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Plaintiff,
New York, N.Y.
v.
Defendant.
Before:
x
15 Civ. 7433(RWS)
June 23, 2016
12:19 p.m.
District Judge
APPEARANCES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: SIGRID S. McCAWLEY
Attorneys for Defendant
Attorneys for Respondent Sharon Churcher
LAW OFFICES OF
Attorneys
BY: GREGORY L.
RACHEL S.
for Respondent Jeffrey Epstein
POE
LI WAI SUEN
(212) 805-0300
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(Case called)
THE COURT: Extending discovery.
MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor. This is Sigrid
McCawley on behalf of the plaintiff, and we had filed a motion
for additional time to complete six depositions. Your Honor
may recall that we received an order on Monday that allowed for
alternative services to three of the witnesses that we were
seeking to depose. Our discovery cutoff right now is set for
June 30th, which is I believe next Friday, if I'm correct. So
at present we have six witnesses that we still need to depose,
the three that we had alternative service for, and then we have
Mr. Ross GOw, who was the defendant's agent who issued the
defamatory statement, Mr. Brunel --
THE COURT: How much time do you want?
MS. McCAWLEY: Sorry. We were requesting 30 days to
complete those depositions to coordinate with their counsel and
then coordinate with the defendant's counsel and get those set,
and I believe we can do that without altering the Court's
deadline for a trial, which is set presently for November
I'm sorry, October 17th.
THE COURT: OK. What is wrong with that?
MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, in theory, initially there
is nothing wrong with that. It seems to me that we're not
going to complete a variety of discovery issues by July 1. The
problem, I think, your Honor, is the cascading effect of that
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extension.
And if I could digress for a moment and just a moment?
When we were here I think in March, the Court raised the issue
of was this enough time for discovery at that time. I told the
Court I didn't think so, and I didn't think that the trial date
was reasonable as a result of what I perceived to be problems
going forward with discovery. Counsel on the other side
opposed my suggestion as to extension of time at that point and
we proceeded. The Court agreed with the plaintiff and not with
me.
The problem I see, your Honor, is that now we are
scheduled to have expert disclosures due in July, dispositive
motions in August, and a trial date in October. I don't
believe that it is feasible, if we continue discovery out until
the end of July, to have expert discovery done by the end of
August. I don't believe it is going to be feasible to have
dispositive motions completed in the time set by the Court, and
all of that is going to push into whether or not we have an
October 18th trial date.
I think the Court also needs to consider, your Honor,
and of course is now familiar with the volume of paper that
gets filed in this court on a regular basis at all hours of the
day and night, and I anticipate that there are going to be
significant evidentiary issues that the Court is going to need
to rule on in advance of trial. The Court sees a harbinger of
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those issues today, I think, as a result of these subpoenas.
All of that tells me that the prudent course of action in my
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view is to sort of try to sit down and rework some of these
discovery deadlines with an idea that we're going to actually
have realistic dates.
THE COURT: OK. Good. I'll extend the deadline 30
days. I'll direct counsel to meet and confer and see if they
can come up with a schedule that both sides will agree upon.
Second, the plaintiff wants to maintain certain
confidentiality designations. What is the problem?
MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor.
So, with respect to our revised Rule 26 disclosures,
we, in order to divulge all information relevant to the case,
had a list of individuals on there who are allegedly victims of
sexual abuse themselves as minors or witnessed things. So we
designated under our protective order in this case that Rule 26
disclosure as confidential. It was challenged under the
Protective Order. Once it is challenged, we have a ten-day
window to file something with the Court. So we filed our
motion for the protective order.
On Friday of this past week, on the 17th, they issued
a new
defendants issued a new Rule 26 disclosure with 42 new
names on it, those of which were on our disclosures, without
marking it as confidential. So I sent them an email just
asking them to hold that as confidential until the Court has an
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opportunity to rule on whether or not those names can remain
confidential under the protective order. So that is the status
as we are right now.
So we are awaiting a ruling. We believe those
individuals should be protected under the Court's protective
order and those names kept confidential during the course of
this, and it is my understanding that defendants oppose that
position.
THE COURT: What is the attack?
MR. PAGLIUCA: Well, your Honor, under the terms of
the protective order, certain categories of information is
likely confidential. People's names, in my view, are not
confidential. I didn't choose to list these folks in what I
understand is a Rule 26(a) disclosure, which is a good faith
disclosure of people who may have information relevant to the
claims or defenses in the case. That's their listing. All it
is is the names of people.
I have absolutely no idea or ability to understand why
someone's name could be considered to be confidential. It is
their name. They use it every day. They walk around with it.
