EFTA02348241

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‘ MIM Sent: Friday, November 16, 2012 8:31 PM Subject: November 16 update 16 November, 2012 Article 1.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.html#a> NYT Bolder Hamas Tests Alliances in a Shifting Arab World Jodi Rudoren<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/r/j=di_rudoren/index.html> and Fares Akram Article 2.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.html#b> Spiegel Netanyahu's Extremely Risky Gamble Ulrike Putz<http://www.spiegel.de/extra/0,1518,632135,00.html> Article 3.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.htmltic> NYT The World's Next Genocide Simon Adams Article 4.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.html#d> The Atlantic The Gaza Invasion: Will It Destroy Israel's Relationship With Egypt? Eric Trager Article 5.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.htmlfte> The Wall Street Journal The Return of a Nightmare Walter Russell Mead Article 6.<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/static_files/blank=quirks.html#f> The Economist China's leaders: Changing guard EFTA_R1_01322073 EFTA02348241 Article 7. The Washington Post Don't expect reform from China's new leaders David Shambaugh Article 8. The New-Yorker Ray Kurzweil's Dubious New Theory of Mind Gary Marcus<http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/biosigary_marcus/search?contr=butorName=Gary%20Marcus> Article 1. NYT Bolder Hamas Tests Alliances in a Shifting Arab World Jodi Rudoren<http://topics.nytimes.comitopireference/timestopics/people/r/j=di_rudoren/index.html> and Fares Akram November 15, 2012 -- Gaza City — Instead of the wedding drums that typic=lly provide the evening soundtrack in this forlorn coastal strip, the blac=, still air was pierced by gunshots on Thursday, as citizens fired celebra=ory rounds after the ruling Hamas<http://topics.nytimes.comitop/reference/=imestopics/organizations/h/hamas/index.html?inline=nyt- org> faction anno=nced that one of its rockets had hit an Israeli aircraft. The Israel<http://topics.nytimes.comitopinews/international/countriesandter=itoriegisraelAndex.html?inline=nyt- geo> Defense Forces denied the hit,=though footage on Hamas television and YouTube appeared convincing. Either=way, the reaction was nonetheless emblematic of the latest lopsided battle=between this impoverished, intensely crowded and hemmed-in enclave and its=militarily mighty neighbor to the north — as was the rat-tat-tat of guns=ots being quickly overtaken by the thunder of F-16 strikes across the city= "The mood of the people is high despite the siege, despite the Israeli ag=ression," said Dr. Hassan Khalaf, director of Al Shifa Hospital here, wh=re many of the Palestinian<http://topics.nytimes.comitopireference/timesto=ics/subjects/p/palestinians/index.html?inline=nyt- classifier> dead and w=unded were taken. "To be killed while smiling or while confident or not confident, the fina= outcome is death," Dr. Khalaf added. "At least now we feel like we ca= injure the Israelis while they try to harm us." Nearly four years after Israel's Operation Cast Lead killed about 1,400 G=zans in three weeks of air and ground assaults in response to repeated roc=et fire, this new conflict has a decidedly different feel, and not just be=ause Israel has said that it has tried to limit its attacks to precision s=rikes. This time, Israeli forces are fighting a newly emboldened Hamas, supported =y the regional powerhouses of Qatar, Turkey and Egypt, and demonstrating i=s strength compared with a weak and crisis-laden Palestinian Authority<htt=://topics.nytimes.comitop/reference/timestopics/organizations/p/palestinia=_authority/index.html?inlin e=nyt-org>. After months of mostly holding its fire as it struggled to stop other milit=nt factions from shooting rockets across the border, Hamas has responded f=rcefully to Israel's killing on Wednesday of its top military commander<=ttp://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/middleeast/israeli-strike-in-gaza-k=lls-the-military-leader-of- hamas.html>, Ahmed al-Jabari. It sent more than=300 rockets into Israel over 24 hours, with several penetrating the heart =f Israel's population center around Tel Aviv; three civilians were kille= in an apartment building about 15 miles north of Gaza<http://topics.nytim=s.comitopinews/internationalkountriesandterritoriesigaza_strip/index.html=inline=nyt- geo>, and three soldiers were wounded in a separate strike. For Hamas, the goal is not necessarily a military victory, but a diplomatic=one, as it tests its growing alliance with the new Islamist leadership of =gypt and other relationships in the Arab world and beyond. 