Case File
efta-efta01929417DOJ Data Set 10CorrespondenceEFTA Document EFTA01929417
Date
Unknown
Source
DOJ Data Set 10
Reference
efta-efta01929417
Pages
0
Persons
0
Integrity
No Hash Available
Loading PDF viewer...
Extracted Text (OCR)
EFTA DisclosureText extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
Sent
Mon 4/14/2014 3:03:02 PM
Subject April 14 update
14 April, 2014
Article '.
The Washington Post
The United States' Middle East 11C11Oe fil'0CCSS
paradox
Jackson Diehl
The National Interest
Khamenei's Nuclear Dilemma
Muhammad Sahimi
Article 1.
The Washington Post
European Union nations see an uptick in economic
security at just the right time
Editorial
Article 4.
Al Monitor
Who betrayed Egypt's revolution?
Wael Nawara
The National Interest
Let Asia Go Nuclear
Harvey M. Sapolsky, Christine M. Leah
,
NYT
Ambiguities of Japan's Nuclear Policy
EFTA_R1_00378576
EFTA01929417
Norihiro Kato
The Hindu
Dancing with the nuclear (I iiaa
Praveen Swami
Arad, 1.
The Washington Post
The United States' Middle East peace
process paradox
Jackson Diehl
April 14, 2014 -- The Middle East "peace process" can look like
an endless loop of diplomatic failures that leave Israelis and
Palestinians stuck in in-trac-table conflict. So as the latest round
of U.S.-sponsored negotiation teeters on the brink, it's worth
pointing out that during the course of the last 25 years the two
peoples have made glacially slow but cumulatively enormous
progress toward coexistence. In fact, they have traveled most of
the path to a final settlement.
A decisive majority of Israelis and the political elite have given
up the dream of a "greater Israel" and accepted that a state of
Palestine will be created in the Gaza Strip and most of the West
EFTA_R1_00378577
EFTA01929418
Bank. That was out of the question in 1990, when Secretary of
State James Baker threw up his hands in frustration and advised
the parties to "call us . . . when you are serious about peace."
Palestinians have dropped their denial of Israel's right to exist
and, for the most part, the tactics of terrorism and violence that
undid the diplomacy of the Clinton administration. Once racked
by suicide bombings and messy military sweeps, Israel, the West
Bank and lately even Gaza have been islands of relative
tranquility in a bloody region. Israeli troops that once patrolled
every major Palestinian town are gone. They are replaced in the
West Bank by competent Palestinian security forces whose
commanders work closely with their Israeli counterparts —
another once-inconceivable development.
True, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators are still far apart on the
specific terms for the Palestine state, including where the border
will be drawn, how former Palestinian refugees will be handled
and whether and how Jerusalem will be divided. But, contrary to
the claim of Secretary of State John F. Kerry, the time for a two-
state settlement is not running out. In fact, the doomsayers who
made that same argument 25 years ago, such as Israeli
demographer Meron Benvenisti , had a more plausible case.
Then, Israel was aggressively expanding Jewish settlements.
Now, all but a handful of the new housing it is adding is in areas
near the 1967 border that both sides know will become part of
Israel. Despite all the episodic furors over the settlements,
careful studies have shown that 80 percent of their residents
could be absorbed by Israel's annexation of less than 5 percent
of the West Bank — and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu has hinted at his acceptance of the principle that the
EFTA_R1_00378578
EFTA01929419
territory could be swapped for land that is now part of Israel.
So why isn't this progress reflected in the diplomacy? Simple:
Almost every positive development in Israeli-Palestinian
relations has happened outside the "peace process." Israelis
accepted Palestinian statehood because they realized their
country could not keep the West Bank and remain both Jewish
and democratic. Palestinians abandoned violence because it
failed to end the occupation and was far more costly to
Palestinians than to Israelis. Security cooperation works in the
West Bank because Israel and the Palestinian authority share an
interest in combating Islamic extremists.
The United States has helped to advance this process not by
holding peace talks but by backing up the pragmatic decisions of
Israeli and Palestinian leaders. George W. Bush helped Ariel
Sharon make the decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and
to carry out the first dismantlement of settlements in the West
Bank by endorsing the principle that Israel would retain
settlement blocs near its 1967 border. U.S. training and funding
has helped create those Palestinian security forces.
The Obama administration could have kept the forward
movement going by continuing to promote the construction of
Palestinian institutions — including a democratic, corruption-
resistant government — and by pushing Israel to turn over more
security responsibility and remove impediments to the
Palestinian economy. Instead it chose to embrace the ever-
failing peace process and bet that it could quickly broker a deal
between two very reluctant leaders: Netanyahu and Mahmoud
Abbas.
EFTA_R1_00378579
EFTA01929420
The wager not only has foundered, but it also has partly reversed
the more organic change that was underway. Freed from
pressure from Washington, Abbas forced out his reformist prime
minister and repeatedly postponed promised elections. He is
now in the tenth year of the four-year term to which he was
elected. Big-time corruption in his regime is back, as are serious
human rights abuses. Rancor over the failing peace talks
meanwhile is causing Israel to withhold cooperation with the
Palestinian Authority, which could cause its collapse.
The moral of this story is that the United States can't produce a
Mideast settlement by diplomatic blitzkrieg. It must rather
patiently invest in the conditions and institutions that would
make a deal possible — and not call a conference until
conditions are ripe and leaders ready. By stubbornly refusing to
recognize that principle, President Obama and Kerry probably
have postponed Palestinian statehood. But the odds are that the
evolution toward peace eventually will go on without them.
