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US. No matter how we might explain our attack, with the joint exercises soon to
begin, it would come over as a deliberate attempt to implicate our most important
ally in a potential conflict with Iran, against the explicit wishes of President
Obama. I felt this even more strongly when, a few weeks later, I was contacted by
one of Bibi’s close political allies. He sounded me out on the possibility of
launching our strike against Iran after the joint exercise: barely two weeks before
the 2012 US election. Politically, he argued, Obama would then feel compelled to
support Israel’s action, or at the very least to refrain from criticizing it. In other
words, we would be setting a political trap for the President of the United States. I
couldn’t quite believe he was suggesting it. But my reply to this last-gasp
suggestion of a way for us to attack the Iranian sites required no hesitation, and
only two words: “No way.”
Bibi would have known I would oppose such a ploy. But as with so much else
in the years I spent in his government, I think it was the politics of the scheme,
more than the substance, that enticed him. Almost everything he did seemed
increasingly about creating a kind of grand narrative to secure his position on the
right, solidifying a base which he figured would sustain him in office. At its core,
the narrative presented a picture of vulnerability and victimhood: a kind of
“fortress Israel” threatened by terror, missiles on its northern and southern borders,
and now potential nuclear annihilation from Iran, while our main ally, the United
States, was under the sway of a President who neither understood nor
fundamentally supported us. In day-to-day policy terms, this allowed Bibi to insist
we couldn’t risk serious engagement with the Palestinians. On domestic issues as
well, like the widening gap between those at the top of our high-tech economy and
a painfully squeezed middle class, the sense of crisis he encouraged gave him
license to hunker down, warn of impending doom, and do virtually nothing.
Effective though the narrative was for him politically, it bore no resemblance to
reality. Yes, President Obama disagreed with us on issues of policy, both the peace
process and on how to deal with Iran. But he was unquestionably committed to
America’s alliance with Israel. I had dealt face-to-face with four US presidents:
both of the Bushes, President Clinton and now President Obama. In terms of Israeli
security, none had proved as consistently supportive and helpful as Obama. And
yes, Israel did face an array of security challenges. A nuclear-armed Iran would
undeniably make things worse. But far from being under existential threat, we
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