EFTA01764521

From: Office of Terje Rod-Larse Sent: Friday, October 26, 2012 10:00 PM Subject: October 24 update 24 October, 2012 Article 1. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/sta=ic_files/blank_quirks.html#a> Al-Monitor Who's the Bigger Friend of Israel — Do Voters Really=Care? Shibley Telhami Article 2. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/sta=ic_files/blank_quirks.html#b> NYT Who Threw Israel Under the Bus? Efraim Halevy Article 3. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/sta=ic_files/blank_quirks.html#c> The Washington Post A country united, for a change David Ignatius <http://www.washingtonpost.com/david-ignatius/2011=02/17/ABXXcal_page.html> Article 4. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/html/compose/sta=ic_files/blank_quirks.html#d> The American Conservative We Are Not All Westerners Now Leon Hadar EFTA_R1_00071873 EFTA01764521 Article 5. <https://mail.google.com/mail/u/O/html/compose/sta=ic_files/blank_quirks.html#e> The Washington Quarterly The Risks of Ignoring Strategic Insolvency<=b> Michael J. Mazarr Art=cle 1. Al-Monitor Who's the Bigg=r Friend of Israel — Do Voters Really Care? Shibley Telhami Oct 23, 2012 -- One =f the striking aspects of the third presidential debate <http://www.al- monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites/almoni=or/contents/articles/opinion/2012/al-monitor/obama-closer-to- bush-on-iran.=tml> was the frequent mention of Israel (34 times)= Western Europe and the challenges facing the European Union, or Mexico an= Latin America hardly registered. It is as if the Israel issue is a burnin= one in American politics, or that the American public is dying to see which candidate supports Israel more. =either is close to the truth. Even aside from the =act that Americans are not much focused on foreign policy in any case in d=termining their electoral choices, the Israel issue is often misunderstood= For years now, polls indicate that when Americans are asked if they want the United States to lean toward Isr=el, toward the Palestinians, or toward neither side, about two thirds cons=stently choose neither side. Roughly one quarter to one third want the US =o take sides, and among those, Israel is favored over the Palestinians by a strong ratio, ranging from 3-=o-1 to S-to-1. But something happened over the past decade in public attit=des toward Israel: America has become far more polarized than ever before.=nbsp; Historically, there =as little difference in the degree of support for Israel among Democrats, =ndependents, and Republicans. In recent polls, a huge difference emerged. =ccording to two polls I conducted with the Program for International Policy Attitudes in 2010 and 2011, more than=two thirds of Democrats and Independents wanted to the United States to ta=e neither side in the conflict, and among those who supported one side or =he other, the ratio of support for Israel over the Palestinians was about 2-to-1. Republicans had substan=ially different views: Nearly half wanted the United States to lean toward=lsrael and the ratio of support for Israel over the Palestinians was 4640=1. In other words, the Israel issue has become far more a Republican issue than a Democratic one, at the level=of constituency opinion. Obviously, given the demographic makeup of both m=jor parties, it is more about the Evangelical Rights than about Jewish Ame=icans. 2 EFTA_R1_00071874 EFTA01764522 Yet these demographi=s do not explain why both candidates would go out of their way to compete =n avowing support for Israel. In fact, two of the constituencies that were=a central target of the final presidential debate, Independents and women, were less likely to want the United States=to take sides. And it is obvious that Mitt Romney <http://www.al- monitor.com/cms/contribute/default/en/sites/almoni=oricontents/articleskpinion/2012/al-monitorimitt-romneys- obama-attacks-on=is.html> labored to bring up women's issues (at least in the Middle Easte=n contest, where it is "safe" politically) and projected himself=as a candidate for "peace," knowing that the general public — =specially Independents and women — feared being dragged into another costly war. Is there any risk of alienating them? No. An Israeli frien= with whom I spoke the morning after the debate said he felt "embarra=sed" and "uncomfortable" about the frequent mention of Isra=l in the debate, knowing that neither candidate truly ranked this issue as high in their priorities as they made it appear. I suspect t=at many Americans felt the same way, or felt at least puzzled. But here is=why it is not likely to make a difference for those who didn't like the fo=us on Israel: In the polling we have done in the past couple of years, those who want the US to take neith=r side rank the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict much lower in their pri=rities than those who want the US to take Israel's side. Those who don't r=nk the issue high in their priorities are less likely to vote based on the candidate's position on that issue. T=ey can be uncomfortable, but not uncomfortable enough to make a difference= In a close election =ampaign like this one, the focus is much narrower. Certainly, there is a f=ndraising aspect of American electoral politics, and supporters of Israel =end to be generous contributors in the American electoral process, which is an important element of the clout=of organizations like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), whose mission is to consolidate American support for Israel. But electoral=y it matters, too. Sure, majorities of Jewish Americans will vote Democrat=c no matter what, as the Israel issue is not the top (or even the second t=p) issue in their voting behavior. And the Evangelical Right will mostly vote Republican, no matter what Romn=y's position is on foreign policy. Still, both constituencies also need to=be energized. But, in the end, the principle focus of the campaigns =n the final two weeks on this issue is two swing states in which Jewish voters could affect a close election: =lorida and Ohio. One Republican advisor, Ari Fleischer has been quoted to =ay that with only 25% of Jewish votes going to Romney, Republicans would w=n Florida, and 30% support would mean winning Ohio and the election. That certainly sounds like an exaggera=ion. But no democratic strategist wants to test it out. All of this adds up =o a show that is particularly hard to take seriously for many voters, and =hich is puzzling to audiences around the world, especially in the Middle E=st. But most have come to expect that there is in the end little correlation between what is said in the heat of=political campaigns, and what presidents in fact do when elected. Shibley Telhami i= Anwar Sadat professor for Peace and Development at the University of Mary=and and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center of the Brookings In=titution. He is co-author of the forthcoming book, "The Peace Puzzle: America's Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989=2011" (Cornell University Press, December 2012). Article=2. NYT Who Threw Isra=l Under the Bus? Efraim Halevy=/p> 3 EFTA_R1_00071875 EFTA01764523 October 23, 2012 -- =N Monday, in their final debate, Mitt Romney denounced President Obama for=creating "tension" and "turmoil" with Israel and chided him for ha=ing "skipped Israel" during his travels in the Middle East. Throughout the campaign, Mr. Romney has repeatedly <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80794.html> accused <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/30/transc=ipt-mitt-romney-speech-at-rnc/> Mr. Obama of having "thrown allies like Israel under the bus.=94 But history tells a different story. Indeed, whenever the United States=has put serious, sustained pressure on Israel's leaders — from the 195=s on — it has come from Republican presidents, not Democratic ones. This was particularly true under Mr. Obama's predec=ssor, George W. Bush. Just one week before the Iraq war began in March Mr. Bush was still struggling to form a broad international coalition to=oust Saddam Hussein. Unlike in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, Russia, a permanent member of the United Nations Se=urity Council, decided to opt out, meaning that the United Nations could n=t provide formal legitimacy for a war against Mr. Hussein. Britain was alm=st alone in aligning itself with America, and Prime Minister Tony Blair's support was deemed crucial in W=shington. Just as the British Parliament was about to approve the joint ve=ture, a group of Mr. Blair's Labour Party colleagues threatened to revol=, demanding Israeli concessions to the Palestinians in exchange for their support for the Iraq invasion. This=demand could have scuttled the war effort, and there was only one way that=British support could be maintained: Mr. Bush would have to dedare that t=e "road map" for Middle East peace, a proposal drafted early in his administration, was the formal policy of t=e United States. Israel's prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon, had =een vehemently opposed to the road map, which contained several "red lin=s" that he refused to accept, including a stipulation <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/01/w=rld/mideast-peace-proposal-proposal-for-final-comprehensive- settlement-mid=le-east.htmPpagewanted=all&src=pm> that the future status of Jerusalem would be determined b= "a negotiated resolution" taking into account "the political and re=igious concerns of both sides." This wording implied a possible end to l=rael's sovereignty over all of Jerusalem, which has been under Israeli control since 1967. On March 13, 2003, senior=lsraeli officials were summarily informed that the United States would pub=icly adopt the draft road map as its policy. Washington made it dear to u= that on the eve of a war, Israel was expected to refrain from criticizing the American policy and also to e=sure that its sympathizers got the message. The United States insisted tha= the road map be approved without any changes, saying Israel's concerns =ould be addressed later <http://artides.cnn.com/2003-=5- 25/world/israellcabinet_l_palestinian-state-mideast-quartet-road-map?