The National Interest
Khamenei's Nuclear Dilemma
Muhammad Sahimi
April 14, 2014 -- As nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1
(the five permanent UN Security Council members, plus
EFTA_R1_00378580
EFTA01929421
Germany) continue, both sides have offered hope that they'll
reach a comprehensive agreement. The International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and Wendy Sherman, Under-Secretary
of State for Political Affairs who heads the U.S. delegation have
both admitted that Iran has kept its promises under the Geneva
Accord, signed between the two sides last November. The U.S.
and its allies have also delivered on their part of the deal, hence
providing Iran with slight, but still significant, relief from the
crippling sanctions that they have imposed on Iran.
U.S. officials have expressed optimism that the final and
comprehensive agreement will end the dispute over Iran's
nuclear program. The Iranians, and in particular Foreign
Minister Javad Zarif and President Hassan Rouhani, have been
saying the same for quite some time. But, of course, drafting the
text of the agreement is one thing, the demand by P5+1 that Iran
must drastically cut back on the scope of its nuclear program
and whether Iran agrees, are completely difficult, and potentially
deal-breaking issues. It is here that the role of Iran's supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is paramount.
The fact is Mr. Khamenei is trapped between a rock—the
Iranian nation—and a hard place—his hardline supporters. The
Iranian people elected President Rouhani in a landslide last
June, and have been demanding uprooting of the vast corruption
under Mr. Rouhani's predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a
functioning and robust economy, better relations with the West,
and a more open and tolerant political system that puts Iran on a
firm and definitive path toward a true and inclusive democracy.
Resolving the nuclear dispute with the West and lifting of the
sanctions represent major steps in this direction. Mr. Khamenei
has supported the nuclear negotiations. As far back as 21 March
EFTA_R1_00378581
EFTA01929422
2013, he signaled a fundamental change in his position
regarding nuclear negotiations with P5+1, and has consistently
said that he supports the negotiations as long as Iran's nuclear
rights are recognized and respected. In a speech on April 9, Mr.
Khamenei emphasized again his support for the nuclear
negotiations, although he also accused the U.S. of presenting an
image of Iran's nuclear program and goals that are far from
reality.
But, the hard place—Iran's hardliners that represent Khamenei's
main social base of support—is not interested in a nuclear
compromise. The hardliners have been using every opportunity
and excuse to attack the Rouhani administration, have likened
the nuclear deal to the Holocaust, have claimed that Iran has
made too many concessions for too little in return, and have
used the Majles [the Iranian parliament] to create problems for
the government by constantly summoning various ministers, and
in particular Mr. Zarif, to explain his position. They have even
threatened to impeach him.
Mr. Khamenei has also made statements that the hardliners, both
in Tehran and Washington, point to as indications that he is not
interested in a reasonable compromise. For example, between
the signing of the Geneva Accord and the beginning of the new
round of negotiations in Vienna in February, Mr. Khamenei
expressed his lack of hope for the negotiations to succeed. In
particular, he said on February 17 that although he supports the
nuclear negotiations, he does not believe that the negotiations
with the U.S. "will go anywhere." The mainstream media in the
U.S., the hawks and the Israel lobby that are looking for any
excuse to scuttle the diplomatic process, quickly interpreted
Khamenei's speech as indicating his unwillingness to
EFTA_R1_00378582
EFTA01929423
compromise. But, as explained elsewhere, Mr. Khamenei was
misquoted: he supports the negotiations and is definitively
interested in a diplomatic solution, but he is pessimistic about
the prospects for better, nonhostile relations with the United
States.
Likewise, Tehran's hardliners, and in particular some of the
leading commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
[IRGC] and intelligence officials in the Ahmadinejad
administration, have also used Mr. Khamenei's pronouncements
to justify their opposition to the nuclear negotiations. The
opposition became louder after the European parliament
approved a resolution in which it criticized Iran for its human-
rights record and proposed to open an office in Tehran by the
end of this year, presumably to enable the European Union to
monitor the state of human rights in Iran. One member of the
Majles, Nader Ghazipoor, declared that "the Iranian nation will
not accept the disgrace of having another `den of spies' on its
`sacred soil'," a reference to the old U.S. embassy in Tehran.
Other hardline MPs suggested that the resolution will negatively
impact the negotiations and have even suggested withdrawing
from them. There is also another suggestion in the Majles to
fingerprint members of European delegations that travel to Iran,
presumably to "humiliate" them.
The fact is, nuclear negotiations with Iran would not have
advanced as far as they have if the Rouhani administration did
not have Mr. Khamenei's support. Therefore, the question is
why Mr. Khamenei makes statements that might be interpreted
as indicating his unwillingness to compromise. The answer, as
already pointed out, is that he is trapped between rock and a
hard place, and that the reasons for his statements that "please"
EFTA_R1_00378583
EFTA01929424
the hardliners are twofold.
One reason is, of course, that the hardliners, the most important
base of support for Mr. Khamenei, oppose the negotiations.
Some of the hardliners do so for ideological reasons. They do
not trust the United States, and are afraid that President Rouhani
and Mr. Zarif will make too many concessions in order to close
Iran's nuclear dossier. Others oppose the negotiations because
during the Ahmadinejad administration they gained their
political and economic power as a result of the hostility of the
U.S. toward Iran, and are afraid that if the negotiations succeed
and the relations between the two nations improve, they will
lose everything. Thus, in order to control such hardliners, Mr.
