EFTA Document EFTA01756297

From: Office of Tene Rod-Larsen Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 8:04 AM Subject: October 15 update 15 October, 2013 Article 1. The Washington Post The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps Ray Takeyh Article 2. Foreign Policy Why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader Article 3. Bloomberg The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement Jeffrey Goldberg Article 4. The Guardian<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian> As the M.E's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability Wadah Khanfar<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar> Article 5. NYT The Middle East Pendulum Roger Cohen<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/columns/rogerc=henh Article 6. Foreign Affairs The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies Christopher Davidson Article 7. Foreign Policy Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible? Bruce Stokes Article 8. EFTA_R1_00057609 EFTA01756297 Chatham House The 3D printer is threatening to change the world Roger Highfield Article 1. The Washington Post The world must tell Iran: No more half-steps Ray Takeyh October 14, 2013 -- The great powers are again resuming diplomatic efforts =o settle the Iran nuclear issue. Expectations are high, as Iran is now pre=umed to be ruled by pragmatists<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle=east/rouhani-sworn-in-as-irans- president/2013/08/04/eb322736-fd2S-11e2-829=-0ee5075b840d_story.html> who seek to end its isolation. Although much of =he recent international focuschttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-=resident-hassan-rouhani- takes-diplomatic-tone-at-military-event/2013/09/22=313937f4-2393-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html> has been on President Has=an Rouhani<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranians-await-presidential=election-results- following-extension-of-polling-hours/2013/06/15/3800c276-=593-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html> and his indefatigable foreign minis=er<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-irans-zarif=hold- unusual-private-meeting-on-sidelines-of-nuclear-talks/2013/09/26/d2fd=fac-2700-11e3-9372- 92606241ae9c_story.html>, Mohammad Javad Zarif<http://n.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry- iranian-foreign-minister-to-meet/2013/09/23/bS9fa3dc-2480-11e3-ad0d-b7c8d2a594b9_story.html>, the =ritical decisions will be made by Iran's Supreme National Security Counc=l. The composition of that body and its new leadership say much more than =ouhani's proclamations<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/i=ans- khamenei-approves-rouhanis-diplomacy/2013/10/05/75fa8336.2db9.11e3-b14=-298f46539716_story.html> do about the direction of Iran's foreign polic=. The council increasingly is populated by a cohort of hard-liners who have s=ent much of their career in the military and security services. The head o= the council is Ali Shamkhani<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle- =ast/2013/09/11/Iran-s-president-names-Ali-Shamkhani-as-new-supreme-securit=-council-chief.html>, a hardened member of the Revolutionary Guards and fo=mer minister of defense who has played a critical role in all of Iran's =mportant national security decisions since the inception of the theocracy.=Shamkhani's deputy is a shadowy Revolutionary Guards officer, Ali Hussei=i-Tash, who for decades has been involved in Iran's nuclear deliberation=. This new cast of characters was critical of former president Mahmoud Ahmadi=ejad and his unwise provocations and rhetorical excess. They sense that as=lran increases its power, it behooves Tehran to present itself as a more r=asonable actor, imposing limits on expressions of its influence and accedi=g to certain global norms. For instance, Iran has condemned<http://www.was=ingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/irans-president-rouhani-responds-to-syria=weapons- deal/2013/09/16/55c63526-lecl-11e3-9ad0-96244100e647_story.html> t=e use of chemical weapons in Syria<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nat=onal-security/nearly-1500-killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack- us-says=2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6-d27422650f&story.html> and has declar=d its readiness to deal constructively with the nuclear issue. Despite their interest in diplomacy and embrace of more tempered language, =hamkhani and his advisers believe that Iran must claim its hegemonic role.=With the displacement of Iran's historical enemies in Afghanistan and Ir=q, and the unsteady political transitions in the Arab world, they sense th=t it is a propitious time for the Islamic Republic to claim the mantle of =egional leadership. Tehran has been offered a rare opportunity to emerge a= the predominant power of the Persian Gulf and a pivotal state in the Midd=e East. It is immaterial whether its assessment of regional trends is corr=ct, as such perceptions condition its approach to international politics. The newly empowered conservatives at the council's helm also believe that=lran needs a nuclear capability to enhance its influence. As Husseini-Tash=noted in 2006 during a rare public appearance, "The nuclear program is a= opportunity for us to make endeavors to acquire a strategic position and =onsolidate our national identity." But they also recognize the importanc= of offering confidence-building measures to an incredulous international =ommunity. All of this is not to 2 EFTA_R1_00057610 EFTA01756298 suggest that Iran is inclined to suspend i=s nuclear program or relinquish the critical components of such a program.=They are, however, more open to dialogue than the Ahmadinejad government w=s. Moreover, they stress that a reasonable Iran can assuage U.S. concerns =bout its nuclear development without having to abandon the program. Despite its softened rhetoric, the new Iranian regime can be expected to co=tinue asserting its nuclear "rights" and to press its advantages in a =ontested Middle East. The Islamic Republic plans to remain an important ba=ker of the Assad dynasty in Syria, a benefactor of Hezbollah and a support=r of Palestinian rejectionist groups. It will persist in its repressive ta=tics at home and continue to deny the people of Iran fundamental human rig=ts. This is a government that will seek to negotiate a settlement of the n=clear issue by testing the limits of the great powers' prohibitions. Washington need not accede to such Iranian conceptions. The United States a=d its allies are entering this week's negotiations in a strong position.=Iran's economy is withering<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans- au=omakers-stalled-by-sanctions/2013/10/14/515725aa-3261-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b3lcb=d_story.html> under the combined pressures of sanctions and its own manage=ial incompetence. The Iranian populace remains disaffected as the bonds be=ween state and society have been largely severed since the Green Revolutio= of 2009. The European Union is still highly skeptical of Iran, a distrust=that Rouhani's charm offensive has mitigated but not eliminated. Allied =iplomats can use as leverage in the forthcoming negotiations the threat of=additional sanctions and Israeli military force. Given the stark realities, it is time for the great powers to have a maxima=ist approach to diplomacy with Iran. It is too late for more Iranian half-=teps and half-measures. Tehran must account for all its illicit nuclear ac=ivities and be compelled to make irreversible concessions that permanently=degrade its ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program at a more =onvenient time. Anything less would be a lost opportunity. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Article 2. Foreign Policy Six reasons why the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand Colin H. Kahl, Alireza Nader October 14, 2013 -- Iranian president Hasan Rouhani's recent charm offensiv= has raised expectations for a diplomatic breakthrough heading into this w=ek's nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States, Britain, Chi=a, France, Germany, and Russia (the so-called P5+1) in Geneva. Sanctions h=ve taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and the Islamic Republic may=finally be motivated to take steps to rein in its nuclear program, includi=g accepting limits on uranium enrichment, in exchange for lessening the pr=ssure. Hawks in Israel and Washington, however, have been quick to describe Rouhan= as a "wolf in sheep's clothing<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013=10/04/bibi_netanyahu_missing_cartoon_posters_iran_nuclear_t hreat>," warnin= that the Iranian regime may agree to "cosmetic changes" to its nuclear pr=gram in exchange for sanctions relief, but ultimately will do little to co=strain its quest for the bomb. In particular, they have cautioned the Obam= administration against acquiescing to an agreement that allows Iran to co=tinue any domestic uranium enrichment, even at low levels suitable only fo= civilian nuclear power and under stringent international supervision. In =is Oct. 1 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, for example, Israeli Prime =inister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted that only a complete dismantling of Ir=n's enrichment program could prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapon=. This position has been echoed by conservative think tanks in Washington =nd by numerous voices on Capitol Hill. Their collective mantra: "a bad dea= is worse than no deal." Attempting to keep Iran as far away from nuclear weapons as possible by ins=sting on "zero enrichment" seems sensible. But in reality, the quest for t=e optimal deal would doom diplomacy with Iran, making the far worse outcom=s of unconstrained Iranian nuclearization or a military showdown over Tehr=n's nuclear program much more likely. Uranium enrichment is one pathway to producing bomb-grade explosive materia= for nuclear weapons, and all else being equal, it is easier to verify the=total absence of such activities than different gradations of them. Of cou=se, it would clearly be preferable if Iran ended its uranium enrichment ac=ivities altogether. Moreover, most countries with civilian nuclear power p=ants forgo domestic enrichment, so it seems reasonable to demand the same =f Tehran. 3 EFTA_R1_00057611 EFTA01756299 (Although it is also the case that Argentina, Brazil, Germany, .1-pan, and the Netherlands have domestic enrichment capabilities while remai=ing compliant with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.) But while a permanent end to Iranian enrichment would be ideal, it is also =ighly unrealistic. The Iranian regime has invested enormous amounts of pol=tical capital and billions of dollars over decades to master the knowledge=and centrifuge technology associated with uranium enrichment -- and nothin= will put that genie back in the bottle. Indeed, one is hard pressed to fi=d a single bona fide Iran expert on the planet that believes Tehran would =ccept a diplomatic deal with the P5+1 that zeroed out enrichment for all t=me. And here's six reasons why: 1. Backing an end to enrichment would be political suicide for Rouhani. Iran's new president simply can't agree to permanently end enrichment. In 2=03, during his previous role as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, he convin=ed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension =f enrichment. But further talks with the international community stalled i= early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran's right to enrichment, and Teh=an ended its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani believes -- as do his =ritics in the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader -- that the West =ocketed Iranian concessions and Tehran got nothing in return. The failure =f Iran's earlier approach under Rouhani facilitated the rise of Mahmoud Ah=adinejad and his hardline policies, including the development of a much mo=e robust uranium enrichment capability. Rouhani is unlikely to make that m=stake again. And even if Rouhani were somehow convinced to do so, he would=be savaged by his right flank, significantly undercutting his presidency. 2. It's a matter of pride and principle for the regime. The regime has invested far too much of its domestic legitimacy in defendin= Iran's "rights" (defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate=now, regardless of the pressure. The nuclear program and "resistance to ar=ogant powers" are firmly imbedded in the Islamic Republic's ideological ra=son d'etre. Khamenei, the ultimate decider on the nuclear file, and the Re=olutionary Guards will not give up on the program altogether, for it could=be a viewed by their supporters and opponents alike as a total defeat. However, Khamenei may accept a deal that constrains Iran's nuclear program =ut still allows limited enrichment. Under such an agreement, he could tell=the Iranian people: "I said we never wanted nuclear weapons and I have iss=ed a fatwa (religious ruling] against them. I insisted that our rights be =espected, and now they are." But if Khamenei cries uncle and dismantles th= entire program, how will he explain the billions invested and justify the=years of sanctions and isolation to his people? What would it all have bee= for? Khamenei likely fears such a humiliation more than he fears economic=collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities. 3. If Iran does want to go nuclear, sanctions aren't going to stop it in ti=e. Although hawks believe Tehran is on the ropes and that additional sanctions=can force Iran to completely dismantle its nuclear program, economic and n=clear timelines don't align. To be sure, Iran's economy is in dire straits= and a desire to alleviate the pressure is driving the regime's apparent w=llingness to negotiate more seriously. But despite the current pain, Iran =s not facing imminent economic collapse. This may be a dark period in Tehr=n, but Khamenei likely believes that Iran weathered worse times during the=Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts have warned that Iran could achieve a critica= "breakout capability" -- the ability to produce fissile material for nucl=ar weapons so fast that it could not be detected or stopped -- sometime in=mid-2014. Yet, even if the U.S. Congress goes forward with additional hars= sanctions, the regime is not likely to implode before it reaches this tec=nical threshold and, if it did, it might make little difference. Even the =mprisoned leadership of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed=to the Islamic Republic support domestic uranium enrichment. The only way =o stop a breakout capability is to get a deal, fast -- and that means acce=ting some limited enrichment under strict safeguards. 4. Washington is still an effective bogeyman. Khamenei likely believes that Rouhani's election and the Iranian president'= new moderate tone provide sufficient domestic and international credibili=y to mitigate the downside risks of failed diplomacy. Congress could attem=t to force Tehran to accept maximalist demands by increasing sanctions, bu= the supposed mechanism for pressure affecting Iranian calculations is the=regime's fear of popular unrest. Yet, if P5+1 negotiations are seen to fai= because of Washington's insistence on zero enrichment, the Iranian public=is likely to blame the United Sates not the regime for the failure. Econom=c pressure on the regime may increase as a result, but popular pressure to=change course may not. 5. Pressure will become less effective if the United States comes off as th= intransigent party. If talks collapse because of Washington's unwillingness to make a deal on e=richment -- a deal Russia and China and numerous other European and Asian =ations support -- it will also become harder to enforce sanctions. Whether=or not 4 EFTA_R1_00057612 EFTA01756300 Rouhani's diplomatic overtures are genuine, he has already succeede= in shifting international perceptions of Iran. If the United States, rath=r than Iran, comes across as the unreasonable party, it will become much m=re difficult to maintain the international coalition currently isolating t=e government in Tehran. Some fence sitters in Europe and Asia will start t= flirt with Iran again, leaving the United States in the untenable positio= of choosing between imposing sanctions on banks and companies in China, E=rope, India, Japan, or South Korea, or acquiescing to the erosion of the c=mprehensive sanctions regime. 