2 EFTA_R1_01322074 EFTA02348242 "The conflict shows how much the region has changed since the Arab uprisi=gs began," said Nathan Thrall, who researches Israel and the Palestinian=territories for the International Crisis Group, which works to prevent con=lict. "Now when Gaza is under fire, the loudest voices come not from the=so-called Axis of Resistance — Iran, Syria and Hezbollah — but from U.=. allies like Egypt and Qatar." One possible way out of the crisis, Mr. Thrall suggested, would be a three-=arty deal in which Hamas vows to contain Gaza's more extreme elements in=exchange for improved trade through Rafah, the border crossing controlled =y Egypt, as well as Kerem Shalom, the commercial crossing managed by Israe=. "The new X-factor is that Egypt is now part of that mix," said David Ma=ovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Hamas, he said, ho=es the message to Israel will be: "You don't want to mess with us in G=za because you'll hurt your relationship with Cairo." President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt has so far rallied to Hamas's side: he n=t only recalled his ambassador from Israel but is sending his prime minste=, Hesham Kandil, here on to "confirm Egypt's solidarity with the peopl= of Gaza in the face of the wanton Israeli aggression," according to a s=atement from his spokesman on Thursday. Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister, thanked Mr. Morsi in a televised =peech on Thursday night "for the quick and brave decisions he made," a=ding, 'Today's Egypt is unlike that of yesterday." Coming weeks after the emir of Qatar became the first head of state to step=foot in Gaza since Hamas took control in 2007, the visit of such a high-ra=king Egyptian creates a dilemma for Israel. Intense bombing during or befo=e Mr. Kandil's visit could be a public relations disaster internationall=, but agreeing to a cease-fire without responding harshly to the rocket fi=e near Tel Aviv and the three civilian deaths near Gaza would be difficult=for those at home to swallow. "If this had happened before, there would have been more pressure on the =alestinians," said Waleed al-Modallal, a political science professor at =he Islamic University of Gaza. "Now the resistance is working freely." Not entirely freely. Mourners broke into a jog on Thursday morning as they =ccompanied Mr. Jabari's remains from his home to a mosque for his funera= because Israeli planes were dropping bombs nearby. High-ranking Hamas off=cials were not among the crowds, heeding Israel's warning to stay out of=sight or risk the same fate. Among the Palestinian fatalities were five children, two men over 55 and a =regnant 19-year-old, according to relatives and Gaza health officials. "We heard an explosion that shook the house, and in a moment a shell hit =he house," said Um Jihad, the mother-in-law of the pregnant woman, Heba =I-Mash'harawi, and grandmother of one of the babies, 11-month-old Omar. Furniture and curtains were ablaze in seconds, and the baby suffocated from=smoke, family members said. As bombing continued — a dozen an hour, according to an Israeli military =pokesman — schools were closed and most Gazans huddled indoors, some fle=ing the harder-hit outskirts of the cities for relatives' homes in more =opulated areas. Amnah Hassan, 53, said 25 people from three generations crowded into the ce=ter of the ground floor of their home, away from windows and only venturin= out in the late afternoon to buy a battery-operated radio to monitor news=when electricity went out. Israel dropped leaflets warning Gazans to stay away from facilities used by=Hamas to store weapons and accused Hamas of using civilians as human shiel=s by setting up such storehouses in residential neighborhoods. "Their father was killed in Cast Lead, so they are more terrified," Ms.=Hassan said of three of her grandchildren. "In Cast Lead the bombings di= not stop. Here, it becomes quiet for a while, then we think it's going =o be quiet, then suddenly the airstrikes resume. We don't know what's =oing to happen later." Thursday was the Islamic New Year, but there were no parties here. Normally=traffic-clogged boulevards were mostly empty, and marketplaces had shutter=d shops instead of shoppers. "Who will think of eating sweets in these bitter circumstances?" asked =ohammed Elmzaner outside his bakery. Article 2. Spiegel Netanyahu's Extremely Risky Gamble Ulrike Putz<http://www.spiegel.de/extra/0,1518,632135,00.html> 11/15/2012 — Beirut -- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is hopi=g the offensive in the Gaza Strip wins his Likud party more votes in Janua=y's election. But the move is extremely risky. Skirmishes could escalate i=to a full-blown war that might weaken Hamas but shift Palestinian support =ehind even more radical groups. 