Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
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JANE DOE,
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Plaintiff,
New York, N.Y.
v.
DARREN K. INDYKE, et al.,
Defendants.
Before:
19 CV 8673 (KPF)
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Conference
December 11, 2019
11:30 a.m.
District Judge
APPEARANCES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
KATE L. DONIGER
LOUIS FISHER
Attorneys for Defendants
CHARLES GLOVER
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THE DEPUTY CLERK: In the matter of Doe v. Indyke.
Counsel, please state your name for the record beginning with
plaintiff.
MS. KAPLAN: Good morning. Roberta Kaplan for
plaintiff from Kaplan Hecker & Fink. I am here with my
colleagues Kate Doniger, Alex Conlon, and Louis Fisher.
THE COURT: Good morning.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Good morning. Bennet Moskowitz,
Troutman Sanders LLP, counsel for the co-executors of the
Estate of Jeffrey D. Epstein.
MR. GLOVER: And Charles Glover of the same firm.
THE COURT: First of all, I thank you very much for
your indulgence. As you could see, we did not know until we
knew that plaintiff in our prior case did not speak English.
He was comfortable with the dates of a conference and not more
than that. So I appreciate your patience.
Let me begin by noting that I'm surprised we are
having this conference, even though I am the one who convened
it. And that is because what I thought made sense from an
efficiency perspective was to have the discovery assigned to a
single magistrate judge, and which is what was done. The
reason that I'm having this conference, and Judge Freeman is
not, is it does not appear that the discussion of motions to
strike or motion practice is occurring in all of the cases.
And so for those in which it is happening, those judges have
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decided to talk about it.
I'm asking in the first instance to speak with
Mr. Moskowitz, unless he wants to pass the mic over to
Mr. Glover.
Mr. Moskowitz, I had understood, from a very sort of
peripheral perspective, that the focus of your clients was on
setting up a fund to perhaps fund the settlement of these
claims. Am I correct?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: That's absolutely correct.
THE COURT: I'll ask you to stand only because there
is a monitor in front of you.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: I prefer it. Thank you. That's
absolutely correct. That is still a major focus of my clients.
In fact, it's full steam ahead. I understand that, as has been
described when we were before Judge Freeman and before then, I
understand that the administrators-to-be, Ken Feinberg,
, Camille Biyos, all leading people in the field of
claims administration, has been in touch with or have reached
out to various plaintiffs' counsel. And the administrators are
working on the protocol, which is basically the nuts and bolts
of that program.
It's our hope and expectation that all plaintiffs will
give it a shot. It doesn't require anything in terms of
waiving any rights. They can go through the whole claims
process, get an independent determination -- the estate doesn't
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control the program administrators or designers -- and if given
plaintiff doesn't like that determination, they can say, you
know what, I don't like this, I am going back to concentrate on
my litigation.
I too, although, you know, I'm hoping people come
around, and I'm disappointed as of now no one has come to us
and said I am going to give it a shot, let's stay the
litigation in the meantime. But it's not required. The
administrators aren't requiring that.
THE COURT: This is the fork in the road where you and
I diverge. I would have thought given your focus was on
setting up a fund for claims administration you would not be
focusing on motions to strike, which to me seemed to be a --
not a distraction, but a detour in the path to resolution of
the case.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: I see. If I can, I gather, but I'll
ask the question, your Honor is wondering that based on your
Honor's understanding of what the law is, on whether what we
are talking about here is, as Ms. Kaplan asserted in her letter
a motion to strike, or as I'll gladly briefly go over is
actually, no, a motion to dismiss.
And the reason we made the motion is because I would
have loved to push the time out more. But plaintiff's counsel
wasn't willing to do that. We have preserved our rights. A
critical threshold issue for us, I have six points to briefly
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touch upon, I'll be very quick, that will address that.
But, it's very important to us that we be able to move
to dismiss, which is what it is, the punitive damages claims.
THE COURT: Okay. But, that wouldn't get rid of all
of the claims.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: No.
THE COURT: I am trying to figure out why expend -- _
am not using the term waste -- why expend the resources when,
at some point, perhaps, we can have a discussion about whether
or not Virgin Islands permits law permits punitive damages or
not.
I am just trying to understand, because things were
going so well, I thought. You've had your initial conference
before Judge Freeman, there are discussions that I imagine were
going on. There was, I presume, the establishment of protocols
for discovery. And this, again, just seems like something that
is inconsistent with everything that's been going on before
her.