_s=3DPM:WORLD> . At a long and tense cabinet debate I attended in May 2=03, Mr. Sharon reluctantly asked his ministers to accept Washington's de=and. Benjamin Netanyahu, then the finance minister, disagreed, and he abst=ined during the vote on the cabinet resolution, which eventually passed. From that point on, the road map, inc=uding the language on Jerusalem, became the policy bible for America, Russ=a, the European Union and the United Nations. Not only was Israel strong-a=med by a Republican president, but it was also compelled to simply acquiesce and swallow the bitterest of=pills. Three years later, the Bush administration again pressured Israel i=to supporting a policy that ran counter to its interests. In early 2006, t=e terrorist group Hamas ran candidates in the Palestinian legislative elections. Israel had been adamant that no =eader could campaign with a gun in his belt; the Palestinian party Fatah o=posed Hamas's participation, too. But the White House would have none of=this; it pushed Fatah to allow Hamas candidates to run, and pressured Israel into allowing voting for Hamas —=even in parts of East Jerusalem. After Hamas won a dear majority, Washing=on sought to train Fatah forces to crush it militarily in the Gaza Strip. =ut Hamas pre-empted this scheme by taking control of Gaza in 2007, and the Palestinians have been ideological=y and territorially divided ever since. Despite the Republic=n Party's shrill campaign rhetoric on Israel, no Democratic president ha= ever strong-armed Israel on any key national security issue. In the 1956 =uez Crisis, it was a Republican, Dwight D. Eisenhower, who joined the Soviet Union in forcing Israel's founding =ather, David Ben-Gurion, to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula after a join= Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt. In 1991, when Iraqi =cud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv, the administration of the first Pres-dent Bush urged Israel not to strike back so as to preserve the coalition =f Arab states fighting Iraq. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir resisted his security chiefs' recommendation to =etaliate and bowed to American demands as his citizens reached for their g=s masks. After the war, Mr. Shamir agreed to go to Madrid for a Middle Eas= peace conference set up by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Fearful that Mr. Shamir would be intransigent=at the negotiating table, the White House pressured him by withholding $10 billion <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/07=world/israel-ignoring-bush-presses- for-loan-guarantees.html> in loan guarantees to Israel, causing us seriou= economic problems. The eventual result was 4 EFTA_R1_00071876 EFTA01764524 Mr. Shamir's political downf=ll. The man who had saved Mr. Bush's grand coalition against Saddam Huss=in in 1991 was "thrown under the bus." In all of these inst=nces, a Republican White House acted in a cold and determined manner, with=no regard for Israel's national pride, strategic interests or sensitivit=es. That's food for thought in October 2012. Efraim Halevy was=the director of the Mossad from 1998 to 2002 and the national security adv=ser to the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, from October 2002 to June=2003. Article=3. The Washington Post<=span> A country unit=d, for a change David Ignatius <http://ww=.washingtonpost.com/david-ignatius/2011/02/17/ABXXcial_page.html> October 23, 2012 -- =here are moments when you can glimpse an emerging bipartisan consensus on =oreign policy, and Monday night's presidential debate <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-third-debate-the-candi=ates-find- much-to-agree-upon/2012/10/22/e249a1d6.1c65.11e2-ba31.3083ca97c3=4_story.html> was one of them: Barack Obama and =itt Romney knew they were speaking to a war-weary country and talked in ne=rly identical terms about bringing troops home, avoiding new conflicts —=and countering terrorism without embracing a "global war." Obama has articulate= versions of this foreign-policy approach for the past four years, not alw=ys with clarity or evident public support. But it was obvious Monday night=that we are living in a changed world — where the combative ethos of George W. Bush is truly gone — when Rom=ey said in his first debate answer: "We can't kill our way out of this=mess." This rejection of wh=t was described just a few years ago as the "long war" is something I =ear from four-star generals and soldiers in the field, and it's increasi=gly evident in the public-opinion polls. Monday's debate ratified that America in 2012 wants to settle the confli=ts it has and avoid new ones. Even if Obama should=lose on Nov. 6, this emerging consensus might well be his legacy. Just as =ush saw the country through the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001, and=took America into two long and painful wars in the Muslim world, Obama voiced a public desire to "turn a page,=94 as he likes to say, and end the decade of war — at least the open, =93boots on the ground" part. Obama's alternativ= to traditional military conflict has been drone attacks <http://www.washingtonpost.cominationalinational-security/under-o=ama-an-emerging-global-apparatus-for-drone- killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_s=ory.html> , and Romney endorsed <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/elect=on-2012/wp/2012/10/22/romney-endorses-obama-on-dronesk this approach of targeted killing, too. That's anothe= part of the new American consensus, and it deserves more public discussio=. Romney's answers h=d the soft polish that comes from focus groups and poll testing. He backed=Obama's sanctions strategy toward Iran and said he favored military acti=n only as a last resort; he declared Obama's troop surge in 5 EFTA_R1_00071877 EFTA01764525 Afghanistan a success and promised not to remain there past=2014, even if Afghanistan is fracturing; he rejected military intervention=in Syria, including a no-fly zone. "We don't want a=other Iraq, we don't want another Afghanistan," insisted Romney. He sa=d he wanted to "help the Muslim world," through economic development, =ducation, gender equality and the rule of law. Undoubtedly, he was chasing the women's vote in these pacific answers, b=t the very fact that Romney is something of a weather vane — a man who t=ims his positions to political need — reinforces my sense of the public =ood. With Romney so deter=ined to play the peacemaker, it fell to Obama to voice what might have bee= Romney's best lines: Obama was the first to express passionate support =or Israel, "a true friend." He spoke of America as the "indispensable nation." And he had the relentlessly =ugnacious, in-your-face presence of a man who wanted to be seen as in comm=nd. What does polling te=l us about the public mood the two candidates were channeling Monday night= A good summary was compiled by Michael J. Mazarr, a professor at the Nati=nal Defense University, in a recent article in The Washington Quarterly <https://csis.org/publicationnwq-risks-ignoring-strategic-insolv=ncy-fall-2012> . He noted a Pew Research C=nter poll that found the percentage of Americans who think the country sho=ld "mind its own business internationally" had jumped from 30 percent =n 2002 to 49 percent in 2009. America's wariness=of global conflict is obvious in other recent Pew Research polling. A September sample <http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/24/for-voters-its-still-the-=conomyh found that the percentage of Americans who list terror=sm as "very important" to their vote has fallen 12 points since 2008. =n September interviews <http://www.people-press.org/2012/09/17/middle-east-turmoil-close=y-followed-romneys-comments-viewed- negativelyk just after the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Ben=hazi, 45 percent of the public approved Obama's handling of the situatio=, vs. just 26 percent who endorsed Romney's approach. In an October poll <http://www.people- press.org/2012/10/18/on-eve-of-foreign-debate-=rowing-pessimism-about-arab-spring-aftermathh , 63 percent of those surveyed wanted to see the United Sta=es "less involved" in the Middle East. I wish I'd heard m=re clarity from the candidates about how the United States will shape an l=lamic world in turmoil, remove Bashar al-Assad from power in Syria and kee= Afghanistan from a civil war — all without using U.S. troops. That's the real debate this war-weary country needs =97 about alternative ways to project American power in a highly unstable e=a of transition. But Monday's basic=message was clear: The country may be divided on many issues, but it's u=ited in not wanting another war. Article=4. The American Conserv=tive We Are Not AII=Westerners Now Leon Hadar <1=> 6 EFTA_R1_00071878 EFTA01764526 October 18, 2012 =n Blind Oracles, his study of the role of intellectuals in formulating and=implementing U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War, historian Bruce Kukl=ck equated these scholars with the "primitive shaman" who performs "feats of ventriloquy." We tend to celebrate=foreign-policy intellectuals as thinkers who try to transform grand ideas =nto actual policies. In reality, their function has usually been to offer =embers of the foreign-policy establishment rationalizations—in the form of "grand strategies" and "doctrines,=94 or the occasional magazine article or op-ed—for doing what they were =oing to do anyway. Not unlike marketing experts, successful foreign-policy=intellectuals are quick to detect a new trend, attach a sexy label to it ("Red Menace," "Islamofascism"), and pro=ose to their clients a brand strategy that answers to the perceived need (=93containment," "détente," "counterinsurgency"). In No One's World,=foreign-policy intellectual Charles Kupchan—a professor of international=affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Forei=n Relations—tackles the trend commonly referred to as "American decline" or "declinism," against the back=rop of the Iraq War, the financial crisis, and the economic rise of China.