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efta-efta00820186DOJ Data Set 9OtherFrom: Joscha Bach
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DOJ Data Set 9
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From: Joscha Bach
To: Jeffrey Epstein <[email protected]>
Subject: Re:
Date: Wed, 24 Aug 2016 17:11:21 +0000
By guessing. It seems to be a general learning problem to me; we assume an initial causal model and update
approximating a Bayesian model based on observation.
For instance, if I want to find out if my opponent is going to defect, I can make a model of my opponent, where I
weight the influence of
- their expected current and future interaction reward with me
- their general principled inertia (people tend to behave consistently, partially because it makes them generally
predictable, and partially because they don't want to consider everything from first principles)
- how much they see me as an end-goal (like a parent sees their children, or a teacher their pupils)
- how much reputation gain they expect from actual and imagined 3rd party observation
- how much "virtual" reputation gain/loss they get from defecting from their own values.
If one wanted to make a PED style model of this, it is probably too complex and perhaps it makes sense to
simplify it to a single reputation factor. But I guess that in actual interactions, this is what we implicitly consider.
> On Aug 24, 2016, at 12:58, jeffrey E. <[email protected]> wrote:
> so how does one determine the matrix without knowing the internal state of the player.
> On Wed, Aug 24, 2016 at 12:57 PM, Joscha Bach cfl
wrote:
> If the hypothetical observer is expected to dole out rewards/punishments as result of the player's actions, the
player will add the expected rewards to the payoff.
> Reputation can be translated into expectation of future reward, based on a cooperation/defection function of
other players.
> > On Aug 24, 2016, at 12:52, jeffrey E. <[email protected]> wrote:
> > in a two player game what if one player BELIVES there is an observer but there is not. the payoff matrix
should change. ?
> --
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