorially biased or always anti-China, it is that they often do not provide proper and sufficient context,” he says. Huang Tiantian, Dong Fangyu and Zheng Yibing contributed to this story. B6 COVER STORY Sunday 25 November 2012 Shanghai Daily On a mission to explain ‘real’ China Above: “How China’s Leaders Think” Right: “The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin” “ I don’t try to make anybody happy, but I just want to tell the truth. I can be wrong, and maybe my truth is not balanced. Lu Feiran China expert and American public intellectual, Robert Lawrence Kuhn is best known in China for two books about Chinese leaders and their views, including a biography of former President Jiang Zemin in 2005 and one about other leaders and their thinking in 2009. Kuhn, also an investment banker, business consultant, brain scientist and philosopher, has been granted unprecedented access to Chinese leaders, though he does not speak Chinese. His biography “The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin” published in both Chinese and English, was a best-seller in China where readers are not accustomed to humanized biographies of leaders. It was probably the first biography written by a foreigner about a living Chinese leader that was published in China. Kuhn has also produced documentaries on China, written extensively for Chinese media and is often quoted by western media. He is a contributor and consultant to CCTV, some Chinese newspapers and the Xinhua News Agency. Kuhn sees his mission as telling the world about the real China. He was in Shanghai late last month for an International Channel Shanghai (ICS) program he co-produced and wrote about China’s challenges, in conjunction with the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. He held a press conference and also spoke with Shanghai Daily. Chinese media sometimes accuse some Westerners and Western media of China bashing, saying they misunderstand or are even malevolent. But 68-year-old Kuhn, a New Yorker, is believed to have a more neutral view for China. He received a bachelor’s degree in human biology from Johns Hopkins University, a master’s of science in management from the MIT Sloan School of Management, and a PhD in anatomy and brain research from UCLA. His books were published by the Shanghai Translation Publishing House and Shanghai Century Publishing Group. Kuhn said he “never tried to please the Chinese government, though Western media thought I did.” “I like feedback, including negative feedback, because I know that people are engaged,” he told Shanghai Daily. “I don’t try to make anybody happy, but I just want to tell the truth. I can be wrong, and maybe my truth is not balanced.” Kuhn’s experience with China started in 1989, when he was invited by former State Councilor Song Jian, director of the State Science and Technology Commission. The two became friends and Kuhn began traveling between the US and China, getting to know government officials and ordinary people. Kuhn said he felt frustrated because his experience in China differed from the description in much of the Western media. “Then they only focused on the negative side and ignored the rest,” he said. That disparity inspired him to write Jiang’s biography, he said. Jiang himself said that Kuhn didn’t “beautify” him and got his wedding date wrong. Kuhn spent four years writing “The Man Who Changed China.” Though he had only met Jiang three times and did not interview him for the book, he talked to many people close to Jiang, including relatives, friends and colleagues, gathering