=While I share Kuklick's skepticism about the near zero influence that in=ellectuals have on creating foreign policy, I've enjoyed reading what thinkers like Charles Kupchan have to say, and=l believe that if we don't take them too seriously (this rule applies al=o to what yours truly has written about these topics), they can help us pu= key questions in context. Such as: is the U.S. losing global military and economic dominance and heading towa=ds decline as other powers are taking over? The good news is tha= Kupchan's book is just the right size—around 200 pages—with not too=many endnotes and a short but valuable bibliography. Kupchan is readable w=thout being too glib. He is clearly an "insider" (he is a former National Security Council staffer) but exhibits a healthy =evel of detachment. And Kupchan displays a commendable willingness to adju=t his grand vision to changing realities. In a book published ten years ag=, The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century, Kupch=n advanced the thesis that an integrating European Union was rising as a c=unterweight to the United States, with China secondary to the EU. That was=his view then. The thesis has since been overtaken—let's say, crushed to death—by the crisis in the euro=one and the failure of the EU to develop a unified, coherent foreign polic=. But unlike neocons who spend much of their time trying to explain why, d=spite all the evidence to the contrary, they have always been right, Kupchan doesn't even revisit his now defunc= thesis. While this suggests that we should treat his current book and its=claims that the global balance of power is shifting from the United States=and the "West" and towards the "Rest"—non-Western nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey—with many grains of salt, =e should nevertheless give Kupchan credit for pursuing a non-dogmatic, pra=matic, and empiricist approach to international relations. Kupchan may onc= have worked on implementing the liberal-internationalist agenda of the Clinton administration, but the vie=s advanced in his latest book—in particular his pessimism about America=92s ability to "manage" the international system and his emphasis on t=e role that history and culture play in relationships between nation-states—place him in the intellectual camp o= realist foreign-policy intellectuals like George Kennan and Henry Kissing=r, at a time when not many of them are around in Washington. Kupchan=92s thesis that America and its Western allies are losing their global military, financial, and economic power, an= that the rising non-Western powers are not going to adopt Washington's =trategic agenda, may not sound too revolutionary these days, when even the=most non-contrarian strategists and economists working for the Pentagon and Wall Street recognize that the dom=nance of the West is on the wane. But in a chapter tit=ed "The Next Turn: The Rise of the Rest," Kupchan provides the reader =ith the "hard cold facts" as he skims through forecasts made by govern=ent agencies and financial institutions predicting that China's economy will pass America's within the current decade. An= while America is still overwhelmingly the greatest military power on the =Janet, it is only a question of time, according to Kupchan, before China o=ertakes the United States in this arena as well and contests America's strategic position in East Asia. "The C=inese ship of state will not dock at the Western harbor, obediently taking=the berth assigned to it," he concludes. What lends Kupchan=92s overall theme a certain conservative and Kennan-like quality is the ch=llenge he poses to the reigning ideological axiom shared by U.S. and Weste=n elites since the end of the Cold War: the notion that the core ideas of the modern West—enlightenment, secular=sm, democracy, capitalism—will continue to spread to the rest of the wor=d, including to China and the Middle East, and the Western order as it has=evolved since 1945 will thus outlast 7 EFTA_R1_00071879 EFTA01764527 the West's own primacy. Even the most doctrinaire neocon ass=mes that American and Western hegemony must come to an end at some point. =ut that won't matter since the Rest will end up being just like us—hol=ing free elections, embracing the free markets, committed to a liberal form of nationalism and to the separation of religi=n of state. Such values and practices will guarantee that rising states li=e China and India bind themselves to a liberal international order based o= functioning multilateral institutions, free international trade, and collective security. Kupchan doe=n't buy this vision. The "Western Way" is not being universalized, h= argues, and the international system looks more and more like a mosaic of=nations, each following its own path towards modernization, a path determined by unique historical circumstances and cultural traditio=s that may not result in anything like our own liberal and democratic prin=iples. Hence, China can embrace a form of "communal autocrac=," Russia chooses a system of "paternal autocracy," while the Arab world follows the route of "religious and tribal autocrac=." Iran remains a theocracy, and other non-liberal political orders may =lourish in parts of Latin America and Africa. In a way, Kupchan is=doing here what foreign-policy intellectuals do best, inventing catchy lab=ls to describe existing trends in China, Russia, and the Arab world that a=e familiar to anyone who follows current events. Kupchan argues, however, that these trends are quite enduring and =hat the United States and Europe should deal with this reality instead of =ursuing policies based on wishful thinking—expecting, for example, that =he Islamists ruling Egypt and the communist-fascists in Beijing will eventually be replaced by a bunch of li=eral democrats. It ain't going to happen, Kupchan predicts. Free electio=s can in fact lead to the victory of anti-Western and anti-American leader=, while capitalism is just a system that allows governments to harness wealth for aggressive nationalist polic=es. As many conservative= would point out, the notion that we are all taking part in an inexorable =arch towards enlightenment, prosperity, and liberty that culminates in the=embrace of liberal democracy, representative government, and free markets here, there, and everywhere is only one versi=n of history, described sometimes as "Whig history." What is bas=cally the story of the emergence of constitutional democracy in Britain an= America has been applied broadly to describe the political and economic development of Europe and West in general from =round 150O to 1800—and to explain why the West prospered and rose to glo=al prominence while other parts of the world, like the Ottoman Empire and =hina, stagnated and declined. Kupchan himself subs=ribes to a Whiggish narrative, in which decentralized feudal power structu=es and the rise of an enlightened middle class that challenged the monarch=, aristocracy, and the church led to Europe developing modern liberal states and capitalism, while the Reformat=on exposed religion to rational inquiry and unleashed bloodshed that ultim=tely caused European societies to accept religious diversity. The growing =osts of the modern state forced monarchs to share power with ever larger classes of citizens, while the ri=ing middle class provided the economic and intellectual foundations for th= Industrial Revolution, which in turn improved education and science and e=tablished the military power that allowed the West to achieve superiority over the more rigid hierarchical o=ders of the Ottoman Empire, India, China, and elsewhere. Francis Fukuyama in =he Origins of Political Order has argued that this Whig version of history=may help explain how Britain and America developed. But in other parts of =urope, such political and economic changes as the rise of the modern state and notions of citizenship and pol=tical accountability were driven in large part by the villains of the Whig=narrative, including monarchy and the Catholic Church. There have always be=n different paths towards political and economic modernity, not only in co=temporary China, India, Iran, and Brazil, but also in Europe and the West =etween 1500 and 1800—and later, with the rise of communism and fascism. Russia is an example of a nation whose =oad towards economic growth has been very different from that taken by the=Anglo-Americans, or for that matter, the Germans, the French, or the Chine=e. IljKupchan cou=d have provided us with a more simplified set of arguments to support his =hesis—that China and Iran are not "like us"—by recognizing that th= political and economic transformation of different European states was not based on a standard model of development. We there=ore shouldn't be surprised that Egypt and Brazil are also choosing their=own non-Whig paths of change and growth. 