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CASE NO.: 08-CV-80I I 9-MARRA/JOHNSON
JANE DOE NO. 2,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Defendant.
Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, files this Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories and Production of Documents, as follows:
I.
Introduction
Defendant relies upon generalization s regarding the nature of the case and the allegations in
the pleadings in justifying his assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to each and
every interrogatory and document request propounded by Plaintiffs. This blanket assertion of the
privilege is insufficient to deny Plaintiffs all discovery in these cases. Defendant otherwise fails to
set forth any basis for denying Plaintiffs any and all answers to its written discovery under the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, the Federal Rules of Evidence, on grounds of relevance, third
party privacy rights, or other grounds. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully request an Order
compelling answers to interrogatories and production of documents.
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II.
Argument in Reply
A.
Defendant Has Made a Blanket
Assertion of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination That Is Insufficient
1.
Defendant Cannot Rely on its Blanket Objections
to Interrogatories on Fifth Amendment Grounds
Defendant Epstein insists that he has not asserted a "blanket privilege" to discovery under the
Fifth Amendment, even though he has repeated the identical objection to each of Plaintiff's
discovery request on this ground. The federal courts have noted that "[t]he term `blanket assertion'
is not limited to the situation where the defendant makes a single response to numerous questions."
United States'. Buaiz 2008 WL 5050102 (E.D. Tenn. 2008). Rather, as here, where the defendant
refuses to answer on fifth amendment grounds each and every question, such repeated assertions are
fairly characterized as a "blanket assertion". Id.; Capitol Products Corp.
Herron, 457 F.2d 541
(8th Cir. 1972).
Accordingly, it is not sufficient to support the invocation of the Fifth Amendment with
nothing more than sweeping generalizations applicable to all questions that were asked in discovery.
See United States'. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978) ("a
blanket refusal to answer any question is unacceptable").
Defendant Epstein's Response does not set forth reasonable cause for a concern of self-
incrimination in response to specific interrogatories. It is particularly deficient with regard to
interrogatory, nos. 1-2 (identity of employees who worked or came to Palm Beach residence), no. 7
(Defendant's presence in Florida), no. 8 (identity of health care providers), no. 9 (persons providing
transport services), no. 11 (Epstein's telephone numbers) and no. 12 (employees' telephone
numbers). Epstein's references to allegations of sexual abuse, exploitation and battery in the
Complaints in this and other civil actions against him, along with the alleged plan and scheme of
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recruiting girls to come to Epstein's Palm Beach mansion to give him "massages", fall well short of
demonstrating that any interrogatory asked of Epstein that is relevant and within the broad scope of
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) would realistically and necessarily furnish a link in the chain of evidence
needed to prove a crime against him.
Epstein alternatively points out that there is a "narrow exception" which allows a blanket
assertion of the privilege where the trial court determines it to be legitimate based on the court's
knowledge of the case and the expected testimony. United States,. Goodwin 625 F.2d 693, 701
(5th Cir. 1980); United States'. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1981). This is not a case, however,
where this narrow exception should apply. In Tsui, the Court allowed a blanket assertion of the
privilege only because it was clear that the witness would only be questioned about the real estate
transactions that were at the heart of his criminal liability concerns, and the proponent of the
testimony argued only that the witness did not have a reasonable fear of prosecution. Id. at 368.
Such unusual circumstances are not present in the instant cases. Because a blanket assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege is not legitimate in these cases, the Court must make a "particularized
inquiry", and "only as to genuinely threatening questions should [the witness's] silence be
sustained." Goodwin, 625 F.2d at 701 (quoting United States'. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042,
1049 (5th Cir. 1976)).
Defendant further asserts that Plaintiff's interrogatories requesting that he identify employees
may lead to evidence tending to incriminate him because one of his employees, Sarah Kellen, is
identified in the Complaint. (Defendant Memorandum (DE 56), p. 18). This does not, however,
support a blanket refusal to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. It does not demonstrate how
answers to these interrogatories, seeking the identities of all employees who were assigned or came
to the Palm Beach residence, could realistically furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
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prosecute Epstein.
Similarly, the allegations of the Complaints alone do not reveal the danger of self-
incrimination from answers to interrogatories seeking information on when Epstein was in the State
of Florida, who provided transportation services to Epstein, his telephone numbers, his employees'
telephone numbers, and his health care providers.' Discovery requests that seek background
information or information on events and experiences of the witness for which he cannot realistically
or genuinely be expected to be charged with a crime are not subject to Fifth Amendment protection.
See Krause'. Rhodes, 390 F.Supp 1070, 1071-72 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (allowing questions to be asked
regarding personal backgrounds and experiences excluding the event at issue in the pending criminal
indictment).