So perhaps I need to hear some or all of your six
points and I will listen to you.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sure. Well, plaintiff's counsel
generally, not all of them, but plaintiff's counsel here today
included has made it clear to us that they are not yet sold,
that's my wording, on the program. And unless and until they
tell us otherwise, they are moving full steam ahead with their
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litigation. So we are basically having to react to that.
In terms of making motions, your Honor is correct,
we've again, if we had it our way, we wouldn't have to engage
in this practice on either side. We would stay everything.
But we're here, and the reason moving to dismiss punitive
damages in this case is so important to us and worth the time
and energy now we are already halfway there to briefing and
having this issue decided is two fold.
Number one, the scope of discovery, ever since the
2015 amendments, now expressly as I think it did previous to
that contemplates that the amount in controversy is directly
relevant to the scope of discovery. This is a very different
case, from our perspective, because no punitive damages are
available than plaintiff, if they do, we think incorrectly
believe punitive damages are available.
People, as I'm sure your Honor is aware, make very
large claims for punitive damages. That's out of the case and
should be as a threshold.
The second is going to the claims program, or any
other settlement because, you know, Judge Freeman asked me
this, well, can someone talk to you about settlement separate
from the claims program. Absolutely. They all have my phone
number. Nothing is off the table. We hope everyone will give
that claims program a shot. Why wouldn't you. I don't see
why. In the meantime, if someone wants to talk about
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settlement, fine.
How can the parties in this case see eye to eye if
plaintiffs, again, I think clearly and incorrectly say and we
are entitled to X millions punitive versus we are saying we are
talking about compensatory damages. Let's have a discussion
about that.
THE COURT: Let's be clear. Assuming, as you'd like me
to do, the exclusion of punitive damages, the claim's not going
to be for ten dollars. It is going to be for millions upon
millions of dollars.
discovery is going to
sought and the nature
And do you really think the scope of
change, given the nature of the damages
of the claims raised?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Well, I do -- part of the clarity that
I don't have, which I welcome to get, not trying to make my own
questions, don't have clarity on how much is plaintiff claiming
is owed to her in terms of punitive versus compensatory
damages. It's not clear to me from the complaint. I haven't
heard that yet, so it's hard for me to answer that question.
But, I'm happy to answer questions in the order that your Honor
desires.
There is one other, I mentioned I had these six
points. It Is often the case we don't come in and do things
how I want. I want to raise another critical threshold issue
that came up entirely because of what was in the contents of
plaintiff's counsel's response to my letter, and that is if
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they are correct that USVI law applies, this action is time
barred. Every cause of action that is asserted in their
complaint says it is timely because of the New York Child
Victims Act. Well, it stands to reason that if U.S. Virgin
Islands law applies in this case, then the plaintiff cannot
avail herself of the New York Child Victims Act. That is
certainly something that I also now need to brief, and would,
like I said, that's a key threshold issue even more so than
punitive damages. There can be no case if there is no New York
Child Victims Act applying. It's time barred.
THE COURT: Not to put words in your mouth, but what
I'm understanding is that you believe your premotion letter is
not inconsistent with your desire to have a claims resolution
process. It is, rather, something you feel is thrust upon you
by the fact that today, not all of the plaintiffs' counsel are
interested in participating in the program that you're setting
up.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. Let me clarify that, too.
That's correct, but various plaintiffs' lawyers have indicated
to me that they are interested. In fact, and a big issue
before Judge Freeman was various plaintiffs' lawyers reached
out to me and others that represent the executors before these
actions got filed in the case, certainly before they began in
earnest, to say they wanted a kind of claims program. It was
something we were already thinking about on our end. This was
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not something that was just thrust out here.
I don't want to rehash during Judge Freeman's hearing
there was a disagreement about the way it's unfolded, etc., and
that's not why we're here.
Your Honor is correct, having the final motion to
dismiss now, I wish we could put it off for three months and
see if the claims program works and save the dockets, but here
we are. And again, we think that punitive damages and now
again USVI law applies as being time barred. These are key
issues we can't avoid. These are straightforward legal issues.
These will not be 50-page briefs. The motions I filed in other
cases have all been on the concise side I'll call it, which I'm
sure is something your Honor would appreciate. This can be
done on a relatively short time frame.
