EFTA01756330

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen Sent: Saturday, October 19, 2013 9:08 PM Subject: October 19 update 19 October, 2013 Article 1. =he Council on Foreign Relations Time Ripe for Iranian Nuclear Accord? =nterview with Suzanne Maloney =a href="#b">Article 2. =he Washington Post What a nuclear deal with Iran could look like =ichael Singh Article 3. HUrriyet Daily News <1=> Turkey sees Israel behind campaign against spy chief =urat Yetkin =a href="#d">Article 4. =he Washington Post America's not in decline — it's on the rise =Iy Ratner and Thomas Wright Article 5. =ew York Post Egyptian military's pact with Islamists</=pan> <http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/egyptian-mil=tarys-pact-with-islamistsk Amir Ta=eri chttp://nypost.com/author/amir-taheri/> ay> Article 6. =gence Global EFTA_R1_00057660 EFTA01756330 The Generals Rule Egypt Again =ami G. Khouri =a name="gg">Article 7. =YT Libya's Political Dysfunction <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/opinion=talk-about-political-dysfunction.html?hp> =ason Pack and Mohamed Eljarh Article 8. =sharq Al-Awsat A Kurdish State—but where and when? =amir Salha &n=sp; Arti=le 1. The Council on Fore=gn Relations Time Ripe for=Iranian Nuclear Accord? Interview with Suza=ne Maloney October 18, 2013 --=It's "very much possible&q=ot; for world powers and Iran to achieve an agreement on the latter's nucl=ar ambitions, says Suzanne Maloney, a longtime expert on the Islamic Republic. "But it's also not inevitable." =n addition to concerns about enrichment levels, Maloney says that negotiat=rs from the so-called P5+1 (United States, Britain, France, Russia, Ch=na, and Germany) will focus intensely in the coming months on Iran's development of advanced centrifuge technology and = heavy-water reactor set to come online next year. Meanwhile, she says tha= talks could be sidetracked by additional U.S. sanctions, which are due up=for Senate debate in the near future. The major powers=and Iran just concluded two days of what from all accounts were very posit=ve talks. This was a continuation of the constructive atmosphere during th= UN General Assembly when the newly elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and foreign minister Javad Zarif =ere in New York. Where do you think we go from here? The nuclear talks wil= continue in early November.</=pan> It's very much poss=ble to get a deal between the United States, its international partners, a=d Iran on the nuclear issue within the span of a year, but it's also not i=evitable. What we saw this week was an important and constructive beginning that has been a long time in the m=king. The international community has been talking to Iran about its nucle=r ambitions and activities for well over a decade, and the United States h=s been prepared to be a participant in 2 EFTA_R1_00057661 EFTA01756331 those dialogues since 2006. And yet never before have we had what=took place over the course of the past few days in Geneva, which was appar=ntly a very serious, technical discussion about how Tehran can meet the co=cerns of the international community for greater transparency and greater assurance that the Islamic republic c=nnot break out and achieve nuclear weapons capability. The Iranians hav= made it clear, though, that they want to continue to enrich uranium. We d=n't know whether they are willing to stop at this 20 percent figure. What =oes the magic figure mean? There are both qual=tative and quantitative constraints that the international community is lo=king to see Iran apply to its enrichment activities. The UN Security Counc=l resolutions that have been passed over the course of the past seven years all refer to a requirement of a su=pension of uranium enrichment, which was of course the condition—the con=ession—that now President Rouhani negotiated while he was in charge of t=e talks for Iran from 2003 to 2005. There has been for some time an understanding among most in the internatio=al community that it is no longer viable to achieve a sustained suspension=of all of Iran's uranium-enrichment activities. However, there are concern= about enrichment to what is described as medium levels—near 20 percent enrichment—which provides something o= a fast track to production of nuclear weapons fuel material. This h=s been an area where the United States and its partners have been focused =or a number of years in hopes of persuading Iran to either forgo that enrichment or to suspend and stop it. It appears=that that's an area [in which] the Iranians are at least prepared to make =ome initial concessions. There is discussion, at least in the reports that=have come from Geneva, that Iran may be prepared to suspend that enrichment for a six-month period. Iran ha= been quite careful to ensure that its stockpile of this medium-enriched u=anium does not go beyond what the Israelis and others have described as a red line. That is an area [where], because of the focus of many years,=we're more likely to see some quick progress. The bigger issues may be som= of the technical areas of concern that have grown more urgent as Iran's program has expanded over the course=of these many years. Like what? In particular, the =evelopment of more sophisticated centrifuges and the heavy-water reactor based in the Iranian city of Arak, which is due to=come online sometime next year. I think these are two particular issues [t=at] the international community is going to be looking at very closely for significant Iranian concessions in=order to build up confidence that we can keep Iran significantly far from =uclear weapons capability. There was some t=lk about Iran agreeing to this so-called "additional protocol" that allows UN inspectors to come in without any real warning. Can you talk about that? This is a form of e=hanced transparency, and something that has been the focus of interest for=many years. The Iranians agreed to implement the "additional protocol=quot; while Rouhani was the nuclear negotiator, but the treaty was never ratified by the Iranian parliament; and that leve= of transparency has not been in place in Iran for many years. And so, it =s of considerable importance that Iranian negotiators appear to have said =ublicly that they are prepared to implement the terms of that protocol, even if they are unable for eithe= legal or political reasons to get parliamentary ratification of the treat= addition itself. That is an important confidence builder, but, in effect,=transparency is not enough. We would like to see greater transparency and cooperation with the Internatio=al Atomic Energy Agency from Iran. But, I believe that the more important =onsiderations from the international community are caps on the number of c=ntrifuges and on the extent of enrichment in Iran. While the Iranians have suggested they are prepared to=talk about it, it's not yet clear if there is any real meeting of the mind= between the two sides on what kinds of numbers would be acceptable. Of course, there=are several parties who are not terribly happy about the improvement in th= atmosphere. There are many members of Congress who would like to have add=tional sanctions put on Iran now, as well as the Israelis who are very nervous about this progress.