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Eye on the Market I October 31. 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
Some of our clients have suffered temporary or permanent damage from the storm. Please let your J.P. Morgan team
know if there are ways they can help. It's a bit early to draw too many conclusions, but here are some thoughts on the
economic and civil engineering aspects of the storm:
•
Comments on CNBC about positive multiplier effects from the storm defy the laws of economics. Natural disasters can
change the contours of spending and investment (lower than trend today, higher than trend for a few months afterwards), but
in general, natural disasters which destroy the capital stock are bad, not good'. Only in cases where a country responds
to a disaster by radically improving productivity through innovation and more advanced technology could the balance be
positive (along the lines of Joseph Schumpeter's theory of "creative destruction"). The best that most developed countries
can shoot for is to re-attain pre-disaster growth levels as soon as possible, which the US has had a habit of doing.
•
Japan is a good example: industrial production collapsed and then rose sharply after the tsunami, but has since resumed its
downward trend. As per last week's energy piece, Japan's transition from nuclear to offshore wind is not likely to yield
creative destruction benefits.
•
Early estimates of the cost of Hurricane Sandy are —$20-$25 billion. Measuring natural disaster costs relative to GDP
makes more sense than simply adjusting over time for inflation. As shown below, Sandy ranks with more severe hurricanes,
but well below Katrina and Andrew even if cost estimates rise from current levels. The long-run economic impacts should
not be very large if history is any guide.
•
However, there are some things for New York to think about: it has the worst "wealth to flood protection" ratio in
the world. Studies by the OECD2 analyzed 136 coastal cities around the world with at least 1 million inhabitants. As
shown in the table, Greater New York was #2 in terms of assets exposed to coastal flooding, only behind Miami. And more
ominously, Amsterdam and Rotterdam are protected to a flood standard of the most severe storm every 10,000 years;
Tokyo, Shanghai and London are protected to a 1,000 year standard; Osaka to a 300 year standard; and New York only to a
standard of 100 years. If the UK is any example, it takes time to change: the Thames Barrier was 30 years in the making.
•
While electricity outages in metropolitan areas are mostly a function of coastal flooding, millions of suburban and rural
customers are without power due to downed electrical wires. This has always struck me as a 19th-century kind of
problem. These instances would be dramatically reduced if power lines and transformers were buried underground.
However, the costs of underground electricity distribution systems can be 4-6 times higher than overhead wires. Can these
costs be justified by the associated benefits: reduced repair costs after storms, fewer car accidents involving utility poles,
reduced tree trimming costs and lower electricity line losses? Not really; in 2005, Virginia estimated the benefits of burying
power lines and transformers as being only 40% of the $10 billion cost. Only if you are willing to assume large increases in
property values can the numbers be made to work. Most US states that looked at this have come to similar conclusions.
The
Total
1.0%
15 costliest mainland US tropical cyclones
estimated damage, percent of GDP
Flood protection standard
Cities ranked by assets exposed
worst storm per ft of years
to coastal flooding (bn, 2007$)
'05
Amsterdam
1:10,000
Miami
416
0.8% •
Rotterdam
1:10,000
New York
320
Shanghai
1:1,000
New Orleans
234
0.6% •
London
1:1,000
Osaka-Kobe
216
0.4% •
Tokyo
1:1,000
Tokyo
174
0.2% •
'12 '04 .66 '89 '
'11 79 '70 '01
Osaka
1:300
Amsterdam
128
New York
1:100
Rotterdam
115
0.0%
•
• El
Nagoya
109
Guangzhou
84
Shanghai
73
University of Southampton (UK) and OECD: see footnote 2
os gia• E gt. 5;
34 tio
i
cy
cE
5 cl' ir2
.
0
0
The Summer 2011 issue of International Economy Magazine had an article on the impact of natural disasters on growth, and the majority
of contributors shared this point of view.
