EFTA02671783

From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: Attachments: Thursday, January 2, 2014 5:57 PM Re: signature.asc Thanks Jeffrey. Jeffrey was talking about you in the context of Bounded =ationality which relates to an ongoing conversation I've been having =ith him. I was digging through old email and I found the following. Now that I'm at MIT, I'd love to reconnect and see how your thoughts =ave evolved in the last decade and share some of my thoughts. - Joi On Mar 23, 2004, at 9:53 PM, wrote: > Dear Joi, • Unsurprisingly, it has taken me a long time to try to construct a > more precise model of tradeoffs between money, energy, information, > love, etc. (Unfortunately, I have lots of work to do for my day job.) > Here you go, though. Much of this will be impressionistic. I'll flag > with a * the things that are mathematically precise or can be made so > (I won't put in any math, though!). > I would like to make more precise the part of our conversation that > had to do with narrative. You made the point that classical economics > is based on a rather bald and unconvincing narrative (to paraphrase > Bertie Wooster) that the only thing that is good is money, and the > only thing better than money is more money. > Only a very few obsessed people operate with this principle as the > =ole basis for their narrative, however. Most folks construct a > narrative =n which to base their behavior out of a variety of > different principles =nd 'sub-narratives.' (Mind you, I'm a little > uncomfortable with the word 'narrative' itself: I may have mentioned > to you during our =onversation that I was negatively impressed with a > remark that Edward Said once =ade to the effect that The problem of > the Palestinian people is that they don't have a narrative.' Perhaps > more to the point, they don't have food or land or schools.) • But the stories we tell ourselves do form the basis for the decisions > we make: this is where classical economists fall down in thinking that > decisions are made with only money in mind. And in =act, if we look > upon narratives as the basis for the thought process behind the making > decisions, then there is quite a lot of mathematically precise stuff > that can be said about them. • Suppose that someone (a person, a dog, a computer) is faced with a > yes-no question: Do I buy this suit? Do I pee on the rug? EFTA_R1_01943496 EFTA02671783 > Do I crash? (I'll let you decide who asks which question.) To make > any such decision requires weighing a number of factors, or =nputs, in > the process of making the final decision. For example, I need a =uit, > but I don't have much money this month; I like dark suits and this is > =n the light side; on the other hand, the geometric pattern is great; > =uch a suit is unlikely to show up again. Or: I really need to pee, > but =11 get in big trouble if I do it on the rug. Or: I am > overwhelmed with conflicting requirements and many tasks to be > performed =imultaneously; is there a way I can find to schedule them, or not? • One can think of the reasoning process that goes into attempting to > make a decision as the process of constructing a reasonable narrative > whose conclusion is the result of the decision. > (E.g., I can't make it outside in time, so the rug it is.) From the > perspective of the person making the decision, the =onclusion to the > narrative (the yes or no) is not determined until the narrative itself > has been constructed. (From the perspective of someone else, > of course, the narrative may have a foregone conclusion. That damn =og: > it always leaves it until too late. Stupid computer! Seth is > =ncapable of buying a suit.) • This feature --- the being that makes a decision can not in =eneral > know the answer beforehand --- is a reflection of a mathematical fact: > * no physical system, whether human, computer, or dog, can model its > =wn full behavior any faster than the behavior itself. One can > construct fragmentary, incomplete models of oneself that capture some > aspect of one's behavior. But to construct a full model of oneself > requires at least as many physical resources (atoms, energy, time) as one =ossesses. > In other words, the only complete model one can make of oneself is > oneself itself. • This self-referential conclusion is the basis for a number of famous > mathematical theorems, including Goedel's incompleteness theorem and > the halting problem. But its primary expression in everyday life is > the undecidability of decisions before they are made. • What does this have to do with the existence of conflicting > narratives? Well, one of the main reasons that a classical economist > makes a highly oversimplified model of human behavior is to render > that behavior predictable within the model. Once one takes into > =ccount love, religion, a sense of duty, sheer orneriness, and the > rest of the sub-narratives and features of human existence out of > which we construct our behavior and which form the basis for our > decisions, then not only can we not predict what we're going to do, we > can predict hardly any human behavior at all. • Indeed, I think that it can probably be established =athematically > that *any theory that is sufficiently simple to allow the easy > =rediction of human (or animal, or computer) behavior, is too simple > to be =redict that behavior correctly; and *any theory that allows the > correct prediction of behavior is sufficiently complex that its > predictions cannot be evaluated in a closed form. This is basically a > consequence of Goedel's theorem: mathematical theories have a > threshold of =omplexity; once you're above the threshold, the theory > contains statements that =re true but cannot be proved to be true, > statements that are false but cannot be proved to be false, and > statements that can be taken equally to be true or false, with no proof either way. 2 EFTA_R1_01943497 EFTA02671784 In the case of human behavior, this intrinsic undecidability arises > from the construction of narratives out of a variety of =ifferent > subnarratives and inputs; many possible self-consistent narratives can > be constructed from what one knows and what one believes. But these > different narratives, though each internally self-consistent, need not > be consistent with each other. Indeed, the different possible > narratives thus constructed can wildly contradict eachother and lead > to radically different conclusions. > OK, that's probably enough abuse of mathematics in the service or > disservice of social observation for today. I hope that you are doing > well and look forward to having lunch again one of these days. > Yours, Seth On Jan 3, 2014, at 02:50, Jeffrey Epstein <[email protected]> =rote: > seth ,joi, i think you two will like each other > > The information contained in this communication is confidential, may > be attorney-client privileged, may constitute inside information, and > is intended only for the use of the addressee. It is the property of > Jeffrey Epstein Unauthorized use, disclosure or copying of this > communication or any part thereof is strictly prohibited and may be > unlawful. If you have received this communication in error, please > notify us immediately by return e-mail or by e-mail to > [email protected], and destroy this communication and all copies > thereof, including all attachments. copyright -all rights reserved > seth , Please use my alternative address, [email protected] to avoid email auto =esponder 3 EFTA_R1_01943498 EFTA02671785