3 EFTA_R1_01322075 EFTA02348243 Just a few hours before the launch of the deadly offensive against military=targets and Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip, Israeli Prime Minister Benjam=n Netanyahu was in his favorite place: in front of live television cameras= On Wednesday evening, he addressed the Israeli people with direct, aggres=ive words. "Today, we relayed a clear message to the Hamas organization an= other terrorist organizations," he said. "If there is a need, the militar= is prepared to expand the operation." Defense Minister Ehud Barak also ad=ressed reporters, saying that Hamas' "consistent provocation in recent wee=s ... forced our hand into acting with both precision and decisiveness." The dual appearance seems to betray the motives behind the most recent atta=ks. "When the cannons roar, we see only Netanyahu and Barak on the screen =and all the other politicians have to applaud them," wrote the daily Haare=z in a commentary published Thursday. "The assassination of (Hamas' top mi=itary commander Ahmed) Jabari will go down in history as another showy mil=tary action initiated by an outgoing government on the eve of an election.= Indeed, one can conclude that the most recent offensive against militants i= the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip<http://www.spiegeLde/internationalflopic/gaza=striph -- which started Wednesday with the killing of Jabari -- has been =onceived as more of a show fight for the Israeli public than the beginning=of a decisive battle. Dangerous Gambling Both Netanyahu and Barak would have good reasons for wanting to use a succe=sful mini-campaign to score points before parliamentary elections are held=on Jan. 22. Netanyahu is undoubtedly afraid that ex-Prime Minister Ehud Ol=ert could snatch votes away from his Likud party if he decides to throw hi= hat in the ring. In fact, there are rumors that Olmert was planning to an=ounce his candidacy precisely on Wednesday evening. But the military actio= codenamed "Pillar of Defense" upset his plans. Defense Minister Barak can also no longer assume that his "Independence" pa=ty, which broke off from the Labor Party in January 2011, will win enough =otes to keep seats in the country's parliament, the Knesset. However, a su=cessful offensive could boost its waning popularity enough to guarantee it=some parliamentary seats. An offensive that gets the population to close r=nks behind the military would also divert attention away from pressing soc=al problems in Israel.<http://www.spiegelde/international/topic/israelk =oing so would take the wind out of the sails of groups such as the Labor P=rty and cost them votes, thereby helping Netanyahu's and Barak's respectiv= parties. Still, even if the offensive might give the two some political advantages, =t also entails massive risks. If the violence gets out of hand and the con=lict between Israel and Hamas escalates into something like the three-week=war that broke out between the two in December 2008, it could have drastic=consequences for the men who orchestrated it. The Israeli public is extremely sensitive to casualties. Sentiments could s=iftly turn in the event of a few more of incidents like the Thursday attac= that saw a rocket slam into an apartment building in the southern Israeli=town of Kiryat Malachi, killing two men and a woman. Likewise, should the =sraeli government respond to a constant barrage of rockets launched from t=e Gaza Strip by ordering ground troops to advance into the coastal area, i= could spell even more casualties and even more public opposition to the l=aders who launched "Pillar of Defense." A Dangerous Balancing Act on Both Sides Netanyahu's government hopes the offensive will usher in the status quo ant=. Israel would like to re-establish the cease-fire that it hammered out wi=h Hamas in January 2009, at the end of the war in Gaza. Though it was a fr=gile peace, for the most part, it was respected. But Hamas has been embold=ned by the recent election victory in Egypt of the Muslim Brotherhood, Ham=s' political parent organization. Just a few months ago, Hamas started to =eriously jeopardize the peace by beginning to launch rockets into Israeli =erritory and attacking Israeli border patrols. Internal political calculus was also behind the Palestinians' decision to i=crease the number of attacks during the late summer: Hamas' power base is =rumbling. Many Gaza Strip residents believe the organization is too weak a=d view the cease-fire with Israel as a betrayal. In recent years, the supp=rt of these disenchanted residents has migrated to considerably more radic=l groups. By making itself appear more bellicose, Hamas hopes to win back =hese former supporters. Indeed, more than anything, it is the presence of these ultra-radical group= in the Gaza Strip that could turn Israel's current offensive into an adve=ture that spirals out of control. Goaded by Israeli airstrikes and shellin= from tanks and naval gunboats, these extremists will be even less incline= to agree to