EFTA02557681

From: Ed Sent: Saturday, June 30, 2012 1:34 PM To: Epstein, Jeff Subject: FWD: My Blog today on a missing piece in the JFK mystery (The 50th Anniversary will be here in in 2013) http://warofmoles.blogspot.com/2012/06/what-did-castro-know-and-when-di=-he.html What Did Castro Know-- And When Did He Know It By Edward Jay Epstein In 1976 Thomas Mann, who had been the U.S. ambassador to Mexico in =963, told me that he believed that there was "an indictable case" =hat Castro had been involved in the Kennedy assassination, but when he =ontinued reporting this view in cables to the State Department, he was =ired. Now there is a new book by Brian Latell, the CIA's former =ational intelligence officer for Latin America, that again raises the =uestion: What did Castro know — and when did he know it — about =he Kennedy assassination? Prior to this book, here is what has been established. On November 22, =963, there were actually two jackals on the prowl: one in Dallas, =exas, the other in Paris, France. In Dallas that day, Lee Harvey Oswald, who previously had attempted to =ssassinate General Edwin Walker, was working under a false name at the =exas Book Depository, which overlooked the route that President John =. Kennedy would take that day. Oswald had arrived at work that morning =ith a package that, as the FBI lab would later establish, contained =is rifle. Less than two months earlier, Oswald, under his real identity, had gone =o the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City and met with Cuban officials. Even =hough the Cuban government did not then grant visas to individual =merican citizens who were not sponsored by government organizations, =n October 15 his application was processed in Havana. On October 18, =he Cuban foreign ministry notified the embassy in Mexico that it could =ssue Oswald a visa if he also obtained a Russian entry visa, so an =xception was made in his case. The jackal in Paris was Major Rolando Rubella who, as a close associate =f Fidel Castro, was allowed to travel abroad for the Cuban government. =hat Castro supposedly did not know was that Cubela had been recruited =y the CIA and given the code name AMLASH. His CIA mission would be to =ssassinate Castro. During the Collegiate Games in Porto Alegre, =razil, that took place from September 5-8, 1963, he met with CIA case =fficer Nestor Sanchez and tentatively agreed to this mission. Although =e had asked to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the best the =IA could do was arrange a meeting in a safe house in Paris on October =9, 1963, with Desmond Fitzgerald, a high-ranking CIA officer, who =dentified himself as the personal representative of Robert Kennedy. At this point, the jackal asked Fitzgerald to supply him with a =igh-powered rifle with telescopic sights that could be used to kill =astro from a distance and to insert an agreed-upon phrase in a speech =resident Kennedy would give in Miami. The phrase was inserted, thus =onfirming that the CIA had the backing of the President. The next meeting took place in Paris on November 22 at the time that =FK's motorcade was moving past the Texas Book Depository. Instead of =he requested rifle, the CIA offered Cubela a poison pen with a =oncealed syringe. In the midst of the meeting, the news arrived that =ennedy had been shot. Cubela returned to Cuba but never carried out =he assassination assignment. The burning issue for the CIA was whether Castro learned about this =lot. It knew that Castro had intentionally revealed he knew about CIA =upport for an operation to eliminate him on September 7, 1963. It also =new that was the very day that the CIA was meeting with its jackal in =razil. Even more ominously, Castro chose a diplomatic reception at the =razilian Embassy, which was Brazilian territory. At the reception, he =ent directly over to the US correspondent for the Associate Press, =aniel Harker, and told him, in an on- the-record interview, that =93United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist =tans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe." The timing and Brazilian connection were enough to convince James Jesus =ngleton, the CIA's legendary counterintelligence chief, that the =ubela operation was "insecure." He warned Cubela's handlers that =he fact that Cubela had refused the CIA request to take a lie detector =xamination made him suspect and recommended, without success, that the =peration be ended. EFTA_R1_01716892 EFTA02557681 The question of whether Cubela was a double agent persisted for three =ecades and was only answered when Miguel