Accountant acquitted of rape after victim allegedly destroyed hair evidence

4.2.12 WC: 191694 The accountant was prosecuted for rape. The case was essentially was essentially a “he said’”—she “suspected” contest, and there was some forensic evidence—the cocaine in her urine—to corroborate her suspicions. But the value of the forensic evidence depended entirely on whether she was telling truth about not having used cocaine prior to the alleged rape. If she had recently used cocaine, then the urine test would not establish that he had given her the drug, but would be equally consistent with her having ingested the drug on her own in the days or weeks prior to the sexual encounter. We came up with the idea of testing her hair for traces of cocaine residue. In my research and teaching, I had come across scientific information that established that the past use of cocaine could be determined by a test of the hair. Indeed, the location of the cocaine residue in the hair could even establish the approximate timeframe of the cocaine use, if the hair was long enough, since hair grows at a fairly consistent rate. She had long hair. Accordingly, we subpoenaed hair samples from the alleged victim. We learned that immediately upon receiving the subpoena, she rushed to the nearest barber shop—an establishment that cuts men’s hair—and had a very short haircut, leaving an insufficient amount of hair to be tested. We tried unsuccessfully to find the barbershop and collect her hair. But her efforts to destroy the evidence upon receiving the subpoena certainly suggested that she had not been truthful about her cocaine use. In the end, the jury, after hearing all of the evidence, concluded that there was a reasonable doubt about whether the accountant had placed cocaine in her drink, or whether she alone was responsible for her decision to drink alcohol and then engage in relatively consensual sex with her boss. The acquittal certainly did not signify approval of the accountant’s behavior. It was a correct application of the principle that proof of rape, like proof of every other serious crime, must be beyond a reasonable doubt, and that all doubts must be resolved even in favor of all defendants, regardless of what the jurors might think of their sexual morality. 252 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017339