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efta-efta01071164DOJ Data Set 9OtherEye on the Market I
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Eye on the Market I
October 24, 2011
J.P.Morgan
Topic: A biological look at the latest attempt to resolve the European Monetary Union debt crisis; US Q3 earnings
The EMU (technical name: Economic and Monetary Union, common name: European Monetary Union) is beginning to bear
more and more resemblance to its aviary twin: the flightless, awkward, and bumbling' emu (drornaius novaehollandiae).
Europe's long-awaited sovereign and bank bailout package will soon attempt liftoff; we will know more after yet another
summit on Wednesday. There are flaws that may weigh this emu down, as annotated in the picture below. Why is this so
important? Bank recaps in Sweden (`92), the US ('92, '08), Japan ('99) and Asia ('98) were close to marking the bottom of
the equity market cycle....but were not designed using the equivalent of the "Goal Seek" function in Microsoft Excel.
Will the EMU bailout fly? The annotated version
For purposes of determining bank capital needs. the EU is NOT going to apply
a stress test per se, but a simple mark-to-market exercise on sovereign
bonds. That's why reported recap needs are only 75-100 bn Euros. Using mark-
to-market levels is less conservative than prior EBA sovereign loss assumptions.
and the planned exercise does not assign loss estimates to corporate. household
and commercial property loans. The process appears Goal-Seeked to maximize
EFSF proceeds available to backstop sovereign debt la.bl.
Demand (depth. pricing) for Italian or Spanish bonds with a first-
loss guarantee from the EFSF is unproven
EFSF direct guarantees could be a possible
violation of EMU bailout restrictions [c]
►
Risks to France's AAA rating from
the extension of too many guarantees to
either the EFSF or its own banks idl
No stress test this time. but we still have
reservations about the prior one. as it
only assumed 1.3% for household.
corporate and commercial property loan
losses over 2 years. This compares to the
current market-implied loss rates of
3.4%. and the US May 2009 Stress Test
assumption of 9%. German bank
exposure to GIPSI sovereign debt is 1/5th
of their exposure to non-sovereign GIPSI
debt. so these assumptions matter.
particularly with a recession looming.
Markets might require a higher degree of bailout
/
package "coverage" of Italian and Spanish
financing needs in 2012 and 2013 (see page 3)
A recession, perhaps confirmed by today's
0,7
7 weak NMI survey (Germany was the only
bright spot), could result in higher than
expected deficits, increasing government
financing needs beyond current expectations Eel
Deutsche Bank CEO Ackermann warned that if
f
asked to substantially raise capital ratios. EU
banks might shrink their loan books by 1
trillion instead of raising equity. possibly
exacerbating a recession
20% might be insufficient for a first-loss guarantee.
given historical Moody's recovery rates of 53% for
defaulting sovereigns
If less than 50% debt forgiveness is used for Greece in
÷__._--------
order to avoid triggering CDS contracts, the exercise
may lose credibility In
ECB might be asked to print hundreds of billions of Euros
to purchase debt in secondary markets, or finance some
other entity that does, exceeding ECB, Bundesbank or
public tolerance for monetary expansion
4--- -- - Orwellian proposals by EU regulators to limit the ability
of rating agencies to act during "inappropriate moments"
borders on the bizarre, could further concern investors [gi
Emu notes
lal Using the prior EBA stress test and a 9% Tier 1 ratio would result in a capital shortfall of 150 billion, even after including the conversion
benefit of convertible bonds and the use of existing loan loss reserves, and without applying sovereign losses to the hold to maturity book.
(b] In prior stress tests, the European Banking Authority only applied loss assumptions to bonds in the trading book. The EBA now appears
ready to assume losses on hold-to-maturity and available-for-sale bonds as well, but with a kinder, gentler loss percentage assumption.
Direct first-loss guarantees from the EFSF may run afoul of Article 125 of the Lisbon Treaty which prohibits member states from being
liable for commitments of other states. There are viable alternatives that get to the same place: a country could borrow from the EFSF and
place borrowed funds into escrow (collateralizing the guarantee), or purchase zero coupon bonds.
[d] With 84% debt to GDP (gross government debt), a large current account deficit, rigid labor markets, lost export competitiveness to
Germany and low growth, France is flirting with a downgrade. France is already highly taxed (government revenues and expenditures are
already at Nordic levels), making deficit reduction a difficult exercise. EFSF commitments from France are another 8.4% of GDP. S&P
wrote last week that a recession in Europe could usher in a round of downgrades for European sovereigns, including France.
lel Recent example: Spain, where flow of funds data suggest that the budget deficit could be 8.6% in 2011, higher than the targeted 6%.
19 Less debt forgiveness raise the chances of a voluntary restructuring, which would avoid triggering credit default swap contracts. Larger
losses are likely to mean that the restructuring is involuntary.
