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efta-efta01071146DOJ Data Set 9OtherEye on the Market I October 15, 2012
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Eye on the Market I October 15, 2012
J.P.Morgan
Topics of the week: the slight upturn in US leading indicators and the implications for profits; the magnitude of the US
housing recovery; Europe's prize; and US energy independence
We are working on our annual energy issue, which will come out next week. In the meantime, topics that True Believers have
written about that we found interesting: assertions that recent improvement in leading indicators heralds better things ahead for
the global economy and for profits; an article by Roger Altman arguing that the US housing recovery will contribute to a robust
US expansion next year; the belief that the US can become energy independent within 10-15 years; and the view from Oslo that
the European Union merited a Nobel Peace Prize. More below.
The recent improvement in leading indicators: better news for profits and growth ahead?
US and global purchasing manager surveys (PMI surveys) weakened during the summer, but have recently picked up modestly.
Some argue that these changes could arrest the decline in earnings growth in sectors like technology and industrials. This seems
plausible to us, and we believe it is more likely than another leg down in the global economy, which if it happened, would raise
the risk of recession next year. PMI surveys are usually shown as an index level; in the two charts below, we show year on year
changes to get a sense for the turns in the cycle. They tend to precede changes in earnings.
Technology earnings and Global PMI survey
Industrial earnings and Global PMI survey
Percent change. YoY (both axes)
Percent change, YoY (both axes)
80%
100% 80%
80%
Global
Technology
800/6
60% -
Global
Industrial
60%
PMI
EPS
60%
PMI
EPS
40%
40%
4-
-4
40% -
4-
60%
40%
20%
20%
20% -
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
-20%
-20%
-20% -20%
-40%
-40%
-40% -40%
-60%
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Most leading indicators suggest that the world is stuck in a period of low but positive growth, rather than a period of
deteriorating conditions. If so, the recent trend of downward revisions to earnings may come to an end as well, particularly if
leading indicators keep improving. Last week, we discussed competing valuation models on US equities which describe them as
being either very cheap or very expensive. We think the reality is somewhere in between, and that perceptions of value are more
influenced by the lack of fixed income returns than at any time we can remember. This year's equity market gains already factor
in an improvement in economic conditions, profits and politics. On the latter point, markets appear to assume that the US
legislated fiscal consolidation ("fiscal cliff') will be renegotiated from 4.3% of GDP to 1.0%-1.5% of GDP. Our contacts
indicate that this may be premature; we won't know for sure until the lame ducks are quacking.
Positive turn in leading indicators may signal an end to
Global and US manufacturing activity stabilizing
falling earnings expectations
Manufacturing PMI index, 50+=expansion
$128
61 -
$123
$118
$113
$108
$103
S&P 500 estimated
earnings per share
032012e
2013
59
57
55
53
51
49
$98
47
Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Jan-10
Jul-10
Jan-11
Jul-11
Jan-12
Jul-12
I
EFTA01071146
Eye on the Market I October 15, 2012
J.P.Morgan
Topics of the week: the slight upturn in US leading indicators and the implications for profits; the magnitude of the US
housing recovery; Europe's prize; and US energy independence
How large a US housing recovery?
Roger Altman, a former Treasury official and founder of Evercore Partners, wrote an article in the Financial Times arguing that
the US housing recovery would boost the US economy. What caught our eye was the view that housing would contribute 1-2
percentage points to US GDP growth and spark a growth rebound above the Fed's 5-year forecast of 2.5%. To get started, here
are some charts on things we agree with him on: the decline in measured and shadow inventories; an increase in pent-up demand
due to the slowing of household formation relative to population growth; the rise in the affordability of housing compared to
renting; and the increase in the number of banks reporting a rise in residential mortgage demand. We also agree that census data
shows that population growth in the 55+ category (with the highest home ownership rates) is at a 70-year peak.
