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MEMORANDUM ——
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“ Pe™ wv THE WHITE HOUSE @
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EYES ONLY APR 29 1970
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FROM: Henry A. Kssinger gy F cumenREESENSTRICTON
ReeLy
8
SUBJECT: Trafficking in C¥mbodia
After reading a recent report alleging that 90% of the income of province
—chiefs in Southeastern Cambodia comes from supplying the enemy
through Sihanoukville, you asked whether or not it would be possible
through the discreet use of funds to prevail upon these province chiefs
to refrain from supplying the enemy. In response to your question,
Director Helms has provided the attached report which assesses the
extent of trafficking under Sihanouk, the impact of smuggling under the
| current Cambodian government, and the feasibility of financial induce-
i ments to province chiefs. With regard to Cambodian involvement in
| supplying the enemy in the past, Director Helms noted that:
! -- The major items provided to the enemy through Cambodian
i sources have been rice and arms.
-- In order to capitalize on a lucrative trade, to stop a loss of
revenues, and to ingratiate itself with the Communists,
Sihanouk's government agreed to sell rice to NVA/V GC forces.
Deliveries were of a magnitude sufficient to 1imit the smuggling
of foodstuffs in border areas to fairly small amounts.
= The flow of arms from Sihanoukville constituted an important
~~source of supply for Communist forces in southern South Vietnam
in the 1968-1969 period. Agreements to provide arms were
handled at high levels of the Cambodian government and, there-
fore, province officials had only minor roles.
In considering the impact of smuggling under the present Gambodian
government, the report indicates that:
~The surplus Tice produced in Gommunist-controlled areas of
Cambodia would probably be more than adequate to supply
| enemy needs. There is little evidence that the Cambodian
government, either national or local, could effectively stop
smuggling if the financial inducements were high enough.
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TOP SECRET (SENSITIVE /EYES ONLY 2
2 1a order to insure a reliable flow of arms, the enemy would have
to control all of Cambodia, However, some arrangements for
limited smuggling of arms could probably be worked out by the
‘enemy.
; In assessing the feasibility of using financial inducemants to persusde
province chiefs to refrain from smuggling activities, the report indi.
cates thats
~~ Province chiefs have little or no control over the riee-producing
areas that could satisfy enemy requirements.
-- Smuggled arms would not be under tha control of fhe provisce
chiefs and it is unlikely that they could mount effective policing
actions.
«=~ Without the ability to directly control province officials, the
net effect of any program to buy them off would probably be
that they would receive dual compensation from the U.S. and
the enemy.
In sum, Director Helms believes that attempts to curtail illicit traffic
through bribing province officials would probably be unsuccessful and,
in any case, would have oaly a nuinor impact on the enemy's capability
J to obtain foodstuffs and arms. 3
HAK:JTH:mlc (4-28-70)
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FER CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY p TS- [K-22
EYER WASHINGTON, b. C. 20505
A i s OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
22 April 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
SUBJECT : Arms Trafficking in Cambodia
i In response to your request, I have had my associates
i analyze the allegations and predictions outlined in your 15
April memorandum. Their views are set forth in the attached
memorandum, which also comments on the matter of attempting
to curtail illicit traffic through bribing provincial officials.
DA
Richard Helms
: Director
Attachment
. TSF 200241/a
oo Copy no. _J
T2 SE =
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I TOT ATE tne Ea
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Le 9 B33 cay 9
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Directorate of Intelligence
21 April 1970
Arms Trafficking in Cambodia
Introduction
This memorandum assesses the allegation that the
province chiefs in southeastern Cambodia derive (or
““have derived) about 90 pércent of their income from
passing arms and other supplies through Sihanoukville
© to VC/NVA forces and the prediction that province
officials will resume this activity once it becomes
clear that the Cambodian government cannot control
this traffic. The memorandum makes these assessments
by analyzing the nature of Cambodian involvement in
the resupply of enemy forces in South Vietnam and the
likelihood of a resumption of logistic support from
Cambodian sources. Finally, the prospects for
successfully using financial inducements to prevent
a resumption of these activities are examined.