They have a driver's license with it. I don't understand how
names in a 26A(a) disclosure could be deemed confidential.
And what I view this as is just simply, you know,
another step in the process here of preventing access and use
of information.
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THE COURT: Well, you've got the information.
MR. PAGLIUCA: I do have the information.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Why is it confidential?
THE COURT: Why?
MS. McCAWLEY: May I address that, your Honor? Did
you want me to address that?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. McCAWLEY: Sorry. So with respect to the reason
why individuals who may have been victims of sexual assault
would be confidential, there is case law that we cite in our
brief, Doby v. Evans, which deals with using, for example,
pseudonyms of victims --
THE COURT: Let's just -- I think we can shorthand in
the context of the patois of this case.
Victims. OK. You want to maintain the
confidentiality of the identity of the victims. OK?
MS. McCAWLEY: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Beyond that?
MS. McCAWLEY: Right. Beyond that we are fine.
THE COURT: OK. All right. That will be maintained.
MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you.
THE COURT: Apple and Microsoft. Let me ask the
defense, seems to me the law bars the subpoenas.
MR. PAGLIUCA: I don't understand why, your Honor. I
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think it's a legitimate Rule 45 subpoena. I don't understand
why it would be barred under Rule 45. There is no objection by
the providers of the information. They have indicated to us
that if there is a release that's provided to them by the
plaintiff, they will turn over the information. And I don't
understand what the problem is. This is information indeed,
your Honor, that the plaintiffs are required to produce to us
under our discovery requests and have not, which resulted in
these Rule 45 subpoenas. After the Rule 45 --
THE COURT: Well, as far as Apple, my understanding
about Apple is that with respect to that, that material has
been reviewed by counsel and everything has been turned over
that's appropriate.
MS. SCHULTZ: That is correct, your Honor.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Well, if that's true, your Honor, then
the issue is moot and I agree.
THE COURT: If what?
MR. PAGLIUCA: The issue is moot if that is true.
THE COURT: So Apple is out.
Now, the problem with Microsoft, I'm not quite clear.
MR. PAGLIUCA: The problem for me or the problem for
them?
THE COURT: The problem for the plaintiffs.
MS. SCHULTZ: Thank you, your Honor. Meredith
Schultz, from Boies, Schiller & Flexner, on behalf of Ms.
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My client had two email accounts with Microsoft.
They are personal emails accounts. We have not been able to
access that.
THE COURT: Why not?
MS. SCHULTZ: Well, it appears for one -- there is one
called live.com, and it appears for that, that that has been
administratively deleted. I don't have personal knowledge of
that, but when you put in the email address to try to recover
it, I get a message saying we don't recognize this one, "this
one" being the email address. That is Exhibit 1 to our brief
on this matter.
We wrote a letter to opposing counsel citing some
governing provisions of Microsoft's email policy that indicates
that due to inactivity they delete accounts after a certain
amount of time. It's my understanding that that has happened
to that account but I can't say so for sure. So we are unable
to access that whatsoever.
The second account is a hotmail.com account. We have
also been unable to access that. It appears that it still
exists, but despite multiple and diligent attempts to get into
that account, we have been unable to. And I have been involved
in those attempts myself personally. Accordingly, we have
captured and produced every electronic document to which we
have access.
And I'd like to speak a minute about the legality of
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the Microsoft subpoena. Even under Rule 26, it is a hopelessly
broad subpoena. It is abusive civil discovery and on the face
of it appears to violate the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act and the Stored Communications Act, federal laws. The email
seeks -- excuse me. The subpoena seeks every email that has
ever been sent to that account or sent from that account.
That's every single personal email. This is without
limitations, without exceptions, without a timeline. And
pursuant to these subpoenas, these emails are to be turned over
to defense counsel. So, plaintiff's counsel would not have an
opportunity to review for attorney-client privilege email,
review for relevance, and it wholly circumvents the protections
of the discovery process, which is why courts who have looked
at this issue have consistently rejected these broad subpoenas.
Defendants know that they are not entitled to every
single personal email plaintiff has ever sent or ever received
in the course of however many years these accounts were open.
In fact, Judge Kozinski in the Ninth Circuit allowed a civil
suit against those who propounded these improper subpoenas, and
that was with regard to a professional email account, as
opposed to personal email accounts, the issue in this case
THE COURT: Do we know what the date of this account
is?
MS. SCHULTZ: It's an old account. I think, 2011 -- I
know that it was -- at least one of them was active in 2011.
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It's impossible for me to determine at this point when it was
opened and when it was last used because we don't have access
to them.