<=pan style="font-size:18.0pt"> There are still man= who have not yet been convinced that there is a real deal on the table at=this point, and that's perfectly justifiable in some quarters, given that =his is a significant shift from much of what we've seen and heard from 3 EFTA_R1_00057662 EFTA01756332 Iran over the course of the past eight y=ars with former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. There are many in Congress =ho believe that pressure has worked, and so it should be intensified in or=er to ensure that we get the very best deal possible. And while I understand the logic behind that sort of a= argument, I think it is a dangerous presumption to assume that simply bec=use pressure has worked that more is always better. In fact, it's qu=te likely that if we were to see the proposed sanctions bill—which has passed the House and intended to =o before the Senate over the course of the next few weeks—passed by over=helming veto-proof majorities of the U.S. Congress, it would likely create real difficulties for the prospect of mai=taining the momentum and seeing some early fruit from these talks in the f=rm of an interim confidence-building measure, which I believe is the objec=ive of the U.S. negotiators. What about from =he Iran side? Are there still many political prisoners that the world woul= like to see released?<=p> We've seen a lot of=progress since the election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013, but Iran is ce=tainly not a free and fair country. It is a country in which there are ong=ing human rights abuses, including the imprisonment of many for simply participating in the political process=or voicing their opinions through the media. It's also a country with one =f the highest levels of prisoner executions per capita in the world. All o= these issues are ongoing concerns for the United States. The most high-profile political prisoners in =ran today are the two candidates, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, =nd their wives from the 2009 election in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's reele=tion victory was contested by millions throughout the country. The pair who had run against him and spearheaded t=e rejection of the official outcome has been under house arrest for two-an=-a-half years under incredibly draconian circumstances. They're in homes, =ot behind bars, but effectively their homes have become prisons. There are bars on the windows. They're li=ited in the contact they can have with the outside world. It is truly an a=ea that the international community ought to be focused on. There are smal= signs of progress even here within Iran. There has been official discussion of a review of their status, and = think that this is going to be a barometer for many Iranians, if not for =he world, of how far President Rouhani can and is prepared to go in terms =f changing the political climate in Iran. And, of course, =e's constrained by what Ayatollah Khamenei will allow, right? Rouhani is limited =y the hard-liners and in the sense that he is not a reformer by any stretc= of the imagination. He is very much a pragmatist who has come to this pos=tion, in a way, to lead a national unity government, to lead Iran out of the crisis that it has found itself =n with the international community, and to begin to rebuild the legitimacy=of the regime within Iran itself. And so he's got a very difficult balanci=g act and a lot of different constituencies to try to manage as he goes about this process of moderating both at home =nd internationally. What do you thin= will happen over the next six months? Any breakthroughs? Predictions with Ir=n are incredibly dangerous, as I think you know. But I'm very optimistic. ='m not irrationally exuberant. There has been just a little bit too much a=oration of the new tone that we've heard from Iran, and I think that it's important to remember that we're on=y beginning to see the first real tangible signs of change within the coun=ry. But it's quite clear that Rouhani was elected with a mission and=a mandate to find some way out of the nuclear mess and rehabilitate Iran's role in the world and fix its economy= The only way that he can do this is to come to an agreement with the inte=national community. The negotiators and the officials that we have seen in=New York and Geneva have made very clear that they are empowered, prepared, and willing. I think it's also cl=ar that the Mama) administration sees the opportunity before it and is a=tempting to seize that opportunity. Suzanne Maloney,=Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Brookings Institution.=/span> =/span> 4 EFTA_R1_00057663 EFTA01756333 Arti=le 2. The Washington Post= What a nuclea= deal with Iran could look like Michael Singh 18 Oct 2013 -- With=the first round of nuclear talks <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran- nucle=r-talks-enter-second-day-western-officials-call-tehrans-proposal-very-usef=1/2013/10/16/615815f4-364e-11e3- be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html> with Ir=n's new, and newly pragma=ic <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rouhani-s=orn-in-as-irans-president/2013/08/04/eb322736- fd25-11e2-8294-0ee5075b840d_=tory.html> , negotiating team in the books, the Washington policy debate about Iran has=shifted from whether a deal is possible to what sort of deal is acceptable= While such discussions can often seem a miasma of centrifuge counts and e=richment levels, there are, in fact, two distinct paths to a nuclear deal with Iran. The first path is o=e in which Tehran would receive relief from sanctions in exchange for putt=ng strict limits on its nuclear activities, such as restricting uranium en=ichment to low levels. The success of such an agreement would depend on ensuring that Iran could not use decl=red nuclear activities as a cover for covert activities aimed at developin= a nuclear weapon. It would also depend on ensuring that the deal was not =asily reversible, so Tehran could not renege once pressure had been alleviated. There are ways that sanction= relief could be made more easily reversible — for example, channeling o=l payments to Tehran through a single mechanism that could be blocked in t=e event of noncompliance — but none of these is fail-safe. The efficacy and durability of a deal over limited =nrichment would rest on Iranian transparency. To be meaningful, transparen=y measures would have to include allowing inspectors unfettered access to =ites of their choosing, not just those declared by Iranian officials, and a comprehensive accounting of Ira='s past and present nuclear work, including the military elements of its=nuclear program, such as weaponization research. Coming clean in thi= manner is a prerequisite for the success of any deal that leaves in