I. Cambodian Involvement
: 1. Cambodia has been an important source of
logistical support for VC/NVA forces since 1966, A
variety of goods such as medical supplies, chemicals,
and communications equipment have always been procured
in Cambodia, either through open purchases in commercial
markets or by smuggling.
2. The smuggling of supplies across the Cambodian
border has been widespread over the years, and has
always been carried on with the connivance of local
officials. Although the amounts involved were not
large it was undoubtedly a highly lucrative trade. As :
75 200241
Copy 4
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TOD epanny (RENT { CET
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the enemy force in South Vietnam expanded, the supply
of the most important goods -- foodstuffs, arms and
ammunition -- entered more regularized channels.
3. The enemy's major uses of Cambodia as a source
of supplies have related to rice purchased under
agreements negotiated between the Cambodian government
and VC representatives and arms and ammunition delivered
by sea to Sihanoukville and ultimately transshipped to
VC/NVA forces.
Foodstuts
4. Prior to 1966 VC needs for Cambodian rice
were small and were satisfied by local smugglers along
the border provinces. As VC needs increased, however,
rice smuggling assumed larger and more profitable
dimensions. In order to cash in on this lucrative
trade, (very profitable in terms of hard currency
‘ earnings), to stop a loss of revenues, and to ingratiate
itself with the Communists, the Cambodian government
entered into agreements with the NLF for the sale of
rice to the Communists. In recent years the Cambodian
government has provided most of the Cambodian rice
bought by the Communists. The amounts involved are
generally reported to have been between 10,000-20,000
tons a year. These amounts were more than adequate to
meet the rice supply needs of the Communist forces
in the food-deficit areas along the Cambodian border.
Although some private smuggling was observed during
. 1966-1967, most of this had stopped by 1968. De-
liveries of this magnitude were certainly sufficient
to limit the smuggling of foodstuffs in border areas
to fairly small amounts. :
Arms and Ammunition
5. Cambodian complicity in the delivery of arms
and ammunition probably began some time in late 1966.
We have no way of quantifying the volume of these
deliveries in 1966 and 1967. There is adequate evidence,
however, to make it clear that the flow of arms from
Sihanoukville constituted an important source of -
supply for Communist forces in southern South Vietnam
in the 1968-1969 period.
2 LTT pg
2-000 :
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6. Information on institutional arrangements and
the personalities involved in the delivery of these
arms make it clear that they were handled at such
high levels of the Cambodian government that officials
at the province level played only a small role. There
is no doubt that the entire operation was supervised
by General Lon Nol acting under the authority of Chief
of State Sihanouk. In addition we know that the arms
movements were handled separately from normal military
aid imports by "special military teams" of the FARK
General Staff. The actual deliveries to VC/NVA forces
were made under the supervision of military officers
(most recently Lt. Col. Les Kossem) in the Office of
Special Missions within the Ministry of National Defense.
7. Given the authority of the personnel and
organizations involved in these arms deals, the oppor-
tunities for province officials to be cut in on arms
smuggling activities were perforce limited. In our
large volume of clandestine reporting on FARK'S Special
Aid Operation there are no firm indications that any
provincial governors or other local officials were
involved. The FARK officers escorting these shipments
carried authorization documents issued from the office
of the Minister of National Defense. There is no
evidence that additional documentation or bribes were
required to complete shipments to delivery points on
the eastern frontier. Thus the opportunities for
provincial or local officials during the past few years
would seem to have been limited to whatever small
amounts of arms could be diverted from the stocks held
by forces deployed in the border areas. We note,
for example, that during 1969 when Sihanouk ordered a
cessation of arms deliveries to VC/NVA forces that there :
was no reporting indicating an upsurge in arms smuggling.
II. Future Likelihood of Smuggling
8. We estimate that a complete denial of supplies
from Cambodian sources would not of itself render the
Communists incapable of carrying on the war. The
denial of supplies from Cambodia would hurt but the
Communists have already demonstrated that they can move -
supplies in the required volume through the Laos
Cal
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Panhandle. Alternatively, they could develop new
water routes to bring supplies in over Cambodian
beaches. In any event the probable need to engage in
large-scale smuggling would be limited.