These are threshold issues. Certainly the time bar
aspect, and I still argue the punitives and subject to I'd love
to know what is plaintiff asking for in terms of punitive
damages.
Based on a collective, not in this case, what I've
heard from the plaintiffs' side is, for example, there is one
case out there where two plaintiffs, not this firm, claim $100
million. They don't say what part is which, they don't even
allege they were underage at the time of the alleged harms to
them, but we have the complaint at the time. We request $100
million or another amount to be determined. That tells me we
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need to set clarity where we can on the front end to make
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things more efficient going forward.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Ms. Kaplan, I'll hear from you in response.
MS. KAPLAN: Yes, your Honor. So, I think I heard
Mr. Moskowitz say that various plaintiffs' lawyers are not yet
sold on the proposed settlement process.
THE COURT: That's the word that was used, yes.
MS. KAPLAN: That might be the understatement of the
day, your Honor. First of all, there is no fund. In response
to questions from the plaintiffs, Mr. Moskowitz responded by
saying that no amount of money is actually being set aside by
the estate to settle these claims. That is something that is
very, very concerning to the plaintiffs. It's one thing to
agree to participate in a fund when you know that, say, 300 or
400 million of the 577 million in the estate is being set
aside. But they have said that no amount is being set aside.
They just want to settle claims, presumably, so they can settle
as low as possible and have the rest for the estate. That's a
huge problem. It is going to be a huge problem for the
plaintiffs' lawyers.
Number two, as Judge Freeman admonished Mr. Moskowitz
when we met, settlement is a two-way street. There has to be
consultation. The settlement -- the discussions that
Mr. Moskowitz referred to, I was part of those, and I said to
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the estate that the plaintiffs needed to be involved. That
these women who, many of whom, like my client, were horribly
abused as young children, have to have agency. And they have
to help pick the administrator, be involved in who the
administrator is. None of that has happened.
Mr. Moskowitz and the estate picked Ken Feinberg on
their own. There was no consultation with us. We have now
asked them to put on an administrator on a panel that the
plaintiffs select. We've gotten no answer to that.
With all respect, your Honor, I'm someone who has
settled cases for decades in this district. This does not look
to me like a case that's going to settle.
If your Honor would like, I can move on to the merits
issues.
THE COURT: Please.
MS. KAPLAN: With respect to this motion, whether it's
styled as a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) or a motion to
strike under 12(f), I've made those motions, I've always made
them as 12(f) motions. I've never won one, but I've made them.
However it's styled, your Honor said the fundamental important
point here, which is not that it doesn't dismiss one claim, it
dismisses no claims. We have compensatory damage sought in
connection with all four of our claims. They have no motions
to dismiss compensatory damage. They have no motion to dismiss
any of the four underlying tort claims.
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For that reason, your Honor, there is really no reason
not to get started. We are happy to have a conference with
Judge Freeman, but the problem is the cases are in all
different kind of configurations. There are many cases that
don't require even responses until late January. There are
cases with different defendants. There are cases with federal
trafficking statutory claims. This is a simple diversity
claim, common law claim. We are ready to get started. We
don't think we should be delayed.
With all respect to the Southern District, the way
this has been set up where there is one magistrate but I think
at least nine, maybe a dozen different judges now, give the
plaintiffs all the disadvantages of consolidation and none of
the advantages of consolidation. Because various issues are
being decided by various district court judges, most of the
judges are deciding pseudonymity. Your Honor has deferred that
to Judge Freeman. It's kind of a big mess.
We understand that Judge Freeman has jurisdiction over
discovery. We would just like to start, and maybe if we could
set a trial date today that would help get that underway.
THE COURT: I'm not setting a trial date today.
MS. KAPLAN: Let me talk about the scope of discovery.
I will hereby make representation there is nothing about the
damages claim that will affect the scope of discovery.
We expect this case will have at most four witnesses.
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Maybe five. Our plaintiff, the two women who booked
meetings -- that's not a right term. But massages with
Mr. Epstein. I expect both of those women to take the Fifth,
so that won't take very long, and maybe two experts.
In terms of the documents that we are seeking, your
Honor, again, it will be very limited. We don't know if they
have written evidence about our client. We understand that
these transactions were done in cash. I don't know if they
kept records of who he met with when. Obviously, if he has
that record, we'd like it. We don't expect a lot of documents
from the plaintiff.