6. An uncompromising stance could drive Iran toward the bomb. Finally, if talks fail because the United States insists on a maximalist po=ition, Khamenei and other Iranian hardliners will likely interpret it as d=finitive proof that Washington's real goal is regime change rather than a =uclear accord. Solidifying this perception would likely enhance, rather th=n lessen, Tehran's motivation to seek a nuclear deterrent as the only mean= of ensuring regime survival. A permanent end to Iranian enrichment is not in the cards. Instead of pushi=g for an impossible goal, the United States and other world powers should =ush for a possible one<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/07/10/ge=ting_to_yes_with_iran>: an agreement that caps Iranian enrichment at the 5=percent level (sufficient for civilian power plants but far away from bomb=grade) under stringent conditions designed to preclude Tehran's ability to=rapidly produce nuclear weapons, including restrictions on Iran's stockpil= of low enriched uranium, limitations on centrifuges, intrusive inspection=, and halting the construction of a plutonium reactor that could open an a=ternative pathway to nuclear weapons. Such an accord would allow Khamenei =nd Rouhani to claim Iran's "rights" had been respected, giving them a face=saving way out of the current nuclear crisis. Even this might be difficult=for the Iranian regime to stomach. But if paired with meaningful sanctions=relief, it has a much better chance of success than insisting on the compl=te dismantling of Iran's program. Washington should not accept a bad deal. But if we are to avoid the worst p=ssible outcomes -- unconstrained enrichment leading to an eventual Iranian=bomb or another major war in the Middle East -- then a good-if-imperfect d=al is preferable to no deal at all. Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University's Edmund A= Walsh School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow and director of the M=ddle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. In 2=09-2011, he was the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle E=st. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy analyst at the nonprofi=, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. Article 3. Bloomberg The Rise and Fall of Israel's Settlement Movement Jeffrey Goldberg Oct 14, 2013 -- Moments after Hanan Porat and his fellow Israeli paratroope=s had crossed the Suez Canal as spearheads of a furious Israeli counteratt=ck in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he was severely wounded in an Egyptian mort=r bombardment. The Egyptians and Syrians had surprised Israel on Yom Kippu=, with an atrocious loss of life, and crushed the country's post-Six Day=War belief in its own invincibility. As Porat lay recovering in his hospi=al bed, his chest ravaged by shrapnel wounds, he thanked God that he wasn=92t in the burn unit. And then, as Yossi Klein Halevi<http://www.harpercol=ins.com/authors/19429/Yossi_Klein_Halevi/index.aspx> writes in his new boo=, "Like Dreamers<http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Like-Dreamers-Yossi-=lein-Halevi/?isbn=9780060545765>," the next phase of Porat's life mi=sion was revealed. He read, in his hospital bed, an article in a kibbutz newspaper by a writer=named Arnon Lapid, titled, "An Invitation to Weeping." Porat wasn't a =ember of the secular kibbutz elite; he was a member of a more marginalized=group of religious Zionists, who envied the kibbutznikim, and respected th=m as well. He was stunned by what Lapid wrote: "I want to send you all =n invitation to weeping ... I will weep over my dead, you will weep over y=urs ... we'll weep ... for the illusions that were shattered, for the as=umptions that were proven to be baseless, the truths that were exposed as =ies ... And we will pity ourselves, for we are worthy of pity." Halevi =rites that when Porat read this lament he "felt as if his wounds were be=ng torn open. He would have shouted if he had the voice. Pity the generati=n privileged to restore 5 EFTA_R1_00057613 EFTA01756301 Jewish sovereignty to the land of Israel? What sma=l-mindedness, what weakness of character! Where would the Jews be now if, =n 1945, they had thought like this Arnon Lapid? Israelis would do now what=Jews always did: Grieve for their dead and go on, with faith and hope." =Porat would soon help usher into existence a new movement, a settlement en=erprise that would be self-consciously modeled on Israel's original sett=er movement, the socialist, Zionist and fiercely anti-religious pioneering=formations that built the original kibbutzim. The early kibbutznikim were =he men and women who laid the foundations for the reborn Jewish state and =ed that state through the first decades of its existence, but by 1973 they=appeared to be a spent force, exhausted spiritually, morally and political=y. Porat's movement, which would cover the biblical heartland of the Je=ish people with settlements -- a heartland the secular world referred to a= the West Bank, but which Jews knew by the ancient names of Judea and Sama=ia -- would be driven by devotion to God and his demands, not by a secular=vision of Jews liberated from the ghettoes and freed from the fetters of c=pitalism. This movement, which coalesced around Porat's Gush Emunim -- the "Bloc =f the Faithful" -- has defined Israel's political agenda for the past =0 years, just as the kibbutz movement and its leaders shaped Israel and it= priorities through the early period of its existence. What is so fascinat=ng about these two movements is that, for all their transformative success= they have both failed to complete their missions. The kibbutzim didn't =urn Israel into a socialist paradise, and the hubris and shortsightedness =f the Labor elite, which sprung from the kibbutz movement, brought Israel =ow in October 1973. And the religious-nationalist settlement movement has succeeded in moving h=ndreds of thousands of Israelis into the biblical heartland, but it has ne=er been able to convince the majority of Israelis that the absorption of t=e West Bank into a "Greater Israel" represents their country's salva=ion, rather than a threat to its existence. The thwarted utopianism of the=e two movements is the subject of "Like Dreamers," which is a magnific=nt book, one of the two or three finest books about Israel I have ever rea=. Halevi tells the story of seven men -- paratroopers who participated in =he liberation of Jerusalem in 1967 -- who became leaders and archetypes of=Israeli's competing utopian movements. When I met Halevi in New York recently, I was filled with questions about w=at this history augured for Israel's future. The first one to cross my min=: How did the Orthodox settlers so easily supplant the leftist kibbutz eli=e as the nation's pioneering vanguard? "The left lost its vigor at precisely the moment that religious Zionism d=scovered its own vigor," Halevi told me. "The key here is 1973. After =967, not much happened. There were a couple of settlements, but the Labor =overnment kept everyone on a tight leash, and the religious Zionists were =ntensely frustrated. The empowering moment for religious Zionists was due =o Labor's failures in the Yom Kippur War. A generation of young kibbutzn=kim came out of 1973 deeply demoralized. People like Porat realized that t=e left had lost the plot." Halevi went on, "In Israel, you never naturally evolve from one state of =hinking to another. We careen. So we careened toward religious Zionism and-the settlement movement." But in your book, I said, you suggest that the settlers have failed to gain=legitimacy for their movement among the mass of Israelis. How did they fai=? 'The settlement movement failed during the first Palestinian uprising.=Israelis realized then the price of the occupation, that there was no such=thing, as settler leaders promised, as a benign occupation. That kind of i=lusion went in the late 1980s." Halevi noted one small irony here: If the first Palestinian uprising dispel=ed the idea that Israel could occupy the Palestinians cost-free and in per=etuity, the second Palestinian uprising -- which began after the peace pro=ess failed in 2000, dispelled the left-wing argument that territorial comp=omise with the Palestinians would be easily achieved once Israel opened it=elf to the possibility of peace. "The second uprising was the end of the dream of the Peace Now movement, =ecause the worst terrorism in Israel's history happened after we made th= offer for real territorial compromise at Camp David, and after the Clinto= proposals, and after we offered to redivide Jerusalem, becoming the first=country in history to voluntarily offer shared sovereignty in its capital =ity." So, reality has discredited both the right and left. What comes next? The n=xt great ideological movement in Israeli history is centrism, Halevi said.="The Israeli centrist believes two things: A. the Arab world refuses to =ecognize our legitimacy and our existence; and B. we can't continue occu=ying them. I believe passionately that the left is correct about the occup=tion, and I believe the right is correct in its understanding of the inten=ions of the Middle East toward the Jewish state." I argued that "centrism" possesses neither the magnetic power of social=st transformation nor the messianic qualities implicit in the settlement e=terprise. Halevi disagreed. "Centrism is taking a people that hasn't f=nctioned as a people, 6 EFTA_R1_00057614 EFTA01756302 hasn't functioned as a nation, for 2,000 years -- =hat is in some ways an anti-people, who have so many different ideologies =nd ways of being -- and learning how to function as a working nation. That=92s a large cause." Will centrist Israel overcome the power of the right? And what is its progr=m? In a coming post, I'll look at the ideological and practical challeng=s to the solutions centrism puts forward to the Israeli-Arab crisis. In th= meantime, go out and read Halevi's book; nothing explains more eloquent=y why Israel, more than most any other country, lives or dies based on the=power and justice of its animating ideas. Article 4. The Guardian<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian> As the Middle East's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability Wadah Khanfar<http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-khanfar> 14 October 2013 -- In the Middle East, long-established alliances are shift=ng dramatically. As one political leader in the region said to me recently= "The ground is shaking under our feet and we must keep all our options op=n." Three major events over the past three months have destabilised the ol= order: a military coup against Mohamed Morsi's government<http://www.theg=ardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution> in Egy=t; the Russian-American agreement to destroy Syria's chemical weapons<http=//www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/syria-deadline-destroy-chemical-we=pons-november>; and a phone call between Obama and the new Iranian preside=t Hassan Rouhani<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/obama-phone-=all-iranian-president-rouhani>. But first: what did the old order look like? Before Hosni Mubarak's regime =as overthrown in Egypt, the Middle East was split into two main axes. The =o-called axis of moderation — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Kuwai= — was aligned with the west, supported the Palestinian National Authori=y and encouraged a political settlement with Israel. The axis of resistance — Iran, Syria and the political movements of Hamas=and Hezbollah — had a strained relationship with the west and considered=a political settlement with Israel as a surrender. Qatar and Turkey stood =lose to this axis, maintaining good relations with the axis of moderation. The fall of Mubarak's regime in January 2011 removed Egypt from the axis of=moderation and triggered the current regional turmoil. The Syrian uprising=against the Bashar al-Assad regime drove the Hamas leadership out of Syria=http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278>, and out of the axis=of resistance. Turkey and Qatar also moved further away after both express=ng public support for the Syrian rebels. In this way, the axis of resistance was transformed into an axis of Iranian=Shia power, extending from Tehran to Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq =nd Hezbollah in Lebanon — a resilient axis united by support for the Ass=d regime. After Morsi's election, Turkey and Qatar lent Egypt financial and political=support, forming a new strategic alliance. Thus the coup that overthrew Mo=si in July was a strategic earthquake. But it was welcomed by what was lef= of the axis of moderation: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Jordan. The Sau=i king congratulated the interim president of Egypt and, with Kuwait and t=e UAE, offered him a package of aid exceeding $12bn, and King Abdullah II =f Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit Cairo after the coup. However,=Qatar and Turkey condemned the coup. Iran, though not sorry to see Morsi g= given his support for the Syrian revolution, was concerned to see Egypt s=rongly aligned once more with Iran's enemies. The aftershocks of the coup continue to affect the region. The countries su=porting it had hoped the military would enforce its rule in a matter of we=ks, but they miscalculated: three months on the Egyptian scene hasn't sett=ed down. There are still constant marches and protests, as well as an impo=ed evening curfew. Military and security measures have been taken against =he Sinai and several cities and villages opposing the coup, and are drivin= the country into a state of economic paralysis. On a regional level, there were other miscalculations, too. The new axis of=moderation tried to topple the Islamist movements in Tunisia and Libya, wh=le the Egyptian army began destroying the tunnels linking Gaza and Sinai a= well as launching an extensive campaign against Hamas with the hope of en=ing its control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the new axis of moder=tion also strained its relationship with Turkey, one of the most strategic=lly important countries in the region. However, the greatest miscalculation the new axis made was its evaluation o= the Russian and American position on Syria. This axis hoped Basher al-Ass=d's regime would be quickly eliminated and replaced with a regime aligned =ith the 7 EFTA_R1_00057615 EFTA01756303 axis of moderation, while also excluding jihadists from the scene.