EFTA Document EFTA01762276

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larsen <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, February 25, 2013 7:22 PM Subject: February 25 update Articl= 2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/./0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#b> Bloomberg North Korea Shows Dangers of Half-=eal With Iran Gary Milhollin Articl= 4. <https://mailgoogle.com/mailN0/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.htmItld> AI-Monitor The Israel-Hezbollah Shadow War Ali Hashem Articl= 6. <https://mail.google.com/mail/40/html/compose/static_files/blank_quirks.html#f> Slate The Art of Cyberwar=/p> Fred Kaplan <http://www.slate.com/authors.=red_kaplan.html> Article 7. The Daily Star Morocco offers a paradigm for good=ties with Jews Adina Friedman EFTA_R1_00067563 EFTA01762276 Ar=icle 1. Al-Monitor</=> West Bank Pro=ests Raise Fears Of Third Intifada Dalia Hatuqa=/p> February 24 -- Acco=ding to the blogosphere and media, a third intifada has been just around t=e corner for a few months now. However, as clashes raged through the =est Bank between Palestinians and the Israeli army over the last two days that followed the death of Arafat Jaradat — = 30-year-old Palestinian man held in an Israeli jail — this rhetoric hit=new heights. Protests and confrontations continued in the West Bank today,=most notably in Jaradat's hometown of Sa'ir, elsewhere in Hebron, Nablus, and outside of Ofer, the Israeli =ilitary prison on the outskirts of Ramallah, where demonstrations had alre=dy been taken place almost everyday for the past week in support of four P=Iestinian hunger strikers, including Samer Issawi. Israeli news outlets — including Haaretz, The Jerusalem Po=t and Arutz Sheva — all wondered aloud whether these heightened ten=ions marked the beginnings of a third intifada, raising many questions: We=e these reflections of fears brewing inside Israel, or did they constitute wishful thinking? In other words, would ano=her intifada be beneficial to Israel at a time when it seems to have been =osing many PR battles of late? Would an outbreak of hostilities provide Is=ael with a much-needed justification to the international community to warrant its ongoing military occupation?=/span> Or is a third intif=da exactly the last thing Israel wants at the moment? One can argue for th=s line of thinking when looking at repeated calls by Israeli officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, fo= the Palestinian Authority (PA) <http://www.timesofisrael.com/third-intifada-is-already-raging-pa=officials-say/> to stop the demonstrations flooding th= streets of the West Bank. In fact, Netanyahu's envoy Itzhak Molho spoke=to Palestinian officials and demanded them to "calm down" the protests. Israel also said it would release so=e of the tax monies it has been withholding since Palestinians upgraded th=ir status at the UN. Netanyahu's reasoning for the transfer—which some=can interpret as bribery — is "so that [the PA] won't have an excuse not to enforce calm on =he ground." <http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=304315> Coincidentally, jus= two days ago, Abbas told Al Arabiya TV <http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=304248> , in a message that seems to have been aimed mo=e at Israelis than the Palestinians, that he supported protests against th= occupation, but stressed that these should be non- violent in nature. "A=med resistance is banned," he said. "This is a law and it is forbidden. It is also forbidden in the Gaza Str=p." The reference to Gaza suggests that Abbas has a say over what goes o= in the coastal enclave run by Hamas. And though there have been repeated =ttempts to reconcile Hamas with Abbas' ruling party, Fatah, nothing fruitful has yet come of them - certainly not=anything that would prompt Abbas to suggest that he can control what happe=s in the Gaza Strip. A telling indication of this is that following Jarada='s death, Palestinian factions in Gaza held an urgent meeting to discuss a response t= the man's demise. <http://972mag.com/prisoner-issue-and-settler-violence-drive- esca=ation-of-west-bank-protests/66577/> Meanwhile, more tha= 4,000 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons went on hunger strike to prote=t the death of their fellow inmate. Four of these prisoners have been on s=rike for months now, and fears for their lives have been expressed by their families and human rights groups.