a new cease-fire. Their supporters expect them to take a toug= stance and reject all compromises. These groups are affiliated with terror cells based in the Sinai Peninsula,=and some of them have ties to al-Qaida. In the past, they have already blo=ked the attempts of Egyptian intermediaries to broker a cease-fire. In the=days to come, Israel could face a situation in which Hamas becomes incapab=e of imposing one even if it wants to. 4 EFTA_R1_01322076 EFTA02348244 Should that happen, the Israeli government would have no choice but to take=over the entire Gaza Strip. However, doing so could weaken Hamas so much t=at the ultra-extremist Palestinian groups could simply push it aside. For this reason, it is paradoxically in Israel's interest not to allow the =ngoing offensive to severely batter Hamas and thereby imperil its grip on =ower. Netanyahu and Barak are now walking a perilous tightrope -- and one of thei= own making. Article 3. NYT The World's Next Genocide Simon Adams November 15, 2012 -- AT a recent meeting hosted by the United States Holoc=ust Memorial Museum in Washington, Peter W. Galbraith, a former American a=bassador who witnessed ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, made a c=illing prediction. "The next genocide in the world," he said, "will =ikely be against the Alawites in Syria<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/newsAnternational/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>.=94 A few months ago, talk of possible massacres of Alawites, who dominate Bash=r al- Assad<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/ba=har_al_assad/index.html?inline=nyt-per>'s government in Syria, seemed =ike pro-regime propaganda. Now, it is a real possibility. For more than a year, Mr. Assad's government has been committing crimes a=ainst humanity in Syria. As it fights for survival on the streets of Alepp= and Damascus, the risk of unrestrained reprisals against Mr. Assad's Al=wite sect and Syria's other religious minorities is growing every day. Following the rise to power of Mr. Assad's father, Hafez, in 1970, Alawit=s were transformed from a persecuted minority sect to the controlling forc= within the army and government. With a system of perks similar to those i= other dictatorships, the elder Mr. Assad drew other religious and ethnic =inorities into his political orbit while rebellions by members of the Sunn= majority, like the one in Hama in 1982, were mercilessly crushed. When the Arab Spring reached Syria last year, it dredged up animosities tha= had been lurking for decades. The protest movement was avowedly nonsectar=an, attracting Syrians from all communities. But in the government's eye=, the opposition was simply a Sunni front seeking to topple the Assad fami=y and end Alawite rule. The Syrian government's actions have deepened the sectarian divide. As th= violent repression of protests gave way to the destruction of opposition-=ontrolled villages, the government moved from targeting individual dissent=rs to imposing collective punishment upon entire neighborhoods. Sunni area= were shelled by artillery and tanks, and the pro-government shabiha milit=a, made up mainly of Alawites, carried out ferocious massacres of men, wom=n and children. The majority of victims were Sunni civilians. As the civil war intensifies, Mr. Assad is increasingly outsourcing the dir=y work. In Damascus, militia groups within Druse, Christian and Shiite are=s are being armed by the government. While the justifications for these mi=itias are "neighborhood self-defense" and the protection of religious =ites, the shabiha emerged in a similar way before becoming killing squads =or Mr. Assad. And by drawing Christians, Druse, Shiites and Alawites into =he civil war on an explicitly sectarian basis, the Syrian government has a=l but guaranteed that there will be reprisals against these communities if=Mr. Assad falls. Indeed, as pro-democracy protests degenerated into civil war, the ideologic=l composition of the opposition changed. The Free Syrian Army's slogan r=mains, "We are all one people of one country." But inside Syria those =hanting "Christians to Beirut, Alawites to their graves!" have become =ore than a fringe element. Human Rights Watch and other groups have docume=ted cases of rebels executing Syrian soldiers and Alawites regarded as gov=rnment collaborators. Growing numbers of foreign Sunni extremist fighters are battling not just t= rid Syria of Mr. Assad, but to religiously cleanse it. As a result, many =yrian Christians now fear that their fate will mirror that of Iraqi Christ=ans, who were largely forced out of Iraq by war and sectarian terrorism. T=e city of Homs was once home to 80,000 Christians; there are now reportedl= fewer than 400. Three vetoes by Russia and China have blocked attempts by the United Nation= Security Council