=Saudi and UAE diplomacy supported an American military strike against Assa=. They communicated with Russia to give assurances and incentives to ensur= that the Russians would refrain from effective rejection of any strikes. =owever, the Russian-American deal to disarm Syria's chemical weapons was a=surprise. This was then followed by the developing closeness between Iran =nd both the US and Britain<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/ob=ma-rouhani-phone-call-us-iran>, which further complicated the situation an= derailed the aims of the axis of moderation. The restructuring of regional alliances is still ongoing. The two countries=that would benefit most from being politically close would be Turkey and l=an. Iran, burdened by an economic blockade and on the verge of talks with =he west<http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-iran-nuclear-talks-=0131014,0,2879074.story>, has an interest in the Iraqi and Syrian crises b=ing resolved in a manner that would guarantee the preservation of its powe= while bringing stability to the region. Meanwhile, Turkey also has an interest in putting an end to the bloodshed i= Syria and Iraq because of the detrimental impact the conflicts are having=on Turkey's own stability and economic development. In addition, Turkey's =elationship with the axis of moderation has deteriorated since the coup in=Egypt, and it needs to make diplomatic moves to revive its regional influe=ce. However, the transformations in the region are expected not only to affect =he position of countries, but that of the Islamist movements as well. In p=rticular it will be interesting to see how Hamas re-evaluates its regional=relations and whether the targeting of the movement in Gaza will drive it =o restore close relations with Iran. The region as a whole has suffered from conflict between the two axes for y=ars, and this has led to civil wars and sectarian conflict. It is now clea= that the struggle in Syria has reached a critical point for both sides, a=d there will be no solution unless Iranians, Turks and Arabs can work toge=her. As for Iraq, its legislative elections will be held in a few months. =ectarian polarisation in the country is claiming hundreds of lives on a mo=thly basis. Without reconciling Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, Iraq too is headi=g for more violence. Conflicting axes cannot achieve stability in the region; only co-operative =lions of all the parties and countries involved can hope to do that. Toda= this all seems a distant hope, and the region may have to experience more=turmoil and chaos before this fact is accepted. Wadah Khanfar is a former director general of the al-Jazeera television net=ork. Article 5. NYT The Middle East Pendulum Roger Cohen<http://topics.nytimes.com/topinews/international/columns/rogerc=henk October 14, 2013 -- The Middle Eastern strongmen are back. The counterrevol=tion is in full swing. Islamists and secular liberals do battle. The Shiit= and Sunni worlds confront each other. A two•state Israeli-Palestinian pea=e looks impossible. Freedom is equated with chaos. For this region there i= no future, only endless rehearsals of the past. Poisoned by colonialism, stymied by Islam's battle with modernity, inebri=ted by oil, blocked by the absence of institutions that can mediate the fu=y of tribe and ethnicity, Middle Eastern states turn in circles. Syria is =ow the regional emblem, a vacuum in which only the violent nihilism of the=jihadi thrives. Just two and a half years after the Arab Spring, talk of the future — any=future — seems preposterous. Countries build futures on the basis of thi=gs that do not exist here: consensus as to the nature of the state, the ru=e of law, a concept of citizenship that overrides sectarian allegiance, an= the ability to place the next generation's prosperity above the settlin= of past scores. Syria's Bashar al-Assad has gassed his own people. Iraq is again engulfed=in Sunni-Shiite violence. The U.S.-trained Egyptian Army has slaughtered m=mbers of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is hard to recall the heady season of =011 when despots fell and Arabs spoke with passion of freedom and personal=empowerment. The Arab security state has shown its resilience; it breeds e=tremism. As the political theorist Benjamin Barber has noted, "Fundament=lism is religion under siege." A scenario of endless conflict is plausible. Yet there are glimmerings. Rep=essive systems have survived but mind-sets have changed. The young people =f the region (the median age in Egypt, where nearly one quarter of all Ara=s live, is 25) 8 EFTA_R1_00057616 EFTA01756304 will not return to a state of submission. They have tasted =hat it is to bring change through protest. As in Iran, where the deep refo=mist current was crushed in 2009 only to resurface in 2013, these currents=run deep and will reemerge. Here in Turkey, the closest approximation to a liberal order in a Middle Ea=tern Muslim state exists. That is the region's core challenge: finding a=model that reconciles Islam and modernity, religion with nonsectarian stat=hood. So it is worth recalling that Turkey's democracy is the fruit of 9= years of violent back-and-forth since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the R=public in 1923, and imposed a Western culture. Only over the past decade, with the arrival in power of Recep Tayyip Erdoga=, has the idea taken hold that Islam is compatible with a liberal order. F=r many secular Turks the swing of the pendulum has been excessive. The pro=ests at Gezi Park this summer were about Erdogan's invasion in the name =f Islam of Turks' personal lives. This was democratic pushback from Turk=y's secular coast against the conservative Anatolian heartland. If in Turkey it has taken 90 years for a democracy to evolve that is not an=i-Islamic, then the 30 months since the Arab Spring are a mere speck in ti=e. Moreover, as Mustafa Akyol points out in his book "Islam Without Extr=mes," Turkey, unlike most other Muslim countries, was never colonized, w=th the result that political Islam did not take on a virulent anti-Western=character. It was not a violent reaction against being the West's lackey= as in Iran. Now Iran, under its new president, Hassan Rouhani, is trying again to build=moderation into its theocracy and repair relations with the West. Such att=mpts have failed in the past. But the Middle Eastern future will look very=different if the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — symbol of the violent entry in=o the American consciousness of the Islamic radical — reopens and the Is=amic Republic becomes a freer polity. Nothing inherent to Islam makes it anti-Western. History has. The Islamic r=volution was an assertion of ideological independence from the West. As po=er in the world shifts away from the West, this idea has run its course. I=anians are drawn to America. The United States can have cordial relations with Iran just as it does with=China, while disagreeing with it on most things. A breakthrough would demo=strate that the vicious circles of the Middle East can be broken. I believe the U.S. Embassy in Tehran will reopen within five years because =he current impasse has become senseless. With Iran inside the tent rather =han outside, anything would be possible, even an Israeli-Palestinian peace= If Arabs could see in Israel not a Zionist oppressor but the region's mos= successful economy, a modern state built in 65 years, they would pose the=selves the right questions about openness, innovation and progress. Israel= in turn, by getting out of the business of occupation and oppression, cou=d ensure its future as a Jewish and democratic state. There is another future for the Middle East, one glimpsed during the Arab S=ring, but first it must be dragged from the insistent clutches of the past= Article 6. Foreign Affairs The Arab Sunset: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies Christopher Davidson October 10, 2013 -- Since their modern formation in the mid-twentieth centu=y, Saudi Arabia and the five smaller Gulf monarchies -- Bahrain, Kuwait, O=an, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) -- have been governed by hig=ly autocratic and seemingly anachronistic regimes. Nevertheless, their rul=rs have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of bloody conflicts=on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations at home, and modernizing forc=s from abroad. One of the monarchies' most visible survival strategies has been to stren=then security ties with Western powers, in part by allowing the United Sta=es, France, and Britain to build massive bases on their soil and by spendi=g lavishly on Western arms. In turn, this expensive militarization has aid=d a new generation of rulers that appears more prone than ever to antagoni=ing Iran and even other Gulf states. In some cases, grievances among them =ave grown strong enough to cause diplomatic crises, incite violence, or pr=mpt one monarchy to interfere in the domestic politics of another. It would thus be a mistake to think that the Gulf monarchies are somehow in=incible. Notwithstanding existing internal threats, these regimes are also=facing mounting external ones -- from Western governments, from Iran, and =ach other. And these are only exacerbating their longstanding conflicts an= inherent contradictions. HOME BASES 9 EFTA_R1_00057617 EFTA01756305 The existence of substantial Western military bases on the Arabian Peninsul= has always been problematic for the Gulf monarchies. To their critics, th= hosting of non-Arab, non-Muslim armies is an affront to Islam and to nati=nal sovereignty. Their proliferation will likely draw further criticism, a=d perhaps serve as yet another flashpoint for the region's opposition mo=ements. Among the largest Western installations in the Gulf is al-Udeid Air Base in=Qatar, which owes its existence to the country's former ruler, Sheikh Ha=ad bin Khalifa al-Thani. In 1999, al-Thani told the United States that he =ould like to see 10,000 American servicemen permanently based in the emira=e, and over the next few years, the United States duly began shifting pers=nnel there from Saudi Arabia. Today, al-Udeid houses several thousand U.S.=servicemen at a time and has also served as a forward headquarters of U.S.=Central Command (CENTCOM), a U.S. Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA =ase, and an array of U.S. Special Forces teams. Nearby Bahrain hosts<http:=/www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18fleet.html?_r=0> [2] the =.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the entire U.S. Fifth Fleet, which in=ludes some 6,000 U.S. personnel. The United States recently downsized its =orce in Kuwait, but four U.S. infantry bases remain, including Camp Patrio=, which is believed to house about 3,000 U.S. soldiers and two air bases. The United States plans to further expand its regional military presence in=the near future. As CENTCOM recently announced, the country will be sendin= the latest U.S. antimissile systems to at least four Gulf states. These a=e new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries that the United State= already sent to the region and are meant to assuage the Gulf rulers' fe=rs of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the announcement did not reveal =xactly which states had agreed to take the U.S. weapons. Yet analysts wide=y assume that the unnamed states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Equally, if not more, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bas=s has been the Gulf monarchies' ever-rising spending on Western arms. Al=hough much of the equipment is inappropriate for bolstering defensive capa=ilities or is superfluous to peacekeeping operations -- the kinds of missi=ns Gulf soldiers are likely to find themselves undertaking -- Gulf leaders=regarded the trade as necessary for their protection. By most measures, such spending has gotten out of hand. As a proportion of =DP, the Gulf monarchies' purchases make them the biggest arms buyers in =he world. Even the poorer Gulf states, which are grappling with declining =esources and serious socioeconomic pressures, spend far beyond their means= Of all of the monarchies' purchases, Saudi and UAE procurements have attr=cted the most attention. In 2009 alone, the UAE purchased nearly $8 billio= in U.S. military equipment, making it the United States' biggest arms c=stomer that year. Saudi Arabia, for its part, purchased about $3.3 billion=in hardware. In December 2011, the United States announced that it had fin=lized a $30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F-15 fighter jets to the S=udi Royal Air Force. And a UAE firm has reportedly partnered with a U.S. c=mpany, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, to bring predator drones to t=e UAE. This venture makes the UAE the first foreign buyer to acquire U.S. =rone technology. In the West, the sales have not been without criticism. The pro-Israel lobb=, for example, has repeatedly argued that the sale of such high-grade equi=ment to the Gulf monarchies will erode Israel's "qualitative edge" i= the region. The programs will also prove troublesome inside the Arab king=oms, as the region's ruling families will find it increasingly difficult=to justify such massive transactions to their beleaguered national populat=ons. Given existing regional tensions, they are likely to continue increas=ng spending anyway -- be it on tanks, warplanes, or naval vessels. COMMON CAUSE The monarchies are also under pressure to deal with Iran, and some of them =ee posturing against Tehran as a convenient mechanism for containing domes=ic opposition, distracting from growing socio-economic pressures, and mani=ulating sectarian tensions. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, the Gu=f monarchs have gone to great lengths to highlight Shia membership in oppo=ition movements, a tactic that has allowed them to delegitimize critics --=falsely -- as Iranian agents. Thus far, the strategy has enjoyed some limited success; members of the Gul='s Sunni populations have been quick to accuse Shia activists of being tra=tors. Many Western authorities continue to lend support to the monarchies =n the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style theocratic, revolut=onary, and anti-Western governments. Still, the risks of such rabid anti-Iran sentiments are serious and possibl= existential. By acting on such attitudes, Gulf monarchs have undermined t=eir longstanding position as neutral peace brokers and distributors of reg=onal development aid, and made themselves into legitimate targets in any c=nflict in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that the fathers of today's G=lf rulers would have allowed that to happen, no matter how deeply they dis=rusted their neighbor across the Gulf. This previous generation sidelined =ost confrontations with Iran -- including even the 1971 seizure of 10 EFTA_R1_00057618 EFTA01756306 three U=E islands by the Shah -- in recognition of shared economic interests and t=e substantial Iranian expatriate populations that reside in many of the mo=archies. All that is now ancient history in states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and t=e UAE. Saudi officials have taken a particularly aggressive stance. Accord=ng to a leaked U.S. diplomatic cable from 2008, the Saudi king has "repe=tedly exhorted the United States to cut off the head of the snake" -- Ir=n's nuclear weapons program. Another cable from the same year quoted a v=teran Saudi minister for foreign affairs suggesting a U.S. or NATO offensi=e in southern Lebanon to end Iran- backed Hezbollah's grip on power there= And a former Saudi intelligence chief has said publicly that Saudi Arabia=should "consider acquiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran." In early 2011, Bahrain's rulers took full advantage of anti-Iranian senti=ents to act against domestic opponents, announcing that they would deport =11 Shia residents who had "links to Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary=Guard." In practice, that meant expelling hundreds of Bahrain's Lebanese=residents, suspending all flights between the capital Manama and Beirut, a=d warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to "threats an= interference by terrorists." Abu Dhabi's attitude toward Iran originally appeared to have been more he=itant, perhaps because of its previous ruler's more moderate policies. A=cording to a 2006 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the UAE govern=ent told U.S. officials that "the threat from al-Qaeda would be minor co=pared to if Iran had nukes...but that it was reluctant to take any action =hat might provoke its neighbor." Nevertheless, as Abu Dhabi's forceful=Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan and his five full brothers gaine= control over most of the country's foreign policy, the emirate's view= have fallen in line with those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007, t=e crown prince's circle has pushed Western officials to put more troops =n the region to counter Iranian hegemony. In 2009, the crown prince forcef=lly warned the United States of appeasing Iran [31, reportedly saying that="Ahmadinejad is Hitler." Qatar, which has sought a role as regional peace broker, has been more care=ul with its public statements on Iran. Even so, in a private meeting in 20=9, Qatar's then prime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber al-Than=, characterized Qatar's relationship with Iran as one in which "they I=e to us and we lie to them." Qatar's calculated diplomacy perhaps owes=to its precarious balancing act: the country hosts major U.S. military fac=lities while sharing its largest gas resource -- the offshore North Field =- with Iran. THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY Perhaps even riskier than their hawkishness toward Iran is the Gulf monarch=es' dovishness toward Israel. Since independence, the Gulf monarchies ha=e upheld laws requiring government personnel, businesses, and even individ=al residents to boycott Israel. In the UAE, the federal government has alw=ys housed an Israel boycott office. One federal law, passed in 1971, stipu=ates that "any natural or legal person shall be prohibited from directly=or indirectly concluding an agreement with organizations or persons either=resident in Israel, connected therewith by virtue of their nationality of =orking