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including a kindergarten teacher, in Jerusalem. On the morning of May 24,
1992, a 15-year-old Israeli schoolgirl named Helena Rapp was on her way to
catch the bus to school south of Tel Aviv, when another Gazan stabbed her to
death. To the extent Israelis were looking for someone to blame, there were
obvious candidates. The army, the primary defense against the intifada, was
one. The police even more so, since many of the attacks were now taking place
inside Israel. And in ugly rioting after Helena Rapp’s murder, bands of Israelis
took to the streets, some of them yelling: “Death to the Arabs’. Still, most
people understood that criticizing the army or the police, or going on a rampage
against “the Arabs” — hundreds of thousands of whom were Israeli citizens and
had lived among us since the birth of the state — would not help. Most, in fact,
placed the blame, and lodged their hopes, with the government.
By the time of the next election, in June 1992, the combination of Palestinian
violence and the still-traumatic memories of Saddam’s Scuds, left Israelis
doubtful that Shamir could fulfil the most basic responsibility of government:
ensuring their day-to-day security. Labor had once again placed its electoral
fortunes in the hands of Yitzhak Rabin, following Peres’s several failed
attempts to lead the party back into power. Knowing that Rabin had a record of
military command unmatched in Israeli politics, Labor strategists did not so
much need to convince voters as to reinforce their fears and frustrations. One of
the campaign slogans, a direct appeal to the anger over the stabbing of Helena
Rapp, was “Get Gaza out of Tel Aviv!” Labor ended up gaining five Knesset
seats, and now had 44. The Likud lost eight and was left with only 32.
That meant that my last three years as chief of staff would be with Rabin
back as Prime Minister — and, like Ben-Gurion before him, as Defense Minister
as well. He and I had been in touch only occasionally since his departure from
the unity-coalition government two years earlier. But I had, of course, spoken
with him after my appointment as ramatkal, in which he’d played an important
part. Though he was 20 years older than me, our relationship had become
steadily closer over the years, especially when I’d worked with him as Defense
Minister. In some ways, we were alike. We’d both been forged by Labor
Zionism. We were career military officers, uncomfortable with flights of
political rhetoric and convinced that Israel’s security and its future depended
less on words than on action. In large groups especially, both of us tended to be
men of a few words. Over the next few years, we would become even closer,
speaking not only in the kirya or at Yitzhak’s office in Jerusalem, but also, with
Nava and Leah, around the dinner table at Rabin’s apartment in Tel Aviv.
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