2 "Ranking of the world's cities most exposed to coastal flooding", 2007, and "A global ranking of port cities with high exposure to climate
extremes", 2009. both from the OECD and the School of Civil Engineering and the Environment, University of Southampton (UK).
EFTA01071186
Eye on the Market I October 31 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
OK, now for my list of demands. Each is related to the investment outlook for 2013 and beyond.
Demand #1: More disclosure by US firms on non-US operations as global growth cools off
The current mix of leading indicators is a mixed bag. The US is growing at 2% with the help of very easy monetary policy (10-
yr interest rates below the rate of inflation) and easy fiscal policy (9% budget deficit). Elsewhere, China, Korea and Taiwan are
getting a bit better, but Europe is still weak (German IFO survey, Euro/German PMI survey, etc.) As for France, its economy is
reacting to its new President the way a French family I once lived with reacted when I put barbecue sauce on salad (2" chart).
More on this next time, but France is the closest thing in the world to a worker's utopia', which is expensive to maintain.
Manufacturing: stable in US; improving in China; sluggish
in Euro area, Flash Markit Manufacturing PMI
60
58
56
54
52
50
48
46
44
Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep•11 Jan-12 May-12 Sep-12
Apr-11
France: Apres Sarkozy, le Deluge?
Business confidence
plunges 22 points
Job seekers rise
a" 13% (inverted)
PMI survey
falls from
57 to 42
Export growth falls
from 13% to 4%
Jan-11
Jul-11
OCt-11
Jan-12
Apr-12
Jul-12
Hollande takes
14% lead over
Sarkozy in 2nd
round poll
Ministers du Travail et de IsEmplol.
So urce: HSBC, Markit, J.P. Morgan Asset Management.
We introduced the next chart 2 years ago when corporate profits started outperforming GDP by a margin we hadn't seen before.
The primary contributors to earnings outperformance: weak labor compensation, and rising profit contributions from outside the
US. However, with the summer slowdowns in Europe, China and Japan, this factor has been working in reverse, leading
to negative US earnings guidance for Q4 2012. 56 companies provided Q4 guidance, and 47 were negative (mostly tech and
consumer discretionary). Street estimates for these companies were -9% higher than guidance provided. While most companies
provide regional revenue breakdowns, they are often bucketed into "Americas", "Europe" and "Asia". That doesn't help much
when there are huge differences between Mexico and the US, Spain and Germany, and China and Taiwan. A more detailed
breakdown would help analysts so that some earnings surprises wouldn't be such a surprise. While earnings growth is slowing,
Q3 was not a disaster; S&P earnings are down —I% vs 2011. There were larger disappointments on sales, offset by companies
managing expenses and increasing share repurchases (the S&P share count divisor shrunk for the 5th quarter in a row).
Unusual period of earnings outperformance ending
US foreign-sourced corporate profits
Percent of GDP
16.6x
3.0% -
Ratio of 2-year earnings growth to 2-year nominal GDP growth
15x
10x
Average peak: 2.1x
•10x
1952
1960
1968
1976
1984
1992
2000
2008
Sou ce: S&P, BEA, JPMAM.
Average peak:4.2x
2.5% ^
2.0% -
1.5% -
1.0% -
0.5%
0.0%
1947
1960
1973
1986
1999
2012
We need to see a more decisive upturn in non-US leading indicators to anticipate higher US profits momentum next year. The
good news: companies have reduced inventories in response to lower growth, setting the stage for a possible rebound in the
spring. As the year comes to a close, the S&P 500 at 1,400 is 13 times 2013 earnings. If earnings are re-converging to nominal
US GDP growth, that's about as high as I would expect them to get until a stronger recovery is more evident.
3 Scanning the world, France ranks at or near the top in government transfers to households, vacation times and labor market rigidity, and at
or near the bottom in hours worked per week, labor force participation rates and retirement age as a % of life expectancy.