8 EFTA_R1_00071880 EFTA01764528 Contrary to Kupachan=92s narrative, as the historian John Darwin argues in his masterpiece Afte= Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire, Europe's rise to pre-eminence =as not a moment in the long-term ascent of the "West" and the triumph of its superior values. "We must set E=rope's age of expansion firmly in its Eurasian context," Darwin writes= and recognize that there was nothing foreordained about Europe's rise=97or its current decline. Great powers like the Ottomans, the Safavids, the Mughals, the Manchus, the Russians and the Sov=ets, the Japanese and the Nazis have risen and fallen for reasons all thei= own. Today the Rest may be rising. But it has never been anyone's world= Leon Hadar, a Was=ington-based journalist and foreign policy analyst, is the author of Sandstorm: Policy Failure in=the Middle East <https://www.amazon.com/dp/1403967245/ref=asii_ss_t=l?tag=theamericonse- 20&camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as4&=mp;creativeASIN=1403967245&adid=1W8JHBSC3DX7S6AB31W1&> .<=p> Article=5. The Wa=hington Quarterly The Risks of l=noring Strategic Insolvency Michael J. Mazarr FALL 2012 -- A momen= has arrived when a great power with global responsibilities is having a c=isis of confidence. Its economy has grown sluggish and it is being overtak=n by a number of rising competitors. Financial pressures loom, notably the ability to keep a balance between go=ernment revenues and expenses. It is losing long-standing superiorities ps=chological as well as technological and numerical in key categories of mil=tary power; this great power, whose diplomats and military leaders manage active or potential conflicts from A=ghanistan to Europe with treaty alliances as far flung as Japan and Austra=ia, confronts the need for constraints on its global ambitions and posture= This urgent reckoning has been prompted in part by a painful and largely unnecessary counterinsurgency wa= far from home that cost many times more than initially thought and exhaus=ed the country's overstretched land forces. The moment in questi=n is the period 1890-1905, and the power is Great Britain. In one sense, L=ndon was riding the crest of her imperial power: As brilliantly narrated b= Robert K. Massie, the Diamond Jubilee of 1897 broadcast the image of an empire at its apogee.1 Yet even as Brita=n paraded its navy before the world, many of its leaders were suffering th=ough a two-decade surge of pessimism about the prospects for their global =ole. They saw their economic prospects dimming, their finances unsupportive of endless foreign commitments, and t=eir naval as well as land power strained by global commitments that presse= against the burgeoning power of a half-dozen regional challengers. As Pri=ceton scholar Aaron Friedberg has put it, "The nation appeared to have its neck in a gradually tightening n=ose from which no easy escape was possible"; without a national crisis to=justify new taxes "there seemed no way of avoiding eventual insolvency."= 9 EFTA_R1_00071881 EFTA01764529 Despite this awarene=s, that insolvency was destined to hit home during a number of key moments=from the Boer War to post-war colonial crises to Suez. Britain suffered th=s fate in part because successive governments in London, although scaling back military and diplomatic commitments in a =ashion that many commentators have found to be a masterful example of step=ing back from global primacy,3 still could not bring themselves to make a =lean break with a deeply-ingrained strategic posture and fashion a more sustainable global role. Great Britai= remained continually overextended, and suffered the drawn-out consequence=. Throughout history, =ajor powers have confronted painful inflection points when their resources= their national will, or the global geopolitical context no longer sustain=d their strategic postures. The very definition of grand strategy is holding ends and means in balance to promo=e the security and interests of the state.4 Yet, the post-war U.S. approac= to strategy is rapidly becoming insolvent and unsustainable not only beca=se Washington can no longer afford it but also, crucially, because it presumes an American relationship with =riends, allies, and rivals that is the hallmark of a bygone era. If Washin=ton continues to cling to its existing role on the premise that the intern=tional order depends upon it, the result will be increasing resistance, economic ruin, and strategic failure= The alleged insolven=y of American strategy has been exhaustively chronicled and debated since =he 1990s. The argument here is that twenty years of warnings will finally =ome true over the next five to ten years, unless we adjust much more fundamentally than administrations of ei=her party have been willing to do so far. The forces undercutting the U.S.=strategic posture are reaching critical mass. This is not an argument abou= "decline" as such; the point here is merely that specific, structural trends in U.S. domestic governanc= and international politics are rendering a particular approach to grand s=rategy insolvent. Only by acknowledging the costs of pursuing yesterday's =trategy, under today's constraints, will it be possible to avoid a sort of halfway adjustment billed as true r=form, forfeiting the opportunity for genuine strategic reassessment. That =pportunity still exists today, but it is fading. Enduring Assumpti=ns The consensus of con=entional wisdom today holds several specific tenets of U.S. national secur=ty strategy dear. It is important to grasp the paradigm because existing t=ends are making a very specific U.S. national security posture infeasible. The primary elements include:=/p> .8tnbs=; America's global role was central to=constructing the post-war order and remains essential to its stability tod=y; -8mbs=; American military power, including t=e ability to project power into any major regional contingency, is predomi=ant and should remain so for as long as possible, both to reassure allies =nd to dissuade rivals; .81nbs=; The stability of many regions has be=ome dependent on a substantial U.S. regional presence of bases, forward-de=loyed combat forces, and active diplomatic engagement; .81nbs=; That stability is also inextricably =inked to the security and well-being of the U.S. homeland; •&nbs=; The United States must commit to the=force structures, technologies, nonmilitary capacities, and geopolitical v=ice required to sustain these concepts. This conventional wisdom is the co=e of the current administration's major U.S. strategy docume=ts the 2010 National Security Strategy and 2011 National Military Strategy=which envision continued U.S. predominance and global power projection. In=fact, it has been central to all post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy doctrines. It was Bill Clinton's Secretary of Stat= who called America "the indispensable nation,"5 Clinton who decided to =xpand NATO to Russia's doorstep and Clinton who inaugurated the post-Cold =ar frenzy of humanitarian intervention.6 The George W. Bush administration embraced a strategy of primacy and dissu=ding global competition. As Barry Posen has remarked, the debate in post-C=ld War U.S. grand strategy has been over what form of hegemony to seek, no= whether to seek it.7 A variety of powerful trends now suggest that the existing paradigm is becoming 10 EFTA_R1_00071882 EFTA01764530 unsu=tainable in both military and diplomatic terms, and that the United States=will inevitably have to divert from its current posture to a new, more sus=ainable role. Engines of a Para=igm Shift To be clear, a signi=icant U.S. leadership role in world politics remains important and viable.=But the current paradigm suffers from cracks in a number of key foundation=l areas. This essay briefly summarizes five: disappearing finances;rising alternative power centers; declining U.=. military predominance; a lack of efficacy of key non-military instrument= of power; and reduced domestic patience for global adventures. These thre=ts to U.S. strategic solvency have existed for decades but they are accelerating, and maturing, in new and de=isive ways. The first threat is =udgetary. Debt is set to rise significantly over the next decade, in some =cenarios approaching 100 percent of GDP shortly after 2020, along with int=rest payments by one estimate, rising from $146 billion in 2010 to over $800 billion in 2020.8 This has already =aised fears of downgraded U.S. credit ratings and threats to the dollar as=a reserve currency. The corresponding social austerity and financial press=res at all levels of government, as well as a public hostility to taxes, mean that spending cuts will bear =he burden of deficit reduction.9 In recognition of this, several bipartisa= budget proposals include major defense cuts. Groups pushing for serious d=ficit control have aimed for $800 billion to over $1 trillion in ten-year defense reductions, and even those=may be just a down payment on a larger bill to follow. Further, the defens= budget faces its own internal budget issues: for example, Tricare, the mi=itary's health program, costs the Department of Defense triple the amount of just a decade ago, and the annu=l costs of the military pension program may balloon from just over $52 bil=ion in 2011 to as much as $117 billion by 2035.10 This is putting further =ressure on those components of the defense budget essential to global strategy and power projection. A second trend is th= rise of alternative centers of power: states and influential non-state ac=ors are clamoring to set the global affairs agenda and determine key outco=es.11 A fundamental reality of the last two or more decades has been an emerging reaction against U.S. primac= many others desire that U.S. influence decline and contrary centers of po=er strengthen.12 This trend is now accelerating, and the coming decade see=s certain to represent the full emergence of an international system of more assertive powers who are less=interested in dominant U.S. leadership. More and more nations, from Brazil=to Turkey to India, while far from "anti-American" in their foreign poli=y or hostile to American leadership per se, have become disaffected with the idea of a U.S.