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THE COURT: Yes. OK.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, this is the problem and I'm
going to be frank. This is a hide-the-ball problem. They tell
us -- so let me backup.
We were originally told these are the only email
accounts that the plaintiff had. When we deposed her, we found
out about these accounts. We then get into an issue with
counsel telling us, oh, we've done this due diligence search
and we can't access any of this information, these accounts are
closed. Well, then we look into it a little bit further and we
find out, indeed, the accounts are not closed; indeed, they
have been active, and there are indeed emails that are relevant
to the issues in this case that were sent and received out of
these accounts. That's a fact here.
Now, all they need to do, if they want to avoid
electronic privacy issues, is comply with their discovery
obligations, execute a release, and send it to Microsoft.
Microsoft will then give them the information. That's what we
have been told in response to this subpoena.
So to sit here and say, oh, it's overbroad and it's a
problem and you can't do it, you know, you can't have it both
ways. You either can't avoid discovery of something that you
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are required to give up and then say, gee, we don't have access
to it. That's the conundrum here, your Honor.
I'm sorry we are here at this point. I agree, if
there is privileged information in there, maybe somebody should
review it. But when you tell opposing counsel we don't have
access to it and the account is closed and that's indeed not
true, it seems to me that you have forfeited your ability to
then stand up and say the subpoena is overbroad.
THE COURT: Forgive me, but what's the basis upon
which you say it's not true?
MR. PAGLIUCA: The account is not closed?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Because we have been told that by
Microsoft when we issued them the subpoena.
MS. SCHULTZ: Can I address that really briefly?
My communications regarding these accounts are in
letters that are attached to the briefs in this case. I never
said that the Hotmail account was closed. I said that we are
unable to access it.
With regard to the Live.com account, I said it appears
to be closed because the website does not recognize the email
address. I never told them that the accounts were closed.
I am more than happy to sign a release to Microsoft
for any data that they might have to be delivered to
plaintiff's counsel, at which point we will be more than happy
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to run our search terms, review it, and produce anything that
is relevant.
THE COURT: That is good.
MS. SCHULTZ: But the subpoenas are requesting that
all of our data be turned over to defense counsel.
THE COURT: OK. Well, so what we'll do is at the
moment -- yes, OK, we'll quash the subpoena on Microsoft, with
the understanding that that's not on the merits and it can be
renewed, if necessary. Also, on the understanding that the
plaintiffs will do whatever is necessary to get access to these
accounts, review them, and determine -- treat it as the Apple
accounts have been treated.
OK. So that solves that problem.
Churcher's motion to quash.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, before we move on, I have
one point of clarification with regard to the earlier ruling
about counsel conferring about scheduling going forward.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PAGLIUCA: I understand that to mean we should
confer about all of the scheduling issues moving forward.
THE COURT: Which you think are relevant.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Including up to the trial date in this
case?
THE COURT: Whatever you think -- if you have a
position that you think is now established that we are not able
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to try the case in October, that's fine.
MR. PAGLIUCA: OK. Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT: Whatever.
MR. PAGLIUCA: I just want to make sure I am
understanding the Court's order.
THE COURT: Yes, OK.
Churcher. Yes.
MR. FEDER: Eric Felder, from Davis Wright Tremaine,
for the movant.
THE COURT: Sure. Of course.
MR. FEDER: Good afternoon. My name is Eric Feder
from Davis Wright Tremaine, for the movant, Sharon Churcher.
My client, Sharon Churcher, is a journalist. She is
currently employed by American Media, Inc., where she is a
reporter for Radar Online and the National Inquirer. And prior
to that she worked at the British newspaper, The Mail on
Sunday. She's also worked as a freelance reporter. And she
has been subpoenaed as a third party here to give testimony and
to provide documents in this case. We move to quash the
subpoena.
As Ms. Churcher states in her affidavit in support of
the motion, her entire involvement with this case, with the
plaintiff, with the defendant, all of the facts underlying the
case was as a reporter seeking to report and publish news
stories. All the documents and the information described in
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the subpoena and the document requests, which are quite broad,
by the way, and which we have to assume provide the contours of
the information they are seeking in deposition, were created or
obtained by Ms. Churcher in the course of her news-gathering
activities, and much of the information sought was communicated
in confidence, as well. So under the New York State Shield
Law, which is the appropriate law and which defendants
acknowledge is the appropriate law, not the slightly less
protective Federal Reporters' privilege, the defendant has a
heavy burden to meet to even obtain nonconfidential
information, and confidential information is absolutely
privileged.