Khamenei must appear resolute at home.
The second reason is that Mr. Khamenei is trying to create a
political cover for himself and his authority, in case the
negotiations fail. He recognizes that he does not have the
authority that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the
Islamic Republic, enjoyed with the people. When he declared to
the nation in 1988 that he would end the war with Iraq, he also
took full responsibility for it, after opposing it for six years after
Iran's military had beaten back the Iraqi army and expelled it
from Iran's territory. Mr. Khamenei is maneuvering to put
himself in a position to be able to declare that he knew all along
that the U.S. is not interested in a diplomatic resolution to the
conflict, if the negotiations fail, and that the failure is not his
fault. Thus, his pessimism about reaching an agreement with the
U.S. is mostly for his hardline supporters, as well a way of
securing his own authority.
But, despite the fact that the hardliners are the most important
EFTA_R1_00378584
EFTA01929425
base of support for Mr. Khamenei, he also recognizes that they
have been cornered by the track record of Ahmadinejad that he
himself had helped bring to power and had strongly supported
for at least six years. Hardly a day goes by without the discovery
of another major Ahmadinejad-era corruption case. In addition,
Iran's economy suffered greatly during Ahmadinejad's second
term. In particular, it contracted by about 5.7 percent in 2012,
and by 1.7 percent during most of 2013. These, together with the
extreme political repression that the hardliners imposed on the
nation as a result of the Green Movement of 2009-2010, created
an explosive situation, but also completely discredited the
hardliners. Cracks have emerged within the hardline movement,
and many have expressed regrets for supporting Ahmadinejad.
Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel, the influential conservative and
father-in-law of Mr. Khamenei's son, Moitaba, was quoted
saying "God regrets creating Ahmadinejad." This has provided
Mr. Khamenei with flexibility for maneuvering, even though he
should take the lion's share of blame for what happened during
the Ahmadinejad administration.
Mr. Khamenei's support for the nuclear negotiations is not,
however, indefinite. The Rouhani administration must be able to
show tangible results to the nation, and demonstrate that it did
not cross the red lines that Mr. Khamenei has set for the
negotiations, namely, recognition of Iran's right to peaceful use
of nuclear technology, particularly uranium enrichment. Thus,
talk of dismantling a major part of Iran's nuclear infrastructure,
espoused by the neocons, as well as Israeli and Saudi Arabian
lobbies in the United States, will also not go anywhere. Iran will
not agree to it, but time and again it has demonstrated its
willingness to make major concessions and to follow a prudent
EFTA_R1_00378585
EFTA01929426
approach, only to be rebuffed by the United States and its allies.
Asking Iran to give up a major part of its nuclear infrastructure
is tantamount to demanding that it surrender its sovereignty and
national rights. It will not happen.
As the author has emphasized repeatedly—if Washington is
interested in a diplomatic resolution of the dispute with Iran,
which in turn will have a tremendously positive effect on peace
and stability in the Middle East, especially in Syria, Iraq,
Lebanon and Afghanistan, it should recognize the Rouhani
administration's domestic constraints, and offer compromises
that President Rouhani can take home and demonstrate to his
nation, including the hardliners, that diplomacy with the U.S.
can work. That would also ensure continuation of Mr.
Khamenei's support for Rouhani, and marginalizing the
hardliners.
Iran analyst Muhammad Sahimi, a Professor at the University
of Southern California, is the editor of the website Iran News &
Middle East Reports.
The Washington Post
European Union nations see an uptick
in economic security at just the right
time
EFTA_R1_00378586
EFTA01929427
Editorial
April 14, 2014 -- Vladimir Putin's seizure of Crimea and
destabilization of Ukraine have added geopolitics to a list of
Europe's woes that had previously been headed by economics.
In fact, if not for Mr. Putin's land grab, the big story out of
Europe might be its surprising economic comeback.
That's a relative judgment, to be sure; Europe has come back
only in comparison to the disaster it faced two years ago, or to
the even larger collapse that many forecast. Still, after many
long months of negative growth and high unemployment,
heavily indebted governments such as those of Spain and Italy
can now access credit markets at rates not much higher than
Germany, Europe's economic powerhouse. Even Greece sold
five-year bonds at manageable interest rates on Thursday; the
European Commission predicts the Greek economy to grow in
2014 for the first time in half a decade, albeit only by 0.6
percent.
These results are a tribute not only to these countries'
willingness to impose wrenching austerity. They also bespeak an
implicit bailout from the European Central Bank, whose
president, Mario Draghi, persuaded would-be investors in
official debt that the ECB would do "whatever it takes" to shore
up the currency, the euro, in which that debt is denominated.
But the progress hardly means that the region's problems are
well and truly behind it. That could only be said once it resumes
sustainable economic growth, which, in turn, hinges on the
resumption of growth in the second and third largest economies
after Germany: France and Italy.
EFTA_R1_00378587
EFTA01929428
France and Italy are plagued not only by insufficient demand,
which austerity worsens, but also by overregulation and job-
destroying tax systems. Entrenched interest groups have fended
off structural reform for years. Fortunately new prime ministers,
Matteo Renzi in Italy and Manuel Valls of France (the latter an
appointee of President Francois Hollande), are proposing fiscal
policies that actually address the high cost of doing private-
sector business in their respective countries. Since these policies
include tax cuts, however, they also might increase French and
Italian borrowing in the short term, above the levels permitted
by the European Union.