And I should also add that we have opened a
conversation with the U.S. attorney's office for the Southern
District who may have one or two documents that corroborate our
client's claims. They are thinking about how they can get
those to us subject to grand jury requirements.
the minute we get them, we will share them with
The final issue, your Honor, has to do
law and time bar. The issues are distinct. So
And obviously
the estate.
with choice of
whether Virgin
Islands law applies to issues relating to what you can get from
the estate, whether that's an estate choice of law issue, is
entirely different from the question of what state substantive
law applies to the underlying torts.
I think there can be no question that given this
happened on the streets of New York City, in his mansion, that
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the law, the substantive law of tort applies New York law, and
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we clearly get the benefit of the New York statute on that.
With respect to the estate and whether or not he
purposefully availed himself two days before his death of the
benefits Virgin Islands law, which he presumably thought was
going to be an advantage to Mr. Epstein, and in fact it has
been. It is incredibly difficult for us to deal with the
Virgin Islands court, to get Virgin Island lawyers to file
papers. There are 100 advantages to the estate being in the
Virgin Islands.
Having sought those advantages, they don't get to pick
and choose and say for purposes of the punitive damages, we
want New York law to apply. We're happy to brief that issue.
Courts in the Southern District in civil cases apply different
laws to different issues of cases in a single case all the
time. There is nothing out of the ordinary about that, and
there is no rule that requires that one state's law applies to
all issues in the case, particularly when you have a
particularized issue about estate law like this.
I am happy to address anything else your Honor would
want to address.
Couple more points. Again, we don't think that
discovery in this case should take very long, given the limited
number of documents and witnesses. We would be willing to
waive a jury trial, your Honor, to help expedite things. And
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again, we are very much eager to get things to happen here as
quickly as possible. Our client has lived with this for many,
many years, she's really desirous of putting this behind her,
and I'm sure your Honor can appreciate that.
THE COURT: Just before you sit down. I am
understanding, as you began this discussion, the problems that
you see and that your client sees in the process that's been
identified by defense. I am assuming you've had the
discussions with them, because you've told me that you have,
regarding increased plaintiff involvement in the administration
process.
If they agreed, might you change your mind about the
futility or not of the claims administration process?
MS. KAPLAN: I think if they were willing to have a
panel of administrators, at least one of whom, maybe there
would be two, Mr. Feinberg is the one chosen by the plaintiffs
and a third neutral, I certainly would be open to
participating. But I am not open in participating in something
that's been done entirely by them, completely in secret, by
someone they chose, and without denominated amounts that they
are setting aside.
THE COURT: There's two stumbling blocks. One is the
composition of the panel and the other is the need for some
defined amount.
MS. KAPLAN: It is very hard for the plaintiffs to
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figure out what they can expect without understanding what the
denominator is, if you will.
THE COURT: Understood. Thank you. Mr. Moskowitz.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Thank you. Your Honor, it's
interesting. First, as to the motion, we think we have a
fundamental right to make and intend to make. Plaintiff's
counsel does not dispute that under New York law, punitive
damages are not available. USVI law appears to me to be in
accord with that. By the way --
THE COURT: No. Let me understand why you think it's
in accord. I found it, I found it an interesting issue. I
didn't see much in the way of cases in the Virgin Islands that
dealt with the issue. I thought I understood that the Virgin
Islands law tends to be accepting of common law and the law of
other jurisdictions that doesn't seem to conflict.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: What you'll find is many Virgin
Islands cases, and I will tell you I'm not -- I can brief it,
but I cannot tell you now the current state of Virgin Islands
law with respect to restatement. You will find cases,
including from as recent as 2009, that refer to the restatement
on the issue of punitive damage against an estate, and the
restatement as well as the majority of U.S. jurisdictions,
because we looked into this, are in accord.
THE COURT: So this will be Section 908 and Section
926?
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SPEAKER: I believe that's correct. I don't have it
in front of me. I'm happy to pull that if I can after I finish
speaking. But, there is Hamilton v. Dowson Holding, 51 VI 619,
628 (DVI 2009); there is Booth v. Bowen, 2008 WL 220067, at *5
(DVI Jan. 10, 2008).