= According to the Israeli human rights group, B'Tselem, there are more tha= 4,500 Palestinian detainees, 178 of whom are being held without charge or=trial. <http://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners> 2 EFTA_R1_00067564 EFTA01762277 In a press conferen=e held on Sunday, Issa Qaraqi, the PA's minister of detainees, said that=Palestinians would continue to protest until Israel responds to the detain=es' demands. Qaraqi called for an international committee to investigate the death of Jaradat, whom he said had no prior h=alth issues. He also warned: "The situation is already explosive because=of the four Palestinians on hunger strike. Palestinians on the street and =nside the prisons are seething with anger." The PA is trying to=tow a fine line: using the specter of a third intifada to put pressur= on Israel while doing much to placate its fears by reiterating that it wi=I not tolerate any armed methods of resistance. That's why the PA was quick to dispel rumors — and Israeli allegations=— that it was stoking the protests. Senior Fatah official Jibril Rajoub =aid PA-Israeli security cooperation would continue. "I say on behalf of =he entire Palestinian leadership that we won't initiate any bloodshed," he told Israel Radio <http://www.timesofisrael.com=third-intifada-is-already-raging-pa-officials-sayk , while echoing Abbas' statement vis-à-vis Pale=tinians' right to "nonviolent resistance." While comparisons a=e being made between the first and second intifadas to draw conclusions ab=ut a possible third one, it is worth noting that the frequency of West Ban= clashes is a marked reflection of frustration with the PA's inability to change the status quo. If anythin=, the PA is being seen as a contributor to the current situation; A few da=s ago PA forces were deployed (as they have been on and off in recent prot=sts) to act as a buffer between demonstrators and Israeli soldiers in Hebron. Settler violence ha= also been playing a central role in the hostilities as the number of inci=ents of vandalism, tree torching, car destruction and racist graffiti-draw=ng skyrocketed. On Saturday, many settlers, some armed with guns, attacked Palestinians in Qusra near the northern Wes= Bank city of Nablus, uprooting residents' trees and torching their cars= Several Palestinians were wounded by live rounds, one of whom is now in critical condition chttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/O2/23/us-palestinians-israel=idUSBRE91M09Q20130223> and has been transferred to Is=ael for further treatment. In summary, it seem= the PA wants to use this new potential intifada to coax conciliation from=lsrael, such as paying money owed to it from taxes, or to nudge it into sore kind of move that would placate its angry streets. It may also be using this as an incentive to U.S. President=Barack Obama — visiting the region in March — to push forward his own =Ian or outline for a permanent peace agreement. Israel may be fearf=l that an intifada would take them back in time; Netanyahu has repeatedly =roven himself more concerned with maintaining the status quo wherein Pales=inians don't play a major role in the national popular psyche. The last elections proved that Palestinians were =arely an afterthought to many Israeli voters and he would much rather keep=the focus on Iran (and Syria) any day of the week than have to deal with t=e Palestinians next door. Dalia Hatuqa <http:=/www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contents/authors/dalia-hatuqa.html> is a contributing writer for Al- Monitor's =alestine Pulse. A print and broadcast journalist specializing in the Middle East, she is based in the West Bank city of Ram=llah and writes for several publications about politics, the economy, cult=re, art and design. 3 EFTA_R1_00067565 EFTA01762278 Articl= 2. Bloomberg North Korea S=ows Dangers of Half-Deal With Iran Gary Milhollin Feb 24, 2013 -- Neg=tiators from the world's major powers sit down with Iran this week for m=re talks on its nuclear program, just weeks after Nort= Korea <http://topics.bloomberg.com/north-korea/> tested another nuclear weapon. If the connection b=tween these two events isn't obvious, it should be: North Korea's nucl=ar saga is a cautionary tale for anyone attempting to bargain with the Isl=mic Republic. Back in the 1980s, =hen suspicions were first raised about North Korea's nuclear ambitions <http://www.wisconsinprojectorg/countries/nkorea/nukemstones06.h=ml> , the country's leadership was keen to distract atte=tion with a show of clean hands. It joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty <http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2005/npttreaty.html> , promised not to make the bomb and said it would report the wher=abouts of all its nuclear material to international inspectors. Iran has been hidin= nuclear work and sites since about the same time, although it was one of =he treaty's original signatories. like Iran <http://topics.bloomberg.com/irant> , N=rth Korea was soon suspected of hiding things after that initial show of c=ean hands. It stiffed inspectors and made lame excuses for doing so. And, =ike Iran, North Korea built plants that generated fissile material that was useful for making bombs, but unne=essary for producing civilian nuclear power. By 1994, matters ha= come to a head. North Korea's lies were bolder, and the pace of its nuc=ear program had accelerated. Its scientists, rounding the last turn, could=see the finish line. The U.S. and