The powers that be within the European Union — German
Chancellor Angela Merkel and Mr. Draghi — would be wise to
grant Mr. Valls and Mr. Renzi the fiscal wiggle room they need.
It's one thing to borrow for current consumption, which is what
France and Italy have done, in spades, until now. It's quite
another to borrow for purposes of enhancing an economy's
growth capacity. To the extent that France and Italy are at last
genuinely and verifiably doing the latter — a big if, admittedly
— they should get the support of their European partners. At a
time when Mr. Putin is moving tanks on Ukraine's borders and
brandishing Europe's gas supplies as a political weapon, Europe
can ill afford any additional crises, economic or political.
Indeed, if they needed any additional reasons to value unity and
pragmatism in their mutual economic dealings, the Russian
leader has supplied them.
Article 4.
EFTA_R1_00378588
EFTA01929429
Al Monitor
Who betrayed Egypt's revolution?
Wael Nawara
April 11, 2014 -- A few days ago, activist Shahenda Maklad,
76, despite being sick and bedridden, carried herself to the
Lawyers Syndicate where she signed a notarized affidavit
supporting (former) Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi's
candidacy for Egypt's presidential race. The law requires that a
candidate must get a minimum of 25,000 such affidavits with at
least 1,000 of them per governorate from 15 of Egypt's 27
governorates.
As soon as news leaked that Maklad was supporting Sisi, she
was brutally attacked on social media with some activists
accusing her of stooping too low and smearing her entire history
of struggle. In response, to their attacks, Maklad criticized the
elitist activists who use banners of "martyrs' blood" for their
own egotistic gain while having no feet to stand upon in the
street among Egyptians.
To this day, Maklad continues to fight for what she believes in.
In January, she demanded the removal of Mohamed Ibrahim, the
minister of interior, and condemned torture and brutal police
practices against detainees. Last week, Maklad was one of the
supporters of the women's sit-in at the presidential palace,
demanding the release of activists Ahmed Douma and Ahmed
Maher, sentenced for three years in prison for violating the
demonstration law. Yet, while opposing certain actions of the
EFTA_R1_00378589
EFTA01929430
interim government, she was brave enough to break ranks with
her usual club and announce near the end of last year that the
majority of Egyptians are looking forward to having Sisi as
Egypt's next president. Following her own conviction, she
decided to support him and not her lifelong friend and leftist
opposition compatriot, Hamdin Sabahy.
In 1997, Maklad, along with three of her friends, Wedad Mitry,
Safinaz Kazem and Amina Rachid, was featured in a highly
acclaimed Canadian documentary film, "Four Women of
Egypt." During Morsi's reign, Shahenda's iconic image of being
hushed in front of the presidential palace on Dec. 5, 2012, by the
heavy hand of one of the Brotherhood's leaders/thugs and
a close aide to Morsi, aggravated many Egyptians and thousands
rushed to the street in demonstration moved by this particular
photo. Robert Mackey of The New York Times' blog The
Lede headlined that image as "Clash of Cultures Within Egypt
Made Visible in Single Frame of Video."
Maklad has been an Egyptian heroine and a symbol of Egypt's
revolution(s) since forever. She was a co-founder of virtually
every opposition movement formed in the past few decades,
including Kifaya, the National Association for Change and
Egyptian Women for Change. The list is pages long. Hers could
be seen as a "Lifelong Trip to Tahrir" as the headline of Radwan
Adam's article suggested in February 2012, one year after
Egypt's January revolution. Adam further recalled when Che
Guevara and Gamal Abdel Nasser went to Kamshish to salute
the young woman, who dared to rebel against feudalism and lost
her husband who was assassinated in the fight, along with her
peasant friends.
EFTA_R1_00378590
EFTA01929431
Since then, Maklad has championed the cause of poor farmers. I
remember before 2011 being invited to the launch of the
"farmers union," which she founded a few months before the
January 2011 revolution. She is simply the personal hero of
many people. That does not mean she could do no wrong. But to
imply that she sold out the revolution is a little silly and screams
of ignorance and fake moral superiority.
Maklad is not the only activist pushed outside the exclusive
"revolutionary club" presided upon by a few self-appointed hard-
core activists. According to overzealous revolutionaries, the list
of exiled members is long and includes, believe it or not, Abdel
Gelil Mostafa, former head of Kifaya and National Association
for Change; Ibrahim Eisa, the renowned journalist who was tried
and persecuted during Hosni Mubarak's rule; Kamal Khalil, an
iconic leader of almost every important uprising, demonstration
and protest; Ahmed Fouad Negm, a revolutionary poet who was
persecuted by every regime since the 1960s; Salah Adly, a
leader of the communist movement; and Bahaa Eddin Shaaban,
leader of the National Association for Change and the Egyptian
Socialist Party.
Many activists and revolutionaries have become so disillusioned
and frustrated with the popular tide turning against their lofty
discourse. Shokeir, a Twitter activist, may have best expressed
this isolation and estrangement in a few simple words: "Wait for
no one," which expressed aloneness, despair and loss of faith.
The screaming pain of despair, aloneness and loss of faith could
only be equaled by the sad relief of when you no longer have
high expectations, or any expectations, from anyone and as a
result feel the comfort of never having to be disappointed again.