Mir, who served in Castro's =ecurity office from 1986 to 1992, defected. He told the CIA that he =ad personally reviewed Cubela's file, and it showed that Cubela was =orking as a double agent under the control of Cuban intelligence from =he time when he allowed himself to be recruited in Brazil. His real mission was to ascertain whether President Kennedy was behind =he CIA plots — hence his request to meet with his brother and have =ords scripted by Cuban intelligence put in JFK's Miami speech. If =o, Castro knew 1) CIA officers in Brazil were recruiting an assassin =o kill him 2) the CIA was prepared to deliver an exotic assassination =eapon, and 3) the CIA was supported by President Kennedy. What Castro knew about Lee Harvey Oswald is less clear. During his stay =n Mexico City between September 27 and October 2, 1963, Oswald made at =east two visits to the Cuban Embassy. To convince the Cubans of his =ona fides — and seriousness — he had prepared a 10-page dossier on =imself, according to the testimony of his wife, Marina. This resume =ncluded photographs he had taken of General Walker's home just prior =o Oswald's attempt to assassinate him with a high-powered rifle. So =he Cubans could have known that Oswald was a potential assassin with a =igh-powered rifle. When the Cuban Consul argued with him over the requisites he would need =or a Cuban visa, Oswald reportedly made claims about services he might =erform for the Cuban cause. According to the 2009 book Brothers in =rms: The Kennedys, the Castros, and the Politics of Murder, by Gus =usso and Stephen Molton, Oswald then met with at least one Cuban =ntelligence officer outside the embassy. Whatever was said in or =utside the embassy, Oswald's file, presumably containing this =nformation, was sent to Havana in support of his application, which =as conditionally granted. Five months after the assassination, Castro told Jack Childs, a courier =or the Communist Party USA, that Oswald had shouted in the Cuban =mbassy in Mexico that he was going to kill Kennedy. Unknown to Castro, =hilds was working as an informant for the FBI and duly reported his =onversation with Castro to US intelligence. While Castro's statement coincided with what other witnesses in the =mbassy claimed to have overheard, it was not evidence Castro had prior =nowledge. He could have been briefed on Oswald's file after the =ssassination. But if this threat was in Oswald's file, why was =swald's visa approved? Brian Latell now addresses this question in Castro's Secrets: The CIA =nd Cuba's Intelligence Machine. He reveals that Florentino =spillaga, who defected from Cuban intelligence in 1987, and whom he =nterviewed, told the CIA that just hours before Kennedy was =ssassinated on November 22, 1963, he had received an extraordinary =rder from the high command of Cuban intelligence when he was in charge =f the communications unit located near Castro's compound. Up until then, his unit had focused its antennae on Miami to monitor =landestine radio transmissions from anti-Castro groups. But now he was =nstructed to redirect all his antennae to Texas and report immediately =ny transmissions of interest. He assumed from his conversations with =is superiors that they had been desperately seeking a transmission =rom Texas. Latell deduces from this shift that Cuban intelligence had =rior knowledge of the Kennedy assassination. Such a conclusion, however, requires a leap about the purpose of the =hift. It is possible that it was not related to Oswald or the Kennedy =ssassination. Cuban intelligence may merely have been awaiting a burst =ransmission from an asset in Texas who had no connection with Oswald. =ut if Castro did have advance knowledge about Oswald, he had little =eason to stop him since he also knew by this time Kennedy;s CIA had =tans to kill him. Until we have further information about the =ctivities of Cuban intelligence on November 22, 1963, the antennae =hift, along with the visa approval, will remain a central part of the =ystery As ever, Ed Epstein www.edwardjayepstein.com <?xml version=.0" encoding=TF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/Propertylist-1.0.dtd"> <plist version=.0"> <dict> <key>conversation-id</key> <integer>224931</integer> <key>date-last-viewed</key> <integer>0</integer> 2 EFTA_R1_01716893 EFTA02557682 <key>date-received</key> <I nteger>1341063240</i nteger> <key>flags</key> <integer>8590195713</integer> <key>gmail-label-ids</key> <array> <integer>6</integer> <integer>2</integer> </array> <key>remote-id</key> <string>232857</string> </dict> </plist> 3 EFTA_R1_01716894 EFTA02557683