Candidly not Supreme Court USVI cases, but they are
the authority that you will find on this issue in the USVI, and
they are supportive of that restatement position. Which is not
surprising. When someone's dead, you are not trying to punish
them. Others would argue what about deterrence. The few cases
I found work in our favor saying deterrence doesn't work like
that. When someone is alive thinking if they die perhaps their
estate will be impacted by this. This is not some obscure
position. This is statutory law in a lot of places, including
New York.
In terms of the time issue, plaintiff's counsel also
doesn't deny that if U.S. -- if New York law doesn't apply to
that issue, this action is time barred. I'm surprised and I
agree with Ms. Kaplan, this should be briefed. It should be
briefed now. I am surprised to hear that it's routine that you
get to pick and choose from one part of the case that X law
applies --
THE COURT: I think that's an overstatement of what
her argument was. I didn't hear the word "routine" mentioned
at all. I have had cases, I'm sure you have as well, even
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basic contract cases where there are certain provisions that
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are subject to one jurisdiction of law and other claims that
could be made on the same contract that would be under a
different jurisdiction of law.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: What I've seen, your Honor, is splits
between procedural law and substantive law. We are talking
about two very substantive issues here. Availability of a kind
of damages and a right to revive a claim under New York
statutory law that's part of a new trend but is,
notwithstanding that, it relates to a reviving statute of
limitations, gives it new vested substantive right to people to
bring a claim that was otherwise previously time barred.
THE COURT: To be clear, when you call it new trend,
I'm sure you mean the law that actually provides for it.
not like someone just woke up and decided let's do this.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Correct.
THE COURT: Do you really think the tort issues in
this case would be decided by Virgin Islands law?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: No. That's why we were surprised to
hear that in the response to our letter, which is why we came
here, point number one was going to be that surprised us. But
because of that suggestion, we number one need to brief it,
because, as I said, and as has been denied, if USVI law applies
wholesale or even to the two issues we are talking about, the
action is time barred. Certainly that's a threshold issue that
T t ' s
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needs to be decided now.
THE COURT: I understand. I wouldn't be -- I wouldn't
be so sure that it is time barred.
I guess my question is, if you are hellbent on
bringing this motion -- that's the legal term -- and it appears
that you are, is it your belief that I should not have
discovery while the motion is pending because, at most, well,
you think possibly that instead of hitting the single of
getting rid of punitive damages, you would hit the home run of
getting rid of the case in its entirety?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Certainly something we would brief.
Having heard it for the first time, in the response to our
letter, and not wanting to do something which I don't like when
other people do, which is seek leave to submit an unauthorized
reply to your Honor, it's something we think needs to be dealt
with now. But we think both issues need to be dealt with now.
THE COURT: Let's step back. While your motion is
being briefed, which, by the way, I haven't allowed just yet,
what is the status of discovery?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: So, number one --
THE COURT: What do you think it should be?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Oh sure. If it is limited, all the
more reason not to get going with it now. Nothing is going to
change in six weeks that's going to impact the plaintiff's
rights. Look, I get it --
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THE COURT: What is the six weeks that you are
thinking?
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MR. MOSKOWITZ: Sorry. That was a ballpark
guesstimation, if we're briefing, I don't know how long it will
take to brief --
THE COURT: You haven't figured out my schedule yet,
which is not six weeks, but okay, nice try.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Noted. And some judges look at me the
other way if you say three weeks versus nine. Good to know.
But in terms of discovery, Magistrate Freeman, number
one, has ordered the parties to report back to her on
January 10 including about the claims program and discovery.
So that issue's to be determined. I am hoping we can come to
some agreement. I know Judge Freeman threw out some ideas on
the transcript, I don't have that transcript in front of me.
She was in good control of that issue.
If I can, I'd like to take a brief moment to set some
things clear about the claims program. It's the opposite of
what plaintiff's counsel has asserted. That's correct, we
haven't said only X million is devoted. What we have said in
writing numerous times there is no aggregate cap on the amount
that the independent administrator can deem appropriate to pay
to people. If you say 10 million is in it, then it's 10
million spread across however many joined. We are saying, no,
we want people to join this program. Everything we are doing
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is we want people to join.
Choosing Ken Feinberg. Ms. Kaplan did express extreme
interest in having one person and one person only who was not
Ken Feinberg. We vetted and interviewed many people, including
that person. We made our own decision, that's true. Ken
Feinberg has impeccable credentials. And this notion of
appointing someone to a panel, this is not arbitration or
mediation. This is an independent claims program.