-centric world orde=, and are determined to squeeze out U.S. influence on certain issues to cl=im greater influence for themselves. Related to this is a set of geopoliti=al trends reducing the perceived salience of American power: The end of the Cold War reduced the perceived =rgency for U.S. protection; the Arab Spring and other developments have br=ught to power governments uninterested in U.S. sponsorship; and the reacti=n to globalization, including reaffirmations of ethnic, religious, and national identity, has in some places spilled ov=r into a resentment of American social and cultural hegemony. A third trend is dec=ining U.S. military predominance and a fast-approaching moment when the Un=ted States will be unable to project power into key regions of the world. =he reasons are partly technological rising actors have burgeoning capabilities in anti-ship missiles, drones, =r other "area denial" structures.13 Moreover, actors have also found oth=r ways to counter American power: major states like China or Russia now po=sess the ability through financial, space, or energy means to threaten massive global consequences in response=to unwanted U.S. force. This includes cyber mayhem: as one recent survey c=ncluded, cyber weapons "allow, for the first time in history, small state= with minimal defense budgets to inflict serious harm on a vastly stronger foe at extreme ranges," a new f=rm of vulnerability that would "greatly constrain America's use of force =broad."14 An important new RAND report by Paul Davis and Peter Wilson war=s of an "impending crisis in defense planning" arising "from technology diffusion that is leveling aspects of=the playing field militarily, geostrategic changes, and the range of poten=ial adversaries."15 These challenges are exacerbated by a crisis of defen=e procurement; America's leading-edge military systems are becoming less affordable and reliable. Aircraft carri=rs, for example, have become prohibitively expensive, with costs set to br=ak through congressionally-imposed limits next year.16 The systems that un=ergird U.S. military primacy are being whittled down to a small handful that no president will readily risk=in anything but the most essential of crises. A fourth threat to U.S. glob=l strategy is that America's non-military tools of influence have proven i=capable of achieving key U.S. goals in the areas nominated as the leading security challenges of the future tr=nsnational, sub-state threats, and the risks 11 EFTA_R1_00071883 EFTA01764531 emanating from fragile states= While states have well-established theories for pursuing traditional poli=ical-military ends with diplomacy and force, the United States possesses no proven models for achieving prog=ess in the social, psychological, and environmental costs of an integratin= globe areas such as regional instability, terrorism, the complexities of =evelopment, radicalism, aggressive nationalism, organized crime, resource shortages, and ecological degradati=n.17 For half a century, the United States was a dominant global power whi=h identified challenging core goals and tasks deterring military adventuri=m, building political-military alliances, erecting mutually-beneficial institutions of trade but to which=Washington could apply established models and techniques. U.S. leadership =nd power becomes much more problematic in a world of complex problems whic= generate no broad agreement and which subject themselves to no clear solutions. Fifth and finally, e=en as America's power projection instruments have become less usable and e=fective, the American people have grown less willing to use them. A 2009 p=ll by the Pew Research Center found that 49 percent of those surveyed, an all-time record, said that the Unite= States should "mind its own business internationally and let other count=ies get along the best they can on their own." That number jumped from 30=percent in 2002.18 Those who favor a powerful American leadership role in the world have also declined in Gal=up polling. For example, the percentage fell from 75 in 2009 to 66 in mid-=011, while the percentage advocating a far more minimal U.S. role grew fro= 23 percent to 32 percent.19 Over 40 percent of Americans now say the country spends too much on defense, co=pared with less than a quarter who say it spends too little.20 Many Americ=ns want their nation to remain a global leader,21 but the public is less e=amored with the massive expenditures and national efforts necessary to sustain the existing paradigm. The Risks of Stra=egic Bankruptcy The default response=to looming failures in strategic posture has so far been, and will likely =ontinue to be, to chip away at its edges and avoid exhausting fundamental =eform. Some would argue that persistence, or incremental change, is the best course: avoiding the risks to U.S. cred=bility, to the international system, to the domestic political health of w=atever administration waded into it of recalibrating U.S. power in the for= of cascading loss of faith in American credibility.22 This is a mistake; in fact, refusing to come to to=ms with U.S. strategic insolvency will damage U.S. credibility and global =tability to a far greater degree. A well-managed readjustment will better =void the pitfalls of strategic insolvency.23 Persisting without reform substantially increases the risk o= a number of specific strategic perils. Global strategies an= specific military plans lose credibility. As the leading power is overtak=n by others, if it refuses to prioritize and attempts instead to uphold al= its commitments equally, the credibility of its regional plans, postures, and threats is destined to erode. Recent =iterature on credibility argues that it is not based merely on past action=, but from an adversary's calculations of the current power capabilities a= a state's disposal.24 When Hitler's Germany was considering whether to take seriously the pledges and commitme=ts of the Western allies, for example, he paid much more attention to thei= existing capabilities, their current national will, and the perceived fea=ibility of their strategic posture than to reputations formed over years or decades of actions. Indeed, such =udgments seem to derive not from a checklist of a rival's defense programs=or military actions, but from a much more diffuse and visceral sense of th= trajectory of a state's power relative to its current posture. What is now clear is that the consensus o= such perceptions is shifting decisively against the tenability of the exi=ting U.S. paradigm of global power projection. It is, in fact, natural for=rising challengers to see weakness in the leading power's capacities as a by-product of the growing self-conf=dence and faith in their own abilities. There is already abundant evidence=of such perceptual shifts in the assertive leaders and elites of rising po=ers today, who while respecting continuing U.S. strengths and expecting the United States to remain the pr=mus inter pares for decades to come, perhaps indefinitely nonetheless see =urrent U.S. global commitments as excessive for a debt-ridden and "declin=ng" power. In China, as a leadi=g example, senior officials and influential analysts view the United State= as troubled, overextended, and increasingly unable to fulfill its defense=paradigm. They believe that the United States will continue as a global power, but expect it to be in a different=guise.25 Conversations with business, government, and military officials f=om burgeoning powers such as India, Turkey, Brazil, and Indonesia produce =he same broad theme: Structural trends in economics, politics, and military affairs are undermining the de=ree of American predominance and the sustainability of the existing paradi=m of U.S. influence. A leading theme is a growing belief in the social and=economic decay of the U.S. 12 EFTA_R1_00071884 EFTA01764532 model and the inability of U.S. political system to address major issues. Recent=polls and studies of opinion in emerging powers come to many of the same c=nclusions.26 These perceptions wi=l be fed and nurtured by parallel actions and trends which will undercut t=e viability of the existing paradigm. Critics at home are already suggesti=g that the United States will be unable to sustain the demands of its "strategic tilt to Asia" given planned bud=et cuts, or meet the requirements of both Middle East and Asian contingenc=es.27 As the United States is forced to pursue cost-saving measures, such =s cancellations of major weapons systems or troop reductions from key regions, the sense of a paradigm in f=ee-fall will accelerate. We see this already in the recommendations in man= reports, even those arguing for a general promotion of forward deployment= for a reduction if not elimination of the U.S. force presence in Europe.28 In addition to a los= of global credibility, a paradigm in crisis also threatens the credibilit= of specific U.S. military and foreign policy doctrines. When concepts and=doctrines flow from