EFTA_R1_00378591
EFTA01929432
Has it all been in vain? The martyrs' blood and the high hopes
for democracy, dignity and social justice? Questions of self-
doubt and the deafening silence are heard from the youth, in
particular those who participated in the 18-day uprising
that ended 30 years of Mubarak's rule and engaged in the
countless Friday sit-ins and marches that followed. Some envy
the martyrs who honorably died by gunfire in their glory only to
leave us revolutionaries to die by the sword of silence, in the
shadows created by the absence of cameras and the silence
screaming from departing microphones and vanishing media
attention.
It is unfair to ask revolutionaries to be "wise" and calculating.
That is just against the nature of revolution. You cannot be
exactly pragmatic and prudent and at the same time face
armored vehicles and security forces with bare chests. But is it
just about being young, passionate and idealistic? Is it just about
the promises made to friends bleeding in your arms while you
watch life slip away from their dimming eyes? In many cases, I
would say yes. This is the case. In other cases, it is more about
identifying with a certain exclusive club that gets more exclusive
when members are kicked out on charges of betraying the
revolution. It may even be about that monstrous collective ego
that can only be fed by crushed images of those once considered
great and heroic symbols of struggle. It probably does make one
feel morally superior when everyone else is eventually found
guilty of treason.
In the beginning it was easy. Just vilify the foloul, high officials
and top aides of the Mubarak regime. Then the label was
extended to include everyone who was once a member of the
National Democratic Party. Then it was yet expanded again to
EFTA_R1_00378592
EFTA01929433
include those who ever had anything to do with or even shaken
hands with anyone related to the Mubarak regime. It was
expanded again to include those who voted for Ahmed Shafik or
Amr Moussa in the 2012 presidential elections. And as the
monster needs to be continuously fed, new flesh must come at
the end from the activists themselves, leaving only a handful of
revolutionaries who belong to that exclusive club, who secretly
even have smaller circles of who is really true revolutionary and
who is so and so. At the end, a few are left at the feet of the
Press Syndicate, each taking a mental selfie while really
admiring his ability to ignore a camera that doesn't exist in the
first place.
There is a unique Egyptian sound gesture, which comes from
between the front teeth to barely escape through tightly, pressed
lips. It is a subtle gesture expressing utter sorrow and disgust.
Many activists make that sound as they exchange tales of those
who betrayed the revolution and sold out the blood of the
martyrs. You cannot help but wonder: Who actually betrayed the
revolution?
Wael Nawara is columnist for Al-Monitor's Egypt Pulse. He
is an Egyptian writer and activist. He is also the co-founder of
Al Dostor Party, the National Association for Change and El
Ghad Party. Formerly president of the Arab Alliance for
Freedom and Democracy, he was a visiting fellow at the
Institute of Politics, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
Article 5.
EFTA_R1_00378593
EFTA01929434
The National Interest
Let Asia Go Nuclear
Harvey M. Sapolsky, Christine M. Leah
April 14, 2014 -- America's policy of opposing the proliferation
of nuclear weapons needs to be more nuanced. What works for
the United States in the Middle East may not in Asia. We do not
want Iran or Saudi Arabia to get the bomb, but why not
Australia, Japan, and South Korea? We are opposed to nuclear
weapons because they are the great military equalizer, because
some countries may let them slip into the hands of terrorists, and
because we have significant advantage in precision conventional
weapons. But our opposition to nuclear weapons in Asia means
we are committed to a costly and risky conventional arms race
with China over our ability to protect allies and partners lying
nearer to China than to us and spread over a vast maritime
theater.
None of our allies in Asia possess nuclear weapons. Instead,
they are protected by what is called extended deterrence, our
vaguely stated promise to use nuclear weapons in their defense
if they are threatened by regional nuclear powers, China, North
Korea and Russia. We promise, in essence, to trade Los Angeles
for Tokyo, Washington for Canberra, and Seattle for Seoul, as
preposterous as that might seem.
In order to avoid such a test of our will, the United States
attempts to contain China in particular, but others as well, via a
conventional force buildup—the so-called pivot to Asia. We
EFTA_R1_00378594
EFTA01929435
station tens of thousands of troops in Japan and South Korea,
and are expanding our presence in Guam, Australia, Singapore,
and the Philippines. The conventional challenge is China's
ability to deny access for US forces in or near the island chains
that are our Asian allies and that at the same time guard China.
As China's military grows the access issue becomes more
problematic because of China's ability to saturate the zone with
missiles and aircraft that can threaten our military presence. The
Air-Sea Battle operational concept, a costly networking of
missile defenses, long-range-strike capabilities and naval forces
has been the US military's response. Billions are being spent by
the United States to assure our Asian allies of our will to protect
them conventionally as well with extended nuclear deterrence.
But there is a better, cheaper way to provide security in Asia.
We should encourage our allies to acquire their own nuclear
weapons. With nuclear weapons Australia, Japan and the others
would have the capability to protect themselves from bullying.
Nearly all of the allies are rich enough and technologically
advanced enough to acquire and maintain nuclear forces. And
those who are not—the Philippines, for example—lose much of
their vulnerability once the focus shifts away from conventional
defenses of the island chains. Nuclear weapons helped prevent
the Cold War from turning hot. In Asia they can stop a
conventional arms race that is forcing the United States to invest
in weapons that can block the Chinese military on its doorstep,
thousands of miles from our own. Let our Asian allies defend
themselves with the weapon that is the great equalizer.
