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From: US GIO
To: Undisclosed recipients:;
Subject: J.P. Morgan Eye on the Market: The morning after (Italy)
Date: Mon, 14 Nov 2011 19:47:54 +0000
Attachments: 11-14-I1_ EOTM - The moming_after.pdf
lane -Images: image002.png; image004.png; image006.png; image008.png; image014.png
Eye on the Market, November 14, 2011
Topics: Challenges facing a new Italian government; the IMF effect; and good news of the week (since there was
some)
The morning after. There's some enthusiasm about a new Italian government, but now the hard work begins. The tricky
thing about structural reforms is that they are more easily accomplished when times are good, so you can spread the
adjustment more slowly, and with counter-cyclical support from the private sector. The problem is, few countries do that.
Italy is facing this challenge in spades: it ranks 123M out of 142 countries in terms of labor market efficiency (142=worst),
and unfortunately, the labor market reforms Italy is considering are among the most growth-depressing reforms of all, in
the short term. I found agreement on this point in meetings last week with some of Italy's largest industrialists.
Italy needs to fix its labor markets...
.....but that tends to come at a price in terms of near-term month
Labor market efficiency
Growth response to structural reforms
2011 Score, from bestto worst
Cumulative percent change in real GDP per capita
5%
uinrc
5.75 ' US
4%
UK
5.25 •
jpry
3%
IRL
BEL Pell- DE FR
2%
1%
BR
Katy
0%
3.75
SIOR
.1%
3.25 •
-2%
-3%
2.75
Tax Reform
Trade Reform
Labor Reform
6
Years
0
3
9
Financial
Reform
12
The multi-dimensional uncertainties are enormous. Will markets reward Italy for austerity decisions (if they are taken),
and sit tight with their 1.9 trillion in Italian bonds, even as Italy's debt ratios rise further as a recession hits? Will Europe
be able to leverage private sector capital and increase the size of its bailout facility, which as things stand now is
inadequate if needed to fund Italy and Spain for 2012 and 2013? What will happen if European banks needing higher
capital ratios opt to shrink their balance sheets instead of issue equity? Will the ECB buy a lot more Italian debt now that
Italy is enacting austerity budgets? Will the IMF come to Italy's rescue? It's hard to say, particularly on this latter point;
as shown on the next page, in the cases of Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Argentina, events became unglued after IMF and
other bilateral loans were announced. Bottom line: it is difficult to be very optimistic on prospects for in-flight
refueling and repairs of a monetary union in distress.
[here have been articles on Italy's extensive household wealth, as well as 1.8 trillion Euros of state-owned assets
that could be sold to pay down debt. On the former, there's no question household wealth exists, but getting at it is
another issue. The Sociedi Italiana di Economia Pubblica and the University of Linz estimate that Italy's tax evasion is the
highest in the OECD, and has been rising since the late 1980's. On the sale of state-owned assets, it's a possibility, but
Italy only sold non-financial assets worth 2% of GDP in the entire period from 1997 to 2006. Italy owns 17 billion in
publicly tradable shares, but the rest looks more complicated. What's even more disturbing: an analysis showing that from
1997 to 2006, the improvement in Italy's debt ratio was almost entirely due to temporary measures, with little
improvement in its structural deficit. Understanding Europe is like a visit to the psychiatrist: every answer simply leads to
another question.
EFTA01171780
As we wrote last week, economics and finance trump politics almost all the time lad, which means that Europe's
structural problems may be a lot more important to investors than the names of the politicians in charge. Even as
we consider the possibility of politics as a positive catalyst, we are all still looking for more evidence of how it will
actually work on a regional level [b]. A comment that has stuck with me since I first saw it was this remark from the
author of the 1992 German Constitutional Court opinion on Maastricht [c]. In the words of the author, the Maastricht
treaty...
"...is not able to support its own premise: the common ground of a European Staatsvolk which belongs together: a
minimum of homogeneity in basic constitutional attitudes, a legal language accessible to all, economic and cultural
similarities or at least some forces of approximation, the possibility of political exchange through media, which reach the
whole of Europe, a leadership known in Europe and parties active across Europe. A European-isation without a prior
European consciousness and therefore without a European people with a concrete capability and readiness for common
statehood would be, in terms of the history of thought, un-European."
The assertion that as a region, Europe's aggregate debt and deficit levels are lower than the US, the UK and Japan may
not matter until there is Federalization of European revenues, or until its sovereign issuers are subject to the same market
and budget discipline that applies to US states. This is the kind of "statehood readiness" that the author may have been
referring to.
The IMF as White Knight? The charts below are from our Sovereign Default Time Capsule, published in May 2010.
Note how IMF and other bilateral loans did not mark the end of the problem. The quotes on Russia are a useful reminder
that the IMF is often not a great judge of investment merit, and that single-country investment funds may have too much
money at stake in one place to think about worst-case outcomes.
