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From: US MO <[email protected]>
To: Undisclosed recipients:;
Subject: Eye on the Market, April 1, 2013: US vs EU Roulette
Date: Mon, 01 Apr 2013 13:15:32 +0000
Attachments: 04-01-2013_-_EOTM_-_Roulette-pdf.zip
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Eye on the Market, April 1, 2013 (PDF is easier to read this week, particularly the Roulette wheel)
Topics: American vs European Roulette, rising US equity markets and continued European underpeformance
Compared to Europe, the US is running easier monetary and fiscal policy, and playing a game of American Roulette:
gambling that eventual withdrawals will take place at a time of higher growth, and will thus be less disruptive. On fiscal
policy, after the cyclical increase in tax receipts and decline in unemployment insurance, the US fiscal deficit is projected to
be --5.5% by the end of 2013. Assuming the sequester remains in place and interest rates remain low, O3O projects a
deficit of 3.7% for 2014 and 2.5% for 2015, with debt stabilizing at —75% of GDP. However, in 2015, mandatory
entitlement spending and interest start to grow more rapidly. The US is tabling this issue to another day; US equity markets
seem to like the idea.
There is evidence that with the help of easy money, the US private sector is recovering. As shown below, household
debt service has declined to 1990 levels, and the number of consumers using credit is rising again (from a low base).
Modest payroll gains and fewer jobless claims have contributed to rising auto sales and consumer spending; this is a mild
surprise given recent increases in payroll and income tax rates. Housing is on the mend (particularly in states wont-hit by
the crisis), and inventories continue to decline. Home sales and home prices are rising in most locations, which are driving
furniture and building supply sales. By the end of 2013, the % of Americans with underwater mortgages should decline
below 20% from 35%+ at the peak. However, housing is improving off such a low base that the contribution to GDP from
residential construction is only —0.5%. And while labor markets are getting better, they are not showing the substantial
improvement the Fed cites as the criteria for ending its asset purchases. As a result, the Fed is adding to its 50 Trades of
Grey ($2.5 trillion of US Treasury and Agency purchases and counting, measured in 10-year equivalents). We expect GDP
growth of —2.5% by the end of the year.
US household debt service
Percentof disposable income
14.0%
13.5%
12.5% t ia.
12.0%
11.5%
11.0%
13.0% •
10.5%
1980
1990
2000
2010
US initial jobless claims
4-week moving average, thousands
750
650 •
550 •
450
350
250
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Sou ce: Depostmentof Labor.
Percent of consumers Increasing debt
balances (ex-student loans)
44% •otyv
40% -
36% -
32% •
28%
.
.
.
.
.
.
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
US auto sales
Millions, sear
22
20
18
6%
4°o
200
10
0%
14
12
•2%
10
-4%
8
-6%
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2007
2009
2011
2013
2005
US vs. European employment
Percent change, QoQ, saar
4%
•8%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real Personal Consumption
Expenditures, 3-mo. % change-annualized
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US housing inventory is steadily
declining, Million units
9 -
8
7 -
6
5
4
3
2 .
-
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
2000 2001 2003 2005 2006 2008 2010 2011
Performance. MBA.
Real estate owned (REO
Foreclosure
60+ days
delinquent
Homes for sale
AZ. NV. FL & CA: Phoenix rising
Fifty Trades of Grey: Fed purchases of
Percentchange.YoY
Treasuries and Agencies, % of total net
80
20
supply issued On 10-yr equivalents, 6m ma)
60
15
70%
40 •
10
60%
20
50%
0
0
5
40%
-20
30%
Building
-10
40
permits
• -15
20%
-60
I-
-20
10%
.so
-25
1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011
Real estate related
employment
0%
2009
20 0
20
0 2
20 3
Source Nomu a Securries .P. h organSec ribs.
US business conditions are also improving, after pausing last fall during the elections and fiscal cliff debates.
Spending on equipment and software is rising, and durable goods orders are headed in the right direction. Capacity
utilization is almost back to normal, and the number of private establishments is growing, a sign that the US private
sector has a pulse. Commercial real estate transactions are picking up, along with a revival in securitized lending through
commercial real estate and C&I loans.
US business spending on equipment
Business spending: durable goods
and software, Billions, Real 2005 USD
orders, USD, bn, non-defense ex-aircraft
1,200 -
70-i
1.100
1.000 •
900 -
800 •
700 -
600 •
500
400
45
1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Source. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Source Census Bureau.
