Corpus Inventory & Evidence Chain
This is the foundational accounting of every piece of source material underlying this
Corpus Inventory & Evidence Chain
What This Document Is
This is the foundational accounting of every piece of source material underlying this
investigation. Every report in this repository traces back to specific documents within
the corpus described here. If you want to verify a claim, this is where you start.
Bottom line: 1,380,937 PDF documents containing 2,731,785 pages and 3.18 billioncharacters of text, plus 3,234 media files, 1,530 audio/video transcripts, 2,587,102
redaction records, and a 1,536-person entity registry. All derived from 194.5 GB of
publicly released U.S. Department of Justice files.
Source Material
All source data was released by the U.S. Department of Justice at
justice.gov/epstein between December 2025 andFebruary 2026. Bulk downloads were obtained from archive.org
mirrors of the DOJ release. No data was obtained through leaks, hacking, FOIA requests,
or any non-public channel.
DOJ Release Timeline
| Dataset | Release Date | Size | Format |
| --------- | ------------- | ------ | -------- |
| DS1-7 | December 19, 2025 | ~3.0 GB | Individual PDFs on justice.gov |
| DS8 | January 17, 2026 | ~1.8 GB | ZIP archive |
| DS9 | January 30, 2026 | ~103.6 GB | tar.bz2 archive |
| DS10 | February 3, 2026 | ~68.3 GB | ZIP archive |
| DS11 | February 6, 2026 | ~26.8 GB | ZIP archive |
| DS12 | February 10, 2026 | ~0.1 GB | Individual PDFs |
Complete Document Inventory
PDF Documents by Dataset
| DS | Documents | Pages | Characters | Size (GB) | EFTA Range | Blank Pages |
| ---- | ----------: | ------: | -----------: | ----------: | ------------ | ------------: |
| 1 | 3,156 | 3,156 | 171,072 | 1.24 | EFTA00000001 – EFTA00003158 | 0 |
| 2 | 574 | 699 | 46,593 | 0.62 | EFTA00003159 – EFTA00003857 | 0 |
| 3 | 67 | 1,847 | 275,943 | 0.58 | EFTA00003858 – EFTA00005586 | 0 |
| 4 | 152 | 2,704 | 3,364,909 | 0.35 | EFTA00005705 – EFTA00008320 | 0 |
| 5 | 120 | 120 | 46,862 | 0.06 | EFTA00008409 – EFTA00008528 | 0 |
| 6 | 13 | 487 | 491,355 | 0.05 | EFTA00008529 – EFTA00008998 | 0 |
| 7 | 17 | 660 | 720,756 | 0.10 | EFTA00009016 – EFTA00009664 | 0 |
| 8 | 10,593 | 29,343 | 38,733,380 | 1.78 | EFTA00009676 – EFTA00039023 | 0 |
| 9 | 531,284 | 1,223,761 | 1,557,581,456 | 94.51 | EFTA00039025 – EFTA01262781 | 32 |
| 10 | 503,154 | 950,101 | 1,060,544,619 | 68.32 | EFTA01262782 – EFTA02212882 | 0 |
| 11 | 331,655 | 517,382 | 513,671,715 | 26.75 | EFTA02212883 – EFTA02730262 | 0 |
| 12 | 152 | 1,525 | 1,658,327 | 0.12 | EFTA02730265 – EFTA02731783 | 0 |
| Total | 1,380,937 | 2,731,785 | 3,177,306,987 | 194.5 | EFTA00000001 – EFTA02731783 | 32 |
in the database. Zero discrepancies across 11 of 12 datasets. DS8 has one duplicate
file (EFTA00022173 exists in two subdirectories at identical size — a packaging artifact,
not a data issue).
EFTA Number Gaps
EFTA numbers are not contiguous. The DOJ did not release every number — there are gaps
within each dataset's range. For example, DS9 spans EFTA00039025 to EFTA01262781
(a range of 1,223,757 possible numbers) but contains only 531,284 documents. These gaps
are part of the DOJ's release structure, not missing data on our end. The same pattern
holds across all datasets.
Media Files (Non-PDF)
| Type | Count | Primary Location | Description |
| ------ | ------: | ----------------- | ------------- |
| .avi | 1,529 | DS9 | MCC/surveillance video clips (no audio) |
| .mp4 | 255 | DS8, DS9 | Surveillance video, longer-form recordings |
| .m4a | 78 | DS9 | Audio recordings (phone calls, interviews) |
| .vob | 10 | DS9 | DVD video objects |
| .m4v | 10 | DS9 | Video files |
| .wav | 9 | DS9 | Audio recordings |
| .mov | 8 | DS9 | QuickTime video |
| .wmv | 5 | DS9 | Windows Media video |
| .mp3 | 2 | DS9 | Audio files |
| .xlsx/.xls | 11 | DS8 | Spreadsheets (victim pseudonym lists, device inventories) |
| .csv | 4 | DS8 | Fully redacted tabular data (every cell blacked out) |
| Other | ~322 | DS8, DS10, DS11 | Miscellaneous native files |
| Total | ~3,234 |
Zero-Page Documents (Corrupted/Non-Standard PDFs)
Five documents across the entire corpus returned zero extractable pages from standard
PDF tools. Byte-level forensic analysis revealed these are not simply corrupted — they
are forensic disk image fragments and truncated scans. All five have been recovered.