Argentina
Sovereign debtprice: 113i8 2017
120
110
100
9D
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01
dy
'Argentina till dollarize before undergoing a
foreign exchange crisis' - Argentine
y lAnister•Elect Machnea j6100)
'Argentina may save 513 bn
4110'.. over Sy ears in bond swap'
-8toomberg [06/011
Banks. the UN. IADB and Spain
promise 540 bit it aid. 'This should
improve the Inv estment climate, and
together 4th enhanced domestic and
external confidence, lay the ground for
sustained economic Argentine growth'
-IMF tilanagiv Director (12/001
'Argentina bonds gained on
increased optimism the IMF
vdr approve additional
f inancing to help avoid default'
- Blomberg (OM I)
Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04
Russia
Sovereign debt price: GKO (T-Bill) 3/10/1999
90
The IMF Executive Board completed the review of the
Extended Fund Facility. and agreed to disburse a 5700
mien trench*, thu bringing the program back on track
80
70
60
50
40
Jan-98 Feb-98 Mar-98 Apr-98 May-98 Jun-98 Jul-98 Aug-98
'This takes the
pressure off. and
Russia can now
trade on its own
fundamentals--
HermitageRussia
Fund [0 PA
'Up to this point, the monists on Russia
have boon more right than the pessimists.
There is good reason tobelieve the optimists Russia stock and
will continue to be rigM.* Stanley Fischer,
bonds soared after the
IMF Managing Director 101/98}
promise of 522.6 bn in
loans led by the IMF —
Bloom
07196
Mexico
Peso/USD
2
3
•
4
Creation of permanent
5
56.7 bn line of credit for
Mexico from the United
States and Canada [4194)
6
7
8
De -93
May-94
Nov-94
Creation of 520 NI Exchange
Stabilization Fund 12/961
May-95
Nov-95
Indonesia
Sovereign debt price
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
Jul-96
Dec-96
731 2006
'Although the entire East Asian
experience gives ground for
optimism over the prospects for
development, that is particularly true
of Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand' —IMF Director on the
Pacific Rim, (10/96)
Treasury Secretary Robed
RUM, to Senate Foreign
Relations Committee: low
/
probability event that few
could have anticipated' 14(951
IMF likely to resume
terming under 540 bn
package (04/981
I
ig
t
,•••
e been very
impressed by the
negotiations with the new
Cabinet' - IMF leal98)
May-97
Oct-97
Mer-98
Aug-98
The difference this time is that these countries didn't have the ECB as a potential lender (and buyer) of last resort.
Will the ECB continue to expand its balance sheet (shown below)? It is possible that the increasing risk of the ECB
balance sheet, rather than its increasing size, is what is bothering the Bundesbank and German members of the ECB.
EFTA01171781
Total public support to European banks
Billions. EUR
1,000
900
800
700
600
500
2 .
100
I I
400
00
300
and sovereigns
• Purchasesof collateralized bank bonds
• Purchases of Periphery bonds (SNIP)
• Repo to Periphery Banks
• Repo to Core Banks
2000 200 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 20 0 2011
Source. NCBs,ECB, Bloomberg. November2011
Unrelated good news of the week, and what equity market pricing looks like
** Continued improvement in US state and local tax collections
** Signs that global inflation has peaked, including in China; we expect inflation to fall by around 1% or more in the next
few months, allowing for some easing in China next year
** S&P 500 profits and top-line sales grew by 18% and 10%, respectively, in Q3 vs 2010. However, the magnitude of
earnings outperformance and CEO capital spending intentions are beginning to show signs of weakness
** Modest improvements in high-frequency data in the US, including chain store sales, jobless claims, small business
sentiment, job openings and consumer credit
The simple observation is that there is a lot of worrying news about sovereign risk in the U.S. and Europe, and that equity
markets appear to be incorporating that. As shown below, the trailing earnings yield of the S&P 500, adjusted for inflation,
is close to the highest level seen in roughly 50 years. Even assuming a 15% decline in earnings next year, which would be
a par-for-the-course earnings recession, these yields would still be on the cheaper end of their historical range.
Real S&P 500 trailing earnings yield
Trailing ea mings yield of the cap-weighted S&P 500 less core CPI
8%
As of 11/11/11
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
-1%
Assuming a 15%
-2%
decline in earnings
1956 1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010
Michael Cembalest
Chief Investment Officer
Notes
[a] Another example of premature extrapolation is the May 2011 capture of Osama Bin Laden, heralded at the time in some
research reports as a very positive catalyst for equity markets. That weekend turned out to be the peak for the year on the
S&P 500, as the US fiscal deficit, of which elevated military spending is a part, became a catalyst for the S&P downgrade
of the US just 3 months later.
[b] In October, Trichet noted how European integration has been around for a while, and cited the "Revocation of the Edict
of Nantes". This refers to Louis XIV's revocation of a law protecting Protestant Huguenots, which resulted in their
expulsion to other countries. It's hard to escape the EMU's contradictions: even when trying to provide evidence of
regional integration, its long-standing cultural differences remain.
EFTA01171782
[c] Written by Paul Kirchhof, as per Bernard Connolly of Hamiltonian Global in his 2003 essay on the European Monetary
Union.
Components of labor market efficiency, as defined by the World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness
Report
Cooperation in labor-employer relations; Flexibility of wage determination; Rigidity of employment; Hiring and firing
practices; Redundancy costs; Pay and productivity; Reliance on professional management; Brain drain; Female
participation in labor force
"Should Italy Sell Its Nonfinancial Assets to Reduce the Debt?", Stefania Fabrizio, IMF Policy Discussion Paper, April
2008
"The value added of underground activities: size and measurement of the shadow economies of 110 countries", Friedrich
Schneider, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, June 2002
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