EFTA02639560

From: Edward Epstein Sent: Friday, August 18, 2017 1:23 PM To: Jeff Epstein Subject: FYI Hi Jeff I thought this might interest =ou A Question of Motive Russia =asn't trying to elect a particular candidate: Vladimir Putin =anted to delegitimize our elections, above all. Edward Jay =pstein July 31, =017 Politics and law The 2016 presidential campaign was marked by =hree disclosure operations, all of which appear to have had a single =uthor. "Oppo research" is the euphemism commonly used =n elections for such operations. The mechanism is fairly simple: dirt =s obtained from wherever it can be found to discredit an opponent. It =5 then "leaked," usually either anonymously or on =ackground, to targeted media channels. What makes the 2016 campaign =articularly interesting from a counterintelligence perspective is not =hat both sides had their own disclosure operations, but that both sides =ere offered the dirt for them by a common source: Russian =ntelligence. As we now =now from the emails of Donald Trump Jr., a thinly veiled intermediary, =atalya Veselnitskaya, offered the Trump campaign documents that =utatively would show that Hillary Clinton had received illegal =onations from Russian financiers; in the event, no such documents were =roffered. But it is a reasonable assumption that Veselnitskaya could =ot have made such an offer, especially in a meeting attended by three =ther Russians, unless the move was approved by the FSB, the Russian =ecurity service. A second disclosure operation, this one involving =upporters of the Clinton campaign, was more layered. The proximate =ntermediary was Fusion GPS, a research firm used by the law firm Baker =ostetler, and the secondary "cut-out" was the British =irm Orbis, co-founded by former MI-6 officer Christopher Steele. We =now something about this sub-contractor from the depositions Steele =ave in defending a libel suit in London. According to Steele, Fusion =PS not only had him prepare the so-called "dossier" on =rump but also directed Steele to "leak" it to specified =eporters at Mother Jones, Yahoo, the New York Times, the Washington Post, The New Yorker, and CNN. In some cases, Steele was =irected to brief the selected journalists personally. The dirt in these =E2$41eaks" relied heavily on information supplied by two =ussian government sources: Source A, whom Steele calls "a =enior Russian Foreign Ministry figure"; and Source B, "a =ormer top-level intelligence officer still active in the Kremlin."=Sources A and B provided information supposedly exposing a long-time =ussian FSB operation to get compromising information that could be used =o control Trump. The idea that two Russian intelligence sources would =eveal a long-time Kremlin-backed FSB operation bears further =xamination. Michael =orell, a former acting CIA director, casts light on the sourcing of the =irt in the Steele dossier. "I had two questions when I first =ead [the dossier]," Morell said in an NBC interview. "One=was, how did Chris [Steele] talk to these sources? I have subsequently =earned that he used intermediaries. I asked myself, why did these guys =rovide this information, what was their motivation? And I subsequently =earned that he paid them. That the intermediaries paid the sources and =he intermediaries got the money from Chris." Paying ex-FSB =fficers for sensitive information? As Steele is no doubt aware, there =s no such thing as an ex-FSB officer. All =ussian intelligence officers, whether currently or formerly employed, =f in Russia, operate under the same tough security regime. The selling =f secret information by them is espionage, pure and simple. Selling it =o someone connected to an adversary intelligence service greatly =ompounds the crime. Sources A and B (through their intermediaries) knew =hat they were dealing with an ex-MI-6 man who could use their betrayal =f secrets against them. The only safe way for A and B to provide the =equested dirt would be to clear it with the security regime at the FSB. =his precaution, a required step in such exchanges, would mean that the =irt in the dossier, whether true or false, was EFTA_R1_01871987 EFTA02639560 curated by the FSB and =poon-fed to Steele. If so, the FSB was the surreptitious provider of =his part of the Steele dossier. The third disclosure operation involved stolen =mails from the DNC bearing on the unfair treatment by Democratic Party =fficials of Bernie Sanders, which were posted on the DC Leaks website. =resident Obama identified the Kremlin as the author of this operation, =aying "These data theft and disclosure activities could only =ave been directed by the highest levels of the Russian government."