on its behalf." For many years, however, the boycott extended well beyond such restrictions= The state-owned telecommunications company has barred telephone calls to =srael and blocked Web sites with an Israeli suffix. The government has not=permitted Israeli nationals to enter the UAE, nor -- in theory -- any visi=ors that possess Israeli visa stamps in their passports. Yet trade opportu=ities have occasionally prompted the UAE to ignore its own boycott. After =oining the World Trade Organization in 1996, UAE authorities were clearly =nder pressure to drop or at least relax their stance. When Dubai agreed to=host the WTO's annual meeting in 2003, delegations from all of the organiz=tion's member states had to be invited; there was no way to prevent the ar=ival of an Israeli delegation or the flying of an Israeli flag on top of t=e Dubai World Trade Centre tower. Concerns over Iran have further thawed relations between some of the Gulf m=narchies and Israel. An open channel of communication now exists between Q=tar and the Israeli security services. In late 2010, Qatar hosted a large =elegation of senior Israeli policemen, among them the head of the Israeli =olice's investigations and intelligence branch, ostensibly as part of an=Interpol meeting. Thus far, there is little firm evidence of growing secur=ty ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, or at least there have been no bl=tant admissions of them (as has been the case with Bahrain and Qatar). Nev=rtheless, rumors of significant Saudi-Israeli cooperation, prompted by the=existence of a mutual enemy, have circulated in diplomatic circles for yea=s. The monarchies' new policies toward Israel are particularly dangerous giv=n domestic political realities. The Gulf's national populations are, for=the most part, anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. Gulf nationals grew up wa=ching the Palestinian intifada on television, and the liberation of Palest=ne remains a shared ideal among the region's youth. There 11 EFTA_R1_00057619 EFTA01756307 are also subst=ntial communities of Palestinians in every monarchy; naturalized Gulf nati=nals who were born in Palestinian refugee camps are even known to hold pow=rful official posts in some rulers' courts. SUCCESSION STRUGGLES The pressures facing the Gulf states make for a very tense region, one in w=ich disagreements over the United States, Iran, and Israel threaten to boi= over. Quarrels between the kingdoms have at times grown so bitter that on= monarchy has tried to alter the course of dynastic succession in another.=Following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispute in one monarchy= it is now commonplace for neighboring monarchs to interfere, either by di=creetly backing a preferred candidate, or, in the more extreme cases, by s=onsoring a coup d'etat. The resulting power vacuums have often allowed=foreign powers to interfere as well. The best example of a modern-day coup and subsequent foreign interference t=ok place in the UAE's northernmost emirate of Ras al-Khaimah. In 2003, a=ter allegedly burning an American flag at an anti-Iraq war demonstration, =rince Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the emirate's long-serving crown=prince, was replaced in the order of succession by a younger half-brother,=Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi. Their very elderly father, Sheikh Saqr bin=Mohammed al-Qasimi, later signed a decree in support of this change, but m=ny analysts questioned the ruler's decision-making abilities, given his =dvanced age and poor health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing=of Abu Dhabi, which sent military tanks to take positions on the streets o= Ras al-Khaimah. The ousted crown prince's supporters still took the str=ets to show their support; security forces with water cannons disbursed th=m. The crown prince was then duly exiled, crossing the border to Oman befo=e leaving for the United States. As the emirate's Dubai-like development program began to flounder in 2008= the new crown prince Saud became increasingly vulnerable to criticism, in=luding widespread allegations that he accepted kickbacks from the construc=ion industry. The deposed prince, who was still in exile, enlisted a U.S. =ublic relations firm and a British lawyer to conduct an international medi= campaign to persuade Abu Dhabi and the international community that the i=cumbent crown prince was a liability. The campaign focused on Saud's apparent connections to Tehran, claiming t=at his effective deputy -- a Shia Lebanese businessman -- had major commer=ial interests, including factories, in the Islamic Republic. In 2009, the =ampaign even claimed that Iranian customs officers had been visiting Ras a=-Khaimah's port and that the emirate was serving as a conduit for nuclea= materials destined for Iran. Local media alleged that recent terror plots=there, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai's incomplete Burj Khali=a skyscraper, had originated in Ras al-Khaimah. The exiled crown prince ev=n courted Israeli support, reportedly meeting with Israel's ambassador t= the United Kingdom, who said that he was "working with certain people f=om his side" and "promised that the matter will be solved in his [the =ormer crown prince's] favor." In late 2010, the campaign appeared to be gaining traction. Abu Dhabi's r=ling family allowed Khalid to return from exile to visit his father Sheikh-Saqr, who still held the throne but was undergoing treatment in an Abu Dha=i hospital. When Saqr died in October, Khalid Ocm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt" valign="top" width="61"> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial">=a name="gg">Article 7.</a></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt; font-f=mily:Arial"> </span></p> </td> <td style="width:462.0pt; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-botto=:solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-right:solid windowtext 1.0pt; padding:Ocm =.4pt 0cm 5.4pt" valign="top" width="462"> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:Arial">=oreign Policy</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:A=ial">Do American Jews think peace with Palestine is possible? </span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:Arial">=ruce Stokes</span></p> </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="width:60.8pt; border:solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-top:none; =adding:Ocm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt" valign="top" width="61"> 12 EFTA_R1_00057620 EFTA01756308 <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="hh"></a><a href="#h"><span style="fon=-size:10.0pt; font-family:Arial">Article 8</span></a><span style="font-srze:10.0pt; font-family:Arial">.</span><span style="font-size:10.0pt; fonr- family:Arial"></span></p> </td> <td style="width:462.0pt; border-top:none; border-left:none; border-botto=:solid windowtext 1.0pt; border-right:solid windowtext 1.0pt; padding:Gcm =.4pt 0cm 5.4pt" valign="top" width="462"> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:Arial">=hatham House</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:A=ial">The 3D printer is threatening to change the world </span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt; font-family:Arial">roger Highfield </span></p> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="a"></a><span style="font-size:8.0pt">&nrsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:8.0pt"><a href="#aa">Artirle 1.</a></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The Washington Postr</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:26.0pt">The world mus= tell Iran: No more half- steps</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Ray Takeyh</span></=> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">October 14, 2013 --=The great powers are again resuming diplomatic efforts to settle the Iran =uclear issue. Expectations are high, as Iran is </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/rouhani-s=orn-in-as-irans- president/2013/08/04/eb322736-fd25-11e2-8294-0ee5075b840d_rtory.html" target="_blank"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">now presumed=to be ruled by pragmatists</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> who seek to end its isolation. Although much of the recent </span><a href=3D"http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranian-president-hassan-rouhani-tares-diplomatic-tone-at-military- event/2013/09/22/313937f4-2393-11e3-9372-92=06241ae9c_story.html" target="_blank"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">i=ternational focus</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> has been on </span><a hr=f="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/iranians-await-presidential-elect=on-results-following-extension-of- polling-hours/2013/06/15/3800c276-d593-1=e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html" target="_blank"><span style="font- siz=:18.0pt">President Hassan Rouhani</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> and his </span>=a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-iran=-zarif-hold-unusual-private-meeting-on- sidelines-of-nuclear-talks/2013/09/=6/d2fddfac-2700-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html" target="_blank"><spanrstyle="font-size:18.0pt">indefatigable foreign minister</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt">, </span><a hr=f="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-irits nuclear program or relinquish the critical components of such a program. They are, however, mo=e open to dialogue than the Ahmadinejad government was. Moreover, they str=ss that a reasonable Iran can assuage U.S. concerns about its nuclear development without having to abandon the =rogram. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Despite its softener rhetoric, the new Iranian regime can be expected to continue asserting it= nuclear "rights" and to press its advantages in a contested Middle Ea=t. The Islamic Republic plans to remain 13 EFTA_R1_00057621 EFTA01756309 an important backer of the Assad dynasty in Syria, a benefactor of Hezboll=h and a supporter of Palestinian rejectionist groups. It will persist in i=s repressive tactics at home and continue to deny the people of Iran funda=ental human rights. This is a government that will seek to negotiate a settlement of the nuclear issue by testing t=e limits of the great powers' prohibitions. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Washington need not=accede to such Iranian conceptions. The United States and its allies are e=tering this week's negotiations in a strong position. </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/irans-automakers-stal=ed-by- sanctions/2013/10/14/515725aa-3261-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b3lcbed_story.html= target="_blank"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">Iran's economy is wi=hering</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> under the combined pressures of sanctions and its own managerial incompete=ce. The Iranian populace remains disaffected as the bonds between state an= society have been largely severed since the Green Revolution of 2009. The=European Union is still highly skeptical of Iran, a distrust that Rouhani's charm offensive has mitigat=d but not eliminated. Allied diplomats can use as leverage in the forthcom=ng negotiations the threat of additional sanctions and Israeli military fo=ce. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Given the stark rea=ities, it is time for the great powers to have a maximalist approach to di=lomacy with Iran. It is too late for more Iranian half-steps and half-meas=res. Tehran must account for all its illicit nuclear activities and be compelled to make irreversible concessio=s that permanently degrade its ability to reconstitute its nuclear weapons=program at a more convenient time. Anything less would be a lost opportuni=y. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Ray Takeyh is a =enior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. </span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="b"><span style="font-size:8.0pt")&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="ftbb"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 2.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Foreign Policy</spa=></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">Six reasons w=y the United States can't force Iran's nuclear hand</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Colin H. Kahl, Alir=za Nader</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">October 14, 2013 --=Iranian president Hasan Rouhani's recent charm offensive has raised expect=tions for a diplomatic breakthrough heading into this week's nuclear negot=ations between Iran and the United States, Britain, China, France, Germany, and Russia (the so-called P584143;=) in Geneva. Sanctions have taken a heavy toll on the Iranian economy, and=the Islamic Republic may </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">finall=</span></span><span style="font- size:18.0pt"> be motivated to take steps=to rein in its nuclear program, including acce chief nuclear negotiator, he convinced Supreme Leader =yatollah Ali Khamenei to accept a temporary suspension of enrichment. But further talks with the international communi=y stalled in early 2005 over a failure to agree on Iran's right to enrichm=nt, and Tehran ended its suspension shortly thereafter. Rouhani believes -= as do his critics in the Revolutionary Guard and the supreme leader -- that the West pocketed Iranian concessions=and Tehran got nothing in return. The failure of Iran's earlier approach u=der Rouhani facilitated the rise of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his hardline p=licies, including the development of a much more robust uranium enrichment capability. Rouhani is unlikely t= make that mistake again. And even if Rouhani were somehow convinced to do=so, he would be savaged by his right flank, significantly undercutting his=presidency. 14 EFTA_R1_00057622 EFTA01756310 </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">2. <b>lt's a matter=of pride and principle for the regime. </b></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The regime has inve=ted far too much of its domestic legitimacy in defending Iran's &quotrigh=s&quot (defined as domestic enrichment) to completely capitulate now, reg=rdless of the pressure. The nuclear program and &quot;resistance to arrogant powers&quot are firmly imbedded in the Islam=c Republic's ideological raison d'etre. Khamenei, the ultimate decider on =he nuclear file, and the Revolutionary Guards will not give up on the prog=am altogether, for it could be a viewed by their supporters and opponents alike as a total defeat. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">However, Khamenei m=y accept a deal that constrains Iran's nuclear program but still allows li=ited enrichment. Under such an agreement, he could tell the Iranian people= 81quot I said we never wanted nuclear weapons and I have issued a </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="fon=-size:18.0pt">fatwa</span></span><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> (religi=us ruling) against them. I insisted that our rights be respected, and now =hey are.&quot But if Khamenei cries uncle and dismantles the entire program, how will he explain the billions invest=d and justify the years of sanctions and isolation to his people? What wou=d it all have been for? Khamenei likely fears such a humiliation more than=he fears economic collapse or targeted military strikes against his nuclear facilities. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">3. <b>lf Iran does =ant to go nuclear, sanctions aren't going to stop it in time.