"Shadow inventory" is steadily declining
Million units
7
Historical
Real estate owned (REO)
6
5
4
3
2
60+ days
delinquent
0
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
Pent-up demand has accumulated
Pent-up dem and for housing, m illi0nS of units
Projected
1.5
Where buying is cheaper than renting
Percent of metropolitan statistical areas
60%
S0%
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
-2.0
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Demand for residential mortgages is improving
%of banks reporting more (less) dem and for res. mortgages
80
60
40
40%
20
0
-20
20%
-40
-60
-80
0%
100
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
1991
1994
1997
2000
2003
2006
2009
2012
So urce:J.P. Morgan Securities LLC. AxioMetrics, CoreLogic FHLMC.
30%
10%
‘1
However, we are having trouble making Altman's math work when it comes to the contribution to overall GDP growth.
As shown in the first chart below, there are only a couple of times when housing contributes 1-2 percentage points to growth, the
most notable being the post-war period of rapid household formation by returning war veterans. Even during the 2000's housing
boom, it was only around half a percentage point. Part of why Altman's forecast may be difficult to hit is the decline in the
share of housing in GDP, shown in the second chart below. Altman cites a Barclay's forecast that Case-Shiller home prices will
reach their pm-crisis peak by 2015 (3s chart). Anything is possible, but given tighter credit standards (4ih chart), a recovery in
prices will have to rely more on income growth than a rapid expansion in credit. This is highlighted by the divergence between
reported home sales (rising) and the mortgage application index (still close to its lowest levels, no sign of a rebound).
We appreciate the multiplier benefits that could be derived from a continued recovery in housing, but are keeping expectations
in check for next year. Even if legislated fiscal tightening for 2013 is postponed, GDP growth substantially above 2.5% seems
like a tall order. By the way, there are interesting opportunities in the rental markets for investors: in some regions, the gap
between current rental yields and after-tax 30-year mortgage costs is the highest on record (since 1971).
2
EFTA01071147
Eye on the Market I October 15, 2012
J.P.Morgan
Topics of the week: the slight upturn in US leading indicators and the implications for profits; the magnitude of the US
housing recovery; Europe's prize; and US energy independence
Housing rarely contributes 1-2 % points to GDP growth
Residential investment contribution to real GDP growth. ppts
2.5
2.0
7-
1.5
Share of housing in GDP at lowest levels since pre-war era
Residential investment. percent of GDP
8
0.5
6-
1.0
5-
1 1/
I
•1.0
I
-1.5
4 -
3
-2.0
0
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Barclays home price forecast cited by Altman
Higher FICO scores required for obtaining a new mortgage
Index. 2006m 1=100
Average FICO score of mortgage originations
105
770
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Sou ce: Federal Housing FinanoeAgency.S8P.CoreLogic.
CoreLogic
750
730
710
690
670
650
630
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2000
Sou ce:J.P.MorganSecurtiesLLC. McDash Onina Data as of August.
US energy independence within the next 10-15 years? Yes, it's possible, depending on how you define it
More on this next week. but depending on your definition of energy independence, a combination of supply and demand factors
has the potential to substantially reduce US oil imports. The chart shows our estimates of these factors. Reduced US oil import
needs that can be sustained by neighboring countries
may result in: (a) the era of US foreign policy being
What US energy independence might look like
US net crude oil imports, million barrels perday
heavily dictated by energy security coming to an
end. and (b) substantial growth, employment and
10
currency benefits from a shift to domestically
9
sourced production. We are not arguing that such
8
trends will bring down oil prices. since other
7
consumers (e.g., China) are likely to see continued
6
increases in demand. Next week, we will walk
5
through each segment of the chart in detail as part of
4
our annual energy outlook, along with a look at how
3
Europe and Japan are defining energy independence
2
quite differently. with much greater planned
contributions from renewable energy (specifically,
0
offshore wind). Also, an update on the latest news
on electric cars (which in 2012 was not very good).