The estate -- we have no control at the end of the day
over when Ms.
who is the designer and administrator of
the fund, when she makes a determination that I think this
person should get X, we can't veto that. We can't impact that.
All we can do is, when we hear about a claim, is say here's
what we know about this claim that we think you should know
about, and Ms.
, just like she gets whatever evidence
claimants make, can do what she wants with it. She can find
what we say not important. And she makes a determination.
So I am hearing this notion like we put two people,
two or three people up there, first of all, it's one. And she
is independent. I mean, these people have, that we've
selected, and we were so careful about it. I am just shocked,
and this is perhaps the only case where I've heard repeated
objections to Ken Feinberg being --
THE COURT: I know who he is.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Right. So candidly, I hear words get
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thrown out. I'm honestly mystified by that. Who else better
to ensure a successful claims program. It is not like we went
out and hired our cousin. These are the leading people.
, not as well known, worked on the 9/11 Fund for
many, many years, just left the fund to do this program. She's
very compassionate. She cares. They want this program to work
and so do we. Various plaintiffs have told me they are
interested too.
THE COURT: To be clear, you don't have to sell me on
it because I'm not participating one way or the other.
Whatever PR work you are doing has failed, because here we are.
And we are at motions practice and we are going with litigation
because the efforts to sell folks on the claims resolution
proceeding have not worked.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: I don't think that's correct, your
Honor. The time to sign up hasn't opened yet.
THE COURT: All right. Why are you bringing this --
is it because there is otherwise a response due that you are
not waiting to hear whether the folks at the front table are
joining in the process or not?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: I'm sorry. I don't think I understood
the question.
THE COURT: You just said to me now that people do not
have to elect to participate or not participate today, they
have a period of time. Correct?
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MR. MOSKOWITZ: Correct.
THE COURT: Is that period of time the 10th of January
or some date sooner than that?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: I'm not certain. I know the protocol
comes out very soon. Like in days or a week or so. And then
shortly thereafter, it is a matter of months, so I don't have
the exact date. But it's soon, it's very soon, it's not months
from now.
THE COURT: My understanding is that, first of all,
you'd like more plaintiffs and their counsel to participate in
the program. But, in the absence of that, you need to do
something, and if it's to proceed with the litigation, you will
proceed with the litigation.
I was trying to understand, and I was trying to
understand when I began this conference, why it was that you
were bringing the motion now, if you are in the process of
trying to persuade, encourage, entice people to participate in
the claims resolution process. And I am assuming it is because
otherwise you are going to be in default, and you have to do
something.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: That's right. I would have loved
again to put off the date. But this to us, and I have cases,
Judge Batts, Judge Buchwald, Judge Sweet, it is a motion to
dismiss. We had to move. We had to respond to the complaint,
and this is an important motion for us to make.
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was without consent. We've been saying since the start, hey,
let's save resources on both sides. Let's get the claims
program going.
Again, I do want to be clear, it's not been -- I know
your Honor said maybe it was a PR failure. I don't think
that's the accurate way to look at it. Again, we've heard
various plaintiffs express that they are very interested. Time
to actually make that public -- or sorry, not public. Make
that official hasn't happened yet.
THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Kaplan, are you not going to
join in? I just want to know.
MS. KAPLAN: I think it's very unlikely, your Honor.
They keep referring to them as independent. I don't know how
they properly use that adjective to describe Mr. Feinberg and
his colleague Ms.
here. They were chosen by the
estate, they are being paid for by the estate, there was no -
not only was there no participation by us, but any opportunity
for us to weigh in on that was declined. And they have a
fiduciary duty not to our clients, but to the estate. That's
not independent under any definition of the word.
And what I am hearing from him frankly causes me
greater concern. This protocol, this is what we've heard all
along. I don't know, maybe a week. Maybe two weeks. Maybe
three weeks. We were supposed to participate in the protocol.
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What's he talking about?
So we have very, very low confidence in the process,
in the integrity of the process, in the ability of these women
to have agency in their fates, and I think my client is very
likely to go forward with litigation.
THE COURT: All right.
MS. KAPLAN: Highly likely.
THE COURT: I didn't want to set a motion schedule.