</b> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Although hawks beli=ve Tehran is on the ropes and that additional sanctions can force Iran to =ompletely dismantle its nuclear program, economic and nuclear timelines do='t align. To be sure, Iran's economy is in </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt"=dire straits</span></span><span style="font- size:18.0pt">, and a desire =o alleviate the pressure is driving the regime's apparent willingness to n=gotiate more seriously. But despite the current pain, Iran is not facing imminent economic collapse. This may be a=dark period in Tehran, but Khamenei likely believes that Iran weathered wo=se times during the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts have warned that Iran cou=d achieve a critical &quot;breakout capability&quot; -- the ability to produce fissile material for nuclear we=pons so fast that it could not be detected or stopped -- sometime in </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">mid-20=4</span></span><span style="font- size:18.0pt">. Yet, even if the U.S. Co=gress goes forward with additional harsh sanctions, the regime is not like=y to implode before it reaches this technical threshold and, if it did, it might make little difference. Even the impris=ned leadership of the Green Movement and Iranian secularists opposed to th= Islamic Repomach. But if paired with meaningful </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">sancti=ns relief</span></span><span style="font- size:18.0pt">, it has a much be=ter chance of success than insisting on the complete dismantling of Iran's=program. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Washington should n=t accept a bad deal. But if we are to avoid the worst possible outcomes --=unconstrained enrichment leading to an eventual Iranian bomb or another ma=or war in the Middle East -- then a good-if-imperfect deal is preferable to no deal at all. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Colin H. Kahl is=an associate professor in Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School o= Foreign Service and a senior fellow and director of the Middle East Secur=ty Program at the Center for a New American Security. In 2009-2011, he was the deputy assistant secretary of =efense for the Middle East. Alireza Nader is a senior international policy=analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. 15 EFTA_R1_00057623 EFTA01756311 </span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="c"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#cc"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 3.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Bloomberg</span></p= <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">The Rise and =all of Israel's Settlement Movement</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Jeffrey Goldberg</s=an></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Oct 14, 2013 -- Mom=nts after Hanan Porat and his fellow Israeli paratroopers had crossed the =uez Canal as spearheads of a furious Israeli counterattack in the 1973 Yom=Kippur War, he was severely wounded in an Egyptian mortar bombardment. The Egyptians and Syrians had surprised=lsrael on Yom Kippur, with an atrocious loss of life, and crushed the coun=ry's post-Six Day War belief in its own invincibility.&nbsp; As Porat la= recovering in his hospital bed, his chest ravaged by shrapnel wounds, he thanked God that he wasn't in the burn un=t. And then, as </span><a href="http://www.harpercollins.com/authors/19429/Yossi_Klein_Ha=evi/index.aspx" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Yossi K=ein Halevi</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> writes in his new b=ok, "</span><a href="http://www.harpercollins.com/books/Like-Dreamers-=ossi-Klein-Halevi/?isbn=9780060545765" target="_blank"><span style="=ont-size:18.0pt">Like Dreamers</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt">," the next phase of=Porat's life mission was revealed.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">He read, in his hos=ital bed, an article in a kibbutz newspaper by a writer named Arnon Lapid,=titled, "An Invitation to Weeping." Porat wasn't a member of the secul=r kibbutz elite; he was a member of a more marginalized group of religious Zionists, who envied the kibbutznikim, and=respected them as well.&nbsp; He was stunned by what Lapid wrote: "I wan= to send you all an invitation to weeping ... I will weep over my dead, yo= will weep over yours ... we'll weep ... for the illusions that were shattered, for the assumptions that were proven to=be baseless, the truths that were exposed as lies ... And we will pity our=elves, for we are worthy of pity."&nbsp; Halevi writes that when Porat r=ad this lament he "felt as if his wounds were being torn open. He would have shouted if he had the voice. Pity the =eneration privileged to restore Jewish sovereignty to the land of Israel? =hat small-mindedness, what weakness of character! Where would the Jews be =ow if, in 1945, they had thought like this Arnon Lapid? Israelis would do now what Jews always did: Grieve =or their dead and go on, with faith and hope."&nbsp; Porat would soon he=p usher into existence a new movement, a settlement enterprise that would =e self- consciously modeled on Israel's original settler movement, the socialist, Zionist and fiercely anti-religi=us pioneering formations that built the original kibbutzim. The early kibb=tznikim were the men and women who laid the foundations for the reborn Jew=sh state and led that state through the first decades of its existence, but by 1973 they appeared to be a spen= force, exhausted spiritually, morally and politically.&nbsp; Porat's mo=ement, which would cover the biblical heartland of the Jewish people with =ettlements -- a heartland the secular world referred to as the West Bank, but which Jews knew by the ancient nam=s of Judea and Samaria -- would be driven by devotion to God and his deman=s, not by a secular vision of Jews liberated from the ghettoes and freed f=om the fetters of capitalism.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">This movement, whic= coalesced around Porat's Gush Emunim -- the "Bloc of the Faithful" =- has defined Israel's political agenda for the past 40 years, just as t=e kibbutz movement and its leaders shaped Israel 16 EFTA_R1_00057624 EFTA01756312 and its priorities through the early period of its existence. What is so f=scinating about these two movements is that, for all their transformative =uccess, they have both failed to complete their missions.&nbsp;&nbsp; The =ibbutzim didn't turn Israel into a socialist paradise, and the hubris and shortsightedness of the Labor elite, which sp=ung from the kibbutz movement, brought Israel low in October 1973.</span><=p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">And the religious-n=tionalist settlement movement has succeeded in moving hundreds of thousand= of Israelis into the biblical heartland, but it has never been able to co=vince the majority of Israelis that the absorption of the West Bank into a "Greater Israel" represents the=r country's salvation, rather than a threat to its existence. The thwart=d utopianism of these two movements is the subject of "Like Dreamers,"=which is a magnificent book, one of the two or three finest books about Israel I have ever read. Halevi tells the stor= of seven men -- paratroopers who participated in the liberation of Jerusa=em in 1967 -- who became leaders and archetypes of Israeli's competing u=opian movements.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">When I met Halevi i= New York recently, I was filled with questions about what this history au=ured for Israel's future. The first one to cross my mind: How did the Orth=dox settlers so easily supplant the leftist kibbutz elite as the nation's pioneering vanguard?</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">"The left lost it= vigor at precisely the moment that religious Zionism discovered its own v=gor," Halevi told me. "The key here is 1973. After 1967, not much happ=ned. There were a couple of settlements, but the Labor government kept everyone on a tight leash, and the religious=Zionists were intensely frustrated. The empowering moment for religious Zi=nists was due to Labor's failures in the Yom Kippur War. A generation of=young kibbutznikim came out of 1973 deeply demoralized. People like Porat realized that the left had lost the =lot."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Halevi went on, "=n Israel, you never naturally evolve from one state of thinking to another= We careen. So we careened toward religious Zionism and the settlement mov=ment."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">But in your book, I=said, you suggest that the settlers have failed to gain legitimacy for the=r movement among the mass of Israelis. How did they fail? 'The settlemen= movement failed during the first Palestinian uprising. Israelis realized then the price of the occupation, that there w=s no such thing, as settler leaders promised, as a benign occupation. That=kind of illusion went in the late 1980s."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Halevi noted one sm=ll irony here: If the first Palestinian uprising dispelled the idea that I=rael could occupy the Palestinians cost-free and in perpetuity, the second=Palestinian uprising - - which began after the peace process failed in 2000, dispelled the left-wing argument t=at territorial compromise with the Palestinians would be easily achieved o=ce Israel opened itself to the possibility of peace.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">'The second upris=ng was the end of the dream of the Peace Now movement, because the worst t=rrorism in Israel's history happened after we made the offer for real te=ritorial compromise at Camp David, and after the Clinton proposals, and after we offered to redivide Jerusalem, b=coming the first country in history to voluntarily offer shared sovereignt= in its capital city." </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">So, reality has dis=redited both the right and left. What comes next? The next great ideologic=l movement in Israeli history is centrism, Halevi said. "The Israeli cen=rist believes two things: A. the Arab world refuses to recognize our legitimacy and our existence; and B. we can=92t continue occupying them. I believe passionately that the left is corre=t about the occupation, and I believe the right is correct in its understa=ding of the intentions of the Middle East toward the Jewish state."</span></p> 17 EFTA_R1_00057625 EFTA01756313 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">l argued that "ce=trism" possesses neither the magnetic power of socialist transformation =or the messianic qualities implicit in the settlement enterprise. Halevi d=sagreed. "Centrism is taking a people that hasn't functioned as a people, hasn't functioned as a nation, for 2,00= years -- that is in some ways an anti-people, who have so many different =deologies and ways of being -- and learning how to function as a working n=tion. That's a large cause."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Will centrist Israe= overcome the power of the right? And what is its program? In a coming pos=, I'll look at the ideological and practical challenges to the solutions=centrism puts forward to the Israeli-Arab crisis. In the meantime, go out and read Halevi's book; nothing explains=more eloquently why Israel, more than most any other country, lives or die= based on the power and justice of its animating ideas.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="d"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">&nbsp;=/span></a></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#dd"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 4.</span></a><span styleefont- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian" ta=get="_blank"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">The Guardiangspan></a><sp=n style="font-size:18.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">As the Middle=East's power blocs fracture, so do hopes of stability</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/profile/wadah-=hanfar" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Wadah Khanfarq=pan></a><span style="font-size:18.Opt"> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">14 October 2013 -- =n the Middle East, long-established alliances are shifting dramatically. A= one political leader in the region said to me recently: &quot;The ground =s shaking under our feet and we must keep all our options open.&quot; Three major events over the past three months =ave destabilised the old order: </span><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-mors=-egypt-second-revolution" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0p=">a military coup against Mohamed Morsi's government</span></a><span style=30"font-size:lS.Opt"> in Egypt; the Russian-American agreement </span><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/s=ria-deadline-destroy-chemical- weapons-november" target="_blank"><span st=le="font-size:lS.Opt">to destroy Syria's chemical weapons</span></a><spa= style="font-size:18.Opt">; and a </span><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/27/obama-phone-=all-iranian-president-rouhani" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:=8.0pt">phone call between Obama and the new Iranian president Hassan Rouha=i</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt">.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">But first: what did=the old order look like? Before Hosni Mubarak's regime was overthrown in E=ypt, the Middle East was split into two main axes. The so-called axis of m=deration — Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Kuwait — was aligned with the west, supported the Palestinian Na=ional Authority and encouraged a political settlement with Israel.</sparn<=p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The axis of resista=ce — Iran, Syria and the political movements of Hamas and Hezbollah — =ad a strained relationship with the west and considered a political settle=ent with Israel as a surrender. Qatar and Turkey stood close to this axis, maintaining good relations with the axis =f moderation.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">The fall of Mubarak=s regime in January 2011 removed Egypt from the axis of moderation and tri=gered the current regional turmoil. The Syrian uprising against the Bashar=al-Assad regime </span><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17192278" tar=et="_blank"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">drove the Hamas leadership =ut of Syria</span></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt">, and out of the ax=s of resistance. Turkey and Qatar also moved further away after both expressing public support for the Syrian reb=ls.</span></p> 18 EFTA_R1_00057626 EFTA01756314 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">In this way, the ax=s of resistance was transformed into an axis of Iranian-Shia power, extend=ng from Tehran to Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq and Hezbollah in Le=anon — a resilient axis united by support for the Assad regime.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">After Morsi's elect=on, Turkey and Qatar lent Egypt financial and political support, forming a=new strategic alliance. Thus the coup that overthrew Morsi in July was a s=rategic earthquake. But it was welcomed by what was left of the axis of moderation: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and=lordan. The Saudi king congratulated the interim president of Egypt and, w=th Kuwait and the UAE, offered him a package of aid exceeding $12bn, and K=ng Abdullah II of Jordan was the first Arab leader to visit Cairo after the coup. However, Qatar and Turkey=condemned the coup. Iran, though not sorry to see Morsi go given his suppo=t for the Syrian revolution, was concerned to see Egypt strongly aligned o=ce more with Iran's enemies.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The aftershocks of =he coup continue to affect the region. The countries supporting it had hop=d the military would enforce its rule in a matter of weeks, but they misca=culated: three months on the Egyptian scene hasn't settled down. There are still constant marches and protests, =s well as an imposed evening curfew. Military and security measures have b=en taken against the Sinai and several cities and villages opposing the co=p, and are driving the country into a state of economic paralysis.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">On a regional level= there were other miscalculations, too. The new axis of moderation tried t= topple the Islamist movements in Tunisia and Libya, while the Egyptian ar=y began destroying the tunnels linking Gaza and Sinai as well as launching an extensive campaign against Hamas wi=h the hope of ending its control of the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the =ew axis of moderation also strained its relationship with Turkey, one of t=e most strategically important countries in the region.