place dual-use nuclear capabilities. Countries =hat have divulged their nuclear secrets, such as South Africa, have procee=ed to cooperate peacefully with the international community on atomic ener=y. Those that continued to obfuscate despite agreements, such as North Korea <http://www.washingtonpost.co=/world/satellite-images-suggest-north-korea-restarted-small- nuclear-reacto=-us-institute-says/2013/09/11/5484039e-lb49-11e3-8685-5021e0c41964_story.h=ml> , experienced deeper isol=tion and external tensions. Iran appears to pre=er the latter model. While its officials profess a desire for cooperation,=they continue to dismiss as "unfounded allegations" evidence deemed =93credible" by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran has engaged in nuclear work related to weapons. Iran cont=nues to deny inspectors access to suspected nuclear sites and key personne=, and it seeks to constrict their activities within the bounds of its decl=red nuclear program. Even in the best ci=cumstances, it would take time to establish confidence that Iran had truly=given up its nuclear weapons aspirations. Allies such as Israel and the Gu=f states would distrust Iranian intentions, while Iranians would bristle at the intrusiveness of inspections. Absent a=strategic shift by Iran, a deal on limited enrichment is more likely to in=rease those tensions than to defuse them: Iran would seek to hide or deny =ctivities for which the United States and its allies have convincing evidence; Iran's adversaries would=seek to match its nuclear capabilities; and erstwhile allies such as Russi= and China would drift away from the unlikely coalition currently led by W=shington. The unlikelihood of a change of heart by Iranian leaders suggests a second, more straightforward=path to an agreement: requiring Iran to dismantle its nuclear program in e=change for any relief from sanctions, which would be increased should Tehr=n refuse to yield. In this model, Iran would have to suspend enrichment- and reprocessing-related activities=as demanded by the U.N. Security Council, dismantle its underground enrich=ent facility at Fordow and export its stockpiles of enriched uranium, amon= other steps. The obvious objection to such a deal is that it may be too difficult to achieve; even U.S. negot=ators have characterized this stance as "maximalist." But any deal mus= be evaluated in comparison to plausible 5 EFTA_R1_00057664 EFTA01756334 alternatives, not in isolation, a=d Iran's alternatives are bleak. Iran's economy is under severe strain because of the sanctions. If Iran tried to =93break out" for a nuclear weapon, the United States and Israel have mad= clear that they would strike a devastating military blow. And contrary to con=entional wisdom, time is not on Iran's side. With each passing day, Iran=92s economic predicament deepens and its nuclear program expands. But whil= the former threatens Iran's well-being, the latter does not improve it. Adding to its centrifuge inventory and ura=ium stockpile merely edges Iran closer to Western "red lines" while ma=ing it no less vulnerable to attack. The United States p=ssesses powerful leverage in the nuclear talks: Its negotiating position i= eminently reasonable. The West is offering Iran something it desperately =eeds — sanctions relief — in exchange for something it has little ostensible use for — enrichment and reproces=ing — given its disavowal of nuclear weapons. That's hardly a maximali=t position. It is commendable t=at the United States and its allies hope earnestly that Iran would take th= path of true transparency and cooperation; indeed, President Hassan Rouha=i's " charm offensive <http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo- way/2013/10/01/228163576/dont-bu=-rouhanis-charm-offensive-israels-netanyahu-tells-u-n> " is so beguiling because it appeals to those hopes. =ut we, and perhaps even Rouhani, cannot compel Iran to make such a fundame=tal change in course. We can, however, with firmness at the negotiating ta=le and confidence in our leverage make plain the alternatives and force Tehran to confront, rather than evad=, the consequences of its choices. Michael Singh is=managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. =/span> Arti=le 3. H0rriyet Daily News Turkey sees l=rael behind campaign against spy chief Murat Yetkin=/p> October/19/2013 --&=bsp; "We see this media campaign as an attack and there might be an Isra=li effort behind it," a Turkish intelligence source said on the phone ye=terday. "Especially after the Washington Post story on Oct. 17 and the follow-ups with Jerusalem bylines." This is a bold clai= and the source was referring to a story by seasoned journa=ist David Ignatius who clai=ed that Turkey's National Intelligence Organization (MIT) had given Ir=nian intelligence the names of 10 Iranians who had been in contact with Israel's intelligence service, MOSSAD, upon=the orders of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan. The story was based=on "knowledgeable sources," without giving any details about the leak =hile noting that Israel=/span> had seen Hakan Fidan, the h=ad of MIT, as someone who had "friendly links with Tehran." There is a backgrou=d to all of it. Ignatius was the moderator at the World Economic Forum pan=l in Davos on Jan. 29, 2009, when Erdogan had his "One minute" storm=against him for failing to give a chance to reply to Israeli President 6 EFTA_R1_00057665 EFTA01756335 Shimon Peres who was also a panelist. And Is=aelis started to accuse Fidan almost at the same time as he was the Turkis= sherpa during the U.N.-sponsored efforts on Iran's nuclear program, bef=re becoming MIT's head. Ankara thinks the W= story is part of a campaign that started with a Wall Street Journal story=printed on Oct. 9 saying Fidan was acting "independently" on Syria ope=ations, jeopardizing Western interests there. The story also noted that the discomfort of the U.S. administration=was increased during a May 16 lunch at the White House put on by U.S. Pres=dent Barack Obama for Erdogan in the presence of Fidan, Turkish Foreign =inister Ahmet Davutoglu, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Obama's national security adviser, Tom Danilon. =he WSJ story said Fidan was responsible for Turkey's soft stance regardi=g al-Qaeda-affiliated opposition groups in the Syrian civil war. Both of the stories=were refuted by Davutoglu on Oct. 17. "The claims attributed to Hakan =idan are both untrue and an example of very bad, black propaganda. Fidan i= doing his job," he said. But the feelings in the Turkish government regarding the "campaign" are=stronger than those on-the-record words of Davutoglu. One government off=cial pointed to the timing of the media reports "targeting" Fidan. Therofficial said the campaign coincided with approaching Syria talks in Geneva, which are expected to take place in lat= November, and a dramatic change in Iran's relations with the West under=its new president, Hassan Rouhani. Since a telephone c=nversation between Obama and Rouhani on Sept. 