We just received an opposition to our motion which was
filed last night after close of business and we've been
reviewing it, but much of the substance of it is redacted out
pursuant, presumably, to the protective order. We had
previously offered defense counsel to sign the acknowledgment
of the protective order, which does provide for disclosure to
witnesses and witnesses' counsel. They didn't take us up on it
before. Obviously, the offer still stands.
But what we can say based on what we've seen is that
the defendant claims that Ms. Churcher, who they fully
acknowledge reported stories about this case -- not this
litigation but the underlying case and who first met the
plaintiff when she traveled to Australia to interview her in
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2011, that she at some point along the way transformed from a
reporter reporting news into a friend or a business adviser.
It's not clear again because of the redactions when this
transformation presumably took place. But the reality is that
that is simply an incorrect characterization of the
relationship.
Since 2011, and continuing up, frankly, through the
present day, Ms. Churcher has continued to cover this story as
a reporter, has published stories, including just I think two
months ago, often using
or her so-called agents as
sources, of course most prominently in early 2015, which is
what underlies this particular litigation.
By its terms, the Shield Law applies to any
information obtained or communications made, quote, in the
course of gathering or obtaining news for publication. Now, of
course, a reporter's source relationship is complicated. Not
every single interaction or every single communication is going
to be an interview with questions and answers that then get
published verbatim. So to the extent that there are particular
emails where Sharon provided advice to
that doesn't
transform the overall relationship from reporter and source to
adviser and advisee or friend.
Reporters communicate with sources in a variety of
ways. A police beat reporter may take a sergeant out for
drinks and talk about life in general with no intention of
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publishing details but with the intention of maintaining that
close source relationship so that when the sergeant comes into
possession of information, he's right there as the first
recipient of that information.
As this Court stated in the Schoolcraft case, that the
reporter's privilege seeks to prevent the unnecessary enmeshing
of the press in litigation that arises from events they cover.
And that's exactly what this is.
The Second Circuit interprets the qualified privilege
very broadly to apply not only to individual bits of
information gathered from sources but also to unpublished
details of the news gathering process. That's from the Baker
.7. Goldman Sachs case, 669 F.3d 105, from 2012.
But either way, what they're seeking here, as
described in their opposition, is quintessential news gathering
Shield Law material. They list it at a couple of different
points in their brief. They are asking for Sharon Churcher's
interview notes, recordings, memos, and other documentation
that are clearly, and concededly by the defendant, from the
news gathering process.
In order to overcome this Shield Law for even the
nonconfidential information, they have to make a clear and
specific showing that the information is highly material and
relevant, that it's critical or necessary to the maintenance of
the claim or defense, and that it is not obtainable from any
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alternate sources. So as an initial point, it is quite clear
that they haven't exhausted all other sources up to and
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including the proceedings here today, where
to seek material from the plaintiff's email
your Honor just granted an order that would
they are continuing
accounts, which
facilitate that,
and also the pending motion to reopen plaintiff's deposition.
So clearly they haven't exhausted plaintiff as a source.
They are also asking for Ms. Churcher's communications
with the plaintiff's agents or attorneys or communications with
law enforcement about
effort to obtain that
attorneys or from law
the plaintiff, but we're not aware of any
information from those agents and
enforcement. Obviously, law enforcement
may have their own objections to a subpoena. And while the
defendants may not like what the FBI would say here, but there
are certainly alternative sources that they are required under
the Shield Law to turn to before seeking this from a reporter.
In addition, the information -- again, we haven't seen
precisely what it is because it is blacked out of their
opposition but to the extent we understand it -- does not meet
the critical or necessary prong, which is, under the Second
Circuit law and under New York law, quite high. As the Second
Circuit articulated in J<rase v. Graco, 79 F.3d 346, the
information can be compelled, or disclosure can be compelled
when the claim or defense, quote, virtually rises or falls with
the admission or exclusion of the proffered evidence. And they
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just -- they have not made that showing here.
They talk about the fact that they need this
information because the credibility of the plaintiff is key,
but the credibility of a plaintiff is key in many kinds of
cases and certainly very often in libel case, where truth or
falsity is sort
obviously not a
the plaintiff's
of the ultimate issue being tried, and there is
wholesale exception for libel or any case where
credibility is central to the Shield Law.
They also focus heavily on the idea that the story
changed over time from what was published in 2011 and what was
published in 2015 and after and, in particular, the question of
whether
had sex with Prince Andrew or not. In 2011,
the article stated that there was not evidence that that
happened. In 2015, after court papers stated that it had
happened, they then reported that it had. But I would submit
that's less an issue of the story changing than what changed
was what the newspapers were comfortable publishing.