stressed conventional-wisdom worldviews, those concepts and doctrines begin to take on the air of empty=rhetoric. A good parallel was the British "two-power" doctrine (the noti=n that the Royal Navy should match the world's next two best fleets combin=d), which eventually became a form of self-reassurance without strategic significance. After a certain point,=Aaron Friedberg explains, "official analyses of Britain's position took o= an air of incompleteness and unreality."29 One can begin to sense this t=ndency in some recent U.S. conceptual statements, such as AirSea Battle: from all the public evidence, this conc=pt appears to respond to growing challenges to U.S. power projection capab=lities with an immense amount of vague rhetoric about intentions,30 couple= with bold new plans to expand planned military efforts in precisely the region where such insertion of m=litary might is becoming more problematic. Meantime, the heyday of counter=nsurgency doctrine appears to have come and gone. A perception of stra=egic insolvency, if not corrected by a readjustment of priorities and comm=tments, will trigger a decline in perceived credibility of threats and pro=ises. The risk then becomes that, in a future scenario, an American administration will lurch into a crisis ass=ming that it can take actions with the same effect as before. Instead, a p=edge or demand will be ignored by an adversary (or an ally or friend) now =nimpressed with the viability of U.S. defense policy and the United States will find itself in a conflict t=at its degraded defense posture could not forestall. Advocates of the curr=nt paradigm agree with the risk, but have a different solution: expand the=defense budget; reaffirm global commitments; reassure allies. But the United States simply does not have t=at option because, as argued above, the factors closing down on the curren= paradigm are not merely momentary or reversible they are structural. The only way out is a recalibrated strategic posture. A related risk, then= is a form of strategic opportunity cost. Every ounce of energy spent tryi=g to prop up an obsolete strategic paradigm forfeits the opportunity to di=cover new and sustainable ways of meeting the same U.S. interests and goals. The pivot to Asia is a perfect example.=Instead of pursuing the pivot and institutionalizing an unsustainable U.S.=regional position, Washington should be constructing and moving toward a p=st-primacy architecture in Asia. The fact is that we have a limited grace period-perhaps a decade, perhaps =ess-to put into place regional and global security architectures for a pos=-primacy world, structures that envision a revised while still prominent r=le for the United States. Using that precious and dwindling time to prop up a fraying paradigm would be co=nterproductive. Diplomacy increasing=y fails. A parallel risk has to do with the ebbing force of U.S. diplomacy=and influence. International power is grounded in legitimacy, and in many =ays it is precisely the legitimacy of the leading power's global posture that is under assault as its posture=comes into question. Historically, rising challengers gradually stop respe=ting the hegemon's right to lead, and they begin to make choices on behalf=of the international community, in part due to strategies consciously designed to frustrate the leading po=er's designs. Germany, under Bismarck and after, is one example: It aspire= to unification and to its "rightful place" as a leading European power =s its power and influence accumulated, its willingness to accept the inherent legitimacy of the existing order as=defined by other states, and the validity and force of their security para=igms, declined proportionately. At nearly all points in this trajectory, G=rman leaders did not seek to depose the international system, but to crowd into its leadership ranks, to mute =he voices of others relative to its own influence, and to modify rather th=n abolish rules. 13 EFTA_R1_00071885 EFTA01764533 We begin to see this=pattern today with regard to many emerging powers, but especially of cours=, China's posture toward the United States.31 As was predicted and expecte= in the post-Cold War context of growing regional power centers, the legitimacy of a system dominated by the United=States is coming under increasing challenge. More states (and, increasingl=, non-state actors) want to share in setting rules and norms and dictating=outcomes. The obvious and inev=table result has been to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. While=measuring the relative success of a major power's diplomacy over time is a=chancy business (and while Washington continues to have success on many fronts), the current trajectory is produ=ing a global system much less subject to the power of U.S. diplomacy and o=her forms of influence. Harvard's Stephen Walt catalogues the enormous str=ngths of the U.S. position during and after the Cold War, and compares that to recent evidence of the emergi=g limits of U.S. power. Such evidence includes Turkey's unwillingness to s=pport U.S. deployments in Iraq, the failure to impose U.S. will or order i= Iraq or Afghanistan, failures of nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran, the Arab Spring's challenges =o long-standing U.S. client rulers, and more.32 As emerging powers become =ore focused on their own interests and goals, their domestic dynamics will=become ever more self-directed and less subject to manipulation from Washington, a trend evident in a num=er of major recent elections.33 Washington will stil= enjoy substantial influence, and many states will welcome (openly or grud=ingly) a U.S. leadership role. But without revising the U.S. posture, the =ap between U.S. ambitions and capabilities will only grow. Continually trying to do too much will create more risk ri=k of demands unmet, requests unfulfilled, and a growing sense of the absur=ity of the U.S. posture. Such a course risks crisis and conflict. Similarl=, doubt in the threats and promises underpinning an unviable U.S. security posture risks conflict: U.S. offici=ls will press into situations assuming that their diplomacy will be capabl= of achieving certain outcomes and will make demands and lay out ultimatum= on that basis only to find that their influence cannot achieve the desired goals, and they must escalate t= harsher measures. The alternative is to shift to a lesser role with more =imited ambitions and more sustainable legitimacy. A military force com=s under increased stress and risks military setbacks. A state trying to do=more than it can afford, as a treasury or a society, risks overextending i=s military, with possibly ruinous results. We are already beginning to see the evidence: U.S. ground forces are showi=g symptoms of stress and exhaustion in terms of post-traumatic stress leve=s, reenlistment challenges at key officer grades, tragic suicide numbers, =nd other indices.34 After ten years of continuous deployments, equipment has become worn down, and there are g=owing reports of everything from ships being unready for missions because =f wear and tear to aircraft engines exploding to cruisers with hull cracks=to radar technology failing inspections.35 As of the first quarter of 2011, just over 40 percent of Navy and marine a=rcraft were judged "mission capable," according to the services well off=the 60 percent goal, itself seemingly modest.36 The vice chief of staff of=the U.S. Air Force, for example, testified in July 2011 that "this high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) has had=some detrimental effects on our overall readiness. Since 2003, we have see= a slow but steady decline in reported unit readiness indicators."37 The ='stress on the force is real and it is relentless," said Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jon Greenert.38=/span> The existing paradig=, then, threatens to destabilize the U.S. military, both in terms of perso=nel and equipment. Defenders of the existing paradigm have a simple cure: =ore resources. Ramp up procurement budgets, expand the Army and Corps, boost readiness funding, and solve the=problem. As argued above, however, the financial ceiling descending on U.S= security capacities is not fungible, it is structural. There is no way to=avoid further substantial cuts without worsening cuts to domestic programs that will already be excruciat=ng. Americans would have to absorb a lower standard of living in order to =ontinue to underwrite global primacy. If they will not, then persisting in=the current posture will gradually erode the health and readiness of U.S. military forces. The ultimate result =f this dangerous practice will be military setbacks in the field. Overexte=ded U.S. forces unable to bring their full complement of equipment to the =ight will be unable to prioritize. Meantime, adversaries employing the asymmetric techniques discussed above =the proliferating means of anti-access and area denial, as well as space a=d cyber counterstrike capabilities) will impose costs which will horrify a=U.S. public accustomed to "virtual wars." In sum, remaining locked in the current paradigm invites future em=arrassments, setbacks, and even defeats. 