See CORRUPTED_PDF_FORENSICS for full details.
| EFTA | Size | What It Actually Is | Recovered Content |
| ------ | ------ | -------------------- | -------------------- |
| EFTA00593870 | 46 KB | Null-padded PDF (64% zeroed) | Page 1 of CVRA motion (Jane Doe #1 & #2 v. US) |
| EFTA00597207 | 883 KB | Disk image with Apple Address Book | 8 contacts + iPhone 5s photo (Aug 2014, LSJ) |
| EFTA00645624 | 35 KB | Truncated Sharp scanner fax | Epstein fee dispute legal memo (Apr 2015) |
| EFTA01175426 | 827 KB | Truncated linearized PDF | 10-page court trust order (Zaffaroni/Packard) |
| EFTA01220934 | 1.1 MB | Raw Windows disk image fragment | Cached web images, application files (not case-relevant) |
Derived Databases
All analysis in this repository is built on four databases derived from the source PDFs.
full_text_corpus.db (6.08 GB)
The primary analytical database. Contains the full text of every page of every document.
| Table | Records | Description |
| ------- | --------: | ------------- |
documents | 1,380,937 | One row per PDF: EFTA number, dataset, file path, page count, file size |
pages | 2,731,785 | One row per page: EFTA number, page number, full text content, character count |
pages_fts | 2,731,785 | FTS5 full-text search index over all page text |
fitz) text extraction on every PDF. For scanned documents,
this captures the invisible OCR text layer (rendering mode Tr=3) that the DOJ's scanning
vendor applied. Documents where PyMuPDF returned zero text were flagged for manual review
(this is how the 5 corrupted PDFs were identified).
redaction_analysis_v2.db (0.95 GB)
Spatial analysis of every redaction rectangle in the corpus, with the text found at
each redaction's coordinates.
| Table | Records | Description |
| ------- | --------: | ------------- |
redactions | 2,587,102 | Every redaction: position, type, hidden text, confidence |
document_summary | 638,416 | Per-document redaction counts and flags |
reconstructed_pages | 39,588 | Pages rebuilt from spatially-ordered redaction fragments |
extracted_entities | 107,422 | Named entities extracted from reconstructed text |
bad_overlay redaction records (~98%) are
OCR noise — the scanner's OCR engine attempted to read black redaction bars and produced
garbage text. Only 12 documents contain genuinely failed redactions (Apple Mail PLIST
metadata exposed behind incompletely flattened overlays). See
DATA_QUALITY_AUDIT and EVIDENCE_RELIABILITY_AUDITfor the full audit. The redaction database remains useful as a searchable index of text
found near redaction zones, but its hidden_text field should not be interpreted as
"recovered secret content."
transcripts.db (2.5 MB)
GPU-transcribed audio/video content using faster-whisper large-v3 on NVIDIA A100.
| Metric | Value |
| -------- | ------: |
| Total entries | 1,530 |
| With speech content | 375 |
| Total words transcribed | 92,153 |
| Silent/surveillance skipped | 1,155 |
Pre-screening classified 2,581 unique media files: 903 were processed, 1,633 were skipped
(silent surveillance footage — 77+ hours of MCC/facility video with no audio stream).
Notable content: BOP Warden OIG interview, 3 MCC prison phone calls, 20+ Grand Jury
testimony recordings, Deepak Chopra voicemails.
persons_registry.json
Unified entity registry merging three sources: our pipeline extraction, la-rana-chicana
community research CSV, and the knowledge_graph.db entity table.
| Metric | Value |
| -------- | ------: |
| Total persons | 1,536 |
| With aliases | 203 |
| With descriptions | 237 |
| With 100+ document hits | 693 |
| With 10-99 document hits | 409 |
What's NOT in This Corpus
For transparency, here is what we do NOT have access to:
We only analyze publicly released material.
sessions (transcribed in transcripts.db) but not official transcripts.
derived from what appears in the public DOJ files, not from classified sources.
Many victim interviews, depositions, and statements referenced in the documents are
not included in the EFTA corpus.
Whether these represent withheld documents, unimaged evidence, or simply unused
numbers in the task force's tracking system is unknown.
Additional datasets may be released.
Verification
Anyone can independently verify any finding in this repository:
or the archive.org mirrors linked in each report
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%20{N}/EFTA{########}.pdf
fitz.open(path)[page].get_text()REDACTION_TEXT_LAYER_ANALYSIS
The EFTA-to-dataset mapping table is in the main [README](../README.md#efta-number-to-dataset-mapping).
Processing Pipeline
``
DOJ PDFs (194.5 GB, 1.38M files)
│
├─→ PyMuPDF text extraction ──→ full_text_corpus.db (6.08 GB)
│ └─→ FTS5 full-text search index
│
├─→ Redaction rectangle analysis ──→ redaction_analysis_v2.db (0.95 GB)
│ ├─→ Reconstructed pages (39,588)
│ └─→ Entity extraction (107,422 entities)
│
├─→ Media file pre-screening + GPU transcription ──→ transcripts.db
│
├─→ Person registry unification ──→ persons_registry.json (1,536 persons)
│
└─→ Byte-level forensic recovery of 5 zero-page PDFs
└─→ recovered_corrupted_pdfs/ (Apple Address Book, LSJ photo, etc.)
``
All processing was performed locally. No documents were uploaded to cloud services
or third-party APIs for analysis. Text extraction, OCR, transcription, and entity
extraction were all run on local hardware.