[g] "In order to prevent that credit rating agencies issue sovereign ratings which do no accurately reflect the situation of the country
concerned and would cause negative spillover effects to other countries, ESMA should be granted the power to temporarily restrict the
issuance of credit ratings in exceptional, precisely defined situations" [EU regulatory draft as reported by the Financial Times]. I
remember reading articles like this in Pravda in 1982.
Professor Louis Lefebvre at McGill University in Montreal has compiled a Bird IQ Index. The emu (and its cousin the ostrich) rank at the
bottom of the list. At the top: crows, ravens, falcons, hawks, woodpeckers and herons.
1
EFTA01071164
Eye on the Market I
October 24, 2011
J.P.Morgan
Topic: A biological look at the latest attempt to resolve the European Monetary Union debt crisis; US Q3 earnings
We consider the universe of oversold European stocks mentioned 2 weeks ago, and portfolios of loans sold by deleveraging
European banks at deep discounts, as the best value in Europe. We are not positioning for a broader recovery in European
financial assets, and retain our overweight to the US. Q3 S&P 500 earnings look to be around 14%2 vs 2010, continuing the run
of US corporate profits growth to a new all-time high. As a reminder, profits are holding up since manufacturing is 60% of
the S&P 500 (compared to 15% of the US economy), and labor costs are at their lowest levels in 50 years relative to
revenues. There are some negative trends in play: both margins and earnings surprises are beginning to flatten out. In addition,
estimates for Q1 2012 profits have fallen from 10.2% y/y on October 3 to 7.6%, consistent with declines in manufacturing and
service sector surveys. Silver lining: there's room for disappointment when the S&P is priced at 11 times earnings. Left
to its own devices, we expect the S&P to close up on the year, but the situation in Europe and the outcome of the US Joint
Select Committee on Deficit Reduction are two substantial wild cards.
The other animal of the week: the Sloth
We had a client conference in Istanbul two weeks ago. Iliad the opportunity to interview Jin Liqun, the Chairman of the Board
of Supervisors of China Investment Corporation. Most of the discussion focused on the challenges that CIC faces in investing
its accumulated reserves at a time of fiscal and economic weakness in the West. Normally I would not disclose comments made
in a closed session, but as reported below by the London Telegraph, Mr. Jin made the following comments, which were similar
to what he said at our conference in Istanbul:
Oct. 20 (Telegraph) -- Britain's "sloth-inducing" work ethic and dependence on benefits are to blame for the current economic
downturn, a senior Chinese official has claimed. Jin Liqun, chairman of China Investment Corporation (CIC), the nation's sovereign
wealth fund, warned that Europeans should "work a bit harder" if they want to pull the Eurozone out of recession. He said people in the
West are too reliant on welfare payments and the benefits system, looking for external solutions to the debt crisis rather than tackling
the problem from within. Mr Jin also said the long-term economic slide could only be solved by amending the restrictive labour laws
that mean Western workers are unable to compete in global markets....."The root cause of the trouble is the over-burdened welfare
system, built up since the Second World War in Europe — the sloth-inducing, indolence-inducing labour laws. People need to
work a bit harder, they need to work a bit longer, and they should be more innovative. We (the Chinese) work like crazy.
European countries have a lot of advantages. They just need to tap these advantages and they will be back on their feet."
Ouch. For the benefit of our urban clients, a sloth (megalonychidae) is a slow-moving, tree-dwelling animal that sleeps 15
hours a day and is covered in beetles. There are many ways to react to this: a wake-up call for the West; an unfair diatribe,
given China's currency intervention which arguably contributes to the economic challenges facing the US and Europe; or a
reflection of inevitable wage convergence, driven by 2.6 billion people in China and India entering the global workforce after
decades of self-imposed isolation. Whatever the truth is, Jin's comments seem in sync with other Chinese assessments of
Western fiscal policies (see August 6th article in Xinhua: "China, the largest creditor of the world's sole superpower, has every
right now to demand the United States address its structural debt problems and ensure the safety of China's dollar assets.").
To stress-test Jin's assertion, we recreated a chart from Eugene Steuerle, former Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary for Tax
Analysis, now with the Urban Institute. He calls the chart a measure of "fiscal democracy": the degree to which Congress can
spend revenues not already committed to mandatory programs.
A measure of Fiscal Democracy shows there isn't much
In 2009, for the first time, all US government revenue was
% of U.S. govemmentrevenue not already committed to
pre-committed to mandatory spending (social security,
mandatoryprograms
healthcare entitlements, farm subsidies, unemployment
70%
insurance) and interest. After a brief rise over the next couple
60%
of years (due to projected declines in unemployment insurance),
SO%
it is estimated by the CBO to fall back to zero again. The chart
40%
confirms the post-war shift to a more entitlement-heavy
30%
economy, a shift former U.S. Comptroller David Walker
20%
describes as crowding out the kind of productive discretionary
10%
spending needed for the US to compete against China and India.