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">However, the greate=t miscalculation the new axis made was its evaluation of the Russian and A=erican position on Syria. This axis hoped Basher al-Assad's regime would b= quickly eliminated and replaced with a regime aligned with the axis of moderation, while also excluding jihadis=s from the scene. Saudi and UAE diplomacy supported an American military s=rike against Assad. They communicated with Russia to give assurances and i=centives to ensure that the Russians would refrain from effective rejection of any strikes. However, the Russia=-American deal to disarm Syria's chemical weapons was a surprise. This was=then followed by the developing </span><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/02/obama-rouhan=-phone-call-us-iran" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">cl=seness between Iran and both the US and Britain</span></a><span style="f=nt-size:18.Opt">, which further complicated the situation and derailed the aims of the axis of moderation.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The restructuring o= regional alliances is still ongoing. The two countries that would benefit=most from being politically close would be Turkey and Iran. Iran, burdened=by an economic blockade and on the verge of </span><a href="http://www.latimes.com/World/worldnow/la-fg-wn-=ran-nuclear-talks- 20131014,0,2879074.story" target="_blank"><span style=3D"font-size:18.0pt">talks with the west</span></a><span style="font-siz=:18.Opt">, has an interest in the Iraqi and Syrian crises being resolved in a manner that would guarantee the pres=rvation of its power while bringing stability to the region.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Meanwhile, Turkey a=so has an interest in putting an end to the bloodshed in Syria and Iraq be=ause of the detrimental impact the conflicts are having on Turkey's own st=bility and economic development. In addition, Turkey's relationship with the axis of moderation has deteriorat=d since the coup in Egypt, and it needs to make diplomatic moves to revive=its regional influence.</span></p> 19 EFTA_R1_00057627 EFTA01756315 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">However, the transf=rmations in the region are expected not only to affect the position of cou=tries, but that of the Islamist movements as well. In particular it will b= interesting to see how Hamas re-evaluates its regional relations and whether the targeting of the movement in Gaza w=II drive it to restore close relations with Iran.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The region as a whore has suffered from conflict between the two axes for years, and this has =ed to civil wars and sectarian conflict. It is now clear that the struggle=in Syria has reached a critical point for both sides, and there will be no solution unless Iranians, Turks and A=abs can work together. As for Iraq, its legislative elections will be held=in a few months. Sectarian polarisation in the country is claiming hundred= of lives on a monthly basis. Without reconciling Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, Iraq too is heading for more violencer</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Conflicting axes ca=not achieve stability in the region; only co- operative efforts of all the =arties and countries involved can hope to do that. Today this all seems a =istant hope, and the region may have to experience more turmoil and chaos before this fact is accepted.</span><=p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Wadah Khanfar is=a former director general of the al-Jazeera television network. </span></i><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt"></span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="e"><span style="font-size:B.Opt">&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="ttee"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 5.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">NYT</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">The Middle Ea=t Pendulum</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://topics.nytimes.comitopinews/intern=tional/columnsirogercohent title="More Articles by ROGER COHEN" targetr3D"_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Roger Cohen</span></a><span st=le="font-size:18.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">October 14, 2013 --=The Middle Eastern strongmen are back. The counterrevolution is in full sw=ng. Islamists and secular liberals do battle. The Shiite and Sunni worlds =onfront each other. A two-state Israeli-Palestinian peace looks impossible. Freedom is equated with chaos. For this region the=e is no future, only endless rehearsals of the past.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Poisoned by colonia=ism, stymied by Islam's battle with modernity, inebriated by oil, blocke= by the absence of institutions that can mediate the fury of tribe and eth=icity, Middle Eastern states turn in circles. Syria is now the regional emblem, a vacuum in which only the viol=nt nihilism of the jihadi thrives.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Just two and a half=years after the Arab Spring, talk of the future — any future — seems p=eposterous. Countries build futures on the basis of things that do not exi=t here: consensus as to the nature of the state, the rule of law, a concept of citizenship that overrides sectarian =llegiance, and the ability to place the next generation's prosperity abo=e the settling of past scores.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Syria's Bashar al=Assad has gassed his own people. Iraq is again engulfed in Sunni-Shiite vi=lence. The U.S.-trained Egyptian Army has slaughtered members of the Musli= Brotherhood. It is hard to recall the heady season of 2011 when despots fell and Arabs spoke with passion of fre=dom and personal empowerment. The Arab security state has shown its resili=nce; it breeds extremism. As the political theorist Benjamin Barber has no=ed, "Fundamentalism is religion under siege."</span></p> 20 EFTA_R1_00057628 EFTA01756316 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">A scenario of endle=s conflict is plausible. Yet there are glimmerings. Repressive systems hav= survived but mind-sets have changed. The young people of the region (the =edian age in Egypt, where nearly one quarter of all Arabs live, is 25) will not return to a state of submission= They have tasted what it is to bring change through protest. As in Iran, =here the deep reformist current was crushed in 2009 only to resurface in 2=13, these currents run deep and will reemerge.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Here in Turkey, the=closest approximation to a liberal order in a Middle Eastern Muslim state =xists. That is the region's core challenge: finding a model that reconci=es Islam and modernity, religion with nonsectarian statehood. So it is worth recalling that Turkey's democracy=is the fruit of 90 years of violent back-and- forth since Mustafa Kemal Ata=urk founded the Republic in 1923, and imposed a Western culture.</span></p= <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Only over the past =ecade, with the arrival in power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has the idea tak=n hold that Islam is compatible with a liberal order. For many secular Tur=s the swing of the pendulum has been excessive. The protests at Gezi Park this summer were about Erdogan's in=asion in the name of Islam of Turks' personal lives. This was democratic=pushback from Turkey's secular coast against the conservative Anatolian =eartland.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">If in Turkey it has=taken 90 years for a democracy to evolve that is not anti-Islamic, then th= 30 months since the Arab Spring are a mere speck in time. Moreover, as Mu=tafa Akyol points out in his book "Islam Without Extremes," Turkey, unlike most other Muslim countries, was never=colonized, with the result that political Islam did not take on a virulent=anti-Western character. It was not a violent reaction against being the We=t's lackey, as in Iran.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Now Iran, under its=new president, Hassan Rouhani, is trying again to build moderation into it= theocracy and repair relations with the West. Such attempts have failed i= the past. But the Middle Eastern future will look very different if the U.S. Embassy in Tehran — symbol of the v=olent entry into the American consciousness of the Islamic radical — reo=ens and the Islamic Republic becomes a freer polity.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Nothing inherent to=lslam makes it anti-Western. History has. The Islamic revolution was an as=ertion of ideological independence from the West. As power in the world sh=fts away from the West, this idea has run its course. Iranians are drawn to America.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The United States c=n have cordial relations with Iran just as it does with China, while disag=eeing with it on most things. A breakthrough would demonstrate that the vi=ious circles of the Middle East can be broken.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">l believe the U.S. =mbassy in Tehran will reopen within five years because the current impasse=has become senseless. With Iran inside the tent rather than outside, anyth=ng would be possible, even an Israeli-Palestinian peace.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">If Arabs could see =n Israel not a Zionist oppressor but the region's most successful econom=, a modern state built in 65 years, they would pose themselves the right q=estions about openness, innovation and progress. Israel, in turn, by getting out of the business of occupation an= oppression, could ensure its future as a Jewish and democratic state.</sp=n></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">There is another fu=ure for the Middle East, one glimpsed during the Arab Spring, but first it=must be dragged from the insistent clutches of the past.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span>qp> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="f"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#ff"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 6.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> 21 EFTA_R1_00057629 EFTA01756317 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Foreign Affairs</sp=n></p> <p ciass="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">The Arab Suns=t: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies</span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Christopher Davidso=</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">October 10, 2013 --=Since their modern formation in the mid- twentieth century, Saudi Arabia an= the five smaller Gulf monarchies -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the=United Arab Emirates (UAE) --&nbsp;have been governed by highly autocratic and seemingly anachronistic regimes. Ne=ertheless, their rulers have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the fac= of bloody conflicts on their doorsteps, fast-growing populations at home,=and modernizing forces from abroad.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">One of the monarchi=s' most visible survival strategies has been to strengthen security ties=with Western powers, in part by allowing the United States, France, and Br=tain to build massive bases on their soil and by spending lavishly on Western arms. In turn, this expensive mil=tarization has aided a new generation of rulers that appears more prone th=n ever to antagonizing Iran and even other Gulf states. In some cases, gri=vances among them have grown strong enough to cause diplomatic crises, incite violence, or prompt one monarchy=to interfere in the domestic politics of another.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">lt would thus be a =istake to think that the Gulf monarchies are somehow invincible. Notwithst=nding existing internal threats, these regimes are also facing mounting ex=ernal ones -- from Western governments, from Iran, and each other. And these are only exacerbating their longstand=ng conflicts and inherent contradictions.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt"Anbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font•size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">HOME BASES</span></=> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The existence of su=stantial Western military bases on the Arabian Peninsula has always been p=oblematic for the Gulf monarchies. To their critics, the hosting of non-Ar=b, non- Muslim armies is an affront to Islam and to national sovereignty. Their proliferation will likely draw=further criticism, and perhaps serve as yet another flashpoint for the reg=on's opposition movements.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Among the largest W=stern installations in the Gulf is al•Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which owes =ts existence to the country's former ruler, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-=hani. In 1999, al- Thani told the United States that he would like to see 10,000 American servicemen permanently ba=ed in the emirate, and over the next few years, the United States duly beg=n shifting personnel there from Saudi Arabia. Today, al-Udeid houses sever=l thousand U.S. servicemen at a time and has also served as a forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command=(CENTCOM), a U.S. Air Force expeditionary air wing, a CIA base, and an arr=y of U.S. Special Forces teams. Nearby Bahrain </span><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18flee=.html?2=0" target="_blank"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">hosts</sp=n></a><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> (2) the U.S. Naval Forces Central =ommand and the entire U.S. Fifth Fleet, which includes some 6,000 U.S. personnel. The United States recently downsized i=s force in Kuwait, but four U.S. infantry bases remain, including Camp Pat=iot, which is believed to house about 3,000 U.S. soldiers and two air base=.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The United States p=ans to further expand its regional military presence in the near future. A= CENTCOM recently announced, the country will be sending the latest U.S. a=timissile systems to at least four Gulf states. These are new versions of the Patriot anti-missile batteries =hat the United States already sent to the region and are meant to&nbsp;ass=age the Gulf rulers' fears of Iranian missile attacks. Tellingly, the an=ouncement did not reveal exactly which 22 EFTA_R1_00057630 EFTA01756318 states had agreed to take the U.S. weapons. Yet analysts widely assume tha= the unnamed states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">Equally, if not mor=, problematic than hosting so many foreign military bases has been the Gul= monarchies' ever-rising spending on Western arms. Although much of the =quipment is inappropriate for bolstering defensive capabilities or is superfluous to peacekeeping operations -- the=kinds of missions Gulf soldiers are likely to find themselves undertaking Gulf leaders regarded the trade as necessary for their protection.</span=</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">By most measures, s=ch spending has gotten out of hand. As a proportion of GDP, the Gulf monar=hies' purchases make them the biggest arms buyers in the world. Even the=poorer Gulf states, which are grappling with declining resources and serious socioeconomic pressures, spend far be=ond their means.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">Of all of the monar=hies' purchases, Saudi and UAE procurements have attracted the most atte=tion. In 2009 alone, the UAE purchased nearly $8 billion in U.S. military =quipment, making it the United States' biggest arms customer that year. Saudi Arabia, for its part, purchased abo=t $3.3 billion in hardware. In December 2011, the United States announced =hat it had finalized a $30 billion sale of Boeing-manufactured F-15 fighte= jets to the Saudi Royal Air Force. And a UAE firm has reportedly partnered with a U.S. company, General Atomi=s Aeronautical Systems, to bring predator drones to the UAE. This venture =akes the UAE the first foreign buyer to acquire U.S. drone technology.</sp=n></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">In the West, the sa=es have not been without criticism. The pro- Israel lobby, for example, has=repeatedly argued that the sale of such high-grade equipment to the Gulf m=narchies will erode Israel's "qualitative edge" in the region. The programs will also prove troublesome inside the=Arab kingdoms, as the region's ruling families will find it increasingly=difficult to justify such massive transactions to their beleaguered nation.' populations. Given existing regional tensions, they are likely to continue increasing spending anyway -- be it =n tanks, warplanes, or naval vessels.