other world powers had to decide how to stop them: Would it be United Nations re=olutions, or economic sanctions, or war? Interim Deal The response was to=negotiate a deal. The U.S. agreed to send North Korea much-needed shipment= of heavy oil and to endorse the building of a new nuclear-power reactor, =or which Sout= Korea <http://topics.bloomberg.com/south- korea/> would be the lead supplier. In return, North Korea agreed to st=p producing nuclear material, on the condition that it could keep its nucl=ar sites, plus the fuel it had already made. This deal was to be a first step only. North Korea would later give =p all of its nuclear material and dismantle its sites, at which point the =.S. would drop sanctions and restore normal relations. The deal fell apart=in 2002, when a U.S. diplomat accused North Korea of secretly building a f=cility to enrich uranium. Oil shipments stopped, and the promised nuclear =eactor wasn't built. Then, as everyone now knows, North Korea used its material and its sites to make nuclear bom=s. The tremors from weapon testing arrived in 2006. What should this ex=erience teach us about the talks with Iran? Last year, the U.S. and its ne=otiating partners in the so- called P5+1 -- China <http://topics.bloomberg.com/china/> ,= France <http://topics.bloomberg.com/france/>, Germany <http://topics.bloomberg.com/germany/>, Russia <http://topics.bloomberg.com/russia/> offered chttp://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_06/PS_plus_1_and_lran_Claim_=rogress_in_Talks> an interim deal for limited economic and technical aid. In exch=nge, Iran would lower (but not stop) its production of nuclear fuel, and w=uld send a portion of its stock out of the country. 4 EFTA_R1_00067566 EFTA01762279 Most important unde= the proposed agreement was that Iran would be able to keep its nuclear si=es and all of the low- enriched uranium <http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articlestiranucleartimetable.ht=l> it had already made. It would ship out only its much s=aller stock of medium-grade fuel. CNN <http://topics.bloomberg.com/cnn/> repo=ted last week that a similar deal will be on the table again at the talks =n Kazak=stan <http://topics.bloomberg.com/kazakhstanh . This initial agreem=nt with Iran would be just the first step in a process. Later, the parties=would move to a comprehensive arrangement in which Iran would, perhaps (th= details are still vague), get rid of its enriched uranium and limit -- to a token, face-saving level -- its =bility to make more of it. The U.S. would, perhaps, drop most of its sanct=ons and move toward normal relations. Same Deal <1=> Sound familiar? It =hould. The North Korea and Iran deals are essentially the same. After the =greement with North Korea, the country's leaders were left with enough p=utonium in the form of spent reactor fuel to make about six nuclear weapons, after further processing. The deal=being floated for Iran would leave it with sufficient enriched uranium to =ake about six nuclear weapons, after further processing. Of course, North Ko=ea did the processing and made the bombs. What we have to ask ourselves is=this: Why won't Iran? Is there any reason to believe that this time the =utcome would be different? The mistake in the =orth Korea talks was not to insist from the outset that all nuclear fuel s=ould be shipped out of the country, and all nuclear sites should be disman=led. The U.S. made a deal that lowered the diplomatic pressure on Supreme Leader Kim Jong-II, but left the danger=in place. North Korea got an agreement with the U.S. without giving up its=ability to make nuclear weapons. It was in a position to restart the progr=m at any time. If Iran accepts the=interim deal being floated this week, it will do even better. Iran will no= have to stop producing nuclear fuel and will only have to cut its product=on back by a small percentage, while keeping enough to produce a small arsenal. Nor will it have to dismantle i=s production sites. Like North Korea, it will be able to restart productio= at any time. The lesson from Nor=h Korea is that an interim agreement of this kind won't work. In additio= to leaving too much fuel in place that can be enriched to weapons grade, =he proposed agreement inevitably renders legitimate what it doesn't prohibit. If nuclear fuel, production or equi=ment is permitted, then it becomes Iran's right. Once such a notion =s accepted, the interim deal becomes the only one, because it dissipates t=e crisis atmosphere. The public starts thinking that things are safe, or a= least safe enough, though they aren't. The effect is to diminish the support for sanctions that was so difficult =o win, and to make it almost impossible to reinstate these measures once i= becomes clear that Iran is not taking the next steps, which -- just as wi=h North Korea -- it won't. Before making any h=lfway deal, U.S. and European diplomats should insist that Iran remove its=lf from the path that North Korea so easily followed. If Iran wants to convince <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-65=pdf> the world that it has no desire to acquire nuclear weapons, th=n it should be willing to give up the means to make them. When the talks r=sume this week, let's hope history isn't forgotten. Gary Milhollin i= executive editor of Iranwatch.org, a website on Iranian weapons programs =hat is published by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control</=>. 