FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10)

FD-302 (Rev. 5-8-10) -1 of 6 - 4", ,OFFICML RECORD 404 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION Dec denim 08/18/2019 , Captain, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS (BOP), place of employment METROPOLITAN CORRECTIONAL CENTER (MCC), 150 Park Row, New York, NY 10007, was interviewed at the FBI New York Field Office, 290 Broadway, New York, NY 10278 by FBI Special Agent Amanda Meyer and OIG Special Agent David Carpenter. Agents reviewed a standard OIG interview waiver form; Agents signed the form and introduced themselves provided the following agreed to a voluntary interview. After the and explained the purpose of the interview, information: began his career with the BOP in Florence, CO in 2005. In 2014, he was transferred to the METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER (MDC) in Brooklyn, NY, where he was made Deputy Captain in 2015. In 2018, was promoted to Captain at MCC, his current position, where he oversees security for the entire building. and has purview. approximately also includes the Warden. directly supervises approximately 13 Lieutenants, 125-134 line staff / Correctional Officers under his sits on the institution's Executive staff, which also primary duty is to ensure that security protocols are met by his Lieutenants and sub-staff, and that policy guidelines are being followed as set forth by the BOP. Among others, is responsible for the following: a Special Housing Unit (SHU) Lieutenant, Lieutenant RICE; an Administrative Lieutenant, responsible for maintaining paperwork, etc.; an SIS Lieutenant, responsible for paperwork; an Operations & Activities Lieutenant(s), responsible for day-to-day operations and maintaining order for three (3) shifts; and an Emergency Preparedness Lieutenant, a collateral duty responsible in the event of emergency incidents such as a fires, bomb threats, etc. advised that his staff provides special considerations for high profile inmates, if deemed appropriate and designated as such. In order to ensure an inmate is provided with proper care, the facility evaluates the inmate using several measures, including mental, physical, medical, Investigationon 08/12/2019 Hex by MEYER AMANDA M at New York, New York, United States (In Person) DmcdrAted 08/13/2019 This document contains neither recommendations nor comitisiom of the FRI. his the pmpcny or the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents arc not to be distributed outside your agency. SDNY_00007681 EFTA_00000805 EFTA00135207 FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) Comthuation of FD-302 of (U) Interview of EMPLOYEE .On 08/12/2019 J34, 2 of 6 psychological, and sexual assault victim or predator assessments. Since different inmates are admitted with different criteria, appropriate housing varies. interacted with inmate JEFFREY EPSTEIN on approximately three occasions at MCC, all of which EPSTEIN maintained a pleasant demeanor. During the first instance, EPSTEIN asked who he was, and responded by introducing himself and explaining his position at the jail. During another instance, explained to EPSTEIN the policy regarding meals during attorney sessions, and made certain EPSTEIN was accommodated with water, visits to the restroom, etc. EPSTEIN spent most of the day with his defense opened. counsel, and was brought down as soon as attorney visiting was made aware of the possibility that EPSTEIN would be housed at MCC in advance of EPSTEIN'S arrival. was not present when inmate EPSTEIN was admitted to the facility. EPSTEIN was thoroughly vetted to determine if he was fit for General Population (GP) and was ultimately placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU). MCC places inmates under three categories of close supervision: 1. "Dry Cell" for those at risk for smuggling contraband, 2. Psychological Observation, and 3. Suicide Watch. advised that EPSTEIN preferred not to have a cellmate and engaged in manipulative behavior to avoid having one, including requesting to see a psychologist. At EPSTEIN'S request, he was interviewed by a psychologist. Following this assessment, EPSTEIN was initially placed on Suicide Watch. He was later interviewed again and downgraded to Psychological Observation, because he was determined not to have suicidal tendencies. After some time, he was returned to the SHU. Mill began hearing talk that EPSTEIN was trying to get back on Suicide Watch. Information like this is usually generated from rounds, "kites", and monitoring of phone calls and letters. On or about July 23, 2019, EPSTEIN was found unresponsive on the floor of his cell with a homemade piece of fabric on his chest. EPSTEIN'S cellmate had flagged the attention of a staff member, who handcuffed the cellmate and