EFTA01071187
Eye on the Market I October 31 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
Demand #2: The CBO should stop publishing its Baseline Case for US Federal Debt since it is increasingly preposterous
The US business sector would be relieved if the fiscal cliff were dispensed with after the election, based on all the letters to
Washington pleading for this to happen. Some believe that this could jump-start business capital spending, which has fallen
sharply (although part of the decline was related to a massive, still-unexplained decline in orders for I-IVAC equipment).
Capital spending slows; fiscal cliff responsible?
Bilrions.2005$
Composite index of Federal Reserve surveys
80
Planned capex
75
70
65
60
55
50
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
60
50
40
30
20
10
The fiscal cliff, in billions and percentage of GDP
Increased Revenues from:
I fl glslated
#1
#2
Expking payroll tax holiday
115
115
115
Expiring personal tax provisions
27
Expking business tax provisions
75
New healthcare taxes
24
24
24
Alternative Mninbm Tax
40
Expiring 2001/2003 Upper income tax relief
83
83
Bcpiring 2001/2003 remaining tax relief
171
Total Increase in revenues
535
222
139
Reduced Expenditures from:
Lower Medicare physician reimbursement
14
Ending extension of unenpbymeni bane! its
33
33
33
BCA spending reductions (Sequester)
85
Total expenditure reductions
132
I
33
I
33
Total fiscal adjustment
667
255
172
Total fiscal adjustment (%GCP)
4.3%
1.6%
1.1%
,,,,, sv •
. sine. -•
•
.flan tee. v....an.
Defusing the fiscal cliff (possibly through iterations #1 and #2 in the grid) would help growth in 2013. However, it would
contribute to rising Federal debt unless the growth payoff was huge. As a result, the business sector is also requesting that
something be done about the long-term fiscal outlook. Eighty US CEOs published a letter last week calling for Washington to
strike a long-term fiscal "grand bargain" that includes higher tax revenues (but not in 2013). In that context, here's our updated
Federal debt chart. The outer contours of the wedge represent the Congressional Budget Office Baseline Case and Alternative
Case. The problem with the Baseline Case is that while it represents "current law", it has become increasingly preposterous, as
it includes items that Congress passed but has been deferring for a decade (changes to the Alternative Minimum Tax and
Medicare reimbursements), and a wholesale resumption of 2001 tax rates that Congress has no intention of implementing. The
CBO should just stop publishing it, or put a unicorn next to it as an indication of how likely it is to happen.
US long-term debt scenarios
Netdebt to GDP, percent
All tax cuts and subsidies extended, MIT and medicare
• patches continue, no BCA sequester
70% -
60% •
CBOAlternative Case ••
•
it • • • • • •
•
•
•
•
•
•
• For AGI > $250k, tax rates return to 2001 levels
• President's budgetas written: forAG1> S250k;
• Tax
to 2001
tax dividends
rates return
levels,
as ordinary
income, tax LTCG at 20% other deduction and exemption
limits (PEP/Pease)
• Limit the tax value of itemized deductions to 28%
' New tax on municipal bond income, contributions to
50% •
CBO Baseline: Tax rates return to 2001
401k pla ns, a nd all health insurance premiums paid by
levels; AMT exemption no longer indexed
employees and employers (taxed at difference between
40% •
to inflation; Medicare reimbursement cuts
taxpayer's top statutory rate and 28%)
301Y
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022
to Doctors proceed; BCA cuts proceed
' Bring estate tax exemption and rates back to 2009 levels
A President's budget as written + BCA Sequester
What might a second Obama administration do about this? The President's proposal shown by the purple square stabilizes
the Federal debt over a ten-year horizon according to CBO forecasts, and does so almost entirely through higher taxation of
families with more than $250,000 in adjusted gross income. The plan does not appear to be politically feasible, even if there is a
Democratic sweep. If the President is re-elected and only manages to pass increases in tax rates on the top two brackets, then as
shown by the green diamond, the impact on the long-term debt is more modest. As we briefly mentioned last week, the
President's tax plan (if enacted) would raise effective tax rates on high net worth families by 4% to 12%, based on some
demographic examples we examined.