There is actually a Vanity Fair article about this
that was published later in 2011 that talks about how -- it
talks about Prince Andrew -- that's what the article is
about -- and it talks about the strictness of British libel
laws that likely are what contributed to newspapers sort of
hedging on that point.
This also is not a case where the journalist was an
eyewitness to events in her capacity as a citizen. She wasn't
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there when whatever happened with Ms. Maxwell and
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took place, witnessing it as citizen Sharon Churcher. All of
her knowledge about this comes from reporting as a reporter.
And, finally, because the documents all fall within
the Shield Law, a reporter should not be burdened with going
and sitting for a deposition where her counsel basically
objects to every question as privileged under the Shield Law.
And both the New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit
have emphasized that. The New York Court of Appeals said, in
Holmes v. Winter, which we cite in our brief, where the entire
focus of a reporter's testimony would be on privileged topics,
quote, No legitimate purpose would be served by requiring a
witness to go through the formality of appearing to testify
only to refuse to answer questions concerning the information
sought.
And the Second Circuit, in Gonzalez, talked about the
dangers that if parties to a lawsuit were free to subpoena the
press at will, it would become standard operating procedure,
and the resulting wholesale exposure of press files to
litigants' scrutiny would burden the press with heavy costs of
subpoena compliance and could otherwise impair its ability to
perform its duties.
Finally, even setting aside the Shield Law, the scope
of the subpoena is very broad and overly burdensome even just
as a third party. These communications go back at least five
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years, if not more. Ms. Churcher was employed at different
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newspapers and is a freelancer, so we are talking about
multiple email accounts. So even just gathering this broad
scope of communications which aren't limited by time or
specific subject matter would be quite burdensome, but, again,
because the Shield Law applies, a fortiori, as a journalist,
she should not be put to that burden.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, I start with -- I would
like to read to the Court an example of Ms. Churcher's
involvement in this case. I have this as an audio file and if
I was allowed to bring my cell phone in, I would play it, but I
wrote it down to read it to the Court.
MS. McCAWLEY: Excuse me, your Honor. I just want to
make sure that we are not -- some documents have been labeled
confidential, which is why there are redactions and I believe
there are other individuals present in the courtroom --
THE COURT: Yes. Find out what it is.
MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you.
THE COURT: No. Confer with counsel.
MR. PAGLIUCA: This is not a document that has been
produced by the plaintiffs, and it has never been labeled as
confidential in connection with this case.
MS. McCAWLEY: Sorry. I was concerned about that.
MR. PAGLIUCA: So, this is a voice message that
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Ms. Churcher left for Paul Cassell, who is a lawyer in this
case who entered an appearance in this case, in February of
2015.
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On February 5, 2015, your Honor, it starts out: Paul,
it's Sharon. I wanted to discuss and with you on a deep
background basis something that's in my file. I, as you know,
feel almost like a friend of
I think that the FBI
affidavit was pretty close to perjury. Give me a call when you
get a chance. On a deep background basis, if it's not going to
be a conflict for you, it's something that I wanted to get your
advice on. Take care. Bye-bye.
This voice message is troubling on a number of levels,
your Honor, in connection with this case. First, it has never
been provided to us, and there is a lawyer who has entered an
appearance in this case. We have asked for this kind of
discovery from the plaintiff and it has never been provided,
and it's germane to the issues before the Court. But what it
reveals is that this is not Ms. Churcher's first interaction
with Mr. Cassell, lawyer for the plaintiff. They are on a
first-name basis. She is feeling free to call him and leave
messages for him.
And what she wants to discuss is apparently an
affidavit prepared by the FBI that's been provided to
Ms. Churcher by someone; I don't know whom, your Honor, but I'm
going to presume it was provided to Ms. Churcher by the
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plaintiff. That's troubling as well because we went through
litigation in this case about our access to alleged
public-interest privileged documents that were not turned over
to us but were submitted in camera to the Court. But to the
extent that that's part of those documents and Ms. Churcher has
it, that's a problem for the discovery process in this case.
And it's a problem for Ms. Churcher, your Honor,
because it's clear, as is attached to our papers, that
Ms. Churcher's role in this entire ordeal was not simply a
journalist. Ms. Churcher is a self-described friend. She is a
self-described adviser. She's a self-described confidante.
She is a self-described advocate. In many instances throughout
this ordeal, Ms. Churcher was acting as a source of information
to Mr. Edwards, who is another lawyer who has entered an
appearance in this case, and to law enforcement.