removed EPSTEIN to bring him to the medical unit. heard from his staff that EPSTEIN may have been faking unconsciousness, because he was observed opening his eyes and making other suspicious movements not consistent with an unconscious state. EPSTEIN was medically assessed and SONY M107682 EFTA_00000806 EFTA00135208 FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) Continuation of FD-302 (LI) Interview of EMPLOYEE .on 08/12/2019 J34, 3 of 6 became coherent. EPSTEIN claimed that his cellmate, NICHOLAS TARTAGLIONE, tried to take his life. He was placed back on Suicide Watch for approximately one week. Unlike his first and previous placement on Suicide Watch, EPSTEIN now has definitive suicidal tendencies reported in his incarceration history. The staff was tasked with determining whether EPSTEIN was in fact suicidal, or using manipulative tactics to avoid assignment of a cellmate. After Suicide Watch, EPSTEIN was placed on Psychological Observation and eventually returned to the SHU. At the direction of the Warden, initiated the process of compiling possible cellmates for EPSTEIN, vetting them, and submitting candidates to the Warden for his review. and his staff fully screened potential cellmates and reported their determinations up to the Warden. EFRAIN REYES was selected and housed in a cell with EPSTEIN. The Assistant Warden, Warden, and Regional Director were notified. The Warden directed on multiple occasions that EPSTEIN needed a cellmate at all times, and Am verbally informed his Lieutenants the same. repeatedly directed his SHU Lieutenant, Lieutenant RICE, that EPSTEIN needed a cellmate at all times. Additionally, visited the SHU on multiple occasions and directed staff to be very alert and attentive about EPSTEIN'S special accommodations. On Friday, August 9, 2019, Lieutenant RICE was on leave and, thus, there was no dedicated Lieutenant assigned to the SHU. In this event, the Operation Lieutenant, Lieutenant MEDINA, had oversight that day and took over the responsibilities of the SHU Lieutenant. Lieutenant MEDINA was aware that EPSTEIN was required to be housed with a cellmate, because approximately one week prior to EPSTEIN'S death, informally advised his Lieutenants that EPSTEIN was not be housed alone, and emphasized the need to be vigilant about "30-minute checks" and unannounced rounds. Inmates/cellmates are moved for various reasons, including but not limited to, an incident in the cell, visits to court, legal library, medical, and recreation. On Friday, August 9, 2019, EPSTEIN'S cellmate, REYES, had court. It would not be uncommon for REYES to be out of his cell for an extended period. EPSTEIN had an attorney session that day. EPSTEIN'S attorney was processed into the facility in the morning and EPSTEIN was brought down to the attorney room. was not notified that SONY 00007683 EFTA_00000807 EFTA00135209 FD-302a (Rev. 54-10) Continuation of FD-302 CU) Interview Of EMPLOYEE REYES was released from court. .on 08/12/2019 .Page 4 of 6 Typically, if an inmate is likely to be discharged or transferred following court, their property is retrieved from their cell, boxed, and secured with a property form by Receiving and Discharge staff. All items are normally accounted for and inventoried. In order to enter the SHU, all staff not assigned there must identify themselves and sign the logbook, then be physically escorted by a Correctional Officer. Alternatively, the staff can pick up inmate property at the Unit door. A Correctional Officer assigned to the SHU would have been aware that REYES'S, or any inmate's, belongings were removed. At this time, the Correctional Officer should notify a Lieutenant, who would in turn brief SIM was not notified that REYES' belongings were removed. IMO advised that if he had known that EPSTEIN was without a cellmate, he nave likely put EPSTEIN on Psychological Observation. is not aware of any Lieutenants knowing that REYES' property was moved. On Saturday, August 10, 2019, received a phone call from Lieutenant JEAN around 7:00 AM, and was told that EPSTEIN was found unresponsive in his cell. inquired about EPSTEIN'S cellmate and was surprised to hear JEAN respond that EPSTEIN did not have a cellmate. MEDINA worked a 4:00 PM - 10:00 PM shift on August 9, 2019. MEDINA was relieved by Lieutenant ANDERSON, who was assigned the 10 PM - 6 AM shift. did not personally tell ANDERSON that EPSTEIN all times. He believed she was aware because Lieutenants repeatedly, and instructed them to pass convey the information amongst themselves. required a cellmate at he had informed his this message along and did not hold a formal all-Lieutenant meeting regarding EPSTEIN, or send a staff email with the Warden's directive. He verbally instructed his Lieutenants on an informal and individual basis, as many as possible with whom he had the opportunity. On Saturday morning, August 10, 2019, ANDERSON was relieved early by JEAN. 10c: nonuniform intervals within a 40-minute time frame. The purpose of these rounds is to ensure that good order is being maintained, there is no suspicious activity, and all inmates are accounted for and responsive. 