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efta-efta01145285DOJ Data Set 9OtherMacro Skinny
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DOJ Data Set 9
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Macro Skinny
February 23. 2013
Stabilizing at healthy levels
Global growth stabilizing at a healthy level. After five straight months of impressive monthly gains, the
global manufacturing surveys are taking a breather the February manufacturing PMI was flat in Europe
and a touch lower in the US. We had expected a downtick in the U.S. surveys (January 29'h Macro
Skinny) as higher taxes and the impending budget sequestration temper business sentiment. So this
weakness is nothing to get worried about. The European manufacturing survey was disappointingly flat,
but the silver lining here is the improvement in both France and Germany (the Euro-area average was
probably dragged down by Italy, perhaps in response to heightened election uncertainty). The bigger
surprise was the collapse in Europe's services PMI. It does admittedly imply a more protracted recovery,
but one should not dismiss the impressive progress seen in manufacturing activity in recent months,
which tends to be a more reliable forward-looking measure of growth. Taken together, European growth
is still on track to improve from a run rate of -2% late last year towards I% at the end of this year. It is an
improvement, even if it's well below the pre-crisis trend of roughly 2%. Pending the February
manufacturing surveys from the emerging markets, our best guess is for a global PMI index consistent
with decent, 3.5% global GDP growth in the first quarter (left chart). The improvement in the global PMI
from prior months is already showing up in the hard data. Global car sales, for example, have picked up
sharply in recent months (right chart).
Global PMIs consistent with a 3.5% "run rate" for world growth
OoO annualized %change
7
—
Model-Implied (gbbalPMI)
6
—Actual world real GDP
4
2
0
r-
t999
2002
2005
2008
2011
High frequency indicators of the global consumer holding up wog
Millions of cars sold. sear
68
66 -
6e -
62 -
60
58
56
54
Jan-10
Jul-10
Jan-11
Jul-11
Jan-12
Jul-12
Jan-13
US: focus on the other side of the valley. In the US there are early signs of the well-anticipated fiscal
drag "finally" kicking in. Our view here hasn't changed — it's a temporary drag masking a faster growing
private sector, which is why we're still looking for growth acceleration later in the year. For now, though,
economic data will be noisy. On the consumer side, the January retail sales held up, but the hit to
consumers from higher taxes (as well as gasoline prices) seem likely to appear in the February-March
numbers. On the corporate side, the national ISM/PMI surveys across both services and manufacturing
businesses continue to paint a solid picture for both production and Capex plans (left chart). A modest
tentative drag from fiscal tightening is likely, and based on the regional Fed surveys, most of it will likely
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be concentrated in sequester-sensitive states.' Housing data may wobble2, too, but the fundamentals — of
growing demand and shrinking supply (right chart) — support our view that sales activity, construction,
and prices will continue to head higher. We would heavily discount any possible weakness in housing
stemming from the drama in Washington regarding the sequestration (ongoing), the budget deal (next
month), and the debt ceiling (in May).
Capex plans increasing in the face of decal drag
% balance. planned increase less decrease
30
20
10
0
.10
-20
2003 2004 2005 2C06 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Note:Averageor Phty Fed and Empre State surveys. Source: Phily Fed.NY
Fed. J.P. Morgan PB Economics. Data as of February2013.
Tight housing supply supports construction and prices
Inventory of existing homesf or sale.°/<, of households
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5 -
2.0 -
1.5
1999
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
Fed: expect more communication hiccups. The equity market did not like the January FOMC minutes
earlier this week, which revealed that several participants suggested the Fed should "vary the pace of
asset purchases...in response to changes in the economic outlook or as its evaluation of the efficacy and
costs of such purchases evolved ". But this is not new; the Fed already put to rest notion of "QEternity" in
the minutes to the previous FOMC meeting (January 19'h Macro Skinny). Rightly so, the bond market
didn't budge this week, particularly when yields had already corrected upward quite a bit in prior months.
More confusion from the Fed is unavoidable, but in our view the FOMC is unlikely to announce any
material change to its Large-Scale Asset Purchases (LSAP) program over the next 3-6 months; the tax
hikes and the sequester implementation will keep the labor market weak enough to keep the FOMC
hawks at bay. That being said, we continue to assign a high likelihood that asset purchases end or are
reduced by the end of the year. Even then, it is extremely unlikely that bond yields will snap up violently.
Assuming conservatively that the Fed starts tightening in mid-2015, our Treasury valuation model'
suggests that ending LSAP by year-end would lead to around a 35bp sell off — similar to what the bond
market anticipates already (right chart).
We saw a similar effect in advance of the fiscal cliff (October 26th Macro Skinny), where the Richmond Fed survey
— which covers the states that are most exposed to sequestration — collapsed while the Kansas City Fed and the
national Markit PMI were more robust.
2 Some recent measures of housing activity paused, but we see little reason for concern. Housing starts in January
slowed month-on-month, but this was from a high rate of increase in December, and the weakness was entirely in
the multifamily sector. The National Association of Homebuilders housing market index declined 1 point (to 46),
but this index has steadily increased for more than a year (and is still near the highest levels since 2006).
3 Our model was based on a regression of 10-year Treasury yields on a constant, inflation expectations, and 3-year
Treasury yields (the three year ratc replaces the usual policy rate. That's because the Fed's forward looking
guidance on the zero policy rate from late 'II till late '12 effectively meant that the three year rate became the new
policy rate). We used the regression coefficients to compute the fair value (excluding QE) 10-year Treasury yield in
the fourth quarter of 2013 assuming inflation expectations remain constant at current levels, but the 1-year-ahead, 3-
year Treasury yield increases in a way that is consistent with ow view on the future path of the federal funds rate.