Foodstuffs
9. Although the current situation in Cambodia is
subject to radical change, the Communists now control --
and, barring outside intervention will continue to
control -- enough Cambodian territory to satisfy their
food requirements without resort to smuggling. We
estimate that the Communists now control territory with
.a_projected production of almost. 80,000 tons of rice
in the 1969/70 crop year. (See Table) Some of this pro-
auction normally constitutes a surplus for distribution
~—elsewhere in the country and for export. We estimate,
for example, that the Communist-controlled areas of
Svay Rieng Province produce some 40,000 tons of rice
annually; the population in these controlled areas
has an annual rice requirement of only 10,000-20,000
tons. Thus, control of Svay Rieng province alone
would give the Communists a rice surplus almost double
‘the amounts procured from Cambodia under the official
: sales agreements.
10. Even if these estimates and the judgment that
the Communists can maintain control were grossly in
© error we estimate that a substantial volume of Cambodian
rice would find its way to Communist hands. In a
situation of scarcity the premium price that would be
given for rice would attract the venality of all con-
cerned -- local officials, merchants and peasants. In
. _addition there is little evidence to support a judgment
that the Cambodian government -- national or local --
could effectively stop smuggling if the financial
inducements are high enough.
Arms
.. 11. The procurement of arms from Cambodian Sources
would present considerably more difficulties than would
_the procurement of foodstuffs. The major arms reposi- -
tories are controlled by the liinistry of Defense and,
so far, are located outside areas controlled by the -
. a.
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" Communists. Moreover, unless an accommodation is worked *
out with the present regime a regularized and reliable
flow of supplies would require Communist control of all
of Cambodia. Lacking this control, the smuggling of
arms would be limited to whatever small amounts could
be diverted from the eastern border areas or to the
amounts that could be brought in over the beaches.
Nevertheless, the amounts to be smuggled would be small
amounting to a little over 5 tons a day.
12. The willingness of the local population to
participate in such a venture is less predictable.
For government officials the determinant factor would
probably be their assessment of the final resolution
of the current Cambodian-Communist dispute and their
Judgments of the risks of punishment or retaliation
from the VC or their Cambodian superiors. To those
outside the government the determinants would be their
assessment of the chances of detection or the likelihood
of successfully bribing the proper officials. On
balance, it would appear that basic traits of venality
and a facility for accommodating to any given situation
would mean that some arrangements for smuggling could
be worked out.
III. The Role of Financial Inducements
13. The prospects for successful use of financial
inducements to persuade province chiefs to refrain
from smuggling activities are limited. Direct access
to such officials is difficult to obtain and rarely
is there any assurance that an individual at this level
will not in turn respond positively to a counter offer
made by the VC/NVA. Alternatively, some pressure
probably could be applied to certain high-level officials
at the Lon Nol government who are in policy making
positions, but the offectiveness of such pressure would
probably be diminished by existing personal loyalties
and the government's traditional inability to control
corruption among its officials.
14. Assuming access to province officials, the
question of their willingness to engage in or refrain 5
from smuggling may be academic. Other than goods
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: No Objection to Decassication in Ful 3310362, LOCTAR 31} 2.21.8 Saal
Estimated Milled Rice Production in Cosmmdst Controlled Areas of Cambodis® w
Iattmted Commit :
Dh roution ebtsaen Commtet- Sototiot Peeil Profan tn Commit
1969/70 Controlled Provincial Ricelend | Controlled Areas, 1969/70
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: likely to be purchased in local markets, province
chiefs for, the most part would be out of the game. In
the present situation they have little or no control
over the rice producing areas that could satisfy enemy.
requirements. The arms to be smuggled would not be
under their control and it is unlikely that they would
have the forces required to mount effective policing
actions against smugglers. In short their role in
resumed smuggling activities would probably be as
peripheral as it was when supplies were obtained through
the cooperation of the highest officials of the Cambodian
government. Finally, it should be noted that without
the ability to exercise direct and full control of
province officials, the net effect of any program to buy
-- them off would probably be ‘that they would receive dual
compensation from the US and the VC.
; -6- :
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THY epanes CRITI
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