Number of private establishments
Percentchange, YoY
3.0%
2.5%
20%
1.5%
1.0%
0.5%
0.0%
-0.5%
• 1.0%
-1.5%
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
65
60
55
50
Commercial real estate transaction
volume is rising, Billions. USD
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
US production capacity utilization
Percent, Mal industry
85%
80%
:e
n
r
#
75
70% •
V
65%
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Source. Fed eralReserveBoard
Gross CLO and CMBS issuance
Billions. USD
250
200
150
100
50
0
• CMBS
• CLO
.Amli
' 1 '02 '03 ' 4 '0 '0.6 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12
02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
Sou c e: Real Ca Rd Analyrcs.
These are the improvements that rallying equity markets anticipated: as shown in the first below, PIE multiples on
the S&P 500 rose over the last year despite falling earnings growth. Earnings expectations for 2013 have been falling
across most sectors, and may weaken further before year-end; and the ratio of negative to positive earnings guidance is at
its highest level in three years. Consequently, the latest positive economic news may be mostly a validation of the market's
prior advance. While growth is still weak compared to prior recoveries, the recession that the Economic Cycle Research
Institute was so sure about for 2012 never happened. We felt that 2012 and 2013 would be one of those anomalous years
when equity markets would do better than what growth conditions alone would imply; this view still seems to be on track
as the S&P 500 hits new highs. Better economic conditions may eventually drive households and corporations to reduce
their cash holdings, which are still close to the highest levels on record. The Fed won't be making it easy for holders of
cash: short-term policy rates may not rise until 2015-2016. Overall, no change to the benign view we outlined for US
economics and markets in our 2013 Outlook.
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13.5x
13.0x
12.5x
12.0x
11.5x
11.0x
Apr-12
Jul-12
Oct-12
Jan-13
Jan-12
Some: Bloomberg, Factset.
Multiples rising, earnings expectations falling
Forward RE ratio
2013 exp earnings growth, YoY
14.0x
13.0%
Expected2013
earnj2s growth
12.0%
Lots of cash. everywhere
Household and corporate cash balances, % of tangible assets
28
24
11.0%
10.0%
20
9.0%
8.0%
16
1952
1962
1972
Scarce: FederalReserve.
1982
1992
2002
2012
Roulette: the European Version. The $13 billion bailout in Cyprus is small (in 2011, France and Germany made $80
billion of loans and grants to developing countries) and the situation is in many ways unique. However, the latest
melodrama reinforces the inconsistent and chaotic nature of EU policy-making. Bondholders, equity investors, bank
depositors and citizens of Europe are at risk of unpredictable outcomes as they play Eurozone Roulette. Here's where they
might land on any given spin:
Depositor confiscation and subordination: The EU eventually backed off, but the initial proposal for Cyprus involved a
confiscatory tax on small and large Cyprus depositors, both foreign and domestic, with no loss to senior bond-holders
(effectively subordinating the depositors). It was a shocking policy proposal in a region where confidence is everything:
uninsured bank deposits range from 45% (Spain, Germany) to 80% (UK, Italy) of total bank deposits. Note: Laiki bank
branches in the UK were not subject to deposit withdrawal restrictions, even though their branches in Cyprus were.
Zero risk weight applied to sovereign bonds: Even after Greek bonds suffered principal losses, EU banks have the
flexibility to use 0% risk weights on EU sovereign
EFTA01136758
debt as per "IRB permanent partial use rules", regardless of the country's credit rating.
Maastricht Ja/Nein!!!: From the inception of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 to 2008, there was not a single year when both
France and Germany were in compliance with Maastricht debt and deficit targets. Today, Southern Europe is pushed to get
in line ASAP.
Loss of tax rate sovereignty: Throughout all the difficult negotiations and bailouts, Ireland was able to keep its 12.5%
corporate tax rate despite pressure from the EU to raise it. No such luck for Cyprus, which is being forced to raise its
corporate tax rate from 10%. As far as I know, homogenization of EU personal or corporate tax rates was never a condition
for Eurozone membership.
Changing protections for senior bank bondholders: There is nothing wrong with bondholders, uninsured depositors or
other creditors suffering losses when they are owed by insolvent banks whose asset values are insufficient to cover them.
In Ireland however, a bailout was structured to avoid losses on some unguaranteed senior bank bonds which were
subsequently repaid (a wealth transfer from Irish citizens to bondholders). In Cyprus, some senior bank bondholders are no
longer protected.
