Legal memorandum argues Jeffrey Epstein cannot be prosecuted under federal sex‑trafficking statutes

KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP 18 U.S.C. § 1591, a sex trafficking statute, provides up to 40 years’ imprisonment for anyone (1) who recruits or obtains by any means a person in interstate commerce (ii) knowing that the person is under 18 and (iii) knowing that the person will be caused to engage in a commercial sex: act. The most heinous of crimes, described on the CEOS website, fall within this statute and include the buying and selling of children and the forced servitude of third-world immigrants brought to this country to be enslaved. Mr. Epstein’s behavior is nowhere near the heartland of this statute. This statute has also been previously reserved for prostitution rings involving violence, drugs and force. In stark contrast, there is no jurisdictional hook that brings Mr. Epstein’s conduct within the ambit of the statute, and securing a prosecution on these facts would require a court to set aside both reason and precedent to convict a local ‘John’ with a sex- slavery crime. It can not be said that Mr. Epstein engaged in trafficking and slavery nor did he knowingly recruit or obtain underage women with knowledge that they would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act. Thus, prosecuting him under this statute would expand the law far beyond its scope. To the extent there are cases where prosecutors think that Mr. Epstein should have known that certain women were underage, there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein “caused [them] to engage in a commercial sex act.” The term “cause” naturally implies the application of some sort of force, coercion, or undue pressure, but there is no evidence that Mr. Epstein’s interactions with the women were anything but consensual. Again, many of the women phoned Mr. Epstein’s assistant themselves in order to determine whether he wanted a massage. Nor can the cause requirement be proved simply by the fact that Mr. Epstein compensated the women. After all, the statute elsewhere requires that the women “engage in a commercial sex act,” which by definition means that they would have received something of value in exchange for sexual services. Interpreting the statute to authorize prosecution whenever a commercial sex act results from solicitation thus would render the term “caused” superfluous, and would make every ‘John’ who interacts with an underage prostitute guilty of a federal crime—even where the transaction is entirely local. Read in context, then, there is no doubt that the statute targets pimps and sex- traffickers who knowingly obtain underage girls and direct them to engage in prostitution. There is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Epstein (or his assistants) did any such thing, and he cannot be prosecuted under this statute. The Cuellar and Santos decisions also foreclose a prosecution under § 1591. Just as the federal money laundering statute did not come down to a proscription against transportation of criminal proceeds that are hidden, the sex trafficking of children statute cannot be boiled down and expanded to a federal proscription of commercial sexual activity with persons who turn out to be below the age of 18. 3. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 1] HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_012152