27 during U.N. General Assem=ly talks, the top diplomats of both countries have officially met for the =irst time since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The discussion led to the quick restart of diplomatic efforts for=direct talks on Iran's nuclear program with the P5+1 countries. = Israeli Prime Minis=er Benjamin Neta=yahu did not hide his uneas= at the rapprochement, immediately flying to Washington D.C. to warn Obama=on Sept. 30 that Irang=pan> was a "wolf in sheep's cl=thing." When asked about th= WP story on the claim of "revealing the Israeli spy ring in Turkey to t=e Iranians," U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki did not make a=y comment but said the U.S. had been working with the Turks as an ally on a range of issues and that the report had not=changed relations with Turkey. Sources in apan class="MsoHyperlink">Ankara<=span> believe that besides trying to defa=e Turkey in U.S. eyes as a country tolerating terrorists like Iran — and beca=se of its "independent tack" on Syria, amid an effort to try and corne= it in a possible move in the U.S. Congress — l=rael might have had another=motivation. That might be, according to those sources who asked not to be =amed, an attempt to avoid paying compensation for the nine Turks killed by Israeli commandoes on May 31, 2010, on board =he Mavi Marmara on its way to carry humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip.&nb=p; After the official =pology from Netanyahu (which was brokered by Obama) on March 24, talks sta=ted for compensation to the families of the victims, albeit with no result= as Israel=/span> does not want to make the p=yments in the form of "compensation," according to Israeli diplomatic =ources talking to HDN. Also, Erdogan's=close relations with Hamas are another source of disturbance between the t=o. By coincidence, Khaled Mashaal, the leader of Hamas, was received by Er=ogan in his office in Ankara=/span> on Oct. 9, the same day tha= the WSJ story published. On Syria, Turkey ha= been taking more careful steps regarding al-Qaeda-affiliated groups fight=ng in the civil war there. Turkish intelligence sources have admitt=d to HDN that there were a =umber of operative and diplomatic steps taken in parallel with the demands=of the U.S., the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia since Erdogan's May 16 meeting with Obama. Davutoglu said su=sequent telephone conversations on Oct. 16 with Kerry and French=/span> counterpart Laurent Fabius =hat Turkey was going to be part of the Geneva talks (which have mainly bee= a U.S.-Russian matter until now) for the future of Syria and the Bashar al-Assad regime there. 7 EFTA_R1_00057666 EFTA01756336 Erdogan had conde=ned al-Qaeda in Syria during an Oct. 2 speech in Istanbul and Davutoglu =ad, again on Oct. 9, said Turkey neither supported nor tolerated al-Qaeda-=ffiliated groups in Syria, the al-Nusra Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and others. Turkish officals may not be ready to acknowledge a "tactical mistake" yet, but thos= statements might be the cost of underestimating the rise of radical Islam=st movements within the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. Perhaps as another =elated and defensive move, the Turkish General Staff said Oct. 16 that Tur=ish artillery had shelled ISIS positions near the al-Qaeda-seized border t=wn of Azaz in response to a shell fired from there — the first event showing the changing Turkish stance. This c=ange of stance may help the Turkish government in its dialogue with the ou=lawed Kurdis=an Workers' Party (PKK) i= the search for a political solution to the Kurdish problem, too.</=> It is unclear wheth=r an Israeli "plot" is behind the obvious campaign against Turkey's =ntelligence chief and whether it is aimed at Erdogan's foreign policy =hoices, especially regarding the greater Middle East. Turkey is criticized at home and abroad for being distanced from the= European Unio= and getting too involved w=th the uncertainties of the Middle East. Both the recent EU Progress Repor=, which calls for Turkey to foster higher standards of democracy to keep up with its European venture, and the Genev= Conference on Syria might be chances to fine-tune Turkish foreign policy. =/span> Arti=le 4. The Washington Post= America's n=t in decline — it's on the rise Ely Ratner and Thom=s Wright 18 Oct 2013 -- It=92s been a banner month for the oracles of American decline. The shutdown =f the federal government, the prospect of a default on the country's deb=, and the political dysfunction that made the United States seem rudderless on Syria and forced the cancellation of =resident Obama's trip to Asia seemed to confirm that the end of American=preeminence is finally upon us. Council on Foreign =elations President Richard Haass argued <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/the-real-threat- to-=s-national-security-97938.html> t=at Washington was "hastening the emergence of a post-American world." The Guardian's Timothy Gar=on Ash wrote <http://www=theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/15/americans-need- discover-how-worl=-sees-them> that "the erosion of American power is happening faster than most of us =redicted — while the politicians in Washington behave like rutting stags=with locked antlers." And the financial Web site MarketWatch declared <http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-what-decline-of-=-superpower-looks-like-2013-10- 08?> China was poised to surpass the United States in GDP by 2016. Today, the picture =ouldn't look more different. Brazil's growth rate has fallen from more=than 7 percent in 2010 to just under 1 percent. Likewise, Indian growth tu=bled to about 3 percent in 2012, down from double digits as recently as two years earlier. Perhaps most pronounced, C=ina's government is revising down its official growth targets. Analysts =re no longer asking whether there will be a Chinese economic slowdown but =ather how hard the landing will be. Morgan Stanley has =dentified five particularly fragile emerging-market currencies: Brazil's=real, India's rupee, Indonesia's rupiah, South Africa's rand and Tur=ey's lira. Those countries are vulnerable to high inflation, large deficits, low growth and a downturn in China. And th=y may soon face problems in international financing. 8 EFTA_R1_00057667 EFTA01756337 The political syste=s in emerging powers are fraying, too. There have been huge protests in B=azil <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/brazil-once-revered-n=w-rocked-by-protest/2013/06/22/1b6c7640-db57- 11e2-b418-9dfa095e125d_story.