0%
Michael Cembalest
-1 o%
Chief Investment Officer
1962 1968 1974 1980 1986 1992 1998 2004 2010 2016
Solace< COO, J.P. Morgan Private Bank.
2 S&P 500 earnings for the third quarter look to be overstated by 3%-4% due to "debt valuation adjustments" by banks. These adjustments
require banks to mark some of their own debt issuance to market. As a result, when their spreads widened in Q3, it resulted in a gain on their
income statements (when spreads rally, banks record a loss); Bank of America and Morgan Stanley had the largest ones. Looking forward,
C&I loan volumes and credit quality are now improving, providing some support for better organic bank profitability in 2012.
2
EFTA01071165
Eye on the Market I
October 24, 2011
J.P. Morgan
Topic: A biological look at the latest attempt to resolve the European Monetary Union debt crisis; US Q3 earnings
Appendix. Here is an abbreviated version of the model we use to assess the adequacy of the European Financial Stability
Facility. There are multiple scenarios; we show a few of them below. The bottom line is that the proposed package appears to
just about cover contingent funding needs for Spain and Italy through 2013, assuming that Germany and France recap their own
banks and don't draw on the EFSF to do so; and assuming that T-bills do not need any backstop. IMF participation would
further increase the EFSF's potential capacity. Throwing 2014 into the mix, adding Belgium, or requiring a larger (more
realistic) bank recap makes the math more difficult, and results in coverage ratios close to 1.0x. The best scenario is the one
where all countries are assuming to return to debt markets in 2013, the 20% first loss guarantee works and the IMF helps out.
EFSF vivisection table
Eur bn
Line Item
1 Bilateral funds available
500
2 Disbursed so far to Ireland and Portgual
37
3 To be disbursed to Ireland and Portgual
55
4 To be disbursed to Greece post-default
50
5 Funds remaining
358
6 Funds required for bank recap
44
7 Funds remaining
314
8 First loss guarantee from EFSF
30%
9 Implied sovereign issuance capacity
1.047
10 Funding needs for Spain and Italy
11 Funding needs for Spain and Italy
Other scenarios
12 What if Belgium is included as well?
13 What if total bank recap needs were 150 bn instead?
14 What if the IMF covered the bank recap for the periphery?
15 What if a 20% guarantee worked?
16 What if 2014 had to be covered as well?
17 Larger bank recap. 2014 coverage needed for Sp/BeVIt
18 20% EFSF guarantee. IMF help. thru 2013 only
Comment
EFSF plus original EFSM
Greece disbursements have not impacted the EFSF: Greece was funded through
other bilateral and IMFprograms whose unspent balances are assumed to expire
Through the end of 2013
The July 2011 109 billion package wont be needed if Greece defaults. but monies
will still be needed to recapitalize banks. insurance companies. pensions. etc.
Also includes next 8 billion disbursement
After incorporating pier and future disbursements
As of right now, we are assuming a total new recap effort of 75 bn. after some
massive window-dressing by the EBA (see EMU on page 1). The 100 bn number
mentioned in the press might include monies already pledged to Ireland. Greece
and Portugal. so we reduced the figure to 76 bn. In our model. France and
Germany assumed to recap their own banks. further reducing the drawdovm needed
from the EFSF to 44 bn
After incorporating prior and future disbursements and bank recap
We do not think a 20% guarantee would be sufficient
Total debt that periphery countnes could issue with EFSF guarantees
Coy.
988
1.1 Through 2013. including 7-bills
750
1.4 Through 2013. excluding T-bills
1.2 Relative to line 11
1.2 Relative to line 11
1.6 Relative to line 11
1.9 Relative to line 11
0.9 Relative to line 11
0.8
2.4 Relative to line 11
EFSF = European financial stability facility; EFSM = European financial stabilization mechanism; EBA = European Banking Authority
EMU = European monetary union (the common name); ECB = European central bank; CBO = Congressional budget office;
CDS = Credit default swaps; ESMA = European Securities and Markets Authority
London Telegraph article: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8837768/Britons-are-lazy-and-addicted-to-benefits-China-claims.html
Xinhua article: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-08/06/c 131032986.htm
The material contained herein is intended as a general market commentary. Opinions expressed herein are those of Michael Cembalest and may differ from those of other J.P.
Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan research and should not be treated as such. Further. the views expressed herein may
differ front that contained in J.P. Morgan research reports. The above summary/prices/quotes/statistics have been obtained from sources deemed to be reliable. but we do not
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