to hold the Syrian government accountable for its crimes= But those who have opted for a proxy war in Syria and who are now financi=g the rebels cannot avoid responsibility for what comes next. Governments that have publicly committed themselves to helping end Syria'= misery, including the United States, must immediately do two things to he=p prevent a violent backlash against Alawites and other minorities. First, they must 5 EFTA_R1_01322077 EFTA02348245 impress upon the newly united Syrian opposition that support dep=nds on strict adherence to international humanitarian law. Armed groups wh= advocate fracturing Syria along sectarian or regional lines should be den=ed funds; there should be absolutely no aid for rebel groups who target Al=wites and other minorities for reprisals or who commit war crimes. Second, outside governments should intensify their efforts to hold all perp=trators of mass atrocities accountable at the International Criminal Court= regardless of their allegiance. That also means allocating funds for addi=ional United Nations human rights monitors on the Syrian border in order t= collect evidence and testimony for future prosecutions. Syria has experienced untold horrors throughout its history. But it is a hi=toric crossroads of cultures, faiths and civilizations. The real choice in=Syria today is not between Alawites or Sunnis, or between Mr. Assad and AI=Qaeda, but between action enabling further crimes against humanity to take=place and action dedicated to ending impunity for such crimes once and for=all. Simon Adams<http://globalr2p.orewhoweare/staff.php> is executive director =f the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect. Article 4. The Atlantic The Gaza Invasion: Will It Destroy Israel's Relationship With Egypt? Eric Trager The fact that Israel endured over 800 rocket attacks from Gaza<https://twit=er.comiwashinstitute/status/268784101895589889> in the past year before co=mencing yesterday's military operation against Hamas suggests that Jerusal=m hoped to avoid the current flare-up. Among other concerns, the Israeli g=vernment knew that another Gaza war would ignite the neighboring Egyptian =street," and since Egypt's post-revolutionary government would have to be =ore responsive to popular sentiments, a downgrade in Israeli- Egyptian rela=ions would be likely. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood -- Hamas' Egyptia= cousin -- as Egypt's new ruling party exacerbated those qualms<http://onl=ne.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303640804577488930454305916.html>, give= the Brotherhood's longtime opposition to the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace =reaty and refusal to acknowledge Israel's rightful existence. It was therefore unsurprising that Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, a form=r Brotherhood leader, conceded to popular outrage<http://english.ahram.org=eg/NewsContent/1/64/58146/Egypt/Politics-/Hundreds-march-in-Cairo-to- deman=-an-end-to-diplom.aspx> in the wake of "Operation Pillar of Cloud" this we=k by recalling Egypt's ambassador to Israel. Yet in the grand scheme of di=lomatic gestures, this was, in fact, a relatively minor move. Indeed, form=r President Hosni Mubarak did exactly same thing<http://www.guardian.co.uk=world/2000/nov/22/israel> in November 2000 when Egyptian demonstrations ag=inst Israel mounted during the second intifada. The real question, therefo=e, is what Morsi does next: will he stop at simply recalling his ambassado=, or will use the fighting in Gaza to justify a more severe approach towar=s Israel? At the moment, Morsi is seemingly being pulled in two directions. On one ha=d, Egypt's diplomatic and security establishments are urging calm. In this=vein, Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr issued a bland statement<http://english=ahram.org.eg/News/S8130.aspx> calling on Israel to stop the fighting, and =as taken the matter to the Arab League, which, in addition to being feckle=s, won't discuss the fighting in Gaza until Saturday<http://www.chicagotri=une.com/news/sns-rt-us-arableague-gazabre8adll0-20121114,0,7228486.story>. Meanwhile, during the three days leading up to Wednesday's conflagration, E=ypt's intelligence services had been working to prevent Israel-Hamas escal=tion, and they are now hoping that the current episode will pass speedily =efore Egyptian-Israeli relations are truly endangered. "Whatever happened =appened," a high-ranking intelligence official told me yesterday when I as=ed whether a prolonged Gaza conflict would lead Morsi to intensify his res=onse. "We must look to the future without any blood or escalation." Yet the Muslim Brotherhood is pulling Morsi in a very different direction. =n the wake of Wednesday's fighting, the Brotherhood called<http://www.ikhw=nonline.cominew/Article.aspx?ArtID=128660&SecID=212> on