CIA mole Alexander Poteyev reveals Russian SVR infiltration of US intelligence agencies (2010)
Summary
The passage identifies a specific Russian intelligence officer (Col. Alexander Poteyev) who was allegedly a CIA asset and positioned to compromise multiple US agencies, including the NSA. While the ex Poteyev, a colonel in Russia's SVR, was recruited by the CIA in the 1990s while posted at the Russia He later became deputy chief of the SVR’s ‘American’ section, overseeing operations against the CI
This document is from the House Oversight Committee Releases.
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