=tml> over wasteful government spending and inadequate social programs. Russia l=oks more authoritarian by the day. And the Chinese Communist Party is step=ing up efforts to crack down <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinas-leader-xi-jinp=ng-consolidates-power-with-crackdowns-on-corruption- internet/2013/10/01/fd=ceeee-leb7-11e3-9ad0-96244100e647_story.html> on journalists, academics and bloggers in what seems to be an attempt to c=ntrol the discontent that accompanies slower growth and painful economic r=forms. These "rising pow=rs" are hardly faring better collectively. The international institution= they established — BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and IBS= — continue to disappoint. At the same time, t=e United States is experiencing a turnaround of fortunes. The unemployment=rate has fallen to just over 7 percent from an October 2009 peak of 10 per=ent. By contrast, euro-zone unemployment remains stuck at around 12 percent. The U.S. fiscal pic=ure is also looking up. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estima=es that the annual budget deficit will drop below $650 billion in 201=, the smallest shortfall since 2008 and approximately half the size it was in 2011. Meanwhile, the dollar remains =he world's top reserve currency. Even more transform=tive, the United States is experiencing an energy revolution that the McKi=sey Global Institute estimates could add as much as 4 percent to annual GD= and create up to 1.7 million new jobs by 2020. America is poised to overtake Russia as the world's largest pro=ucer of oil and natural gas, and there are signs that low-cost and abundan= energy is driving a revival of the U.S. manufacturing i=dustry <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/0=/is-u-s-manufacturing-set-for-a-comeback-or-is-it- all-hype/> . Although the United States will have an enduring interest in stable global=energy prices, it will no longer rely on direct and uncertain acces= to Middle Eastern oil <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/does-opec-still-ha=e- the-us-over-a-barrel/2013/10/11/d3395316-2ad9-11e3-8ade-alf23cda135e_sto=y.html> , in sharp contrast to energy- starved countries in Asia. In terms of hard po=er, the U.S. military is at the forefront of next-generation technologies,=including unmanned systems, robotics and lasers. Even more superior than i=s hardware is its software: the command and control systems to conduct highly advanced joint operations and major =ars. The United States a=so remains the linchpin of the international community. Through hard-nosed=diplomacy, economic pressure and the specter of military action, Washingto= has retained its ability to marshal effective multinational coalitions, bringing down Libya's Moammar Gaddaf=, getting weapons inspectors on the ground in Syria and embarking on serio=s negotiations to curb Iran's nuclear weapons program <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national- security/ira=-nuclear-talks-enter-second-day-western-officials-call-tehrans-proposal-ve=y-useful/2013/10/16/615815f4- 364e-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html> . You can quibble with process and style, but it's hard to argue t=at any of these would have happened without the United States. More broadly, and m=st important, the United States is blessed with a superior combination of =ound fundamentals in demography, geography, higher education and innovatio=. That ensures it has the people, ideas and security to thrive at home and on the world stage. There's a reason =lites around the world remain eager to send their fortunes, and often thei= families, to the United States. Of course, the econ=mic recovery is incomplete, and much remains to be done on the debt and gr=wth, but as <=pan style="font-size:18.0pt">Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political- news/car=-caught-in-us-political-crossfire-20120723-22k5b.html> =/a> aptly noted in July 2012, "America is just one budget deal away from ending al= talk of America being in decline." Easier said than done, but still eas=er to address than the mammoth challenges facing the emerging powers. 9 EFTA_R1_00057668 EFTA01756338 As partisan as Wash=ngton is today, the United States has overcome episodes of far greater soc=al discord and political turmoil. The recent souring of public opinion on =he obstructionists in Congress is a healthy reminder of America's propensity for political renewal.</=> In this dawning era=of strategic advantage, the United States will confront foreign policy cha=lenges largely associated with weakness and instability abroad. Washington=will wrestle with the consequences of a fragile China and its implications for the economics and politics of =ast Asia. The Middle East will continue its painful and bloody revolution.=And Europe appears increasingly unable to move beyond protracted stagnatio=, eroding its ability to play a constructive role in world affairs. But being lonely at=the top will also engender huge opportunities to build the kind of liberal=order that the United States failed to consolidate in the 1990s. Rather th=n simply reengineering the existing system, this will require U.S. leadership to build international norms, ru=es and institutions from the ground up. Washington will have new leverage =o renegotiate its relationships and engagements with the Middle East; the =uccess of U.S. sanctions on Iran is only the first manifestation of America as an energy powerhouse. The United States c=n also lead in knitting together historic trade pacts across the Pacific a=d Atlantic oceans, reenergizing a first-rate global trade agenda long sabo=aged by protectionism and low standards. And Washington can use its newfound strength to exercise restraint and dev=lop international rules around emerging security issues such as drone warf=re and offensive cyber-capabilities. All of this will contribute to a more=prosperous and secure United States. The principal risk =o these efforts is that Americans could choose to wall themselves off from=the world after a difficult decade. According to a survey by the Chicago C=uncil on Global Affairs, 38 percent of Americans want to stay out of world affairs, the highest share since 19=7, and the figure rises to a majority among young Americans who came of ag= during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. But retrenchment wo=ld be a huge mistake. America's domestic revival provides all the necess=ry tools to facilitate American leadership abroad. Being humble about the =nited States' ability to shape foreign societies, particularly through military means, is no excuse for a lack of=ambition to continue advancing U.S. interests and universal values oversea=. Rather than bracing=for American decline, Washington should prepare to lead the world anew. Ely Ratner is de=uty director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New =merican Security. Thomas Wright is a fellow with the Managing Global Order=project at the Brookings Institution. =1span> Arti=le 5. New York Post Egyptian military's pact with Islamists <http://nypost.com/2013/10/17/egyptian-mil=tarys-pact-with-islamistsh =span style="font-size:28.0pt"> Amir Taheri <http://nypost.com/author/amir-taheri/> 10 EFTA_R1_00057669 EFTA01756339 October 17, 2013 --=Sometime next week, Egypt's military-run government will publish the "=irst draft" of a new constitution to replace the one worked out by the