Tailored proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is
not the Middle East. Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even
Taiwan are strong democracies. They have stable political
EFTA_R1_00378595
EFTA01929436
regimes. Government leaders are accountable to democratic
institutions. Civilian control of the military is strong. And they
don't have a history of lobbing missiles at each other—they are
much more risk-averse than Egypt, Syria or Iran. America's
allies would be responsible nuclear weapon states.
A number of Asian nations have at one time or another
considered going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S.
Defense Department encouragement in the 1960s. They chose
what for them was the cheaper alternative of living under the US
nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees provided by the
United States, coupled with the US Navy patrolling offshore,
have allowed our allies to grow prosperous without having to
invest much in their own defense.
Confident that the United States protects them, our allies have
even begun to squabble with China over strings of uninhabited
islands in the hope that there is oil out there. It is time to give
them a dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that
is to stop standing between them and their nuclear-armed
neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of
having their own nuclear weapons. The waters of the Pacific
under those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a
fortune.
Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor Emeritus and the Former
Director of The MIT Security Studies Program. Christine M.
Leah is a Stanton Fellow at the MIT Security Studies Program.
EFTA_R1_00378596
EFTA01929437
Article 6.
NYT
Ambiguities of Japan's Nuclear Policy
Norihiro Kato
April 13, 2014 -- Tokyo — When Yasunari Kawabata became
the first Japanese to receive the Nobel Prize for Literature in
1968, he gave a speech called "Japan, the Beautiful, and Myself'
that presented a benignly aesthetic portrait of the so-called
Japanese spirit larded with references to classical poetry, the tea
ceremony and ikebana. When Kenzaburo Oe received the prize
in 1994, he titled his lecture, "Japan, the Ambiguous, and
Myself," and offered a critical take on the country's ambiguities,
starting its being part of Asia and simultaneously aligned with
the West.
I was reminded of the contrast between Japan the Beautiful and
Japan the Ambiguous late last month when, during the third
Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, the Japanese
government announced that it would hand over to the United
States more than 700 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium and a
vast supply of highly enriched uranium. It struck me then that
the ambiguities of Japan's policy on nuclear weapons might be
coming up against the nationalist agenda of Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe, also the author of "Towards a Beautiful Country:
My Vision for Japan."
Although Japan does not have nuclear weapons, it has a nuclear
weapons policy. The strategy was set out by the Ministry of
EFTA_R1_00378597
EFTA01929438
Foreign Affairs in 1969 in an internal document whose existence
was kept secret until the daily Mainichi Shimbun published it in
1994. That paper states that "for the time being we will maintain
the policy of not possessing nuclear weapons" but also "keep the
economic and technical potential for the production of nuclear
weapons, while seeing to it that Japan will not be interfered with
in this regard." Known as "technological deterrence," this
posture is inherently ambiguous, and has been made more so
still by the ministry's insistence that the document was a
research paper rather than a statement of policy.
In a 2000 essay about the future of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, the disarmament advocate Jonathan Schell drew a
distinction between capacity and intention in describing the
range of positions states may adopt on nuclear weapons. At the
time, Sweden had the capacity to produce such weapons but not
the intention; Libya had the intention but not the capacity.
Japan, by contrast, stands out as the only nation that has both the
capacity and the intention to produce nuclear weapons but does
not act on its intention. It has pioneered a type of nuclear
deterrence that relies not on any overt threat, but on the mere
suggestion of a latent possibility.
Despite all the evidence to this effect, the Japanese government
has continued to deny that it has pursued technological
deterrence because acknowledging this would both contravene
the spirit of the N.P.T. and anger the Japanese people, who
remain strongly opposed to nuclear weapons. Thus Japan has
managed to signal to other countries that it could produce
nuclear weapons, and that it would if it had to, while
simultaneously making it hard for anyone, either at home or
abroad, to object.
EFTA_R1_00378598
EFTA01929439
On the one hand, since the 1970s Japan has pursued a pacifist
foreign policy best symbolized by its Three Non-Nuclear
Principles: "Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear
weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese
territory." On the other hand, starting in the 1950s it has
implemented a nuclear energy policy centered on a closed
nuclear fuel cycle, which yields nuclear materials that can be
used to run so-called fast-breeding reactors. Japan has one such
facility, which it uses for research, but it has been plagued by
problems and is not commercially viable. Although the fuel
cycle yields plutonium through the reprocessing of spent fuel,
Japan has managed to escape the usual restrictions on the
possession of such materials by stressing its commitment to the
Three Non-Nuclear Principles and so, implicitly, its special
status as the only country in the world to have suffered atomic
bombings.
But now the two props of Japan's not-so-secret strategy of
technological deterrence are falling apart. The Abe cabinet has
adopted a confrontational stance toward Japan's East Asian
neighbors. It has weakened the country's previous commitment
to not exporting arms to certain types of countries, including
those subject to arms embargoes or involved in international
conflicts. Other countries, sensing that the Abe administration
may want to jettison the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, have
begun expressing concern over Japan's stores of plutonium.
At the same time, the government is finding it increasingly
difficult to explain why Japan should maintain its fuel-cycle
policy. In the wake of the Fukushima disaster in 2011, none of
Japan's 48 commercial nuclear reactors is currently in operation,
and popular opinion is mounting against the idea of developing
EFTA_R1_00378599
EFTA01929440
more special fast-breeder reactors.