stories and perceptions. He became close to many of them. “I thought I had been rather familiar with China before I started working on the book,” said Kuhn. “But after I started collecting the information, I found that my knowledge was very limited.” Humanized leader Kuhn said he was determined to depict a real, animated Jiang, different from the seemingly impassive figure appearing on state occasions, on Chinese TV and in newspapers. “For a very long time, Chinese leaders were either described as God or the Devil, but never in-between,” he said. “So I expected to display a Chinese leader who is a human being.” Soon after publication, it became a best-seller in China. After Kuhn held a book-signing in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, more than 300 books were sold in an hour. In Shanghai, more than a million copies were sold in 2005, the highest in the social science category. Chinese readers called the book refreshing because it told daily life stories and described Jiang’s youth. One Internet user called “Burn the scarecrow” said before reading the biography, he thought Jiang was “a quiet man standing high above the masses.” “But after reading the book, my first feeling was that he was once young like us and he is also an ordinary man.” The English version, however, received some criticism, primarily that Kuhn was “fawning” over Jiang and the government. Kuhn denied that. “In fact, the book had a disclaimer, saying all Wisdom comes with Global People 读环球人物获人生智慧 第 32 期总第 201 期 2012 年 12 月 6 日 美国将军腐化生活 罗阳 , 没喝上最后的庆功酒何亮亮 :“ 廉政公署不可复制 ” 苹果设计团队的秘密领袖有种气质叫 “ 桂纶镁 ” www.globalpeople.com.cn 售价人民币 10 元港币 20 元邮发代号 :82-667 COVER PEOPLE 封面人物 情地与他们聊天 , 再从庞杂的素材中挑选自己需要的故事 …… 库恩坦言 , 在写这本书的过程中 , 自己与江泽民仅仅在公开场合见过 3 次面。 “1993 年 , 江泽民对古巴进行国事访问 , 住在古巴国宾馆 , 当时 , 我也在那里。我站在走廊上 , 而他正好也走了出来。那是我们的第一次见面。 ”2000 年 9 月 , 江泽民赴纽约参加联合国千禧年首脑峰会 , 他在一次招待会上第二次见到江泽民。 3 年后 , 库恩又在北京听了江泽民关于几个重要问题的讲话。尽管没采访到江泽民本人 , 库恩却并不觉得有什么遗憾。在他看来 , 这本书只是传记而非自传 , 没必要非采访到本人。为了完成这本书 , 库恩总是随身带着手提电脑 , 一有空就开始写作 , 从周一到周五 , 他常常工作至凌晨。每当他在吃完饭后一头钻进书房 , 妻子总会调侃他 “ 又去见江泽民了 ”。整整 4 年 ,3 次重写 ,5 次编辑 , 库恩光资料就搜集了 3000 万字 , 第一稿 70 万字 …… 2005 年 , 一本 47 万字的《他改变了中国 —— 江泽民传》出版。首批印刷的 20 2006 年 3 月 , 库恩在浙江与习近平会谈。万册 , 仅 10 多天就销售一空。为新书做巡回推广时 , 由于签名数量太多 , 库恩的手肘甚至有些劳损 ,“ 影响了打网球 ”。走访中国 40 多个城市《他改变了中国—— 江泽民传》的成功 , 让库恩有了进一步探寻中国整体形象的想法。他于是带着助手 , 开始走访中国 40 多个城市 , 进行深入的、大规模的调查研究。就是在这次调研过程中 ,2005 年 2 月 26 日 , 库恩在浙江西子宾馆见到了时任浙江省委书记习近平。习近平向库恩介绍了浙江的经济、历史和文化等方面的情况 , 并感谢库恩多年来从自己独到的角度研究中国、向世界介绍中国 , 在中美两国之间搭起了文化的桥梁。次年 3 月 , 库恩再次来到浙江 , 这一次 , 他的目的是了解 “ 浙江模式 ”。虽然是不期而至 , 但习近平仍挤出时间与他见面。习近平说 , 自己之所以要这么做 , 是要 “ 表示我们对库恩先生关注中国、客观介绍中国的感激之意 ”。库恩回忆说 , 习近平在那次谈话中强 调了中国自改革开放以来发生的翻天覆地的变化。 “‘ 有句老话 , 士别三日当刮目相看。你一个月不来 , 半年不来 , 中国就会有很大的变化。 ’ 他又补充说 ,‘ 但如果结合中国悠久的历史来分析 , 又不会惊讶于它变化之快 , 因为我们经历了几千年才走到这一步。无论我们怎么看待这一速度 , 中国的发展变化 , 至少在一定程度上 , 是由爱国热情和民族自豪感推动的。 ’” 让库恩印象最深的是 , 在谈及如何以最好的方式向世界介绍中国时 , 习近平提出 , 中国的情况无法用简单的一句话来描述 , 或用单一的方法来概括 , 并借用中国古代寓言 “ 盲人摸象 ” 来说明这个问题。 “ 他把中国富裕的东部沿海比作大象的腿 , 而将中国广袤的西部比作大象宽阔的后背 , 认为 ‘ 象是一个完整的概念 , 必须全面地了解 , 要避免犯盲人摸象的错误 ’。 ” 对库恩来说 , 这样的比喻是新颖而有用的 , 这个说法 , 他到现在还记得。接连的调研 , 让库恩对中国有了更深入的认识。 2007 年 12 月 9 日 , 时任中宣部部长刘云山在与库恩的一次会谈中提议 , 如果由他来写一部关于中国改革 30 年的书 , 一定很有意义。库恩知道 , 这次又说到他心坎上了。库恩列出了一份庞大的采访名单 , 每次采访前 , 他会向被采访对象提供三四十个问题的采访提纲 , 后者通常会选择其中的二三十个作答。采访结束后 , 库恩再根据采访录音进行整理 , 并对其中提及的年份、数字和事实进行核实。在与 100 余位省部级官员、企业领袖和专家学者沟通交流 , 并采访了诸多改革开放的亲历者后 , 库恩用 5 个月时间完成了 80 万字的初稿。 “ 我的家人说 , 整整一年 , 他们只能看到我的后脑勺。 ” 2008 年 12 月 ,《中国 30 年 : 人类社会的一次伟大变迁》中文版在中国发行。第二年 , 为纪念新中国成立 60 周年 , 该书英文版在全球出版发行。截至目前 , 这本书是唯一由外国人详细描述中国改革开放 30 年进程的书籍。 编辑 | 张建魁肖莹美编 | 苑立荣图编 | 傅聪编审 | 刘爱成丁子 31 库恩十年十人政治□ 本刊记者凌云 讲述中国政坛 10 年变迁 . 16 . 2016 年 1 月 11 日 , 库恩在北京接受本刊记者专访。 ( 本刊记者傅聪摄 )