g=vernment of the ousted President Mohamed Morsi. The coup that retur=ed the military to power after a year-long interval was presented as an at=empt to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from imposing an Islamist dictators=ip with a constitutional facade. Highlighted were two articles in the Morsi constitution that identified the Islamic sh=ria as the source of legislation in Egypt and gave Al-Azhar, the official =eminary, a virtual veto on certain issues. The crowds that for=weeks filled Tahrir Square called on the army to intervene to save the nat=on from a burgeoning sharia-based -dictatorship. Well, when the new draf= constitution — written by a 50-man committee appointed by the military — is published, the Tahrir Square crowds are l=kely to be disappointed. The two controversial articles will still be ther=, albeit under different numbers and with slight changes in terminology.4=pan> "Egyptians want t= retain their Islamic identity," says Kamal Halbawi, a former Brotherhoo= member who co-chaired the army-appointed drafting committee with Amr Mous=a, a former foreign minister during the earlier military governments. Thus Islamists, inc=uding the Salafist Nour ( Light) Party sponsored by Saudi Arabia will have=no reason to be unhappy with the proposed draft. The difference this=time is that the new constitution also gives the military what the text dr=fted by Morsi denied it. The armed forces will get recognition for their =93special status" and given a virtual veto on key aspects of security, foreign and even economic policies. The Supreme Council=of the Armed Forces, the junta formed after Hosni Mubarak's ouster, will=be recognized as a constitutionally sanctioned state organ with "special=responsibilities and prerogatives," including the appointment of the defense minister and the supervision of the militar= budget, which will be spared public submission to the parliament.<=p> Put brutally, the p=oposed draft constitution is a pact between a section of the military led =y Gen. Abdul-Fattah al-Sisi and a section of the Islamic movement spearhea=ed by Salafists. The faction led by =isi represents a segment of the officers' corps reluctant to abandon a s=stem under which the army acted as a state within the state and seized con=rol of perhaps 20 percent of the national economy. As always during the past 100 years, the military is using a pseu=o-nationalistic discourse full of xenophobic shibboleths. The Salafist factio= hopes to seize the opportunity of its collaboration with the military to =uild its position within the Islamist constituency. With the Muslim Brothe=hood banned and most of its leaders under arrest, the Salafists hope to seduce some of their followers, especi=lly with the help of a deluge of Saudi money. However, even when =hey add their respective bases of support, the Sisi faction of the militar= and the Salafist faction do not represent more than a third of the Egypti=n electorate. The two factions ca= dominate the organs of the state and exercise power only if they stick to=ether. They hope to do so with the proposed constitution, which is a rehas=ed version of an old recipe for despotism. This is the recipe =he interim government has followed in a series of incremental moves that i=clude reimposing the 50- year-old state of emergency, enacting new laws on =ublic gatherings and reviving special tribunals acting as star chambers outside the normal legal systems.=/p> 11 EFTA_R1_00057670 EFTA01756340 It all makes for a =iabolical feast in which the likely losers will be the freedom-loving demo=strators who filled Tahrir Square. If so it will mean history repeating it=elf, given the similar fate their grandfathers suffered in the 1950s when the military and the Muslim Brotherhood also bu=lt a tacit alliance against Egypt's democratic =/span> Arti=le 6. Agence Global The Generals =ule Egypt Again Rami G. Khouri 19 Oct 2013 -- One =f the major ongoing debates these days is about the real meaning and conse=uences of the armed forces' ousting of the elected government of Preside=t Mohammad Morsi in Egypt some three months ago, and the subsequent banning and arrests of the Muslim Brotherho=d organization. This is an important debate that touches on the heart of t=e political realities that millions of Arabs have been struggling, sometim=s dying, to define in the past nearly three years of uprisings—namely, whether public power and state a=thority will reflect the will of the majority and the consent of the gover=ed, or instead will continue to be shaped and wielded by small handfuls of=men with guns. The school of thoug=t that I subscribe to holds that the army's populist coup marks a severe=but temporary setback to the democratic transition that has been moving er=atically since January 2011. Egypt and its democratic aspirations have been grievously wounded by the swift and s=vere manner in which the armed forces evicted and jailed Morsi, arrested m=st of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, killed hundreds of pro-Morsi =emonstrators, and then started exerting pressure on the mass media to conform to the generals' policies= Not only was this bad enough, but many Egyptians also supported the elimi=ation of the Muslim Brotherhood, including many whom we referred to as lib=rals in recent years. I say this is a tem=orary setback mainly because of how Egyptians behaved several times since =anuary 2011—first evicting Mubarak and his armed forces and crony capita=ist regime, and then again insisting in the year to June 2012 that the armed forces turn over power to a legiti=ately elected civilian government. Those mass and repeated expressions of =ejection of military rule were deeply felt political realities that did no= reflect momentary whims—they were the result of six decades of military rule that transformed Egypt from a l=ader of the Arab world and the developing world into a backwater of medioc=ity and mass citizen humiliation. I suspect that in d=e course we will see the critical reactions of many Egyptians who are now =ilent or support the armed forces, but who will probably discover that rul= by generals was the core of the problems that led so many Egyptians to oust the Mubarak government and start on the=path towards democratic and constitutional pluralism. What actually happen= in Egypt remains to be seen. It is possible that I am dreaming, and that =gypt's democratic moment is over. That, indeed, is th= view held by those who feel that the last three months mark the definitiv= end of the democratic transition in Egypt, and the return of rule by the =enerals, with only cosmetic gestures to civilian rule. They see the severe crushing of the Muslim Brotherhood a= a sign of a fascistic moment that also includes some nationalistic hyster=a. This line of thinking despairs of a successful democratic transformatio= in Egypt, given the ferocity of the armed forces' treatment of the Muslim Brotherhood and the apparent w=despread support for this move among the Egyptian public. 