To make matters worse, the U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation
agreement that came into force in 1988 — which allows Japan
to recover and store plutonium derived from fuel the United
States supplied for Japan's power plants - is set to expire in
2018. The agreement had widely been expected to be renewed.
But then in January the U.S. government requested the return of
some plutonium and highly enriched uranium it lent to Japan for
research purposes under another, older, agreement. (These are
the materials Japan agreed to return last month.) On the face of
it, Washington's request appears to be merely one part of a
broader effort to ensure the security of nuclear materials. Yet it
has sparked speculation both in Japan and abroad that the U.S.
government is worried about the Abe government's belligerence
and may be reconsidering extending the 1988 cooperation
agreement.
If Mr. Abe keeps pushing ahead with his confrontational agenda,
his government may lose Washington's support. In that case,
Japan will either have to submit to the same rules that apply to
other countries on nuclear materials or isolate itself by openly
flouting them. One can only hope that Japan's unusual approach
to nuclear deterrence will, in the end, have a deterrent effect on
Mr. Abe himself— that ambiguity will win out over beauty.
Norihiro Kato is a literary scholar and a professor at Waseda
University. This article was translated by Michael Emmerich
from the Japanese.
EFTA_R1_00378600
EFTA01929441
The Ili lid u
Dancing with the nuclear djinn
Praveen Swami
The Bharatiya Janata Party's election manifesto promises to
review India's nuclear doctrine. What does this portend?
April 12, 2014 -- He saw the signs of the approaching doomsday
all around him: in moral degradation, in casual sex, in the rise of
western power, in space travel, in our high-tech age. God, wrote
Pakistan's nuclear-weapons guru Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood
in Mechanics of the Doomsday..., had not privileged man to
know when it would come, but "the promised Hour is not a far
off event now." It would come as a "great blast," perhaps
"initiated by some catastrophic man-made devices, such as
sudden detonation of a large number of nuclear bombs."
Long mocked by his colleagues for his crazed beliefs — the
physicist Pervez Hoodbhoy records him as saying, "djinns,
being fiery creatures, ought to be tapped as a free source of
energy" — and condemned to obscurity after his arrest on
charges of aiding the Taliban, Mr. Mahmood may yet be
remembered as a prophet.
The doctrine debate
EFTA_R1_00378601
EFTA01929442
India's next government will, without dispute, find itself
dancing with the nuclear djinn Mr. Mahmood helped unleash. In
its election manifesto, the Bharatiya Janata Party has promised
to "study in detail India's nuclear doctrine, and revise and
update it to make it relevant to [the] challenges of current
times." Mr. Seshadri Chari, a member of the group that
formulated this section of the party's manifesto said: "why
should we tie our hands into accepting a global no-first-use
policy, as has been proposed by the Prime Minister recently?"
The debate will come in dangerous times. Pakistan has been
growing its arsenal low-yield plutonium nuclear weapons, also
called tactical or theatre nuclear weapons. Estimates suggest
some 10-12 new nuclear warheads are being added to the
country's 90-110 strong arsenal, and new reactors going critical
at Khushab will likely boost that number even further. New
Delhi must respond — but the seeds of a nuclear apocalypse
could sprout if it gets that response wrong.
Mr. Chari's grasp of fact doesn't give much reason to hope for
much else: India's no-first-use commitment was made by a
government his party led, not Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
In 1998, battling to contain the international fallout from the
Pokhran II nuclear tests, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee
promised Parliament that "India would not be the first to use
nuclear weapons." Later, in August 1999, the National Security
Advisory Board's draft nuclear doctrine stated that India would
only "retaliate with sufficient nuclear weapons to inflict
destruction and punishment that the aggressor will find
unacceptable if nuclear weapons are used against India and its
forces."
EFTA_R1_00378602
EFTA01929443
The no-first-use posture, scholar Ashley Tellis has noted in his
magisterial book, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, was
founded on a pragmatic judgment of India's strategic
circumstances. Even if India needed to fight shallow cross-
border wars, Dr. Tellis argued, its "nominal military superiority
over Pakistan and its local military superiority, allow such
operations to be conducted by conventional means alone."
For more than a decade-and-a-half, the commitment has held,
but there have been signs it is fraying at the edges. In 2003,
India announced it reserved the right to deliver a nuclear-
weapons response to a chemical or biological attack, a
significant caveat to the no-first-use promise. Then, in a speech
delivered at the National Defence College, National Security
Adviser, Shivshankar Menon, appeared to add a caveat to
India's nuclear doctrine, saying in passing that it committed to
"no first use against non-nuclear weapon states." This was
interpreted by some observers to mean India might consider first
strikes against nuclear-weapons states.
Dr. Singh reiterated Mr. Vajpayee's formulation early this
month — but there is at least some reason to believe the caveats
reflect ongoing debates at the highest levels of the strategic
community.
From its genesis, questions have hung over India's no-first-use
commitment. How would India react to credible intelligence that
an imminent Pakistani first-strike against its own nuclear
arsenal, would degrade its ability to retaliate? How might India
deal with an attack that came from an insurgent group operating
from within Pakistani territory, which seized control of a nuclear
weapon? In addition, as the scholar Vipin Narang has argued,
EFTA_R1_00378603
EFTA01929444
India has not committed against using its superior air power
against Pakistani missile launchers armed with nuclear warheads
— confronting its western adversary in a "use-it-or-lose-it"
dilemma.
Bharat Karnad, a strategic affairs commentator who will likely
influence a future BJP-led government's nuclear thinking, thus
described no-first-use as something of a pious fiction: "one of
those restrictions which countries are willing to abide by except
in war."