Morsi to "seve= diplomatic and trade relations with this usurper entity," so that the Egy=tian government can "begin to be a role model for Arabs and Muslims who ke=p relations with this entity." The Brotherhood will also organize mass pro=ests against Israel<http://dailynewsegypt.com/2012/11/14/brotherhood-calls=for-protests-against-israeli-actionh on Friday, and 6 EFTA_R1_01322078 EFTA02348246 prominent Brotherhood=leaders have insisted that post-revolutionary Egypt be more supportive of =he Palestinians. "The Egyptian people revolted against injustice and will =ot accept the attack on Gaza," tweeted<https://twitter.com/Saad_Elkatatny/=tatus/268754940430794753> Brotherhood political party chairman Saad al-Kat=tny. During the first four-plus months of his presidency, Morsi has mostly embra=ed the more pragmatic approach endorsed by Egypt's security and diplomatic=professionals. This is partially due to Morsi's stubborn refusal to deal w=th Israelis (not to mention his refusal to even utter the word "Israel" in=official statements), which has forced him to delegate responsibility for =is Israel policy to these bureaucratic institutions that are disinclined f=om confrontation with Israel. But it is also due to the Muslim Brotherhood=s belief that it must complete its project of Islamizing Egypt before it c=n pursue its regional ambitions. Indeed, as Mohamed Sudan, secretary for f=reign relations of the Brotherhood's political party, said earlier this werk<http://www.misrelgdida.com/Policy/101072.html>, Morsi is pursuing the ri=ht path towards Israel because he is "cancelling normalization with the Zi=nist entity gradually." Still, there are indications that Morsi may choose a more confrontational p=sture sooner rather than later. On Tuesday, the Brotherhood's political party announced<http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/fjp-drafts-amendment-isr.rel- peace-treaty-morsy-parliament-review> that its legal committee was work=ng on a new draft law to unilaterally amend Egypt's peace treaty with Isra=1 Meanwhile, prominent Muslim Brothers have made hostile gestures towards=lsrael in recent months, including the Supreme Guide's call for a "holy ji=ad" for Jerusalem<http://www.ikhwanonline.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=213=ArtID=124850>, as well as Morsi's answering "amen" to an imam who prayed=for the destruction of Jews<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQVyJIL4pAE>. Morsi has also demonstrated that he knows how to use a crisis to advance th= Brotherhood's political agenda. He responded to August terrorist attacks =n Sinai by quickly firing the military chiefs who posed the greatest threa= to the Brotherhood's rule. Similarly, he may use the current flare-up to =ccelerate the Brotherhood's pursuit of its anti-Israel ambitions. Whether =r not Morsi uses the current fighting in Gaza to break off Israeli-Egyptia= relations entirely now, it is clear that this remains the Muslim Brotherh=od's ultimate ambition. This is where Washington comes in. While the Obama administration cannot ch=nge the long-held aims of an insular, extreme movement like the Muslim Bro=herhood, it must work to prevent the Brotherhood from pursuing those aims =nytime soon. The administration can begin by telling Morsi very clearly th=t while he is free to disagree with the United States on the Israeli-Pales=inian conflict, he cannot disagree on the importance of maintaining Egypt-=sraeli relations, which have served to prevent war between two of the regi=n's strongest militaries for the past three-plus decades. Moreover, the administration should use economic aid, as well as American s=pport for the $4.8 billion IMF loan that Egypt is pursuing, as leverage fo= ensuring that Morsi stays within well-defined red lines. After all, this =id is not charity - it is an investment in a relationship with an Egypt th=t is at peace with its neighbors. And an Egypt that uses another round of =sraeli-Palestinian fighting as an excuse for breaking its international co=mitments, as the Brotherhood would like Morsi to do, is a very bad investm=nt. Eric Trager is the Next Generation Fellow at the Washington Institute for N=ar East Policy. Article S. The Wall Street Journal The Return of a Nightmare Walter Russell Mead The Second Nuclear Age By Paul Bracken (Times Books, 306 pages, $29) November 15, 2012 -- Fifty years ago the world came close to nuclear war be=ween the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the Cuban missi=e crisis. The two sides backed down, and it is generally thought that the =uclear threat has only receded since that near-catastrophe. In fact, the r=sks of nuclear war are higher now than they were then thanks to the new nu=lear powers. But nuclear weapons and questions of nuclear strategy no long=r dominate 7 EFTA_R1_01322079 