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">COMMON CAUSE</span>=/p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">The monarchies are =Iso under pressure to deal with Iran, and some of them see posturing again=t Tehran as a convenient mechanism for containing domestic opposition, dis=racting from growing socio-economic pressures, and manipulating sectarian tensions. Since the beginning of the=Arab Spring, the Gulf monarchs have gone to great lengths to highlight Shi= membership in opposition movements, a tactic that has allowed them to del=gitimize critics -- falsely -- as Iranian agents.&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:lB.Opt">Thus far, the strat=gy has enjoyed some limited success; members of the Gulf's Sunni populatio=s have been quick to accuse Shia activists of being traitors. Many Western=authorities continue to lend support to the monarchies on the grounds that the alternative would be Iran-style =heocratic, revolutionary, and anti-Western governments.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Still, the risks of=such rabid anti-Iran sentiments are serious and possibly existential. By a=ting on such attitudes, Gulf monarchs have undermined their longstanding p=sition as neutral peace brokers and distributors of regional development aid, and made themselves into legitim=te targets in any conflict in the Persian Gulf. It is unlikely that the fa=hers of today's Gulf rulers would have allowed that to happen, no matter=how deeply they distrusted their neighbor across the Gulf. This previous generation sidelined most confront=tions with Iran -- including even the 1971 seizure of three UAE islands by=the Shah -- in recognition of shared economic interests and the substantia= Iranian expatriate populations that reside in many of the monarchies.</span></p> 23 EFTA_R1_00057631 EFTA01756319 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">All that is now anc=ent history in states like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Saudi offic=als have taken a particularly aggressive stance. According to a leaked U.S= diplomatic cable from 2008, the Saudi king has "repeatedly exhorted the United States to cut off the head of t=e snake" -- Iran's nuclear weapons program. Another cable from the sam= year quoted a veteran Saudi minister for foreign affairs suggesting a U.S= or NATO offensive in southern Lebanon to end Iran-backed Hezbollah's grip on power there. And a former Saudi i=telligence chief has said publicly that Saudi Arabia should "consider ac=uiring nuclear weapons to counter Iran."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">In early 2011, Bahr=in's rulers took full advantage of anti-Iranian sentiments to act agains= domestic opponents, announcing that they would deport all Shia residents =ho had "links to Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard." In practice, that meant expelling hundreds of Bahr=in's Lebanese residents, suspending all flights between the capital Manama=and Beirut, and warning Bahraini nationals not to travel to Lebanon due to="threats and interference by terrorists."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Abu Dhabi's attit=de toward Iran originally appeared to have been more hesitant, perhaps bec=use of its previous ruler's more moderate policies. According to a 2006 =able from the U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi, the UAE government told U.S. officials that "the threat from al-Qaeda wo=ld be minor compared to if Iran had nukes...but that it was reluctant to t=ke any action that might provoke its neighbor." Nevertheless, as Abu Dha=i's forceful Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed al-Nahyan and his five full brothers gained control over most of the=country's foreign policy, the emirate's views have fallen in line with=those of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Since 2007, the crown prince's circle=has pushed Western officials to put more troops in the region to counter Iranian hegemony. In 2009, the crown princ= forcefully&nbsp;</span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-s=ze:18.0pt">warned the United States of appeasing Iran</span></span><span s=yle="font-size:18.0pt"> [3], reportedly saying that "Ahmadinejad is Hitler."&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Qatar, which has so=ght a role as regional peace broker, has been more careful with its public=statements on Iran. Even so, in a private meeting in 2009, Qatar's then =rime minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Taber al-Thani, characterized Qatar's relationship with Iran as one =n which "they lie to us and we lie to them." Qatar's calculated dipl=macy perhaps owes to its precarious balancing act: the country hosts major=U.S. military facilities while sharing its largest gas resource -- the offshore North Field -- with Iran.</span><=p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">THE ENEMY OF MY ENE=Y</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Perhaps even riskie= than their hawkishness toward Iran is the Gulf monarchies' dovishness t=ward Israel. Since independence, the Gulf monarchies have upheld laws requ=ring government personnel, businesses, and even individual residents to boycott Israel. In the UAE, the federal g=vernment has always housed an Israel boycott office. One federal law, pass=d in 1971, stipulates that "any natural or legal person shall be prohibi=ed from directly or indirectly concluding an agreement with organizations or persons either resident in Israel, conn=cted therewith by virtue of their nationality of working on its behalf."=/span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">For many years, how=ver, the boycott extended well beyond such restrictions. The state-owned t=lecommunications company has barred telephone calls to Israel and blocked =eb sites with an Israeli suffix. The government has not permitted Israeli nationals to enter the UAE, nor -- in=theory -- any visitors that possess Israeli visa stamps in their passports= Yet trade opportunities have occasionally prompted the UAE to ignore its =wn boycott. After joining the World Trade Organization in 1996, UAE authorities were clearly under pressure to=drop or at least relax their stance. When Dubai agreed to host the WTO's a=nual meeting in 2003, delegations from all of the organization's member st=tes had to be invited; there was 24 EFTA_R1_00057632 EFTA01756320 no way to prevent the arrival of an Israeli delegation or the flying of an=lsraeli flag on top of the Dubai World Trade Centre tower.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Concerns over Iran =ave further thawed relations between some of the Gulf monarchies and Israe=.&nbsp;An open channel of communication now exists between Qatar and the l=raeli security services. In late 2010, Qatar hosted a large delegation of senior Israeli policemen, among them the head=of the Israeli police's investigations and intelligence branch, ostensib=y as part of an Interpol meeting. Thus far, there is little firm evidence =f growing security ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, or at least there have been no blatant admissions of th=m (as has been the case with Bahrain and Qatar). Nevertheless, rumors of s=gnificant Saudi-Israeli cooperation, prompted by the existence of a mutual=enemy, have circulated in diplomatic circles for yearsAnbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The monarchies' n=w policies toward Israel are particularly dangerous given domestic politic=l realities. The Gulf's national populations are, for the most part, ant=-Israeli and pro- Palestinian. Gulf nationals grew up watching the Palestinian intifada on television, and the liberatio= of Palestine remains a shared ideal among the region's youth. There are=also substantial communities of Palestinians in every monarchy; naturalize= Gulf nationals who were born in Palestinian refugee camps are even known to hold powerful official posts i= some rulers' courts.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">SUCCESSION STRUGGLE=</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The pressures facin= the Gulf states make for a very tense region, one in which disagreements =ver the United States, Iran, and Israel threaten to boil over. Quarrels be=ween the kingdoms have at times grown so bitter that one monarchy has tried to alter the course of dynastic succ=ssion in another. Following the death of a ruler or a petty internal dispu=e in one monarchy, it is now commonplace for neighboring monarchs to inter=ere, either by discreetly backing a preferred candidate, or, in the more extreme cases, by sponsoring a coup=d'etat. The resulting power vacuums have often allowed foreign powers =o interfere as well.Smbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The best example of=a modern-day coup and subsequent foreign interference took place in the UA='s northernmost emirate of&nbsp;Ras al-Khaimah. In 2003, after allegedly=burning an American flag at an anti-Iraq war demonstration, Prince Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al-Qasimi, the emirate's lo=g-serving crown prince, was replaced in the order of succession by a young=r half-brother, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al-Qasimi. Their very elderly father,=Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed al-Qasimi, later signed a decree in support of this change, but many analysts questio=ed the ruler's decision-making abilities, given his advanced age and poo= health. The new crown prince had the apparent backing of Abu Dhabi, which=sent military tanks to take positions on the streets of Ras al-Khaimah. The ousted crown prince's supporters s=ill took the streets to show their support; security forces with water can=ons disbursed them. The crown prince was then duly exiled, crossing the bo=der to Oman before leaving for the United States.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">As the emirate's =ubai-like development program began to flounder in 2008, the new crown pri=ce Saud became increasingly vulnerable to criticism, including widespread =llegations that he accepted kickbacks from the construction industry. The deposed prince, who was still in exile= enlisted a U.S. public relations firm and a British lawyer to conduct an =nternational media campaign to persuade Abu Dhabi and the international co=munity that the incumbent crown prince was a liability.&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The campaign focuse= on Saud's apparent connections to Tehran, claiming that his effective d=puty -- a Shia Lebanese businessman -- had major commercial interests, inc=uding factories, in the Islamic Republic. 25 EFTA_R1_00057633 EFTA01756321 In 2009, the campaign even claimed that Iranian customs officers had been =isiting Ras al-Khaimah's port and that the emirate was serving as a cond=it for nuclear materials destined for Iran. Local media alleged that recen= terror plots there, including a 2009 attempt to blow up Dubai's incomplete Burj Khalifa skyscraper, had =riginated in Ras al-Khaimah. The exiled crown prince even courted Israeli =upport, reportedly meeting with Israel's ambassador to the United Kingdo=, who said that he was "working with certain people from his side" and "promised that the matter will be so=ved in his [the former crown prince's] favor."</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">In late 2010, the c=mpaign appeared to be gaining traction. Abu Dhabi's ruling family allowe= Khalid to return from exile to visit his father Sheikh Saqr, who still he=d the throne but was undergoing treatment in an Abu Dhabi hospital. When Saqr died&nbsp;in October, Khalid quickly r=turned to Ras al-Khaimah and installed himself in his former palace with s=me 150 heavily armed guards and even more loyal tribesmen. He seemed confi=ent that, having received Abu Dhabi's blessing to attend his father's funeral, he would be officially installe= as ruler of Ras Khaimah later that day. But in the early evening, the UAE=Ministry for Presidential Affairs in Abu Dhabi announced that his younger =rother Saud had been named the new ruler of Ras al-Khaimah.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Abu Dhabi, which ho=ds the presidency of the Emirates, deployed UAE tanks on the outskirts of =he emirate and all of the deposed crown prince's retainers -- including =wo of his cousins, several Omani citizens, and a Canadian military adviser -- were arrested and detained for question=ng. Two months later, the emirate's new ruler was invited to a banquet i= Abu Dhabi held in his honor, where the ruler of Abu Dhabi congratulated h=m on his success.&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The Gulf's immedi=te future is likely to be marked by many more such coup and countercoup at=empts. Several current monarchs are very old, and powerful factions in gro=ing royal families have coalesced around rival successors. In each of these cases, internecine contests will develo= and, given the high stakes involved, the involvement of foreign powers is=all but inevitable.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">In the end, however= the monarchies may all suffer from such meddling, for these regimes are o=ly as strong as the weakest links in their chain. An especially brittle mo=archy succumbing to pressure over Western involvement, Iran, or Israel could easily be the first domino to fall, und=ing the illusion of invincibility that the Gulf monarchies have so painsta=ingly built to distinguish themselves from the floundering Arab republics =ext door.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><1><span style="font-size:18.Opt">CHRISTOPHER DAVI=SON is a reader in Middle East politics at Durham University and the autho= of&nbsp;</span></i><span class="MsoHyperlink"><i><span style="font- si=e:18.0pt">After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies</span>O></span><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt=> [1], from which this article is adapted.</span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">{Reprinted from&nbs=;</span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">Afte= the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies</span></span><spa= style="font-size:11.0pt"> [1], by Christopher M. Davidson, with the permission of Oxford University Press. © Oxford Un=versity Press 2013.)</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="g"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="#gg"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 7.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Foreign Policy</spa=></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.Opt">Do American J=ws think peace with Palestine is possible? 26 EFTA_R1_00057634 EFTA01756322 </span></u></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Bruce Stokes</span>=/p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">October 14, 2013 --=Whatever your thoughts on the viability -- or futility -- of a peace deal =etween Israel and Palestine, in </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">early =ctober</span></span><span style="font- size:18.0pt">, prodded by America'r top diplomat Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli and Palestinian negot=ators engaged in a new round of peace talks in an attempt to breathe new life into their on-again, off-again eff=rts to bring lasting stability to their relationship. To prove successful =nd sustainable, the outcome of these talks must ultimately gain the suppor= of both the Israeli and Palestinian people. But given the catalytic role Washington has played in this effort =o revive the Middle East peace process, there is a third party whose judgment of the outcome may prove crucial: American Jews. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">A new </span><span =lass="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font- size:18.0pt">Pew Research Centerrsurvey</span></span><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> is a reminder that t=e view widely held in some parts of the world -- that American Jews uniformly back a hardline stance on the Israeli-Pale=tinian issue -- is simply not true. The 5.3 million-member American Jewish=community is far from monolithic in its emotional attachment to Israel, on=a two- state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or on many of the other issues that bedevil the peace process. 