5 EFTA_R1_00067567 EFTA01762280 Articl= 3. The New-Yorker Who Are We Fighting? Steve Coll <http://w=w.newyorker.com/magazine/bios/steve_coll/search?contributorName=steve%20=oll> March 4, 2013 -- In=the summer of 1988, in the University Town neighborhood of Peshawar, Pakisran, Osama bin Laden founded Al Qaeda, which means "the Base," in Arabi=. As a calling card for terror or revolution, the name lacked pizzazz. Bases are safe places, not threatening ones. We c=n infer from the historical record that bin Laden's comrades either coul=n't come up with a better idea or didn't want to annoy him by question=ng his brainstorm. A decade later, Al =aeda announced itself as a global menace by bombing two American Embassies=in Africa. The group's ambitions escalated until the apex of September 1=th. That day's mass murder assured Al Qaeda's notoriety, but the Bush Administration raised its profile furthe= by embarking on a Global War on Terror, in which Al Qaeda figured central=y. For a time, bin Laden's brand thrived. When President Obam= came to office, he scuttled the Global War on Terror—he objected to its=Orwellian tone and its imprecision. He has framed, instead, a more prosaic=sounding war, against Al Qaeda and "associated forces." Obama's reasoning is that Al Qaeda and its allies distinguish=themselves from other terrorist groups with their intent to attack the Uni=ed States, and that they remain cohesive enough to jointly qualify as an e=emy force under the laws of war. Worldwide drone strikes, indefinite detention in Guantanamo and elsewhere, and mil=tary trials are some of the policies that flow from this logic. Since U.S. Navy SEA=s killed bin Laden, in May, 2011, the President's aides have trumpeted s=ccess in their campaign. Last September, Matthew Olsen, the director of th= National Counterterrorism Center, testified to Congress that "core Al Qaeda"—the original, Arab-led group, whose=surviving members, hiding mainly in Pakistan, are thought to number in the=dozens or low hundreds—is at "its weakest point in the last ten years.=94 Yet, to explain the White House's policy, he and many other counterterrorism analysts warn of a resilient threat pos=d by Al Qaeda "franchises": regional offspring of varying provenance w=ich have lately overtaken the parent outfit as fonts of perceived danger. Experts refer to th=se groups by their acronyms, such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq), AQAP (Al Qaed= in the Arabian Peninsula, mainly in Yemen), and AQIM (AI Qaeda in the Isl=mic Maghreb, the North African group that has recently been attacked by French forces in Mali). Each group has = distinctive local history and a mostly local membership. None have strong=ties to "core Al Qaeda," which is now led by bin Laden's successor, =yman al-Zawahiri, although some of the groups have maintained contact with its operatives. What's in a name? Of=the several wars that Obama inherited, the war against Al Qaeda is the onl= one that he has not promised to end. The conflict presents a problem of d=finition: as long as there are bands of violent Islamic radicals anywhere in the world who find it attractive t= call themselves Al Qaeda, a formal state of war may exist between Al Qaed= and America. The Hundred Years War could seem a brief skirmish in compari=on. There is no questio= that some of these groups pose a serious threat to the United States. Jab=at al-Nusra, an AQI spinoff that has lately blossomed in the bloody fields=of Syria's civil war, is worryingly ascendant among the opposition forces seeking the overthrow of President B=shar al-Assad. If a group as radical and as hardened as that one were to a=quire some of Syria's chemical-weapons stockpile or seized power after A=sad's fall, the results might be disastrous. And AQAP in Yemen attempted to blow up an American airliner la=ding in Detroit three years ago, on Christmas Day. 6 EFTA_R1_00067568 EFTA01762281 But there are deriv=tive groups whose lines of work are hard to differentiate from those of So=ali pirate gangs or the Sicilian Mafia. AQIM, for example, is a shabby net=ork that includes kidnappers and drug racketeers, whose main income in recent years has come from ransom payment= and the smuggling of Colombian cocaine and Moroccan hashish through the S=hara. AQIM and its splinters enforced a brutal Islamist ideology when they=captured territory in Mali last year, and a breakaway unit attacked a remote gas field in eastern Algeria =n January. These groups, however, lack a demonstrated capacity to strike