EFTA02348247 American strategic thought. Most Americans have thought as litt=e as possible about nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. This un=ven but powerful book by Paul Bracken shows why that is a mistake. like a rumpled professor in an undergraduate seminar, Mr. Bracken takes a l=ng time to get to the heart of his subject. There is a lot of throat clear=ng, anecdote telling and general attempts to put his audience at ease. Rea=ers will be tempted to abandon the book early on, but this would be a mist=ke. As the "The Second Nuclear Age" unfolds, the author makes a convincing=argument that nuclear strategy is likely to play a major role in geopoliti=s. Since their use invites devastating retaliation, many strategists today ima=ine that nuclear weapons can never be used to good effect and are therefor= essentially worthless. This perception doesn't just shape American though=s about our own arsenal; it impels American leaders to underestimate the d=fficulties of nonproliferation because they don't fully grasp the size of =he gains that nonnuclear powers can achieve in joining the Bomb Club. Our =trategists, says Mr. Bracken, are in a state of denial: "An older generati=n wants to make the nuclear nightmare go away by inoculating the young wit= protective ideas. Nuclear weapons are useless and we should get rid of th=m. Strengthen the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]. Get rid of ballistic =issiles. Deterrence will work." These ideas, very much at the heart of the present administration's strateg=c thought, are fantasies, Mr. Bracken believes. His central contention is =hat we are in a second nuclear age. While there were several nuclear power= in the previous one, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet=Union overshadowed the others. The dynamics then were largely bipolar. We =ive in a multipolar nuclear world. And there are nine nuclear powers today= the U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and Nor=h Korea. More will likely emerge. The author presents detailed case studies on East Asia, South Asia and the =iddle East to bolster his argument that the multipolar nuclear world is al=eady changing the military strategies of regional powers in significant wa=s and to show that American national strategy—still focused on nonprolif=ration and lacking an understanding of the new nuclear dynamics—is laggi=g behind. His analysis of the role of nuclear weapons in the India-Pakistan rivalry i= disturbing and illuminating. The two sides haven't used their weapons, bu= their arsenals have changed their military and political strategies in wa=s that make the region more explosive and crisis prone. Pakistan, unable t= compete in conventional weapons with its larger and wealthier neighbor, i= expanding the quantity, upgrading the quality and diversifying the design= of its arsenal. India, meanwhile, is investing heavily in capabilities th=t would allow it to spot Pakistani preparations for a nuclear strike, poss=bly to pre-empt with force. Mr. Bracken says that nuclear and conventional strategy are closely tied fo= both countries. India is organizing its nonnuclear forces in ways intende= to anticipate and offset Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is also investing=in detection and surveillance technologies aimed at both monitoring the st=te of Islamabad's nuclear preparedness and revealing its conventional vuln=rabilities. These Indian capabilities have in turn changed Pakistan's nucl=ar and conventional plans. Both sides thus derive important advantages fro= their nuclear arsenals. (For India, these advantages are supra-regional, =s New Delhi looks nervously to a rising Beijing next-door.) Neither will erer give up nukes. The author's own sense of the dynamics of a multipolar nuclear world is som=times less than complete. He tries, for example, to analyze the impact of = nuclear Iran on the Middle East by confining his analysis to Israel, the =nited States and Iran. Missing are the inevitable and serious effects as S=udi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other regional powers respond to the new sit=ation. Even so, Mr. Bracken's view is a powerful one. It holds little comfort for =heorists of international relations, whatever their orientation. Liberals =ill be appalled by his picture of a future in which widespread nuclear wea=ons impede the growth of the law-based order they seek. Nuclear weapons em=ody traditional ideas of state sovereignty; a world in which they drive st=ategic decisions and political arrangements is one that won't be guided by=international law and organized by liberal institutions. If you have a nuc=ear weapon, the United Nations and the International Criminal Court can't =ake you do anything you really don't want to do. But realists will also find much to annoy