14 EFTA_R1_00071886 EFTA01764534 Toward a Revised =osture Historians Harold an= Margaret Sprout summarized Britain's bankrupt strategy in an age of dimmi=g empire: Britain had "too heavy commitments, depleted capabilities, (and= extreme reluctance to relinquish the role of a Great Power."39 This aptly describes the United States today. T=e argument here is not to surrender a central, leading U.S. global =ole it is to refashion that role in a manner that achieves many of the sam= goals, but in a more sustainable way. Advocates of the current paradigm e=phasize the dangers of moving off the current posture, such as worrying allies about the U.S. desire to remain e=gaged in regional affairs. As we have seen, however, the risks of refusing=to reform a bankrupt posture are far greater. Washington's current paradig= is being undermined; the only question now is whether U.S. officials take the initiative to craft a pers=asive, credible, innovative concept to supplant it. At the moment, there=seems little interest in such a process. The existing paradigm is deeply i=grained in habits of thought and assumptions about the nature of world pol=tics and the necessary U.S. role in the international system. For ideological and political reasons, the manag=rs of U.S. national security remain resistant to necessary changes. Even t=e Obama administration, which promised a transformation of U.S. foreign po=icy, has reaffirmed and even deepened many aspects of the conventional paradigm. Successive U.S. administrations=will be likely to apply well-established concepts, doctrines, worldviews, =nd ideologies for example, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces =n support of regional alliances and the U.S. commitment to global precision strikes for counterterror purp=ses whose effect will be to emphasize or even exaggerate the immediate thr=ats facing the United States, and to militate against dramatic changes in =he existing paradigm. Most likely, we will=see a sort of halfway strategic reform: policies will make a seeming shift=to a supposedly constrained posture without actually surrendering the core=elements of the current paradigm. A perfect example of such an approach can be found in a recent essay by two =ormer senior Obama administration officials, who firmly reject "retrenchm=nt" while offering something they call "realignment" as an answer to th= obvious need for "a recalibration of the United States' global military posture."40 Their "realignment" i= fact defends nearly all the existing paradigm's assumptions. Such halfway=choices forfeit the opportunity for innovative strategic thinking at a cri=ical transition moment. They do not represent coherent, truly sustainable strategic postures, and they lea=e the time bomb at the core of the current paradigm the essential mismatch=between ends and means ticking loudly away. If a future U.S. adm=nistration were interested in a more dramatic break from the existing post=re, what steps might it take? This essay has been mostly a diagnosis; elem=nts of a cure are largely beyond its scope. Some principles do, however, suggest themselves. The first is a the=e on whichboth history and current analyses of the U.S. predicament speak =ost loudly: the essential causes of great power constraints and strengths =re always to be found at home, in the economic and social foundations of national power. Without an energ=tic campaign to reinvigorate institutions of national governance to addres= key national problems, catalyze growth and innovation in key sectors of t=e economy, build 21st-century energy and education sectors, and more, every other proposal for U.S. grand strat=gy will represent mere rhetoric. Second, the U.S. mil=tary establishment must shrink, and be deployed less with a stronger capac=ty to arrive with decisive force when required. This can be accomplished t=rough a combination of emerging capabilities (cyber, unmanned vehicle, stealth, long-range precision strike) as well as=hard core, over-the-horizon capabilities that can overawe the military of =ny single aggressor state. Such capabilities can sustain U.S. deterrent an= effectively "veto" large-scale aggression. The United States need not withdraw from all forward-deployed =ommitments, but it will need to assess its current slate much more frugall=. Third, U.S. strategi=ts need to design a new arrangement which preserves the essential function=of U.S. power in the current system shaping conditional preferences of oth=r states in different, more constrained, shared, and efficient ways.41 There is not space to sketch out what this m=ght mean in detail. One piece, however, could be to help the world communi=y comprehend events to help their capabilities in anticipation and respons= by expanding investments in knowledge, intelligence, and strategic foresight. A second component will be to becom= more adept at, and expand 15 EFTA_R1_00071887 EFTA01764535 and deepen existing efforts in, rallying coalit=ons despite state reluctance, from China to Europe, to bear leadership bur=ens in a range of areas from anti-piracy to global warming to counterproliferation.42 Unlike Great Britain= a less-dominant United States has no rising liberal democracy to whom it =an hand off leadership of the world community. The only alternative, as ch=llenging as it will be, is to make U.S. global strategy much more purposeful in inviting a set of emerging po=ers into the shared leadership of norm-and institution-bound world politic=. This is a natural extension of the international system the United State= set out to build in 1945. The approach retains a realistic core by preserving a U.S. military force suff=cient to threaten any single large-scale aggressor, a backstop to multilat=ral norms and institutions. It is by no means a perfect option, but for a =tate confronting an insolvent strategic posture, no perfect option exists. Bismarck once remark=d that the essence of strategy is the ability to hear the hoof-beats of hi=tory. They are clamoring for our attention today, thundering in the backgr=und as the United States goes about daily business as it has for the last sixty years. Meanwhile, key assumpti=ns that have supported the current U.S. posture, as well as America's abil=ty to sustain a dominant role, are being called into question at an accele=ating rate. These facts grow more obvious and insistent with every passing year as do the dangers of a strat=gic posture whose insolvency is exposed, gradually or in several disastrou= episodes, over the coming decades. Left to its own natural momentum, the =resent trajectory of the U.S. strategic posture is likely to end in generalized loss of confidence, direct challen=e, or perhaps even conflict. The question for the United States now is whe=her it responds to this emerging reality, or continues doggedly trying to =gnore it. Michael J. Mazarr=is professor of national security strategy at the U.S. National War Co'leg.. Notesc/=> 1. Robert K. Massie, Dr=adnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Ran=om House, 1991), xvii-xxxi. 2. Aaron Friedberg, The=Weary Titan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 103. 3. Fareed Zakaria, "Th= Future of American Power," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008). 4. John Lewis Gaddis, '=What is Grand Strategy?" Duke University working paper, February 26, 2009= David S. McDonough, "Beyond Primacy: Hegemony and 'Security Addiction' i= U.S. Grand Strategy," Orbis, Winter 2009, 7-8. 16 EFTA_R1_00071888 EFTA01764536 5. See for example Mich=el Dobbs and John M. Goshko, "Albright's Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign =olicy Beliefs," Washington Post, December 6, 1996, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp- srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/albright120696.htm <http:Thashingtonpost.com/wp- srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/albright120696.htm> 6. On this point see Mc=onough, "Beyond Primacy," 10-12. 7. Barry Posen, "Comma=d of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," Internationa= Security 28, no. 1 (Summer 2003): 6. See also Posen, "Stability and Chan=e in U.S. Grand Strategy," Orbis, (Fall 2007): 563. 8. U.S. Congressional B=dget Office, "U.S. Debt and Interest Costs," December 2010, http://w=w.cbo.gov/publication/21960 <http://www.cbo.gov/publication/21960> . 9. Cindy Williams, "Th= Future Affordability of U.S. National Security," MIT Security Studies Pr=gram, October 28, 2011, p. 15, http:=/web.mit.edu/ssp/people/williams/ <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/people/williams/> Williams_Tobin_paper_102811.pdf. 10. Lawrence J. Korb, La=ra Conley, and Alex Rothman, "Restoring Tricare: Ensuring the Long Term V=ability of the Military Health Care System," Center for American Progress= THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j FALL 2012 February 28, 2011, <= href="http://www.americanprogress.oreissues/2011/02/tricare.html" targ=t="_blank"> http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/tricare.html; Defense Bu=iness Board, "Modernizing the Military Retirement System," July 2011, p. 3, http://dbb.defense.gov/pdf/DBB_Military_Retirement_Final_Presentationpdf.pd=. 11. Stephen M. Walt, Tam=ng American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W. W. Nor=on, 2005); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, Release 2.0 (New York: W. W. Nor=on, 2011). 12. 17 EFTA_R1_00071889 EFTA01764537 Peter Rodman, Uneasy=Giant: Challenges to American Predominance (Washington, D.C.: Nixon Center= 2000), vii. 13. See for example Jame= R. Holmes, "U.S. Confronts an Anti-Access World," The Diplomat, March 9= 2012, http://the- diplomat.com/2012/03/O9/u-s-confronts-an-antiaccess-world/?all</=> true; Wendell Minnick, "China's 10 Killer Weapons," Defense News, Apri= 9, 2012; Robert C. Rubel, "The Future of Aircraft Carriers," U.S. Naval=War College Review, Autumn 2001; Loren B. Thompson, "Iranian Unmanned Aircraft Signal New Threat," Early =arning Blog, The Lexington Institute, February 17, 2012, http:// <http://the-diplomat.com/2012/03/09/u-s-confronts-an-antiaccess- w=rld/?all> www.lexingtoninstitute.org/iranian-unmanned-aircraft-signal-new-threat?a 1&=mp;c <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/iranian-unmanned-aircraft-sign=l-new-threat?al&c> 1171. 