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ing from the bombing of Pan Am Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. The court
found it had subject matter jurisdiction
over defendant Libya, a designated state
sponsor of terror, pursuant to § 1605(a)(7)
of the FSIA. Rew, 995 F.Supp. at 329-30.
Noting that the FSIA provides for person-
al jurisdiction as long as subject matter
jurisdiction exists and proper service was
effected, the court turned to Libya’s con-
tacts with the United States. Jd. at 330
(citing Burger King, 471 US. at 472, 105
S.Ct. 2174). It found that Libya’s contacts
with the United States were sufficient be-
cause its allegedly “intentional, tortious ac-
tions [were] ... ‘expressly aimed at’ the
United States,” and included “destruction
of a United States flag aircraft ... while
en route to the United States ... with 189
United States nationals on board.” Jd.
(citing Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 104 S.Ct.
1482). The court concluded that its exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction was appropri-
ate since “[alny foreign state would know
that the United States has substantial in-
terests in protecting its flag carriers and
its nationals from terrorist activities and
should reasonably expect that if these in-
terests were harmed, it would be subject
to a variety of potential responses, includ-
ing civil actions in the United States.” Jd.
Similarly, in Dalibertt the court found it
had subject matter jurisdiction over defen-
dant Iraq, a designated state sponsor of
terror, in a case stemming from the al-
leged torture of several United States citi-
zens who were working in Kuwait. Dal-
bertt, 97 F.Supp.2d at 46. Iraq argued
that exercising personal jurisdiction over it
would offend constitutional due process
since the FSIA “abrogates the minimum
contacts requirement.” Jd. at 52. The
court disagreed and explained that “Con-
eress expressly addressed the minimum
contacts requirement in enacting the FSIA
by providing that ‘[plersonal jurisdiction
over a foreign state shall exist as to every
349 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT, 2d SERIES
claim for relief over which the district
courts have jurisdiction”” Jd. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 183000); Shapiro v. Republic of
Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1018, 1020 (2d Cir.1991)).
The court acknowledged that the foreign
state’s contacts with the United States
might be more attenuated in the context of
the state sponsor of terrorism exception
than in the FSIA’s other exceptions, but
concluded “in the context of this statute,
the purpose for which it was enacted, and
the nature of the activity toward which it
is directed, ... it is reasonable that for-
eign states be held accountable in the
courts of the United States for terrorist
actions perpetrated against U.S. citizens
anywhere.” Jd. at 54. Finally, it noted
that the “detention of these three plaintiffs
had a direct effect in the United States
and was consciously designed to affect
United States policy ... Iraq cannot now
claim surprise at the assertion of jurisdic-
tion by this Court.” Jd.
Most recently, in Pugh, representatives
of passengers killed in the bombing of a
French airliner in Africa survived a motion
to dismiss by the individual defendants.
The court found it had subject matter ju-
risdiction over seven Libyan officials, in-
cluding Muammar Qadhafi, pursuant to
the state sponsor of terrorism exception of
the FSIA outlined in § 1605(a)(7). Pugh,
290 F.Supp.2d at 58. In its personal juris-
diction analysis, the court concluded that
the individuals had sufficient contacts with
the United States to satisfy due process
since they had “conspired to sabotage” a
flight, which was scheduled to “stop in
several nations,” thus making it foresee-
able that “passengers of many nationalities
would be on board.” Jd. at 59. From
their actions, the defendants could have
expected to be haled into “the courts of
those nations whose citizens would die.”
Id. Given the number of passengers on the
plane, it was also foreseeable that Ameri-
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