12 EFTA_R1_00057671 EFTA01756341 We do not yet have =ufficient evidence to know which of these two views of Egypt's direction=is more accurate. It is possible that we may see something in between, aki= to the liberalizations that the Arab world experienced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including parliamenta=y elections, new space for political parties and civil society organizatio=s, and other signs of a peculiar Arab brand of liberalization without demo=ratization. A dashing general may well run for the presidency and win on the strength of having restored ord=r to a land that the Muslim Brothers had driven into disorder and fear. Millions of Egyptia=s clearly were humiliated to such a great extent that they rose up in revo=t against the Mubarak regime in January 2011. Was the fear of the incompet=nce and power-grab of the Muslim Brotherhood so great that these same Egyptians would welcome back the rule of the gene=als, simply to get rid of the Muslim Brothers? It is very possible=that we are seeing how the human need for basic security, jobs, food, gaso=ine and health and education services is so overwhelming that it takes pri=rity over any issues of rights, freedoms and dignity in the political realm. It is also possible that Egyptians mer=ly want a pause from the chaos of their political transition that the Musl=m Brothers mishandled, and they trust the generals to provide that pause, =deally to be followed by a return to the path of forging a real democracy. Egyptians do not ha=e any other alternative right now. The Muslim Brothers are down for the mo=ent, but they will return in another form. The non-Islamist political forc=s proved to be as incompetent as the Islamists. The armed forces are the only institution Egyptians trust for b=sic security. They rule again today, but for how long? Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the=lssam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the A=erican University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon. =/span> Arti=le 7. NYT Libya's Political Dysfunction <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/opinion=talk-about-political-dysfunction.html?hp> <=pan style=lont-size:28.0pt"> Jason Pack and=nbsp;Mohamed Eljarh October 18, 2013 --=ON Oct. 5, American Special Forces captured Nazih Abdul-Named al-Ruqai, an=operative of Al Qaeda living in Libya. Five days later, a group of Libyan =ilitiamen kidnapped their own prime minister, Ali Zeidan. After five hours, having faced no opposition from th= police or the army, they released him <http://transitions.foreig=policy.com/posts/2013/10/10/catch_and_release_libyan_style_0> . The prime minister's ca=tors made no demands for cash, nor did they overtly request any changes in=current government policy. Nor was anyone hurt — an aspect that gave the=whole affair the air of a vast publicity stunt. Some have described=the kidnapping as a pseudo-coup. But coups usually aim to overthrow one go=ernment and replace it with another. Things are different in Libya.=/p> 13 EFTA_R1_00057672 EFTA01756342 None of the country=92s competing armed factions are capable of governing alone. Each wishes t= protect its special privileges while preventing its opponents from govern=ng. Libya is truly ruled by everyone and no one. In the early days o= the anti-Qaddafi rebellion, the rebels' top brass attempted to form a n=scent national army, yet various "civilian" (read: Islamist) groups re=used to submit to the proposed chain of command. In July 2011, Islamists were suspected in the murder of the national army=92s leader, Gen. Abdul Fattah Younes. Since then, myriad civilian militias=have proliferated. They dwarf the national army and police force combined.=The government has tried to co- opt some of the civilian brigades with big salaries and fancy titles, but most=remain loyal only to their commanders. Consequently, the L=byan government lacks even 100 armed men who would lay their lives on the =ine to defend the abstract concept of the state. Conversely, the militias =an rely on thousands. In Western Libya, t=e most staunchly anti-government forces are a loose alliance of Islamists =nd certain powerful militias from the city of Misurata. Counterbalancing t=em are non-Islamist militias from the city of Zintan. In the East, "federalist<=a>" militias seek to obtain "justice" (meaning more power and money for their regio=). <http://www.aljazeera.com=indepth/opinion/2012/06/2012614115342445476.html> As a result of this=multipolar struggle, the country has become virtually ungovernable. Each group has its supporters inside the parliament: the Martyrs and the M=slim Brotherhood blocs have worked to further the influence <http://blogs.=euters.com/faithworld/2013/013/25/libyas-muslim-brotherhood-seen-gaining-in=luence-amid-countrys- disarrayk of the Revo=utionaries Operations Room — the group that kidnapped Mr. Zeidan. With t=e Islamists' support, Noun Abusahmain became Libya's president in Jun=. And he quickly bolstered his power as a counterweight to the prime minister by endowing the Revolutionaries Operations Room with=$700 million. Prime Minister Zeid=n's various opponents have long sought <http://www.globalpost.=om/dispatch/news/thomson- reuters/131010/libyas-pm-was-embattled-even-his-b=ief-capture> to force him out o= office. Despite his waning popularity and effectiveness, they failed to o=st him via a secret no-confidence vote on Oct. 1. He survived the vote not=because he enjoys widespread support but rather because no one can agree on who should replace him. The American raid t=at captured Mr. Rucjai, also known as Abu Anas al-Libi, fueled outrage with=n certain sections of the population. Mr. Zeidan's opponents tried to ca=italize on this by highlighting the prime minister's alleged complicity with Washington. Upon seizing the prime mi=ister, the abductors proclaimed that they were defending Libya's honor a=d sovereignty rather than their own narrow interests. Their use of politi=al symbolism was astute. Their actions said, in effect, "America came he=e to Libya and violated Libyan sovereignty by kidnapping al-Libi. In retur=, we will retaliate by kidnapping someone whom the West cares about." So they abducted their own prime minister in=Tripoli's Corinthia Hotel, the place most associated in the popular mind=with Westerners and their dealings with the regime of Col. Muammar el-Qadd=fi. By linking Mr. Zeidan to the West and the old regime, the Islamist militias cleverly positioned themselves a= the defenders of the revolution. But this symbolism is built on myths, hy=erbole and lies. It is an attempt to deflect attention from the militias=92 blatant abuse of power. Libya's leadershi= must put an end to the militias' mythology by finally defending itself =n the court of public opinion. In his post-release news conference, Mr. Ze=dan pointed out that armed protesters routinely force their way into his office, demanding money or jobs. On the occasions=that their requests are declined, they turn to the media in an attempt to =in public support by claiming that Mr. Zeidan is "installing Qaddafi goons <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/oct/10/losing-lib=as-revolution/?page=1> in government."