The Shield Law only applies when journalists are asked
to disclose information received in the course of gathering or
obtaining news for publication. And Ms. Churcher's activities
in connection with this case are far outside of those bounds.
To be clear, we don't want that information from Ms. Churcher.
So whatever information Ms. Churcher has that was indeed
obtained in her job in the course of gathering or obtaining
news for publication, we haven't subpoenaed that information.
But I suggest, your Honor, that the blanket notion
that Ms. Churcher can't sit for a deposition in this case is
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simply wrong, and these issues need to be resolved on a
question-and-answer basis by Ms. Churcher, because her role in
connection with this case far exceeded any role as a
journalist.
Indeed, your Honor, Ms. Churcher is a fact witness in
this case. The Shield Law relied on is only applicable when
the journalist is asked to disclose information, again,
received in the course of gathering or obtaining news for
publication. And much of the information that we are asking
if, indeed, it is not all -- from Ms. Churcher has nothing to
do with information she gathered or collected in the course of
gathering news for publication.
We have Ms. Churcher meeting with the plaintiff in
early 2011 and then conducting a week-long series of interviews
leading to the publications in March of 2011. We then go
through another five years here where the story changes, and it
is reasonable, I believe, to believe that the story is changing
not because of the truth of the story but because of
information that's being given to the plaintiff and she is then
changing her story to make it more salacious and more sellable
to various people through the world.
There is a series of exchanges between the plaintiff
and Ms. Churcher that we have in email communications that have
been provided to the Court that demonstrate this course of
conduct over time. We also have a series of communications
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between the plaintiff and law enforcement and the plaintiff's
lawyers that are not news-gathering activities. These are
wholly outside of the process of gathering news. And they are
sharing information back and forth, and Ms. Churcher is
providing information to Mr. Edwards, counsel in this case.
Ms. Churcher is advising the plaintiff on how to deal with her
own lawyer in connection with maximizing her return on
publishing details that appear to be provided to the plaintiff
by Ms. Churcher. All of this is outside the bounds of any
Shield Law or any privilege.
I think the Court knows
I'm sure the Court is
exhausted with all of the pleadings that have been filed in
this case related to discovery. I believe we have exhausted
all avenues available to us to obtain this information. There
is really no place else to go. And so there is -- I think it
is not well founded, your Honor, that there is some notion that
we have not done everything that we can to get this information
from the plaintiff, Microsoft, other places before turning to a
subpoena to Ms. Churcher.
Ms. Churcher is likely the only source of this highly
relevant information, which is this 24-page fabricated diary
and the testimony around that, communications with law
enforcement and the FBI that have no legitimate investigative
reporter purpose.
So, for those reasons, Judge, I believe the Court
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should deny the motion to quash, we should be allowed to
proceed forward with the deposition of Ms. Churcher. If there
are particularized objections to the questions because counsel
believe that those invade some privilege, they should be raised
at that time, and we go forward on a question-by-question basis
because most of this information will not be subject to any
privilege.
Thank you.
MR. FEDER: May I be heard briefly?
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. FEDER: Thank you. Just very briefly.
First of all, the voicemail that my colleague read is
totally consistent with news gathering. She mentions that it's
on deep background, and in trying to cultivate the source she
describes herself as almost a friend. Again, I don't think
that type of less formal communication is indicative of a
transformation from a journalist into something else.
But more problematically, we haven't heard that
voicemail. We haven't seen any of the emails they are talking
about because they are redacted; the exhibits containing them
were filed under seal. So we don't know exactly which pieces
of information they are trying to seek and which pieces of
information they are claiming are not subject to the privilege.
I think we can all agree that Ms. Churcher is in fact
a journalist, that she did in fact publish stories from
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actually going back to 2007 that
wasn't named, but
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from 2007 and certainly 2011 onward, publishing stories about
these matters. So, clearly the Shield Law is floating around
here at a minimum somewhere.
And they have to make a clear and specific showing for
each piece of information that they claim either the Shield Law
doesn't apply because she wasn't acting in her capacity as a
journalist or that the Shield Law is overcome because it's
critical or necessary and they've exhausted alternative
sources. And the Shield Law itself provides that the Court
shall order disclosure only of such portions of the news sought
as to which the above-described showing has been made and shall
support such order with clear and specific findings made after
a hearing.
So we can't go forward and just deny the motion to
quash entirely and just go to a deposition and start answering
questions when the Shield Law at a minimum applies to, we would
submit, all of it but at a minimum a substantial portion of the
information. We need to see what they're specifically talking
about here.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I will reserve
decision.