4 There are those who believe that the Fed could just write off the Treasuries that it owns. This view has been advanced by Ron Paul in H.R.
2768, and seconded by his ideological opposite Dean Baker, ultra-progressive founder of the Center for Economic and Policy Research. The
economists that I trust the most describe the idea as "ludicrous".
3
EFTA01071188
Eye on the Market I October 31 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
As for Romney, there is no dot to plot given a lack of specifics. The candidate has proposed cutting tax rates and broadening
the base by reducing itemized deductions. However, the Tax Policy Center concluded that reducing tax rates by 20% would
result in lost revenue that is 3x higher than revenue gained by limiting itemized deductions at $25k. Romney also mentioned
cutting discretionary spending by 5%, which would most likely fall on non-defense spending as a 10% cut. However, the first
phase of the Budget Control Act already brings non-defense discretionary spending well below the lowest level in 40 years. As
a result, like Obama's tax-the-mass-affluent plan, Romney's idea of further non-defense cuts may not be politically feasible.
As a result, we don't have much insight on a Romney long-term debt outlook, other than the notion that pro-growth policies will
reduce the debt. Before you dismiss this, it is exactly what happened during the 1950's, when US debt/GDP fell from 80%
to 40%. The popular myths as to how this happened are wrong: as shown below, government expenditures were not gutted;
tax receipts did not rise sharply; the government did not inflate the debt away (inflation was -2%); and the Fed did not rely on
Greenspan-Bernanke market manipulation (ten year Treasuries were above the rate of inflation). The economy grew its way
out, as 4.3% real growth solved the debt problem through rising growth instead of falling debt. Whether pro-business policies
like those enacted by Eisenhower can accomplish the same result again is part of what the current election is about. It's
also about the chart next to the table, showing that close to 100% of government revenues are already committed to entitlement
programs, other mandatory programs and interest. The President's signature health care bill expanded the entitlement system,
whereas his opponents have mentioned (in very abstract terms) efforts to reduce it.
1950's Federal debt reduction relied on growth, not austerity,
inflation, taxation or artificall low interest rates
Net debt Net debt
GDP
(bn)
Nominal
GDP bn
Real
Outlays% Receipts
GDP bn of GDP
%ititGDP
Real 10 year
Trees rate
110%
80%
$219
$273
$273
16%
14%
100%
1950
1.3%
1951
67%
$214
$320
$302
14%
16%
-5.3%
90%
1952
62%
$215
$349
$322
19%
19%
0.5%
59%
$218
$373
$341
21%
19%
2.0%
80%
1953
1954
60%
$224
$377
$343
19%
19%
2.1%
70%
1955
57%
$227
$396
$354
17%
17%
3.1%
60%
1956
52%
$222
$427
$368
17%
18%
1.7%
1957
49%
$219
$451
$377
17%
18%
0.3%
50%
1958
49%
$226
$460
$377
18%
17%
0.6%
40%
1959
48%
$235
$490
$398
19%
16%
3.3%
46%
$237
$519
$415
18%
18%
2.7%
30%
1960
1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
Comp. ann'l gr:
0.8%
6.6%
4.3%
Sources:0UB. BEA. Acton SanerOm sec Bureau se Labor &MIMICS.
Percent of US government revenue already committed to
mandatory programs and interest expense
Demand #3: China should clean up contradictions in its reported data particularly as growth is slowing
There have been press articles on the accuracy of Chinese
Chinese equity valuations a shadow of their former
dates, an important discussion given the debate about
selves, Price to trailing earnings
Chinese growth. China is partly to blame; measures of
60 -
GDP, retail sales, electricity consumption, industrial profits
-
and fixed asset investment from China's National Bureau of
50
Statistics are at times internally inconsistent (i.e.,
40 -
extrapolations of monthly results from YTD data do not
match those from year-on-year data). China also just
30 -
reported the 9th quarter in a row of a magically unchanged
20 -
unemployment rate (4.1%), and still does not report
quarterly components of GDP (consumption, investment,
10 -
etc) which are only provided annually. There are lots of
factors involved, but these issues might be contributing to
the apparently structural decline in Chinese P/E. These
2001
zoos
issues did not matter much to investors in 2007, but as
Chinese growth has slowed down, many people are taking a
closer look at the numbers.