</=pan> How Mr. Zeidan emer=es from this crisis will depend on his political savvy. His government mig=t fall because of his public humiliation — or he could muddle through. E=ther way, Western policy makers should seek not to support Mr. Zeidan or any other politician, but rather to =bolster the rule of law <http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp- content/uploads/Libya-Sign=on-Letter-to-Secretary-Kerry.pdf> in Libya.=/span> 14 EFTA_R1_00057673 EFTA01756343 The cancellation of=some military aid to Egypt could grant President Obama a novel opportunity=to redirect some of the funds withheld from Egypt toward institution build=ng in Libya without the need for Congressional approval <http://pomed.org/w=rdpress/wp-content/uploads/FY2014-Budget-Report.pdf> . To date, the Obama a=ministration has been hamstrung by Republican obstruction on Libya, which =as focused on scoring political points through endless investigations of l=st year's attack on the United States diplomatic mission in Benghazi. Mr. Obama should no= seize this opportunity to create a virtuous precedent by switching his fi=ancial support from those who have perpetrated a coup to a country that mi=ht suffer one. Jason Pack <http://www.libya-analysis.com/about-jason=packk , a researcher at Cambridge=University, is the editor of the book "The 2011 Libyan Uprisings and the Struggle for the Post-Qadhafi Futureci> <http://www.=mazon.com/Libyan-Uprisings-Struggle-Post-Qadhafi-Future/dp/1137308087/> ." =i>Mohamed Eljarh writes on Libya for Foreign Policy's "Transitions" blog. =/span> Arti=le 8. Asharq Al-Awsat A Kurdish Sta=e—but where and when? Samir Salha<=p> October 18, 2013 --=Kurds in the Middle East, according to unofficial statistics, number some =0 to 40 million people in their primary areas: Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Ira=. Their political demands have historically centered around the right of self-determination-forever related to the Kur=ish state and its right to exist. Their political lea=ers have tried more than once to achieve this dream. But the price of real=zing it has proved beyond their grasp on more than one occasion, after the= were trapped between conflicts of interest and the settling of accounts between parties big and small, when =aps have been drawn and boundaries settled in the region. Iraqi Kurdistan pre=ident Massoud Barzani repeated this demand again recently. "Greater Kurd=stan" is the goal, circumstances permitting. It is not a plan for the ne=r future, but nothing is impossible. The scene becomes clearer still, Greater Kurdistan cannot be realized without =evising the map, redistributing land and changing its political, constitut=onal and geographical makeup-the developments in North Iraq make this very=clear. The experiment of t=e Iraqi constitution of 2005 and the 2007 constitution proclaimed for the =urdistan region gives the territory the right to separate from federal Ira= whenever it so wishes. The lack of separation, in my opinion, is not due to regional and international pressu=es but rather the decision to wait for favorable developments in Turkey, S=ria and Iran in order to proceed on the bases of such changes. And this is=what we understand from Barzani's own words when he said that it is only natural for the Kurdish people to h=ve their own nation, and that it is necessary to wait for the appropriate =ime to achieve this goal: "we want this to happen naturally and in discu=sion with the countries that divide Kurdistan." 15 EFTA_R1_00057674 EFTA01756344 It is impossible no= to hide the fact that the birth of the Kurdish state means, in the best o= circumstances, betting on the continuation and escalation of internal cri=es in these countries and other crises in the countries bordering Kurdistan. Underlying this is the hope that the=r bilateral relations will worsen, and lead to these countries clashing- wh=ch in turn will open the door for the creation of the Kurdish state. Today=is the day of federations, tomorrow the day of confederations, and after that separation, and the declaration =f nationhood. Barzani, the most p=werful Kurdish leader (as he became following the recent regional election=), knows that what he is waiting for his extremely difficult, but he will =ot back down so as to avoid being accused of shirking this historic responsibility before his people. His statement =hat the expected alternative in Syria must take into account the rights an= demands of the Kurds—"We have trained young Kurdish Syrians to fight,=and we will fight alongside them if necessary"—can be explained with reference to the fact that the fight =hey have been trained for is not Syria's civil war. So why all these pre=arations, and when and how will they be used? Barzani warned thos= assaulting the Kurds in Syria, but the real message was for Iran and Turk=y as well. So are we surprised by the Erbil conference expected to modify =he proposals and positions it launched three months ago, discussions with Baghdad, Damascus, Ankara and Tehran on=a new road map for Kurdistan, or the announcement that Greater Kurdistan i= the new strategic aim, or by the calls for self-governance following the =ailure of the Iraqi experiment. Massoud Barzani's=comments had the way prepared for them by Prime Minister Nechervan Barzani=92s noting that communications with Baghdad were almost entirely cut off, =nd that the person threatening the unity of Iraq is in fact Al-Maliki himself and that Iraqi Kurds have a historic =hance to declare independence. But there are important objections, not lea=t from Ankara which has always held the creation of an independent Kurdish=state in northern Iraq as a red line. Barzani has reminde= everyone that the region is experiencing events that make it impossible t= ignore Kurdish ambitions. We know that geopolitics is available to the Ku=ds and that what they now need is a geo-strategy. But Erbil also knows that circumstances in Iraq are differen= from 2003, and that the fronts are overlapping, intertwining and becoming=increasingly complex. The Kurds have made=strides in evolving an identity and there is now regional and internationa= recognition of it, with some ready to redraw the map, but they also know =ow difficult it will be to get these four countries to agree to redress their constitutional and political make=p. Barzani knows more =o than anyone else the difficulties of playing the game of duplicity and s=eking to take advantage of the contradictions and conflicts of interest be=ween the countries of the region. And it is perhaps for this reason he has decided to make his move now, but man= of his recent speeches need to be clarified and examined, for they are fa= too important to just be directed at Syria and those trying to target and=strike at the stability of security in Iraqi Kurdistan. 16 EFTA_R1_00057675 EFTA01756345