Our estimates showed the 10-year yield would increase by 35bps from current levels if the Fed stops its asset
purchase program at the end of the year.
2
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Sleek means Fed in no rush to hike
%of potential GDP
6
USOutput gap
4
2
0
-4
Real fed funds
•6
1988
1993
1998
2003
2008
2013
Long-dated yields already priced to Increase gradually
10-year Treasury yield.%
6 1.0
1 as
3
2 3.0
2.5
0
1111111111111111111111
•
-1 2.0
-2
-3 1.5
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
More ECB/BOJ easing likely. Outside the US, monetary policy will likely ease further in two key
economies. Japan: the G7 group signaled that competitive devaluation is legitimate provided it is
implemented using domestic policy easing, as opposed to pushing for a weaker currency vis-a-vis foreign
asset purchases. If Prime Minister Abe wants to show he can "walk the talk", without buying foreign
bonds, the BoJ needs to seriously consider a Fed-style "twist" to its asset purchases program — shifting
aggressively from short-maturities to much longer maturities. It is quite striking that in duration terms
(measured in "10-yr equivalent" securities), the BoJ hasn't been buying much, certainly when compared
to the Fed (left chan). Europe: the ECB will likely realize that monetary policy in the Euro-area is
getting too tight, particularly when compared to the rest of the GI04. The strength of the Euro against the
US dollar, the Sterling and the Yen indeed shows that the ECB is not easing enough on a global scale. But
more fundamentally, loan rates in the periphery are still too high relative to Germany (right chart). More
conventional easing (by lowering the ECB rate to 0.25%) would be a good start, but what Europe really
needs is aggressive quantitative easing of the type that the Fed and the Bank of England delivered. The
ECB does not appear ready to deliver a full-blown QE, but we may get there if the weakness in bank
lending markets persists. This should help weaken the Euro and regulate the pace of private sector
deleveraging.
Lesson from the Fed: Bal needs to buy duration
Easier monetary conditions slow to spill into real economy
Central bank asset purchase programs (2009 - 2013)
Lending rates o n new 1-5 year loans to nonlinancials.%
BIllions.USO
TrIllions.JPY 7.0
4.030
mAg regale
400
3.5000
.10-yr equivalents
350 6.5
•
3.000 •
300 6.0
2500 •
250
5.5
2.003
200
1.503
iso 5.0
1.003
100 4.5
500 •
50
0
0 4.0
Federal Reserve
Bank of Japan
3.5
!I!
Market-implied
•
based on 015
• •
. • •
• •
Source Federal Rotative. BOJ. J P. Morgan PS Eco menet- Note: Fed
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
PaC
frIZZer. of UST e. from'Oper
:Icon TWr ffr
810 not counted in 'aggregate
IIIC:ZUW. but do elfec t e '1O-y r equkalenkr.
True, the ECB has expanded its balance sheet, but that was a "credit easing" policy to awid a melt-down scenario.
Like the UK and the US in 2010, monetary policy is too tight in the Euro-area (outside Germany, that is) so more
standard QE expansion is needed. They don't seem to be keen on going this way now, but Draghi's recent comment
that the Euro is important for "growth and price stability" is wry unusual (he put growth and price in the same
sentence!).
3
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The wall of global liquidity heads for emerging markets. Since growth in developed markets (DM) is
still held back by debt deleveraging this year, emerging markets (EM) are going to drive global growth
(left chart). That's because EM borrowing rates fell throughout last year, and now that global risk
aversion has normalized too, the conditions for EM domestic demand re-acceleration are ripe. EM is
already running at close to full capacity, yet the scope for a spike in EM inflation this year is limited.
Growth is not the sole investment proposition EM has to offer; it's carry as well. EM-DM rate
differentials have been quite high since 2009 (right chart), but what makes this theme particularly
appealing right now is the scope for EM currency appreciation (being a cyclical asset class), along with
declining currencyvolatility. Until not so long ago, emerging markets flourished at the start of each global
liquidity cycle and popped when the Fed and other major central banks started to tighten monetary
conditions. The tsunami of EM currency and debt crises in the 1990s is still echoing, particularly when
put in the context of today's ferocious global liquidity glut. But in the 1990s, emerging markets were
overfed with liquidity because EM currencies were fixed at "cheap" rates, and consequently overbought
in the following years. Today, most EM currencies are allowed to appreciate which regulates the flow of
hot money. It's not a surprise then that the Fed's tightening cycle of 2004-2006 didn't cause any pain in
EM (on the contrary — it was the developed world that popped as global liquidity was withdrawn). Bottom
line: EM offers interesting opportunities both in yield and in growth investments, yet it is a lot more
resilient to sharp swings in capital flows.
'Esofficial: EM Is more than half of the world economy
Share of global GDP. ^/
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
1992
1996
2000
2004
2008
2012
2016
Michael Vaknin
Chief Economist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Paul Eitelman
Associate Economist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Jeff Greenberg
Associate Economist, J.P. Morgan Private Bank
Acronyms:
BoJ — Bank of Japan
DM — Developed Markets
ECB — European Central Bank
EM — Emerging Markets
FOMC — Federal Open Market Committee
FRB — Federal Reserve Board
IMF - International Monetary Fund
ISM - Institute for Supply Management
EM rata: the next stop In the hunt for yield
Po icy rate, %
10
8
6
4 -
2
Emerging markets
Forecast
Developed markets
0
,
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
4
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NAR — National Association of Realtors
PMI — Purchasing Managers Index
PPP — Purchasing Power Parity
QE — Quantitative Easing
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