30- minute rounds are documented in TRUSCOPE, which serves as an electronic logbook. After a round is physically done, the Correctional Officer can log In the SHU, 30-minute rounds need to be completed consistently at SONY moompi EFTA_00000808 EFTA00135210 FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) Continuation of FD-302 CU) Interview of EMPLOYEE .on 08/12/2019 J34, 5 of 6 in to TRUSCOPE and press a button certifying that the round was completed. Unfortunately, sometimes officers do not complete a 30-minute round, or exceed the 40-minute threshold. TRUSCOPE also documents from what location/terminal the rounds are logged. is aware of at least two (2) terminals located in the SHU. The only way to determine if a 30-minute round was physically completed is to check the video surveillance footage. There are two (2) Correctional Officers assigned to the SHU on morning watch at midnight, SHU1 and SHU2. SHU2 is responsible for completing rounds. was unaware that the camera system early on Thursday when the discussion about occurred. MR. DANIELS, the camera working on the system earlier that in the SHU was down. He left the camera system would have technician, notified that he was week, but Ism did not know specifics and was not informed that the cameras were cut *Inctioning. Since the building is in the middle of a camera project, Mill assumed the camera work may have been related. was first notified that the cameras were down on Saturday morning, August _0, 2019, when he arrived at MCC and asked to see the video. Correctional Officers do not typically know when the cameras are down. After receiving the phone call from JEAN on the morning of Saturday, August 10, 2019, notified Associate Warden SKIPPER-SCOTT, who informed the Warden. also attempted to call Institution Duty Officer NATHANIEL BULLOCK, the Chaplain, and the building, to get more information. He then went to MCC, arriving before 8:00 AM, approximately. Upon arrival, screened in and retrieved his gear from the 3rd Floor. He went to the SHU and signed the logbook. He gathered any records pertaining to EPSTEIN, including the 30-minute rounds logbook, the attorney conference logbook, count slips, and El's. He could not locate EPSTEIN'S inmate file. He also asked to view the camera footage. The Warden was already present at the facility when arrived. JEAN expressed to Ism that the staff admitted to her they did not complete rounds, the 3:CO AM and 5:00 AM counts, and that Officer THOMAS entered EPSTEIN'S cell without supervision. EPSTEIN was placed on the floor to administer lifesaving efforts. Ism informed Associate Warden SKIPPER- SCOTT about what Officers NOEL and THOMAS admitted to JEAN. SONY woomas EFTA_00000809 EFTA00135211 FD-302a (Rev. 5-8-10) Continuation of FD-302 of CU) Interview of EMPLOYEE .On 08/12/2019 ,Page 6 of 6 had concerns about the whereabouts of EPSTEIN'S cellmate. Some of his staff were under the impression that REYES was released from the SHU, which later confirmed was not true. The purpose of the 3:00 AM and 5:00 AM counts is to physically count and confirm each person in each cell. There were no entries of counts in TRUSCOPE the entire night. If technology is down, the Correctional Officers also have the option to document the count on a hardcopy form. Although there are no electronic records of counts, hardcopies may have been retained. All inmate phone calls in the SHU are monitored and inmates have limited access to phone calls. All calls should be recorded. was not aware of any issues or complaints with EPSTEIN related to phone calls. On Saturday, August 10, 2019, approximately 7:00 PM on the evening of Friday, August 9, 2019. It is uncommon to make an unrecorded phone call in the SHU, and would advise against it because calls should be surveilled. Inmates can make a recorded phone call in the Lieutenant's Office, where it is documented in a monitored logbook. In the SHU, Correctional Officers are not permitted to give inmates phone calls, but a Unit Team Member or the Chaplain can take the inmate to the Lieutenant's office to make a call. is not briefed on phone calls in the SHU, generally. was told that EPSTEIN made a phone call at Ism wholeheartedly emphasized that he and his staff at MCC did their best to supervise, safeguard and ensure the protection of EPSTEIN and all inmates effectively. His staff is aware of the seriousness of the investigation into EPSTEIN'S death. S0NY _00007686 EFTA_00000810 EFTA00135212