The motion to quash the Epstein --
MR. POE: May I approach the podium, your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. Of course.
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MR. POE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Gregory Poe on
behalf of non-party Jeffrey Epstein. With me, your Honor, is
my colleague Rachel Li Wai Suen.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. POE: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.
We've attempted to be thorough in our briefing so I
won't belabor the issues. I think the key issue is whether in
fact an undue burden would exist if Mr. Epstein were subjected
at this point to a deposition. The plaintiff concedes, as the
law requires, that evidence must be relevant and admissible.
And here the examples the plaintiff's counsel has offered with
respect to a 2010 deposition in a different proceeding where
Mr. Epstein apparently answered some questions doesn't add
anything that the public record already doesn't reveal. So, in
our view, that would not justify a deposition, which leaves
really the Fifth Amendment implications that have been
represented will be made, and that raises the LiButti issue.
And under LiButti, your Honor, really the permeating
factor is control. And the typical case -- really, most of the
cases, to the extent courts have addressed this issue, are
employee invocations where the corporation for which the
employee works is the party, and there the invocation can be
imputed because it is controlled. There is no control here,
and the factors that exist don't justify the deposition under
the LiButti analysis. And I would point the Court, as I'm sure
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the Court has reviewed, to docket 228 -- that's the defendant's
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pleading -- at pages 16 to 18, which lays out both in redacted
form, which I have not reviewed, and unredacted form, various
bases for why LiButti has not been met here by the plaintiff.
But the alternative argument the plaintiff makes,
which is this is not ripe for decision, while we certainly
concede that it would not be something that is the usual
practice in a typical case, this is not a typical case, we
would respectfully submit. And we would ask the Court consider
as an alternative holding in abeyance any deposition of
Mr. Epstein until the record that the plaintiff refers to has
been developed. That would not result in prejudice to either
party, and it would not subject Mr. Epstein to a burden of a
deposition or the cost or inconvenience, which, of course, need
to be considered with respect to a third party under Rule 45,
when, in fact, if we are correct that no litigation purpose
would be served, it would by definition, in our view, be an
unnecessary cost and inconvenience and, therefore, an undue
burden.
Finally, your Honor, if the Court -- and, ultimately,
if Mr. Epstein is not granted relief with respect to this
motion, we would ask in the alternative that the Court prohibit
videography for the reasons that we have outlined in our
briefs. The plaintiff's opposition states that Mr. Epstein is
asking for preferential treatment. We make legal arguments,
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your Honor. Whether the Court agrees or disagrees with our
legal arguments, Mr. Epstein is not asking to be treated better
or worse than anybody else under the law.
So with that, your Honor, we -- if the Court has any
questions, I am prepared to answer them.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. POE: Thank you.
MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, may I be heard on the
motion to quash, please?
So with respect to Mr. Epstein, obviously the Court
has heard from us previously. He is at the center of this
conspiracy, we allege, with Ms. Maxwell, the defendant. It
would be highly prejudicial to the plaintiff here to not be
able to take his deposition.
To accommodate his concerns, even though he was
sighted just even days ago by his New York mansion, we have
agreed to fly down to the U.S. Virgin Islands to handle that
deposition.
With respect to his concerns over videography, he said
he was concerned that that would be leaked to the media, we
have a confidentiality order in place in this case and we will
gladly mark that as confidential so that is not a concern.
It's very important that we are entitled to ask him
those questions. I know his counsel has stated that he intends
to take the Fifth. As the Court well knows, there are many
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questions for which you have to have a basis to take the Fifth,
so it can't be just a carte blanche taking of the Fifth. So
there will be questions that he can answer during that
deposition.
In addition, we're entitled to see his demeanor during
that, to have the jury see his demeanor on video if this goes
to trial. So it's critical that we are entitled to take that
deposition of Mr. Epstein, who is the co-conspirator here.
With respect to the J,iRiztti case, your Honor, that
case addresses, as the Court may well know -- it is a Second
Circuit case -- it addresses the standard by which a court can
allow a nonparty's invocation of the Fifth Amendment to have an
adverse inference against a party in a litigation. We contend
that we meet all of the factors of LiButti, but at this point
that would not be the time for the Court to make that decision.
Obviously, the deposition needs to take place. We need to have
a record of what he is taking the Fifth on, and then we can
make those arguments presumably in a motion in limine for why
we believe that that adverse inference should apply.
So, your Honor, I submit to you that this deposition
is critical to us. We've done our part in trying to
accommodate this witness, and we believe that the deposition
should move forward and the motion to quash should be denied.
