Nonsensical philosophical essay with no actionable leads

Defining Intelligence 153 Great Pumpkin rises on Halloween if you like, but at some point you might notice that this doesn’t seem to take place. Beliefs, reality, and the rules of causation are interrelated but they are not the same thing. Causal knowledge should, however, enable one to alter erroneous beliefs that don’t stand up to what one knows about causation. So what would cause Jews to suddenly flock to Israel? Is she privy to information about another Holocaust or is this some fundamental- ist religious belief? She doesn’t say. The fact that she doesn’t say, is what makes her look either unintelligent or incapable of clear reason- ing. Being able to justify one’s beliefs by citing common knowledge or revealing knowledge known only to you involves relying on com- monly known rules about causation. What about prediction? You can believe that New York will beat Philadelphia in football. You can predict it based on evidence. You can explain the cause and effect that have made you come to this point of view. But, after New York loses, you need to modify some beliefs that you previously held. At the very least you have to acknowledge that your prediction was wrong and you might want take this into account the next time you make a prediction, by finding out what went wrong in your reasoning, if anything. Or, you simply can say your team wasn’t lucky, of course. Prediction relies on beliefs, and in many situations predictions are or are not verified immediately and new thinking can begin. But when one gets married, for example, one is predicting that the marriage will be good and will work out well for all parties. One might not realize for some years that this prediction was wrong. Then, when seeking a new marriage, the predictor hopes she has determined what went wrong by seeing what erroneous beliefs were held the last time. It is very good to be able to predict, but predictive ability is not seen as a Sign of intelligence. After all, people seek out fortune tellers because they think fortune tellers have a gift, not because they think fortune tellers are very bright. At the 2010 Olympics an octopus was apparently capable of making accurate predictions. No one claimed that it was an especially bright octopus. A prediction made by someone that is justified by, “I just feel it,” makes the predictor look foolish. In contrast, a prediction about rela- tivity, for example, that is complex to understand but has been ex- plained clearly and later is borne out by evidence makes the predictor HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023899