i= Europe or across the Atlantic. Lumping them in with more potent jihadist =roups, on scant evidence of their connections, is a prescription for ascribing indefinite and elastic war po=ers to the White House. Bin Laden himself m=y have been reconsidering the Al Qaeda brand. A document by an unidentifie= author recovered from bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, lam=nts the name's vagueness and its lack of religious content. The author mused about alternatives, such as Muslim =nity Group. If bin Laden had renamed Al Qaeda, he would have succeeded, at=least, in irritating Obama's speechwriters by forsaking the brand they h=ve used while defining the President's war against terrorists. Late last year, the=Pentagon's departing general counsel, Jeh Johnson, delivered a speech be=ore the Oxford Union entitled "The Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Aff=liates: How Will It End?" No time soon, he reported. He said that he could imagine a "tipping point" when Al Q=eda and its affiliates were so decrepit that policing and intelligence act=vity might supplant the current state of war, a change that would reduce t=e scope for drone attacks and might end detention without trial. But a V-AQ Day is not yet in sight, Johnson c=ncluded. "There is still danger," he said, because Al Qaeda has become="more decentralized," with "most terrorist activity now conducted by=local franchises." This March marks te= years since the United States led an invasion of Iraq based on bad intell=gence about Saddam Hussein's weapons-of-mass-destruction programs. That =ark anniversary offers a reminder, if one is required, that in any conflict where a President claims war powers =he Chief Executive's analytical precision in describing the enemy is a g=ave responsibility. A franchise is a business that typically operates unde= strict rules laid down by a parent corporation; to apply that label to Al Qaeda's derivative groups today i= false. If Al Qaeda is not coherent enough to justify a formal state of wa=, the war should end; if the Administration wishes to argue that some deri=ative groups justify emergency measures, it should identify that enemy accurately. Jihadist violence p=esents an enduring danger. Its proponents will rise and ebb; the amorphous=threats that they pose will require adaptive security policies and, occasi=nally, military action. Yet the empirical case for a worldwide state of war against a corporeal thing called Al Qaed= looks increasingly threadbare. A war against a name is a war in name only= Articl= 4. Al-Monitor</=> The Israel-He=bollah Shadow War Ali Hashem ap> February 24 -- Five=years ago, when Hezbollah's military commander Imad Mughniyah was assassin=ted in Damascus, fingers were quickly pointed toward Israel= The group's secretary-general, as once described by Richard Armitage. According to the Israelis, the Shii=e group is running an international network that involving Lebanese Shiite= in North 7 EFTA_R1_00067569 EFTA01762282 and South America, Europe, West Africa and East Asia. But it's a=so obvious the group have its operation functioning in Israel. In 2009 a severe indictment was issued against=23-year-old Rawi Fuad Sultani, a Palestinian Israeli, who was allegedly re=ruited by Hezbollah to spy on Israel's army Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.=The Israeli investigation said Sultani officially joined Hezbollah and delivered the information he had collected=Gabi Ashkenazi and the possibilities to harm him, thanks to the fact that =ultani worked out at the same gym as Ashkenazi. <http://www.al- monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/nasrall=h-weakend-without-his-syrian-patron.html> According to the so=rce close to Hezbollah, "Israel knows well what type of underground w=r is taking place, they hit one place Hezbollah hit in another, and a good=example are the Israeli spy networks unveiled in Lebanon." The source added: "Hezbollah was capable of almost =linding Israel in Lebanon." Lebanese security f=rces and Hezbollah uncovered several Israeli spies in Lebanon in the =ast three years. Some of those were within the ranks of Hezbollah. Israel =as this time working on penetrating the solid structure of the group reaching to someone who was very close to the=leadership. "The officer who was arrested was working for the CIA, bu= Hezbollah believes he was put in contact with Mossad," said our sour=e. Israeli spies were =apable of infiltrating the Lebanese communication sector. At least two tel=com engineers were indicted by Lebanese courts for providing Israel with i=formation. Charbel Nahhas, former minister of telecoms, said in a press conference at the time that "this was th= most dangerous espionage act in Lebanese history." Both Hezbollah and =srael believe they are destined to fight each other, though both might thi=k, given the existing deterrence, it's safer, wiser and maybe cheaper to f=ght away while watching the common borders getting calmer. Ali