Thank you.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Your Honor, may I make some comments on
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this motion as well?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PAGLIUCA: Thank you.
Your Honor, first, I think what I'd like to say to the
Court is that, indeed, I wish Mr. Epstein's deposition could go
forward. I have every reason to expect that should Mr. Epstein
testify and testify truthfully, his testimony would be of
enormous support and corroboration of Ms. Maxwell's version of
events in this case.
It's important to note, your Honor, that Ms. Maxwell
was not the subject of this investigation that led to
Mr. Epstein's being charged and pleading guilty. We just
finished the deposition of Detective Recarey, who was the lead
deposition -- the lead detective in the case, and he agreed
that throughout this investigation he never spoke to
Ms. Maxwell. No one identified Ms. Maxwell as being involved
in any of the alleged crimes. He did not seek any indictment
or prosecution against Ms. Maxwell. And his only investigation
relative to Ms. Maxwell was to simply look her up on the
Internet.
There is no surveillance footage of Ms. Maxwell. She
is not named in any of the affidavits that are filed with the
court. So, in short, Ms. Maxwell was not implicated in any of
the conduct that Mr. Epstein was alleged to have committed.
It's important background, your Honor, for the next
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point here, because the plaintiff has not raised what I think
is a very important issue here with regard to the Fifth
Amendment, and that is does Mr. Epstein indeed have the ability
to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege now in the context of
this litigation. And there are a number of factors that are
considered, the first being, and I think it is important to
recognize, Mr. Epstein was granted immunity by the United
States Attorney in the District of Florida for the conduct that
I believe he is going to be questioned about. And I don't
believe that it is appropriate for a witness to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege after they have been granted immunity by
the prosecuting authority under 18 United States Code 6001.
So, I don't think that there has been any exploration of
whether Mr. Epstein can indeed invoke his Fifth Amendment
privilege.
He also pled guilty to state charges which likely
would act as a jeopardy bar and prohibit Mr. Epstein from
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege in the state system to
the extent that the immunity from the federal government
doesn't cover him, which I submit that it would.
There is also the statute of limitations, your Honor,
which seems to me has long expired with regard to any of the
allegations in this case.
Now, why do I raise that, Judge? They don't really
want Mr. Epstein to testify. That's the point here. They want
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to be able to have him assert his Fifth Amendment privilege so
that they can then try to back-door this against Ms. Maxwell.
And, in effect, they are creating their own little dichotomy
here, which is he's taking the Fifth, we want him to take the
Fifth, because then we get to just do a list of questions about
everything that we want to have an adverse inference about as
it relates to Ms. Maxwell, not as to Mr. Epstein. That is the
problem, because they haven't done what they should do to get
to that point in the first place. I think that is a real issue
and a real problem for this motion before the Court now.
This is simply an attempt to manufacture -- and I use
that word deliberately, your Honor -- manufacture self-serving
evidence that they can then try to present to a jury through
this derivative adverse inference.
Final comment: I have never had a court allow a
witness to come into court and assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege, whether that be in a criminal case or a civil case.
I've never had a court allow a jury to be shown someone's
deposition while they are asserting a Fifth Amendment
privilege. I don't understand the point of that. And it seems
to me there is no point in allowing a videotaped deposition of
somebody who is going to sit there and say to every question
"On the advice of my counsel, I assert my Fifth Amendment
privilege." There is nothing to be served by the added expense
of that process.
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So, your Honor, this is Mr. Epstein's fight, it is not
Ms. Maxwell's fight, but it becomes Ms. Maxwell's fight to the
extent that we're trying to create evidence down the road that
is used against Ms. Maxwell in this proceeding.
Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Yes. Anything further?
MR. POE: Nothing further, your Honor. Thank you.
MS. McCAWLEY: Your Honor, may I just briefly
address -- defendant's counsel didn't file a brief on this so I
just want to take a few moments to address the points he has
just raised very briefly.
First, we would love to have Mr. Epstein give complete
testimony in this case. I look forward to that. I hope that
he will do that for us, and that is why we want to take his
deposition. Ms. Maxwell had given an indication she was going
to take the Fifth. When we deposed her, she didn't. So things
may change. We need his deposition.
Second, with respect to the representations regarding
the deposition of Detective Recarey which occurred earlier this
week, Detective Recarey did say that he sought to interview
Ms. Maxwell in the course of that and did acknowledge that
Ms. Maxwell is in the police reports. I just want to make sure
that that is corrected on the record.
Thank you, your Honor.
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THE COURT: Thank you, all.
I will reserve decision.
MS. McCAWLEY: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you, all.
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