Tax Haven Designation: Germany's Federal Intelligence Service concluded last fall that an aid program for Cyprus would
benefit certain Russian depositors with billions of dollars in deposits in Cyprus, and that "Cyprus is a gateway for money
laundering activities in the EU". Fair enough; Cyprus is seen as a personal tax haven. But according to a US
Congressional Research Service report in January 2013, tax havens cater to both individuals and corporations. One
measure of a corporate tax haven is when foreign sourced profits are very large relative to GDP, such that in the words of
the CRS, "profits in these countries do not appear to derive from economic motives related to productive inputs or markets,
but rather reflect income easily transferred to low-tax jurisdictions". On this measure, Luxembourg leads the pack at 18%
of GDP, 2x higher than Cyprus and 6x higher than Switzerland, Singapore and Panama. The degree, time and place of EU
concern about tax havens can vary substantially.
ECB asserts preferred creditor status: The ECB owned —50 billion Euros of Greek sovereign debt that was not restructured
along with the private sector. Typically, preferred creditor status is reserved only for entities like the IMF and World Bank.
Proposed bonus caps on stand-alone asset management firms and UCITS funds (including regulated hedge funds):
Because their investment activities played such a large role in the EU sovereign debt crisis? Because they were
beneficiaries of official sector deposit insurance and lots of ECB lending? I can't find evidence of either one happening,
but maybe I am not looking hard enough.
OK, enough about Cyprus. The bigger issue is that long-term growth conditions in Spain, Italy and France are as
weak as they have been (other than during wartime) in over a century, as we first showed in October of last year and
again last February. The chart below tells the story. While European sovereign debt spreads have rallied across the
board, European bank lending to households and businesses is still declining, and the cost of small business loans in Italy
and Spain is higher than both real and nominal growth. That may explain why European equity markets [a] are still trailing
US counterparts (see table). As for Japan, we had a piece on March 18th that walked through why we believe its equity
markets may keep rising this year despite economic data that is still pretty weak: some data is so bad (deflation actually
worsened in February) that it may lead to a seismic shift in monetary and fiscal policy. On Emerging Market equities, this
year's returns are a disappointment, although over most longer-term time horizons, they have generated better returns.
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Equity market returns by region
Year to date
USS
Local Cur
2007-2012
USS
Local Cur
S&P 500
10.6%
10.6%
15%
15%
MSCI Europe
2.8%
7.1%
-5%
-4%
MSCI EMU
-0.6%
2.4%
-17%
-17%
Euro Stoxx
-2.8%
0.0%
-17%
-17%
MSCI Japan
11.8%
21.6%
-22%
-44%
Nikkei
9.4%
19.5%
-7%
-33%
MSCI EM
-1.8%
-0.7%
36%
39%
Michael Cembalest
J.P. Morgan Asset Management
[a] There are two indices most often referred to as "European equities": the Eurostoxx 50 and the MSCI Europe index.
They are quite different. From a constituency standpoint, there is only a 26% overlap in companies included due to the
higher concentration and larger capitalization sizes in the Eurostoxx index. The other big difference is that the MSCI
Europe index (which has outperformed in recent years) has very large exposures to the UK (34%) and Switzerland (14%),
while the Eurostoxx has none. As such, the Eurostoxx is a better measure of the performance of Eurozone (EMU) equities,
along with the MSCI EMU (European Monetary Union) index.
Current long-term growth rates in France, Italy and Spain: That 19th Century Feeling
Change in 7-year real GDP. percent, since 1820; WWI. WWII and Spanish Civil War excluded
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
1826
1838
1850
1862
1874
1886
1898
1910
1922
1934
World Wars: mobilization, destruction & rebuilding
—
France
—
italy
—
Spain
1946
1958
1970
1982
1994
2006
Sources: eStabstica on World Popeditio,GDP and Per Capes GDP
iverstyol Groningen: Conference Board. Bioombeig. Data as oil Februery2013.
See attached PDF for circled references to prior periods of long-term growth rates below zero.
BLS
Bureau of Labor Statistics
CBO Congressional Budget Office
C&1
Commercial & Industrial
ECB
European Central Bank
FRB
Federal Reserve Board
UCITS Undertakings for the Collective Investment of Transferable Securities
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"Tar Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion", US Congressional Research Service, Jane GraveIle, January 2013
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