Shanghai
Composite Index
2005
2007
2009
2012
5 US data is considered much more reliable, but last month, Jack Welch described a report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as "downright
implausible" due to the spike in the number of people working part-time. and the increase in the number of government workers.
4
EFTA01071189
Eye on the Market
October 31. 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
Given these concerns, a cottage industry has arisen which looks at contemporaneous, high-frequency Chinese data to see
if it matches up with GDP. The grid below is part of what we look at (it doesn't make sense to just pick one of these and
obsess on it, which some people do with electricity production). In aggregate, these data points tell a story of an economy that
slowed this year but is now stabilizing, albeit at a reduced level of growth (around 7%), and with the help of government
infrastructure spending (China ran a 600 bn RMB budget surplus through September, and intends on having an 800 bn RMB
deficit through December). This may explain why some of our EM hedge fund managers have just turned positive on China
equities. While Chinese growth is stable, there's a big difference between 7% and 10% for the rest of the world.
High-frequency complements to Chinese GDP data
EM domestic demand has held up well
Real retail sales growth, 3m/3m annualized %change
Cement production
15
Container throughput
13
Electricity consumption
&ports
11
Floor space started
9
Fighway freight
7
Hong Kong Lu*iry sales
HSBC Manuf. survey
Macau gaming revenue
Passenger car sales
Rail freight
Steel production
Waterway freight
Latest read
Irrprmement in Aug/Sep to normal pace
Small irrprovement in Sep
No growth
Small irrprovement in Aug/Sep
Very volatile. weak after summer rebound
Irrprmement in Aug/Sep
Flat vs large gains in 2009.2011
Flat. no improvement all year
Flat vs large gains in 2009.2011
Still weak after large gain in '09 and smaller
gain in 2010 and 2011
lrrprovement in Sep after summer collapse
Flat vs large gains in 2009 and 2010
Small irrprovement in Aug/Sep
5
3
1
1
-3
Jan-10 May-10 Sep-10 Jan-11 May-11 Sep•11 Jan-12 May-12 Sep-12
Emerging markets
Developed markets
Demand manazement
My demands are pretty simple, at least compared to some riders I have seen from performing artists as part of their concert
venue contracts6. However, I have few expectations they will be granted, and surfaced them to walk through the issues we are
looking at as 2012 comes to a close. All things considered, financial markets digested these issues pretty well this year.
Here's an optimistic read for 2013: easy monetary policy increases global growth from its current 2% pace to 3.0%-3.5% next
Spring, with contributions from emerging economies where retail sales are still growing by 10%+; the US avoids the 2013 fiscal
cliff and simultaneously strikes a grand bargain on long-term debt, making headway on both entitlements and tax reform; US
companies respond by increasing capital spending and hiring in a virtuous circle; and with the ECB buying bonds and providing
an incentive for others to join them, Spain and Italy start to grow again, France avoids another recession, and the EU crisis
gradually fades away. I can't figure out which part of this outlook is more remote: a grand compromise in Washington, or the
notion that all Spain and Italy ever needed was a more interventionist Central Bank.
Michael Cembalest
J.P. Morgan Asset Management
(if you missed our annual energy issue last week, please ask your J.P. Morgan contacts for a copy]
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American beer".
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EFTA01071190
Eye on the Market I October 31 2012
J.P.Morgan
The Storm; and my list of demands regarding global growth, US profits, the US Federal debt and China
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