14. Ross M. Rustici, "C=berweapons: Leveling the International Playing Field," Parameters (Autumn=2011): 36-37. 15. Paul K. Davis and Pe=er A. Wilson, Looming Discontinuities in U.S. Military Strategy and Defens= Planning (Washington, D.C.: The RAND Corporation, 2012), summary.<=p> 16. Christopher Cavas, '=U.S. Carrier Costs Will Breach Cap Next Year," AOL Defense News, March 16= 2012, http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120316/DEFREG02/</=> 3031600O3/U-S-Carrie=-Costs-Will-Breach-Cap-Next-Year?odyssey modjnewswellftextjFRONTPAGEjs/ 17. "National Security =trategy of the United States of America," May 2010, http://www. whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pd= <http://=hitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pd=> . 18. Meg Bortin, "Survey=Shows a Revival of Isolationism in U.S.," New York Times, November 17, 20=5, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/national/17cnd-survey.html?_ chttp://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/17/national/17cnd-survey.html?_> r 1&=agewanted print. 19. Lydia Saad, "Growin= Minority Wants Minimal U.S. Role in World Affairs," Gallup Politics Repo=t, February 21, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146240/Growing-MinorityWants-Minimal-Role-World-=ffairs.aspx chttp://www.gallup.com/poll/146240/Growing-MinorityWants-Minimal•=ole-World-Affairs.aspx> . See also the Chicago Council on Global Affairs poll which=showed rising number of Americans interested in growing emphasis on domest=c affairs, reported at "U.S. 'Sees World Influence Declining' Amid Economic Woe," BBC Online, September 16, =010, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada11331265. 20. 18 EFTA_R1_00071890 EFTA01764538 Jeffrey M. Jones, "=ewer Americans Say U.S. is No. 1 Military Power," Gallup Politics Report,=March 12, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/153185/Fewer-Americans-Say-NoMilitary-Power.aspx=/a>. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/153185/Fewer-Americans-Say-NoMilitary=Power.aspx> 21. "Public Takes Stron= Stance Against Iran's Nuclear Program," Pew Research Center, February 15= 2012, http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/15/public-takes-strong-stanceagainst-ir=ns-nuclear-program/ <http://www.people-press.org/2012/02/15/public-takes-strong-stanc=against-irans-nuclear-program/> . 22. See for example the =ritings of Robert Kagan, such as "No Time to Cut Defense," Washington Po=t, February 3, 2009, and "Against the Myth of American Decline," The New=Republic, January 11, 2012. 23. Paul K. MacDonald an= Joseph M. Parent, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Pow=r Retrenchment," International Security 35, no. 4 (Spring 2011).</=> 24. See for example Dary= G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (I=haca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996) and his "current calculus theor=." The broader literature questioning the veto power of reputation and credibility two related and often poorly-=efined concepts is enormous; for three representative and thoughtful examp=es see Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence Theory and American Foreig= Policy in the Third World, 1965.1990 (Ann Arbor: University of Michogan Press, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputati=n and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996);=and Shiping Ting, "Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conf=ict," Security Studies, Vol., 14, No. 1 (January-March 2005). 25. On the balanced view=in Chinese circles, see Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-=hina Strategic Distrust (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2012), pp. 8-9, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2012/03/30-us-china-lieberthal= 26. See for example Pew =lobal Attitudes Project, "From Hyperpower to Declining Power," September=7, 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-decliningpower/ <http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-declining=ower/> ;=and Bonnie S. Glaser and Lyle Morris, "Chinese Perceptions of U.S. Declin= and Power," China Brief 9, Issue 14 (Jamestown Foundation: July 9, 2009)= http:// www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news] 35241&=Hash <http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5=tt_news%5d35241&cHash> . db9748f805; Craig S. Cohen, editor, "Capacity and Resolve: Fore=gn Assessments of U.S. Power," (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, June 2011), http://csis.org/program/foreignassessments-us-power. 27. 19 EFTA_R1_00071891 EFTA01764539 Robert Haddick, "If-You Build Up, Who Will Come?" Foreign Policy, July 20, 2012, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/20/this_week_at_war_if_you_bu=ld_up_ <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/20/this_week_at_wa=_if_you_build_up_> who_will_come. 28. See for example Robe=t Art, "Selective Engagement in an Era of Austerity," in Richard Fontain= and Kristin M. Lord, America's Path, (Washington, D.C.: Center for a New =merican Security, 2012), p. 21, http://www.c=as.org/americaspath <http://www.cnas.org/americaspath> . 29. Friedberg, 189. 30. See for example Jan =an Tol et al., "AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept,'= Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010, http://www. csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/ <http://=sbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> . 31. Randall L. Schweller=and Xiaoyu Pu, "After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order=in an Era of U.S. Decline," International Security 36, no. 1 (Summer 2011=. 32. Stephen M. Walt, "T=e End of the American Era," The National Interest, November/ December 201=, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037 <http://nationalinterest.org/artide/the-end-the- american-era-603=> 33. Nicholas Gvosdev, "=olitical Contests Abroad Show Limits of U.S. Power," World Politics Revie=, October 21, 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10415/ the-realist-prism-politi=al-contests-abroad-show-limits-of-u-s- power <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10415/the-realist-pr=sm-political-contests-abroad-show-limits-of- u-s-power> . 34. One broad treatment =f Army force issues is Army 2020: Generating Health and Discipline in the =orce Ahead of the Strategic Reset (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Departm=nt of the Army, 2012), ht=p://www.army.mil/article/72086/;William <http://www.army.mil/article/72086/;William> Astore, "The Price of Pushing=Our Troops Too Far," The Huffington Post, December 15, 2009, http://www. huffingtonpost.com/william- astore/the-price-of-pushing-our_b_393226.html <http://=uffingtonpost.com/william-astore/the-price-of-pushing- our_b_393226.html> 35. Mackenzie Eaglen, "=entagon Struggles To Keep Ships Sailing, Planes Flying As Budget Cuts Loom=" AOL Defense News, July 18, 2011, http://def=nse.aol.com/2011/07/18/ <http://defense.aol.com/2011/07/18/> pentagon-struggles-to- keep-ships-sailing-plane=-flying-as-budget Eaglen, "A Military Teetering on the Ragged Edge," Ti=e Online Edition, July 20 EFTA_R1_00071892 EFTA01764540 27, 2011, http://nation. time.com/2011/07/27/a-military-teetering-on-the-ragged-edge/; Matthew M= Burke, "USS Essex Unable to Fulfill Mission for Second Time in Seven Mon=hs," Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2012, http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/uss-essex-unableto-fulfill-mission-for-2nd=time-in-seven-months-1.167330 <http://www.stripes.com/news/navy/uss-essex-unableto-fulfill-miss=on-for-2nd-time-in-seven-months-1.167330> . See also Mike McCarthy, "Admiral Warns=of 'Burning Out' Ships, Aircraft," Defense Daily, March 1, 2012, http://www.defensedaily.com/sectors/navy_usmc/Admiral-Warns-Of-Burning-Out-=hipsAircraft_ 16910.html <http://www.defensedaily.com/sectors/navy_usmc/Admiral-Warns-Of-B=rning-Out-ShipsAircraft_16910.html> . THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY j FALL 2012<=p> 36. Joshua Stewart, "Na=y: Aircraft Better Off Than Reports Say," Military Times, July 30, 2011, http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2011/07/navy-aviation-rates-deployment073=11w/. 37. General Philip Breed=ove, "Total Force Readiness," testimony before the U.S. House Armed Serv=ces Committee, July 26, 2011, http://www.airforce-magazine.com/Site CollectionDocuments/Testimony/2011/Ju=y%202011/072611breedlove.pdf <http://www.airforce- magazine.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/Testimo=y/2011/July%202011/072611breedlove.pdf> . 38. Stewart. 39. Harold and Margaret =grout, "Retreat from World Power: Processes and Consequences of Readjustm=nt," World Politics 15, Issue 4 (July 1963): 668, http://www.jstor.org/</=> <http://www.jstor.org/> discover/10.2307/200=462?uid 3739584&uid 2&uid 4&uid 3739256&sid 211014=> 124536081. 40. Michele Flournoy and=lanine Davidson, "Obama's New Global Posture: The Logic of U.S. Foreign D=ployments," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012): 55. 41. The author is indebt=d to a conversation with Robert Keohane for raising the connection to the =oncept of conditional preferences. 42. As Robert Keohane re=ently argued, states cannot hand off power to multilateral institutions bu= they can use them as vehicles "to pursue their own interests"; Keohane,="Hegemony and After," Foreign Affairs 91, no. 4 (July/August 2012), 116. 21 EFTA_R1_00071893 EFTA01764541 22 EFTA_R1_00071894 EFTA01764542