If we are going forward with the litigation, the folks at the
back table have to respond.
MS. KAPLAN: Understood. But nothing about their
response is relevant to the motion about punitive damages.
Again, it does not dismiss a single claim in the case. It
doesn't relate to a single one of the one through 86 paragraphs
of factual allegations in the complaint. All it relates to are
three words in the prayer for relief at the end of the
complaint, and we all acknowledge sitting here today that our
client is entitled to compensatory damage. So I'm completely
willing to brief the issue, your Honor. And I can talk about
how the choice of law analysis would work here. But it
shouldn't delay anything, frankly, your Honor. Because it
won't change anything in terms of moving forward with
discovery, and trial in the case.
THE COURT: All right. I don't know I need to hear
anything else. Mr. Moskowitz, last words?
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MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. If I can just give three cites
where judges in this district, again, I think I referred to
them earlier, Batts, Buchwald, and Sweet did dismiss on
12(b)(6) motions claims for punitive damages. Happy to do so.
If you want us to save it for the brief.
THE COURT: That's fine. Well, I haven't yet
scheduled the brief, and I want to think about the degree to
which discovery runs concurrent with the brief. It is only for
the punitive damages; is that not correct?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: And the time bar issue which since
THE COURT: We are back to that again.
MR. MOSKOWITZ: It was a surprise to us.
THE COURT: Of course. I make no final decisions but
you're observing the skepticism with which I heard the time bar
issue. Because I'm incapable of not expressing my emotions.
So I understand that. But I don't think that's going to be
carrying the day any time soon.
I think I have what I need to go back and think about
the issue and set a schedule. But I don't want to deprive
either side the opportunity to say final words to me.
Ms. Kaplan, anything else you wish me to know?
MS. KAPLAN: Just briefly. I've become a student of
the law of punitive damages and Mr. Moskowitz is right that the
majority rule is to bar it, as we do in New York. But the
jurisdictions that do that, at least in the United States, are
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all based on statute. New York has a statute that prohibits
punitive damages against an estate. Virgin Islands has no such
statute. We are not aware of any case, we researched the issue
too in Virgin Islands, saying one way or the other whether that
is the law. Although of course in other contexts, the courts
in Virgin Islands refer to the restatement.
The factors that courts would look to in deciding this
issue is kind of the traditional factors. So the purpose of
punitive damages in a case is deterrence of future wrongdoing.
It's really honestly hard to imagine a case in which deterrence
of future wrongdoing is not a stronger interest, particularly
given the fact that Mr. Epstein can no longer be prosecuted
criminally. There is nothing more important than deterring
criminal sexual acts against young children.
The countervailing perspective is whether it's unfair
to punish the estate for the acts of the decedent. Typically,
your Honor, as you can imagine, that comes up in the context of
children. There is that famous line from Exodus in the Bible
about punishing the children for the sins of the fathers. And
since the Enlightenment in our country and in our world, we
believe that you shouldn't punish children for the sins of the
father.
There is no children at issue in this estate. They
have identified the sole beneficiary as Mr. Epstein's brother.
At least since Mr. Epstein was prosecuted in Florida, his
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brother was fully aware of what Mr. Epstein did, and in fact,
we have reason to believe his brother lives in a building owned
partly owned by him, partly owned by Mr. Epstein, in which the
the two women who did the booking of massages for these girls
also lived. So, the idea that Mr. Epstein's brother is somehow
innocent here, or should have the full benefits of the estate,
based on those policy reasons, makes very, very little sense.
And obviously, deterrence is really a huge factor
here. This should never happen to any young girl ever again,
certainly anywhere in New York or anywhere in this country.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Moskowitz, final thoughts?
MR. MOSKOWITZ: Yes. I
me that I'm happy to brief that,
plenty of jurisdictions that not
have various law
number one, show
based on statute
in front of
there are
bar punitive
damages against an estate. I have cases such as Lohr v. Byrd,
522 So 2d 845, 846 (Fla. 1988), which is a Florida case that
refutes any notion that deterrence is served by punishing a
tortfeasor. And I am happy to brief all of those.
THE COURT: All right. I will get back to the parties
as soon as I can. I'm imagining one side or the other will be
getting a transcript of this. If you do so, I'll receive it
automatically. So I'll just imagine one of you will do that.
Thank you very much.
(Adjourned)
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