Hashem dittp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/contentsAuthors/ali-hashemi.html> is =n Arab journalist serving as chief correspondent for the Al Mayadeen news network. Until March 2012, he was an AI=Jazeera war correspondent and prior to that a senior journalist at th= BBC. Articl= 5. The National, (Abu Dhabi) <http://www.admedia.ae/> US visit agen=as put Syria and Iran ahead of Palestine 8 EFTA_R1_00067570 EFTA01762283 James Zogby=/a> <http://www.thenational.ae/authors/james-z=gby> Feb 24, 2013 -= John Kerry leaves Washington today on his first trip abroad as US secretary of state. After stops in western Europe, Turkey and Egypt, Mr Kerry will=attend a GCC ministerial meeting in Riyadh, and then visit the UAE and Qatar. A few weeks later B=rack Obama will make his first trip to Israel as US president, followed by=his first visits to Palestine and Jordan. High on the agenda =f both men will be the civil war in Syria and the regional crisis it has c=eated, as well as Iran's nuclear programme. Previous maiden voy=ges to the region by presidents and their top emissaries have focused on l=raeli-Palestinian peacemaking. I hope that I will be proven wrong, but I d= not believe that we will see any serious new US effort on that subject now. I say this not beca=se I believe the White House has lost interest in resolving this conflict,=nor because I think American leaders no longer understand that Israeli-Pal=stinian peace is vital to US interests in the region. The reason for my p=ssimism is simpler: current conditions make progress impossible, and prete=ding otherwise would be foolish. First, Benjamin Net=nyahu, the Israeli prime minister, has so far been unable to form a govern=ent. (This is the stated reason why Mr Kerry is not going to Israel.) The =ecent Israeli election weakened Mr Netanyahu. Ever the manoeuvrer, he is now trying to cobble together a gove=ning coalition by tilting this way and that - mixing secular and religious=parties, combining advocates of renewed talks with the Palestinians with h=rdline opponents. Mr Netanyahu appears to thrive on dysfunction; the paralysis it produces allows him to =ule while avoiding tough decisions. He will be forced t= call new elections, or else to form a government of indecision. My bet is=that desperation will win out and, fearing that he might do worse in a new=round of voting, he will form a weak governing coalition - able to expand settlements but incapable of advancin= peace. The Palestinian sit=ation is also dysfunctional. Unity talks between Fatah and Hamas have been=fruitless. We once criticised the notion of an endless "peace process=quot; that was all process and no peace. This appears to have been replaced by a "reconciliation process" that=is all process and no reconciliation. Given their divisio=s, it is difficult to see how Palestinians can move forward with any peace=aking. Not only are Israel=s and Palestinians unable to make peace, but so is the US. Washington rema=ns unable to deal with the issue. The continued resis=ance of Congress to any reasoned discourse on Israel was on display this m=nth during the debate over Chuck Hagel's confirmation as secretary of defe=ce. This hearkened back=to the humiliating "smackdown" Congress delivered to the preside=t in 2011, by backing Mr Netanyahu's position over Mr Obama's. So it is hard to se= a bold initiative coming from Washington. Israelis wouldn't accept it. Pa=estinians couldn't do anything with it. And Congress wouldn't support it.<=span> 9 EFTA_R1_00067571 EFTA01762284 That does not mean =he White House can do nothing. The president can raise critical questions =nd support positive behaviour while challenging bad behaviour. He may warn that ex=anding Israeli colonies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem will make peac= impossible. Israelis will, no doubt, be told that the US will continue to=support their security, but they should also be challenged to choose between a future of peace and partnership or =ne in which they remain at war. Also, Mr Obama can =nd should address Palestinian realities, giving support to Palestine's civ=I society and business community. However, that kind =f lecturing, recognising real needs and making gestures of support, may be=all that can be expected at this time. James Zogby is t=e President, Arab American Institute; author, 'Arab Voices'. Articl= 6. Slate The Art of Cy=erwar Fred Kaplan=/a> <http://www.slate.com/authors.fred_kaplan.=tml> Feb. 20, 2013 -- The New York Times' front-page report <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas- army-=s-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all& _r=0> this week that the Chinese army is hacking into America's most sensitive computer netwo=ks from a 12-story building outside Shanghai might finally persuade skepti=s that the threat of "cyber warfare" isn't the fevered fantasy of Richard Clarke <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stori=s/2010/04/the_cyber_peril.html> , the pr=ducers of Die Hard 4 <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B000VNMMR0/ref=as_li_s=2I?