=ff so, as in the previous cases, the FSB would have curated the dirt. =o be sure, oppo- research operatives, because of their singular focus on =etting usable slime, are highly vulnerable to shady offers, but why =ould Russia so blatantly feed the slime to all sides in a =ampaign? The United =tates has a wide array of tools for monitoring Russian intelligence, =ncluding the world's most sophisticated sensors for =ntercepting signals, but discovering the Kremlin's motives =emains an elusive enterprise because, unlike in a scientific inquiry, =ne cannot fully trust the observable data. While a scientist can safely =ssume that the microbes he observes through the lens of a microscope =re not employing guile to mislead him, an intelligence analyst cannot =ake similar assumptions about the content of intercepted communications =rom Russia. If one assumes that the Russians do not know that the =hannel is being monitored—an assumption which, following the =efection of Edward Snowden to Russia, is hard to make prudently—t=en the intelligence gleaned from that channel can reveal the =remlin's activities and motive. If, however, it is understood =hat the Russians know that a channel is being monitored, the =nformation conveyed over it can be considered a disclosure =peration. If, for =xample, a Mafia family finds out that the FBI is tapping its telephone =ines, it can use those lines to burn its rivals. The Kremlin can also =se a knowntapped phone line to its advantage. Consider, for =xample, the tapped phone of Russian ambassador Sergey Kislyak. On =ecember 1, 2016, Kislyak went to Trump Tower to meet Jared Kushner and =ichael Flynn. According to Kushner's version of that meeting, =islyak suggested that Russian generals could supply information about =ussian military operations in Syria on the condition that the Trump =ransition team provide a "secure line in the transition =ffice." Of course, as Kislyak likely knew, transition teams =on't have secure lines to Moscow. Kushner responded by asking =f the Russian embassy could supply such a "secure line." =islyak then used an open phone line at his embassy to relay Kushner•=99s response to his foreign ministry in Moscow. It is inconceivable =hat Kislyak did not know that the call would be monitored by the FBI, =ince the FBI had routinely listened in on these lines for the past 68 =ears, or that his discussion of Kushner's request would set off =larm bells in the intelligence community. If Kislyak had wanted to hide this exchange from =.S. intelligence, he could have easily sent it under diplomatic cover =irectly to Moscow, used a secure line, or relayed it in a coded =ashion. By communicating the message en clair, or in plaintext, =islyak skillfully exposed Kushner's incredibly stupid response, =hich he himself had provoked, to stoke distrust about the incoming =resident within the U.S. intelligence community. Nor was this the only =istrust Kislyak cultivated: the conversations on the monitored phone =ed to the firing of National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and =onversations that Kislyak had with Attorney General Jeff Sessions led =o Sessions's recusing himself from the Russian investigation, =hich has now driven a wedge between President Trump and one of his most =ffective and popular cabinet members. Kislyak's resume indicates that he is a =ell-regarded and competent player in the game of nations: he has served =s Second Secretary of the Soviet UN mission in New York, First =ecretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Deputy Director of the =oviet Department of International Organizations in Moscow, Permanent =ussian representative to NATO in Brussels, Deputy Foreign Minister, and =mbassador to the United States. Nothing in his 37-year career, either =uring or after the Cold War, suggests that his moves are not aligned =ith Kremlin strategy. But when it comes to the various disclosures and =nterventions surrounding the 2016 election, what exactly was that =trategy? In a report =ssued on January 6, 2017, entitled "Assessing Russian =ctivities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections," the U.S. =ntelligence community concluded, based both on its sources and its =nalysis of stories on the Russian-controlled network RT, that Putin =anted to hurt Clinton, help Trump, and discredit the American election. =hese may well have been motives of the Russian president, but the =arrowly focused assessment fails to explain, or even take into account, =islyak's post-election ensnarement of Kushner, or the =iscrediting dirt against Trump. If Putin had really wanted to help =rump win the election, why did Russian sources provide damaging dirt to =teele, which could have cost Trump the election? Why did Kislyak =rovide the FBI with information, via a known tapped line, that could =and did) compromise key members of Trump's =dministration? 2 EFTA_R1_01871988 EFTA02639561 A wider focus =an be found, of all places, in Oliver Stone's revealing, if =awning, four-hour interview with Putin, in which the Russian dictator =akes clear that he views American hegemony, including America's =tanding and respect in the international community, as a threat that =ussia must counter. One way to undermine America's standing is =o provide disclosures that can be used by its own political factions, =nd the media, to sow distrust in America's reliability as a =emocracy founded on transparency. Putin tells the truth when he says =hat it doesn't matter particularly to Russia whether Clinton or =rump won the election: his goal was to install doubt in the legitimacy =f the process, regardless of how it turned out. Edward Jay Epstein's most recent book =s How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, the Man and the =heft, published by Alfred A. Knopf in =anuary. 3 EFTA_R1_01871989 EFTA02639562