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Division, advanced up the Bekaa, alongside the Syrian border, toward the town
of Yanta, across from Jobb Jannine.
But as it was making its way there, we got word a cease-fire had been
agreed. It was set for noon the next day, Friday, June 11. The main focus of our
advance shifted to a crossroads a few miles east of Jobb Janine. It was a flat,
open area surrounded by hills, codenamed the Tovlano Triangle on our maps.
We knew we would meet some Syrian resistance. On the way up the valley,
we'd seen signs of reinforcements from inside Syria. But we had overwhelming
superiority in tanks, artillery and infantry in the area, as well as full control of
the air. In our command post, about five miles back from our frontline forces,
Yanoush set in motion the plan for a pre-cease-fire advance to take the hills
overlooking the Tovlano Triangle. It was still about eight miles short of the
Beirut-Damascus road. But the idea was to establish a more secure defensive
position by the time the truce took effect, and to put us in position to advance
further if the cease-fire collapsed or was delayed.
Shortly before sunset, Yanoush left by helicopter for a field commanders’
meeting with Raful in northern Israel. That left me in charge, alongside
Yanoush’s de facto chief-of-staff, Amram Mitzna. A decorated veteran of 1967
and 1973 whom I knew well, Amram had the added distinction of being disliked
by Raful almost as much as I was. Our main reserve division had been ordered
to take control over the hills south of the Tovlano Triangle. One of its brigades,
led by a former Sayeret Matkal soldier named Nachman Rifkind, was sent to
take up a position immediately south of the triangle. Soon after nightfall,
Rifkind radioed in that he was there, and that the area seemed clear of enemy
forces. The divisional command post then ordered a second brigade to move
toward the hills dominating the crossroads.
The first sign of trouble came around midnight. From our overall command
post, we were listening in on all radio traffic, and heard the second brigade
report that it had come under fire while moving toward the crossroads. At first,
we assumed it must be from the remnants of a retreating Syrian unit. But
Rifkind, who had reported the area was clear, now said that he could see flashes
of shellfire two or three miles to his north. Only the following morning did it
become clear that he had not deployed immediately south of the triangle as
planned. He had mistakenly halted at a hill about two miles short of there.
By the time Yanoush returned to the command post a little after midnight,
we were facing another problem. The battalion nearest to the south of the
triangle had spotted a dozen large vehicles armed with missiles a few hundred
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