1= fact, there are wide differences between Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform Jews on many of these concerns. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">To be sure, more th=n two-thirds (69 percent) of American Jews feel some attachment to Israel.=But just 30 percent of Jews feel very attached, and this ranges from 61 pe=cent of the Orthodox to 24 percent of Reform Jews. Asked whether they trust Israel to make a sincere effort t= achieve peace, though, and things start to get more complicated. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">As for the peace pr=cess, only about four-in-ten American Jews (38 percent) think the current =sraeli government is making a sincere effort in negotiations with the Pale=tinians, while 48 percent say the Israeli effort is lacking. But such numbers mask divisions within the American Jew=sh community. Most Orthodox Jews (61 percent) believe the Israeli governme=t is working to bring about peace with the Palestinians, as do 52 percent =f Conservative Jews. But fewer Reform Jews (36 percent) agree. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">That said, there's =reater consensus among American Jews when looking at the other side of the=negotiating table. Three-quarters of respondents think the Palestinian lea=ership's efforts to bring about a peace settlement with Israel are not sincere. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Clearly, Jewish set=lements in the West Bank are a major point of contention in the negotiatio=s. A plurality of American Jews (44 percent) say the continued building of=such settlements hurts the security of Israel. Just 17 percent say it helps, while 29 percent say it does not =ake a difference. Notably, 50 percent of Reform Jews think the settlements=harm the peace process, but only 16 percent of the Orthodox agree. By comp=rison, a 2013 </span><span class="MsoHyperlink"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Pew Re=earch Center survey</span></span><span style="font-size:18.0pt"> in Isra=l found that Israeli Jews have more mixed views: 35 percent say the contin=ed building of Jewish settlements hurts the security of Israel, 31 percent say it helps, and 27 percent say it doe= not make a difference. </span></p> 27 EFTA_R1_00057635 EFTA01756323 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Land exchanges betw=en Israel and the Palestinian territories are likely to be part of any fin=l peace settlement, an outcome that could be complicated by views held by =mericans. While only four-in-ten American Jews (40 percent) believe the land that is now Israel was given to the Jew=sh people by God, this sentiment is held by an overwhelming majority of Or=hodox Jews (84 percent). Fewer Reform Jews (35 percent) share this sentime=t. Notably, other Pew surveys show that more American Christians than Jews actually believe God gave Israel t= the Jews: 55 percent of U.S. Christians, including 82 percent of white ev=ngelical Protestants. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">As the peace talks =rogress, the role played by the United States may become ever more of an i=sue. Today, more than half of American Jews say U.S. support for Israel is=about right (54 percent), although a substantial minority believes that Washington is not supportive enough or the Jewish state (31 percent). Just 11 percent think the United States is=too supportive of Israel. By comparison, 41 percent of the general public =hinks support for Israel is about right, while the rest are nearly evenly divided between those who say Amer=ca is not supportive enough and those who say it is too supportive of the =ewish state. </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Opinions about U.S.=support for Israel vary considerably across denominations, with Orthodox J=ws (53 percent) particularly likely to say Washington is not supportive en=ugh, while only 30 percent of Reform Jews think America is not backing Jerusalem sufficiently. Interestingly, m=re white evangelical Protestants than Jews think the U.S. currently is not=sufficiently supportive of Israel (46 percent vs. 31 percent). </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">But there is reason=for hope. Indeed, looking into the future, American Jews are more optimist=c than the U.S. general public that a way can be found for Israel and an i=dependent Palestinian state to coexist peacefully: 61 percent of American Jews say this is possible, compared wit= 50 percent of the public overall. But, again, all Jews do not agree. Majo=ities of Reform (58 percent) and Conservative (62 percent) Jews think peac=ful coexistence is possible. But most Orthodox Jews (61 percent) do not believe a two-state solution will w=rk. </span> </P> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">So, as Washington r=mps up its efforts to get the Israelis and Palestinians to fashion a lasti=g settlement of their differences, there is no uniform American Jewish vie=point on the peace process. American Jews are hopeful about the objective, but divided on the details. And the =iew held by many foreigners, that Jewish Americans are knee-jerk supporter= of the Israeli position on the Palestinian territories, is just wrong. &nrsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Bruce Stokes is =irector of global economic attitudes at the Pew Research Center. </span></i></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.Opt">&nbsp;</span></i=</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a name="h"><span style="font-size:8.0pt")&nbsp;=/span></a></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><a href="Shh"><span style="font-size:8.0pt">Arti=le 8.</span></a><span style="font- size:8.0pt"></span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Chatham House</span=</p> <p class="MsoNormal"><b><u><span style="font-size:28.0pt">The 30 printe= is threatening to change the world in ways we can barely imagine</span></=></b></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Roger Highfield </s=an></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> 28 EFTA_R1_00057636 EFTA01756324 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">October 2013 -- Vis=tors to the Science Museum this autumn will catch a glimpse of a future in=which engineers can make lighter and more efficient parts for aircraft and=space probes, where patients will one day be able to mint their own drugs and doctors print replacement body org=ns.8mbsp;</span></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">The idea of 3D prin=ing is not new: it has been available commercially for around three decade=. Back in the 1990s, I speculated about the potential of 'printing' Ch=istmas presents. In 2004, I became aware of the potential of what was then called 'rapid prototyping' when I vi=ited the Renault Fl team works in Oxfordshire.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">What has changed in=recent years is that 3D printers are becoming cheaper, smarter, better and=more ubiquitous. When in May a self-proclaimed crypto-anarchist in Texas m=de a handgun using a f 5,000 30 printer, the international press cottoned on that something was changing in the wor=d of manufacturing.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">One object in parti=ular seems to sum up the potential of this technology: a mechanical hand d=signed and printed by Richard Van As, a South African carpenter, following=a circular saw accident in which he lost four fingers. Van As was able to collaborate with a British prop-make= over a distance of 10,000 miles to create the 'Robohand' and has made=the plans freely available online so that anyone can use them. At the time=of writing, these have been downloaded more than 30,000 times.&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:lS.Opt">The first industria= revolution reshaped society and boosted the incomes of the poor as manual=labour was displaced by machine-based manufacturing. Factories produced it=ms in their thousands, profiting from vast economies of scale. Now, thanks to the 3D printing revolution, bespok= craftsmanship is making a comeback.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">The formal label gi=en to this craft is 'additive manufacturing' — the object is built u= layer by layer in a 3D printer. The traditional approach to manufacturing=is 'subtractive' and relies on milling, grinding and cutting to remove material, wasting much of it in the process.</span><=p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">Additive manufactur=ng is an organic blend of craft and hi-tech that is the opposite of the pr=duction line assembly methods pioneered by Henry Ford. It heralds a new wo=ld of consumer choice as almost anything can be customized and then printed — even the 3D printer itself.&nbsp;</=pan></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">One of the mileston=s in the field came when Adrian Bowyer, who was then at the University of =ath, devised RepRap, which stands for 'replicating rapid-prototyper', =hich works like a printer but, rather than squirting ink on to paper, lays down thin layers of molten biodegradable p=astic which solidify to make objects.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">This machine was th= first to copy all of its own 3D-printed parts, which could then be assemb=ed into a new RepRap machine. Now similar machines are available in kit fo=m, marking a dramatic rise in the use of this technology analogous to when the mainframe computer gave way to th= desktop PC.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:lS.Opt">Nimble start-up com=anies are now entering the market and being absorbed into industrial giant=. All the while, the software and other ingredients of 3D printers are get=ing cheaper, while hackers adapt and improve them. Hobbyists now play with them. Communal 3D printing facilitie= for local people are springing up in the United States.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.Opt">These 3D printers c=me in various kinds. Some spray 'inks', such as liquid polymers that s=lidify when exposed to ultra violet light. Others use layers of sticky pap=r, or extrude filaments of molten plastic. There are those that use powdered metal or plastic that is made solid with=a laser or an electron beam. As the technology mutates and evolves, the qu=lity of the objects they can make gets better.&nbsp;</span></p> 29 EFTA_R1_00057637 EFTA01756325 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">.loshua Pearce, asso=iate professor at Michigan Technological University, says: '3D printing =s ready for showtime.' He has carried out an economic analysis of 3D pri=ting in an average American household, published recently in the journal Mechatronics.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">His team selected 2= relatively inexpensive items for their study: mobile phone accessories, a=garlic press, a showerhead, a spoon holder, and the like, and then calcula=ed the cost of making them with 3D printers. The conclusion: it would cost the typical consumer from $312 to =1,944 — depending on brand and quality — to buy those 20 things, compa=ed to $18 to make them in a weekend. If the family made only 20 items a ye=r, Pearce's group calculated that the printers would pay for themselves within a few months to a few years.</spa=></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">When these printers=become as common as the microwave, they will have a profound effect on eve=yday life. DIY will take on a new meaning. Why order parts from a warehous= or visit a shop when entire designs can be stored in virtual computer warehouses, waiting to be printed locall=, and on demand?</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">You will be able to=make everything from door handles to mobile phones in your garage, or at a=neighbourhood 3D print shop. And if you have an actual kitchen garden as w=ll, you can grow the plastic — polylactic acid is made from fermented plant starch, usually corn. You will have a se=f-replicating 3D printing machine making useful goods from a self-replicat=ng material supply.&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">'3D printing enab=es engineers and designers to manufacture things they couldn't make with=traditional methods,' says Suzy Antoniw, exhibition leader at the Scienc= Museum.8.inbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">No country will wan= to be left behind as 3D printing evolves, least of all China, once the gl=bal source of low-cost manufacturing and now rapidly moving up the technol=gical ladder.&nbsp;</span></P> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">To make sure that B=itain stays at the forefront of this rapidly evolving technology, the Engi=eering and Physical Sciences Research Council has set up the Centre for In=ovative Manufacturing in Additive Manufacturing at the University of Nottingham. The aerospace company EADS can print comp=ex geometries rapidly from computer- aided design information, without the =eed for dies, form tools or moulds.80thsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">The company 3T RPD,=of Greenham Common, Berkshire, working in partnership with the University =f Southampton, created the world's first 3D-printed aircraft, a small dr=ne. It has also printed the titanium lattice of the Queen's Baton for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The baton =ill tour all the competing nations and territories before the games.&nbsp;=/span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Bespoke items such =s the baton will not just be small scale. At Loughborough University, Rich=rd Buswell is developing a vast, three-storey rig to create buildings by =9lconcrete printing' elaborate components with far greater complexity than currently possible, opening up almost lim=tless possibilities for architects.8mbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">As a result there h=s been an explosion of creativity. The Urbee is a hybrid car with a 3D-pri=ted body. Its successor will use additive manufacturing to make both exter=or and interior.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Enrico Dini, the lt=lian inventor, has created a device that uses a magnesium-based material t= bind sand particles together; creating sedimentary stone, a process that =ormally takes hundreds of years, in a matter of minutes. Dini's machine, known as the D-Shape, can print any=feature that will fit into a cube that is 6x6 metres, from artistic stairc=se to kiosks, benches and statues.8inbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">ln space, other opp=rtunities beckon. Imagine landing on the Moon or Mars, putting lunar rock =ust through a 3D printer and making something useful — like a wrench or = replacement part.&nbsp;</span></p> 30 EFTA_R1_00057638 EFTA01756326 <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">And, taking us a st=p closer to every Trekkie's dream of a food replicator, Nasa has awarded=a contract to a research consultancy in Austin, Texas, to study the feasib=lity of printing pizzas. The aim is to find ways to satisfy the appetite of astronauts on deep space missions, wh=re the shelf life of ingredients needs to be a few decades rather than a f=w days.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">At this stage the p=ssibilities seem endless. Do I believe the hype? I do — but I am not so =ure when the revolution will come.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">There was a lag of =any years between the first feverish headlines about the personal computer=revolution and the arrival of truly useful domestic computers. The same we=t for the internet, which was billed as transformative in the primitive dial-up era of the 1990s and is only no= delivering that promise thanks to broadband, tablets and 4G.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">As for the 3D revol=tion, I am confident that the technology will spread beyond industry and g=eks in the 2020s to change the way we do things, and in more fascinating w=ys than we can possibly imagine.</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:18.0pt">&nbsp;</span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><i><span style="font-size:18.0pt">Roger Highfield,=director of external affairs at the Science Museum.</span></i></p> </div> </div> </div> <AIR') </body> </html> 31 EFTA_R1_00057639 EFTA01756327