SAVA BLACK BOOK SUBMISSION

8x4 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDPBOR01720R000800060003-1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDPBOR01720R000800060003-1  ext ~ men - Approved For Relewé 2004/07/08 : TT 2x1 There have been no major changes In the situation on the ground in Laos or South Vietnam. In Cambodia, prospects for governmental improvement are encouraging, though talk has mot yet been reflected in actual action. Unless Lon Nol reverses ford (always a possibility) he does seem prepared to make the new four-man governing council (himself, Sirik Matak, In Tam, Cheng Heng) into a meaningful body which will rule Cambodia more effectively than it has been ruled under Lon Nol alone. Tames brother, Lon Non, still says he is leaving (after he helps his brother establish the council), but he is still physically present fn Bae. Pent. 4 One other item affecting Cambodia arose during the resk =~ a slightly confused quadille in connection with» sequest from the Vice President's office. One of the Vice Presidente sees aides, a Colonel Slack, called Dick Lehman directly to ask about {he extent of Vietnamese Communist involvement in the fighting tn i Cambodia. OCI provided a one-page answer which discisocd oepy the evidence concerning who is pulling the triggers of Creer.) guns in Cambodia. The answer, as you might oxpect, fo foes 1 Khmer Gommunists axe doing almost all of the actual shosting friendly forces. This ignores, however, the question of wh hor Hanol controls the Khmer Communists, and whether fhe Latta neeald continue fighting if Hanoi did not want them to. To correct the picture, we telephoned the Vice President's office and exgatusd (a) that Hanoi had a major degree of control over Khmer Communist actions, and (b) that the question of who controlled the trigger- fingers in Cambodia was just 2s important 25 the nationalities of the trigger fingers. 5. We also sent down to the Vice President's office a copy of gur recent memorandum to Dr. Kissinger entitled, "Hanoi ang iranoutc The Emerging Communist Game Plan in Cambodia." Thi memorandum Contains a comprehensive appraisal of Hanolrs present bates 1s Cambodia, and also a balanced discussion of the degree to which North Vietnam is calling the Communist shots fn Cambodie.. The vr President's aide, Colonel Slack, was very appreciative of our efforts. a Approved For Release 2004107; CIA-ROPBORO1720R000300060003-1 SEREI——  .. sem} 25X1 6. The Ellsberg trial is snarled in 2 procedural molehill out of which the defense, with some help from the judge, is trying to create a mountain. One of the RAND witnesses mentioned some carly OST investigative reports of whose existence the prosecution was unaware, and which cover no ground not well ploughed in other material given the defense long ago. The defense, however, is screaming "suppression of exculpatory material" and the judge is giving the prosecution a hard time. I flew to Los Angeles on Wednesday (25 April) expecting to testify Thursday or possibly Friday. The above described snarl blew up on Wednesday afternoon. Dave Nissen, the prosecutor - with whom I had a four-hour session -- now wants to use me as his final rebuttal witness (clean- up hitter). There is no telling when I will be called, possibly Monday (30 April), perhaps Tuesday (1 May) or -- if there are further snarls -- even later in the week. Rather than cool my heels in Los Angeles, I returned to Washington (on 26 April), preferring to stand by here rather than there. 25X1 GepFge AT Carver, Tr. i Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs ER Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDPBOR01720R000800060003-1 I eva