Dangerous future
This much, we do know: the next government, whoever forms it,
will command a more lethal nuclear arsenal than ever before.
Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris have noted that while India's
nuclear arsenal, at some 80-100 warheads, is smaller than that of
Pakistan, it is set to expand. India is introducing new missiles
and is inducting almost-impossible-to-target nuclear-powered
submarines. The experts estimate that India already has a
weapons-grade plutonium stockpile of 520 kilograms, enough
for 100-130 warheads, but will need more from the prototype
fast-breeder reactor at Kalpakkam to meet the needs of its
growing arsenal.
India's strategic establishment seems certain it needs these
weapons — but remains less than clear on just how and under
what circumstances they might be used.
The threat from the east is relatively predictable. For years now,
India has periodically suffered from dragon-under-the-bed
nightmares — the prospect that a more aggressively nationalist
China, whose conventional forces are expanding and
EFTA_R1_00378604
EFTA01929445
modernising dramatically, could initiate a war to settle the two
countries' unresolved conflicts. China is bound by a no-first-use
pledge, but some experts fear India's conventional forces might
be overwhelmed. It is improbable, though, that these losses
would pose an existential threat to India.
"Ironically," Dr. Narang has written, "China doubts India's no-
first-use pledge for the same reasons the United States doubts
China's: that in a crisis, no rhetorical pledge physically prevents
the state from using nuclear weapons first." For India's nuclear
strategists, this is a good thing: China's fears should deter it
from a large-scale war.
The TNW challenge
From the east, though, the threat is more complex. In the wake
of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan crisis, the Indian Army began
acquiring the resources to fight limited conflicts at short notice
— in essence, wars of punishment for acts of terrorism. Pakistan
responded by growing its Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)
arsenal, for use against advancing Indian formations inside its
own territory. Last year, eminent diplomat Shyam Saran lucidly
explained the thinking. Pakistan hopes "to dissuade India from
contemplating conventional punitive retaliation to sub-
conventional but highly destructive and disruptive cross-border
terrorist strikes."
From Cold War experience, Pakistan likely knows its nuclear-
weapons strategy makes no sense. In 1955, historian David
Smith has recorded, a NATO exercise code-named Carte
Blanche concluded that a war using TNWs would leave two
million dead in the north German plains. Exercise Sagebrush
EFTA_R1_00378605
EFTA01929446
later concluded that all participating military formations would
also end up being annihilated. Exercise Oregon Trail, conducted
from 1963-1965, showed that when forces concentrated to fight
conventionally, they "offered lucrative nuclear targets" — but if
they "dispersed to avoid nuclear strikes, the units could be
defeated by conventional tactics."
Pakistan's generals know expert studies, like that of A.H.
Nayyar and Zia Mian, demonstrate that TNWs would be near-
useless in stopping an Indian armoured thrust into Pakistan. The
generals know that TNWs have to be dispersed, vastly
increasing the risks of miscalculation by local commanders,
accidental use, or even theft. Ejaz Haider, a Pakistani strategic
commentator, has bluntly stated that the confused state of the
Pakistan's TNW doctrine "essentially means we don't know
what the hell to do with them."
India doesn't either. Purely symbolic gestures like revoking the
no-first-use policy will yield no dividends, though. If Pakistan is
desperate enough to use TNWs, thus inviting an Indian second
strike, it certainly won't be deterred by a threat to unleash
Armageddon first. Backing down on no-first-use will, moreover,
deny India the fruits of being seen as a responsible nuclear-
weapons state, one of the reasons Mr. Vajpayee made his call in
the first place.
It isn't clear, though, that reason will prevail: Mr. Mahmood,
after all, isn't the only crazed South Asian in shouting distance
of a nuclear bomb. In 1999, as war raged in Kargil, the
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh journal organiser had these
words for Mr. Vajpayee: "Arise, Atal Behari! Who knows if fate
has destined you to be the author of the final chapter of this long
EFTA_R1_00378606
EFTA01929447
story. For what have we manufactured bombs? For what have
we exercised the nuclear option?"
It is critical that voices like these be nowhere near the ears of the
leaders whose hands hover over our nuclear button.
Praveen Swami is an Indian journalist, analyst and author
specialising on international strategic and security issues.
EFTA_R1_00378607
EFTA01929448
Related Documents (6)
DOJ Data Set 10OtherUnknown
EFTA01658773
43p
Court UnsealedJan 4, 2024
Unsealed Jeffrey Epstein court papers
January 3, 2024 VIA ECF The Honorable Loretta A. Preska District Court Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 Re: Giuffre v. Maxwell, Case No. 15-cv-7433-LAP Dear Judge Preska, Pursuant to the Court’s December 18, 2023, unsealing order, and following conferral with Defendant, Plaintiff files this set of documents ordered unsealed. The filing of these documents ordered unsealed will be done on a rolling basis until c
943p
DOJ Data Set 10CorrespondenceUnknown
EFTA Document EFTA01658887
0p
DOJ Data Set 10CorrespondenceUnknown
EFTA Document EFTA01658773
0p
DOJ Data Set 10CorrespondenceUnknown
EFTA Document EFTA01658979
0p
DOJ Data Set 10OtherUnknown
EFTA01658735
38p
Forum Discussions
This document was digitized, indexed, and cross-referenced with 1,400+ persons in the Epstein files. 100% free, ad-free, and independent.
Annotations powered by Hypothesis. Select any text on this page to annotate or highlight it.