2.
Defendant Has Not Demonstrated That the Act of
Producing Documents in Response to Specific Requests
Would be Sufficiently Testimonial and Incriminating
Defendant Epstein makes a general assertion that a response to any of Plaintiff's document
requests would entail testimonial self-incrimination. (Defendant's Response (DE 56), pp. 22-23).
Whether the act of producing a particular document would be sufficiently testimonial and
incriminatory to support the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a "fact
dependent inquiry." United States'. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 985 (4th Cir. 1991). It is the burden
of the party asserting the privilege to "explain how the act of producing documents would pose a real
danger of incrimination." Bear Stems & Co. l. Wyler, 182 F.Supp. 2d 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
Defendant's reliance on United States I. Hubbell 530 U.S. 27 (2000), is inadequate. In
Hubbell it was apparent from the breadth of the description of documents demanded in the
government's subpoena that "the prosecutor needed respondent's assistance both to identify
' See Interrogatory nos. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12.
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potential sources of information and to produce those sources." Id. at 41. In Bear Stems the Court
explained that the facts of Hubbell were unique and do not support a blanket, all-encompassing
assertion by a witness or party that the production of documents would be testimonial and
incriminating:
To begin with, in Hubei!, the incriminatory nature of the production
of the document sought was obvious. The respondent was already
incarcerated as a result of one investigation and he was the target of a
second. Indeed, the second investigation was directed at whether the
respondent was in compliance with a plea agreement-resulting from
the first investigation-requiring him to produce information relating
to the Whitewater investigation. If the respondent had produced such
information in response to the subpoena, it would have constituted
testimony that he had Whitewater information that he had not
provided-it would be an admission that he failed to comply with the
plea agreement. Accordingly, it was the testimonial aspect of the
production that concerned the Court in Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 36-44
120 S.Ct. at 2043-48.
At the appellate court level, the court
specifically found that respondent's acknowledgment of the existence
of certain records sought in the government's subpoena would be
directly incriminating. Hubbell, 167 F.3d at 582.
Id. at 683.
As noted by the Court in Bear Sterns, a determination that the production of documents
would be testimonial cannot be premised on the witness's say so:
A witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he
declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself; his assertion
does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination.
Id. at 684. In Bear Stems, the Court found that the defendant failed to meet his burden in asserting
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to a request for production that included wire
transfer records, telephone records, bank records, and records pertaining to specific investment
firms. Id. Plaintiffs seek in their document requests, among other things, telephone records, travel
records, correspondence and communications, and personal calendars and diaries. The act of
producing such records is not a crime. See id. ("[a]s the plaintiff notes, it is not a crime to make a
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wire transfer, use the phone, or possess corporate records"). Defendant Epstein has failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating that the document requests made by Plaintiffs in these cases would pose
a real danger of incrimination. As in Bear Stems the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of
Documents should accordingly be granted. Id.
B.
Defendant Epstein Fails to Demonstrate Why His
Invocation of the Fifth Amendment Would Not
Warrant an Adverse Interest In These Civil Cases
Defendant Epstein does not dispute the general rule that an adverse inference may be drawn
in a civil case from a defendant's refusal to testify or respond to discovery by invoking the privilege
against self incrimination. Baxter
Palmigiano 425 U.S. 308, 318-20 (1976). He instead asserts
that there is a "recognized exception" that applies in a case where the adverse inference is the sole
basis for the plaintiff's prima facie case or will cause the automatic eau), of summary judgment.
(Defendant's Response, (DE 56), pp. 14-15); Federal Trade Comm'n t Transnet Wireless Corp.,
506 F.Supp. 2d 1247, 1252 n. 4 (S.D. Fla. 2007). This exception plainly would not apply here.
There are witnesses other than Defendant to the acts and conduct alleged in these cases, including
Plaintiffs and other victims. See Transnet Wireless, 506 F.Supp. 2d at 1252 n. 4 (holding that the
Court "will draw adverse inferences where appropriate" in reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, "in light of the myriad evidence presented by plaintiff').
In any event, it would be premature at this stage of the case for the Court to foreclose the use
of an adverse inference from the Defendant's invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
This issue would arise either in a motion for summary judgment or a motion in limine. Accordingly,
based on the foregoing, Defendant's self-serving assertion in his discovery responses concerning the
drawing of an adverse inference is improper, and should be rejected and stricken.
C. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Discovery of Health Care
Information Requested In Interrogatory No. 8
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Defendant Epstein argues that Plaintiff's Interrogatory no. 8 is overbroad because it seeks
information over a ten year period. As to Defendant Epstein's psychological condition, particularly
any problem of a sexual nature, ten years is more than reasonable. Any psychosexual condition has
likely existed for most or all of Defendant Epstein's adult life.
Defendant Epstein next asserts Florida's psychotherapist-patient privilege under Florida
Statute §90.503(2). As set forth in Plaintiff's Motion, the allegations of child sexual abuse in this
case bring into play the exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege of Florida Statute §39.204.
Defendant asserts that this Court is required to hold an in camera inspection of documents to
determine, as to each document, whether Florida Statute §39.204 is applicable. See Doherty I. John
Doe No. 22, 957 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Plaintiff agrees that such an in camera
inspection would be appropriate to evaluate whether the documents relate to allegations of child
sexual abuse. In this regard, any notes or records relating to Epstein's sexual interests or tendencies
produced in an in camera inspection would be relevant and should be turned over to Plaintiff as
falling within the exception of §39.204.
D.
Third Party Privacy Rights Are
Not a Basis to Deny Discovery
The right to privacy discussed in Eisenstadt t. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972), has nothing
to do with the discovery issues in this case. Eisenstadt concerns the distribution of a contraceptive
device. Yet Defendant relies entirely on Eisenstadt in contending that third party privacy rights
provide a basis for Defendant to object to discovery in this case. The vague argument and
unsupported assertion raised by Defendant in this case, "that the privacy rights of third parties are
implicated", is frivolous and must be rejected.
E.
Plaintiff Is Entitled In Discovery to Documents
Relating to Plea Agreements and Criminal Proceedings
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Defendant asserts that Plaintiff should not be entitled to receive any documents responsive to
her Request nos. 1-4 for the sole reason that these documents would not themselves be admissible
under Fed.R.Evid. 408 and 410. It is well established that broad discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26
should not, without more, be limited on the basis of admissibility at trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (1946
Advisory Committee Note). (Rule 26(b) "may cover not only evidence for use at the trial but also
inquiry into matters in themselves inadmissible as evidence but which will lead to the discovery of
such evidence. The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of
witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his
case"). Accordingly, the fact alone that plea agreements and related documents may not be
admissible at trial is not a basis to deny their production in discovery.2 In Cupac. Inc.'. Mid-West
Agency. Inc. 100 F.R.D. 440 (S.D. Ohio 1983), the Court held on these grounds that a party could
obtain discovery relating to a criminal plea, including the answers to questions asked by the
prosecutor, even though this information would be inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 410. Any
concerns regarding the disclosure of documents responsive to request nos. 1-4 could be addressed in
an appropriate protective order. Plaintiffs and their counsel, however, should have these documents
in discovery.
F.
An In Camera Hearing May Be Appropriate To Determine
Whether Defendant Properly Claims Privilege In
Response To Interrogatories And Document Requests
Given the fact intensive nature of the inquiry into whether a defendant has met his burden in
asserting a privilege against self-incrimination, some courts have conducted in camera, ex pane
hearings to determine whether assertions of the privilege are valid in each instance. See United
'Plaintiff further notes that her document request no. 4 seeks documents obtained in discovery and
investigation of the criminal cases, not documents pertaining to the plea agreement. Accordingly,
Rules 408 and 410 could not serve as a basis to object to these requests.
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States
Duncan, 704 F.Supp 820 (N.D. III. 1989); see also United States'. Wujkowski 929 F.2d
981, 986 (4th Cir. 1991) ("rwie hold only that the district court must undertake a more careful
examination of the documents in question and provide a basis for its findings"). To the extent that
this Court is in doubt as to whether to uphold the Defendant's privilege claim as to any particular
document request or interrogatory, then an in camera hearing would be appropriate.
III.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, and for the reasons stated in Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Answers
to Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and Incorporated Memorandum of Law,
Plaintiff requests that Defendant Epstein be ordered to answer interrogatories and produce
responsive documents.
Dated: April 20, 2009
Respectfully submitted,
By:
s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein
Stuart S. Mermelstein (FL Bar No. 947245)
[email protected]
Adam D. Horowitz (FL Bar No. 376980)
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiff
18205 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2218
Miami, Florida 33160
Tel: 305-931-2200
Fax: 305-931-0877
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I hereby certify that on April 20 2009, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the
Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day
to all parties on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices
of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those parties who
are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.
s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein
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SERVICE LIST
DOE vs. JEFFREY EPSTEIN
United States District Court, Southern District of Florida
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq.
[email protected]
Robert D. Critton, Esq.
[email protected]
s/ Stuart S. Mermelstein
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