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativ eASIN=B00=VNMMR0&IinkCode=as2&tag=slatmaga-20> , or the generals at the ever-growing U.S. Cyber Command. Alas, it's real.=/span> But what is the thr=at? Few of those in the know believe that some fine day, out of the blue, =hina will zap the programs that run our power grids, gas lines, waterworks= or banking systems, sending our economy—and much else—into a tailspin. Even if the Chinese could pull off such a fea= with one keystroke, it's hard to imagine what they'd accomplish, espe=ially since their fortunes are wrapped up with our own. 10 EFTA_R1_00067572 EFTA01762285 The more worrisome =hreat is subtler: that the Chinese (or some other powers) will use their a=ility to wreak cyberhavoc as leverage to strengthen their position, and we=ken ours, in a diplomatic crisis or a conventional war. Advertisement For instance, in a =rewing conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea (areas where China has =sserted claims aggressively in recent years), would an American president =espond with full military force if he knew that the Chinese would retaliate by turning out all the lights on =he Eastern Seaboard? A familiar concept =n strategic war games is "escalation-dominance." The idea is that vict=ry goes to the player who can take a conflict to the next level of violenc= in a way that inflicts enormous damage on his opponent but very little on himself. The expected outcome of the ne=t round is so obvious that the opponent decides not to escalate; the domin=nt player thus controls the subsequent course of the battle and possibly w=ns the war. Real war is messier=than war games. Escalation holds risks all round. The two sides might have=different perceptions of which one is dominant. Or the dominant side might=miscalculate the opponent's strategic priorities. For instance, China might think the American president values =ninterrupted electricity on the East Coast more than a free, independent T=iwan—but that thought might be mistaken. Still, leaders in w=r and crisis do take these kinds of factors into account. Many surrenders =n history have been prompted less by the damage already absorbed than by f=ars of the damage to come. And China is not th= only foe or rival whose calculations are complicating this new cyber worl=. Iran is another. last summer, all of a sudden, a computer virus nickname= executive order on cybersecurity<=a>. In recent years, Congress has rejecter bills requiring Internet service providers to follow government standards on security for various reasons, many of th=m legitimate. The executive order at least allows government agencies to s=are information with ISPs, some of it classified, on how to meet these sta=dards themselves. It's a good first step. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/24/businessiglobal/cyberat=ack-on-saudi-oil-firm-disquiets- us.html?pagewanted=all> But there's anoth=r way to stave off the danger of cyberwar, and that's diplomacy.<=p> In his extremely im=ortant 2010 book Cyber War <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0061962244/ref=as_li_s=_Wie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeA SIN=006=962244&linkCode=as2&tag=slatmaga-20> , Richard Clarke likened the current era to the decade after the first atom'= bombs, when American, then Soviet, scientists built these weapons of enor=ous destructiveness—but before politicians or strategists devised ways o= thinking about them rationally: how to control them, deter their use, or limit their damage if a war could='t be deterred. It's time to move=on to the next era, when this sort of thinking did occur, not just in secr=tive research tanks but also in open discussions and international negotia=ions. Clarke, who was chief of counterterrorism and cybersecurity for Presidents Clinton and Bush, spells out ways that co=cepts from nuclear arms control—inspections and verification, no first u=e, and ideas from other accords, including the Geneva Conventions—might =e applied to cyberweapons. In any case, it's=sheer silliness, at this point, to keep cyber issues off the table for fea= of upsetting the sensitivities of Chinese officials (who deny that they h=ve offensive cyberwarfare programs) and thus possibly triggering a diplomatic crisis. A crisis already looms from =11 sides of the globe; the United States, after all, has an offensive cybe=warfare program, too. Best to deal with it head-on, and soon. 11 EFTA_R1_00067573 EFTA01762286 Fred Kaplan is S=ate's "War Stories" columnist and author of the book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War.=/span> <http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1451642636/ref=as_h_ss=tl?ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeA SIN=1451.42636&linkCode=as2&tag=slatmaga-20> Articl= 7. The Daily Star Morocco offer= a paradigm for good ties with Jews Adina Friedman February 22, 2013 -= At a ceremony recently marking the end of the restoration of a 17th-centu=y synagogue in Fez's Old City, Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane read a=message from King Mohammad VI hailing Morocco's "spiritual wealth and diversity" and the "values of coex=stence, tolerance and harmony between the different components of the nati=n." These statements we=e reassuring in a regional political climate that is often turbulent, and =uggests that Morocco offers a new — yet in fact very old — paradigm fo= inter-communal relations, particularly when it comes to Arab-Muslim- Jewish relations. In the context of the Arab-=sraeli conflict, "Jewishness" and "Arabness" are often positioned =s mutually exclusive; Morocco seems to exemplify important ways of reconci=ing these identities. I received this imp=ession too when I traveled to Morocco this winter with a group of students= consisting of Americans, Israelis, Amazigh (a non-Arab ethnic group from =orth Africa) and Christians, Jews and Muslims. Not only did Morocco offer a fascinating mosaic of religions and =ultures, languages and landscapes. But for me, as a Jewish Israeli, it off=red important insights and renewed hope. Jews have lived in =orocco continuously for more than 2,000 years, and have played a vital rol= in the country's social, political, cultural and economic life. Most Je=s had left by the 1960s after the founding of Israel, but a few thousand still remain, occupying various niches in so=iety. Throughout history many were merchants or local craftsmen, while oth=rs served as government ministers and advisers to the king. Most Moroccans we m=t — from taxi drivers in cities to camel riders in the Sahara, and from =cademicians to tour guides — were welcoming, and unashamedly highlighted=the positive role of Jews in Moroccan society. Jewish cemeteries and places of worship were well kept and protected. Moro=co's constitution, adopted in 2011 against the backdrop of the Arab Spri=g, recognizes the country's Jewish heritage as part of Morocco's natio=al identity. Importantly, we als= met with members of Mimouna Club, a non-governmental organization founded=by Muslim Moroccan students dedicated to learning about the history of Jud=ism and Jews in Morocco. Such organization are rare in the Arab world. All these were encouraging examples that highl=ght the acceptance of Jews as integral to Morocco. Einat, an Israeli J=wish participant in our group, was the first from her family to visit Moro=co since her grandparents' departure in 1952. She was welcomed in "her=country" by most everyone she met. As she uncovered layers of her family's past and of her own identity, she share= her personal journey with the group and with friends and family in Israel= Her story, while unique, reflects experiences of many Jewish Israelis fro= the Arab world. 12 EFTA_R1_00067574 EFTA01762287 Her family's docu=ented history in Morocco dates back to the fifth century. When her grandpa=ents departed Morocco for Israel, they left behind their homes and belongi=gs, and the graves of their ancestors. In Israel, Einat's family spent their first few years living in "trans=tory camps" as refugees. Like most Jews who immigrated to Israel from Ar=b and Muslim-majority countries, they were marginalized and disenfranchise= by the state's structures and hegemonic culture, which were mostly European and Ashkenazi, Jews who trace their or=gins to the Middle East via Europe. Moreover, they often had to suppress t=e "Ara bness" of their identities. As an Ashkenazi Jew=growing up in Israel, the predicaments and nuances of Moroccan Jewish iden=ity were largely invisible to me, as their experiences were largely margin=lized by, or absent from the local narrative. Morocco enabled me to see and better understand some of these. =hough things have changed in the last several decades, in Israel, being an=Arab-Jew came to be viewed by most as a contradiction in terms. Yet Jews i= Morocco saw little, if any, contradiction between the Arab, Amazigh, and Jewish dimensions of their identity.=/p> Positive attitudes =oward Jews do not necessarily imply acceptance of Israeli policies. Nevert=eless, as Israel struggles to define its identity and its place in the reg=on, and as its neighbors challenge its existence and legitimacy, Morocco offers a pertinent example that defi=s traditional "East-West" categories, and re-contextualizes the Jewish=experience in the region. By embodying possibilities for reconciling "Je=ishness" and "Arabness," Morocco offers ways for Arab-Jews to understand their own identities in a new light. And =s the Arab-Israeli conflict persists, Morocco reaffirms historical example= of coexistence. Adina Friedman t=aches conflict resolution, peacebuilding and Middle East courses at Americ=n University's School of International Service and at George Mason Unive=sity's School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. 13 EFTA_R1_00067575 EFTA01762288