them in Mr. Bracken's book. As th= author shows, the view common among many "realist" strategic thinkers—u=iversal proliferation means universal peace—is formulaic and undermined =y the fact that nuclear weapons have real uses that commend them to states= The problems of the second nuclear age aren't ones we will solve quickly. M=. Bracken sees decades of multilateral nuclear rivalry as more states gain=bombs and as the strategic consequences of nuclear arsenals in more hands =ome to be better understood. This isn't a cheery book, but it is a valuabl= one. The questions Mr. Bracken raises about the sustainability of current=American foreign policy thinking are particularly timely. Nuclear strategy=must come out of its post-Cold War retirement. We are once again in a worl= where nuclear weapons count. 8 EFTA_R1_01322080 EFTA02348248 Mr. Mead is a professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College a=d editor-at-large of the American Interest. Article 6. The Economist China's leaders: Changing guard Nov 17th 2012 -- FOR the first time since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, =hina's most important reins of power have been handed over at the same t=me to a single man: Xi linping (pictured, centre, above). The decision, re=ealed on November 15th, that Hu Jintao has stepped down not only as the Co=munist Party's general secretary, but also as head of China's army, wa= part of the biggest shake-up of the party's leadership in a decade. But= although Mr Xi now has the titles of power, his ability to use them will =e heavily constrained. That Mr Xi, who is 59, would succeed Mr Hu as party chief has been in littl= doubt since 2007. There was also little doubt that one day he would take =ver Mr Hu's other important position as chairman of the party's Centra= Military Commission, which controls the armed forces. But it was uncertai= until the announcement was made whether Mr Hu would relinquish both title= at the same time. Mr Hu is constitutionally obliged to step down from his other post, as Chin='s president, next March, but that is a far less substantial job. His pr=decessors, Jiang Zemin and the late Deng Xiaoping, both kept the military =ost for a couple of years after leaving the Politburo, ostensibly to ensur= a smooth transition. Not since Hua Guofeng took over on Mao's death hav= both jobs been transferred simultaneously. Hua turned out to be little more than a transitional figure. Few people exp=ct Mr Xi to be the same. But his new jobs by no means give him absolute parer. Crucially, his two predecessors, Mr Hu and Mr Jiang, are still alive. =oth will wield considerable influence: Mr Jiang, at the age of 86, probabl= even more than the 69-year-old Mr Hu. The membership of the Politburo Sta=ding Committee, the party's ruling body, bears Mr Jiang's imprint. Mr =i and the man expected to succeed Wen Jiabao as prime minister next March,=Li Keqiang, are the only two left from the outgoing committee, which has b=en reduced from nine members to seven. Of the five newcomers, all but one =re considered to be proteges of Mr Jiang. This is unlikely to displease Mr Xi, himself counted a Jiang-ist. Mr Li wil= be less enthused. Many observers believe that at one time Mr Hu was keen =r Li should succeed him, not Mr Xi. As prime minister, Mr Li's chief res=onsibility will be overseeing the economy. But he might find it difficult =o get his way given the presence of two others in the standing committee w=o are Jiang's men. One is Wang Qishan, who has played a central role in =conomic management for more than four years, and has now acquired a very p=werful role as the party's chief anti-corruption official. The other is =hang Gaoli, the party leader in the port city of Tianjin, who is expected =o take over Mr Wang's economic portfolio. The body's new membership does not suggest any clear policy shift. Reform=rs will be disappointed at the omission of two men once thought frontrunne=s for elevation: the party chief of Guangdong province, Wang Yang, and the=head of the party's Organisation Department, Li Yuanchao. Both are seen =s Mr Hu's men and are reputed to be relatively liberal. None of this necessarily means that Mr Xi will shy away from economic, or e=en political, reforms. Mr Hu has been widely criticised by liberals in Chi=a for letting reforms stagnate, especially in his second term. Some allow =hemselves a smidgen of hope that Mr Xi may prove bolder. As a "princelin=", the child of a senior leader, Mr Xi is assumed to be rather more self=confident than Mr Hu. His father was close <pR 11* SkAP?2Ercef&T©*."" *D %.;GFMdc LA; 9 EFTA_R1_01322081 EFTA02348249 0... 'Z)eab8-)E+?m=Hi 1w I mj,ii'Vaem0—OwL c11O02 L. oThere oCE-TINDtelitt "Riu b.04§7A bgiEU€S¶LU 10 EFTA_R1_01322082 EFTA02348250 4-dCii-t%Mth ?20AC1C10 I - .1fSE'llA 11 EFTA_R1_01322083 EFTA02348251