I
I
F-^i
i
1
4 I
I
Oil Imported for refined product
Displaced by Natural Gas
Reduced consumption: CAFE
and Auto Replacement Cycle
Net increase in domestic
exports
Vehicles
standards
production
CoUBrazIl
Net
Imports
Net
Imports
Canada
2012
2025
Current US
Projection
imports
3
EFTA01071148
Eye on the Market I October 15, 2012
J.P.Morgan
Topics of the week: the slight upturn in US leading indicators and the implications for profits; the magnitude of the US
housing recovery; Europe's prize; and US energy independence
The European Union, the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize
Normally, peace prizes lay outside the realm of investment discussions. But in this case, politics and economics collide. The
Nobel committee lauded the European Union for bringing peace to a continent at war. An understandable point of view, but it is
this kind of thinking that elevates the Euro to a project that must be preserved at all costs. Such arguments have always puzzled
me. By 1954, Germany had already become a stable, liberal, democratic society, one of the most amazing transformations in
history given what preceded it ten years earlier. One can argue whether the Marshall Plan, in avoiding the reparations policies
following WWI, paved the way for this or not. In any case, it seems indisputable that conditions for a lasting peace in Europe
were already in place by 1954, a point of view explained by Stanford's James Sheehan in "Where have all the soldiers gone:
The Transformation of Modern Europe". The notion that the Euro is needed to cement these gains appears to be more about the
ambition of specific political movements in Europe/Brussels than anything else. Nevertheless, Europe soldiers on with its
project, out of the belief that a single-currency monetary union must exist in order to reap the benefits of a common European
consciousness. The irony of the Nobel Peace Prize for Europe is that as shown below, it comes at a time of rising social stress.
There are of course those who believe that the Euro itself has contributed to these developments: it distorted the regional current
accounts and encouraged consumption not funded by national income in the South, exaggerated the severity of the recession,
and then prevented currency adjustments which mitigated Southern European recessions in the past.
Europe's Nobel Peace Prize comes at a challenging titne for the region
Election results of extremist right-wing parties in selected Ell member countries, national parliamentary elections
Using the definition of extremism as applied by the Friedrich EbertFoundation in its 2011 analysis: see notes below.
35%
Periods shown: 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000.2004. 2005-2009 and 2010-2012
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0°/
Belgium
Denmark
France
Greece
Italy
Norway
Nether!
Austria
Switzer!
extremism and right-wing popuism in Europe'. Lan g enbacher an d Schellenberg. Friedrich Ebert Stinting (Friedrich Ebert Foundation). 2011. Established in
1925. the FES is thepolitical legacy of Friedrich Ebert. Germany's li rst d °mimetically elected President. and has offices in 90 countries worldwide.
Measuring the social fabric in Europe through Google
A poll of European citizenry, conducted by the EU:
Searches, Index, Max Search Volume= 100
"Do you have trust in the European Union?"
90
60
80
Greece
Depression
55
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Catalonia
Independence
In 8 ra- 8
"
00000333
N N N N N N N N
von
N. CO Oa.-
CV
OOOOOO.-
OOOOOOOOO
CV CV C•INC•INCMCN1
Spain Riots
0
CD CD CD CD CD 0 0 ;13
cm cm
cm
cm
cm
cm
cm
cm
C4
50
45
40
35
30
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Sou ce: 'Public Opinion in the European Union", Standard Eurobarometer 77.
Spring 2012.
4
EFTA01071149
Eye on the Market I October 15, 2012
J.P.Morgan
Topics of the week: the slight upturn in US leading indicators and the implications for profits: the magnitude of the US
housing recovery; Europe's prize; and US energy independence
An investments perspective: the improvement in
European credit and equity markets has been substantial in
recent weeks, a reaction to the ECB plan to effectively
prevent any sovereign or bank defaults by printing money
and monetizing government debt. However, in the absence
of a full fiscal transfer union funded by Germany, prices
for equity, credit and real estate in Europe need to be low
enough to compensate for the risk that growth does not
return soon enough. Case in point: we didn't start looking
at European equities as being interesting again until earlier
this year, when they reached a 40-year low in terms of
relative valuation vs US equities (see composite price-
dividend, price-earnings and price-book chart). After the
recent rally, this gap has narrowed, but not by very much.
Michael Cembalest
J.P. Morgan Asset Management
European equity discount to US: as bad as it gets?
Com posite premiiinkliscoirit using PIE, P/8 and P/Dividend
10%
0%
•10% -
-30%
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
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