Case File
efta-efta01071575DOJ Data Set 9OtherEye on the Market I
Date
Unknown
Source
DOJ Data Set 9
Reference
efta-efta01071575
Pages
3
Persons
0
Integrity
Extracted Text (OCR)
Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
Eye on the Market I
November 14,2011
J.P.Morgan
Topic: Challenges facing a new Italian government; the IMF effect; and good news of the week (since there was some)
The morning after. There's some enthusiasm about a new Italian government, but now the hard work begins. The tricky thing
about structural reforms is that they are more easily accomplished when times are good, so you can spread the adjustment more
slowly, and with counter-cyclical support from the private sector. The problem is, few countries do that. Italy is facing this
challenge in spades: it ranks 123" out of 142 countries in terms of labor market efficiency (142=worst), and unfortunately, the
labor market reforms Italy is considering are among the most growth-depressing reforms of all, in the short term. I found
agreement on this point in meetings last week with some of Italy's largest industrialists.
Italy needs to fix its labor markets...
.....but that tends to come at a mrice in terms of near-term tarowth
Labor market efficiency
2011 Score. from best to worst
Growth response to structural reforms
Cumulative percent change in real GDP per capita
swz
5%
5.75
US
4%
UK
5.25
JPN
3%
4.75
IRL
BEL pn
L DE FR
2%
1%
4.25
BR
Italy
0%
3.75
S4GR
-1%
3.25
-2%
-3%
2.75
-
-
-
-
-
Tax Reform
Trade Reform
9
Financial
Labor Reform
Reform
O
3
6
Years
12
The multi-dimensional uncertainties are enormous. Will markets reward Italy for austerity decisions (if they are taken), and
sit tight with their 1.9 trillion in Italian bonds, even as Italy's debt ratios rise further as a recession hits? Will Europe be able to
leverage private sector capital and increase the size of its bailout facility, which as things stand now is inadequate if needed to
fund Italy and Spain for 2012 and 2013? What will happen if European banks needing higher capital ratios opt to shrink their
balance sheets instead of issue equity? Will the ECB buy a lot more Italian debt now that Italy is enacting austerity budgets?
Will the IMF come to Italy's rescue? it's hard to say, particularly on this latter point; as shown on the next page, in the cases of
Mexico, Russia, Indonesia and Argentina, events became unglued after IMF and other bilateral loans were announced. Bottom
line: it is difficult to be very optimistic on prospects for in-flight refueling and repairs of a monetary union in distress.
As we wrote last week, economics and finance trump politics almost all the time', which means that Europe's structural
problems may be a lot more important to investors than the names of the politicians in charge. Even as we consider the
possibility of politics as a positive catalyst, we are all still looking for more evidence of how it will actually work on a regional
level2. A comment that stuck with me since I first saw it was this remark from the author of the 1992 German Constitutional
Court opinion on Maastricht3. In the words of the author, the Maastricht treaty...
"...is not able to support its own premise: the common ground of a European Staatsvolk which belongs together: a minimum
of homogeneity in basic constitutional attitudes, a legal language accessible to all, economic and cultural similarities or at
least some forces of approximation, the possibility of political exchange through media, which reach the whole of Europe, a
leadership known in Europe and parties active across Europe. A European-isation without a prior European consciousness
and therefore without a European people with a concrete capability and readiness for common statehood would be, in terms
of the history of thought, un-European."
The assertion that as a region, Europe's debt and deficit levels are lower than the US, the UK and Japan may not matter until
there is Federalization of European revenues, or until its sovereign issuers are subject to the same market and budget
discipline that applies to US states. This is the kind of "statehood readiness" that the author may have been referring to.
Another example of premature extrapolation is the May 2011 capture of Osama Bin Laden, heralded at the time in some research reports as
a very positive catalyst for equity markets. That weekend turned out to be the peak for the year on the S&P 500, as the US fiscal deficit, of
which elevated military spending is a part, became a catalyst for the S&P downgrade of the US just 3 months later.
2 In October, Trichet noted how European integration has been around for a while, and cited the "Revocation of the Edict of Nantes". This
refers to Louis XIV's revocation of a law protecting Protestant Huguenots, which resulted in their expulsion to other countries. It's hard to
escape the EMU's contradictions: even when trying to provide evidence of regional integration, its long-standing cultural differences remain.
3 Written by Paul Kirchhof, as per Bernard Connolly of Hamiltonian Global in his 2003 essay on the European Monetary Union.
1
EFTA01071575
Eye on the Market I
November 14, 2011
J.P.Morgan
Topic: Challenges facing a new Italian government; the IMF effect; and good news of the week (since there was some)
The IMF as White Knight? The charts below are from our Sovereign Default Time Capsule, published in May 2010. Note
how IMF and other bilateral loans did not mark the end of the problem. The quotes on Russia are a useful reminder that the
IMF is often not a great judge of investment merit, and that single-country investment funds may have too much money at stake
in one place to think about worst-case outcomes.
Argentina
Sovereign debt price: 1138 2017
120
110
t00
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00
Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03
Jan-04
f\e
'Argentina x111 dolladze bef ore undergoing a
foreign exchange crisis' - Argentine
do,
Ec nomy Mnister-Elect Machinea (5100)
'Argentina may save $13 bn
Alr"-- over 5 years in bond swap'
- Bloomberg 105,011
Banks. the IMF. IADB and Spain
parnise$40 ion in bd. Ibis should
improvetheinvestment carnal.. and
together weh enhanced domestic and
external confidence. lay the ground tor
sustainedeconomic Argentine growth"
-IMF Managing Director ( I 2/001
•Argentina bonds gained on
increased optimism the IMF
will approve additional
financing to help avoiddefaull'
- Bloomberg I
401]
Russia
Sovereign debt price: GKO (T-Bill) 3/10/1999
90
80
70
60
50
40
Jan•98 Feb-98 Mar-98 Apr-98 May-98 Jun-98
The IMF Executive Board completed the review of the
Extended Fund Facets% and agreed to disburse a $700
million tranche. t
the program back on track.
"lJptothis point. the optimists on Russia
havebeen more right than the pessimists.
There Is good reason to believe the optimists Russia stock and
wi continue to be right: Stanley Fischer,
bonds soared after the
IMF Managing Director [01198)
promise of $22.6 bn in
loans led by the IMF -
Bloom
07198
'This takes the
pressure oil. and
Russia can now
trade on as own
lunctaineniake-
Henntage Russia
Fund (07/98)
Jul-98 Aug-98
Mexico
Peso/USD
2
3
4•
5 •
6 -
7 -
8
Dec-93
May-94
Nov-94
May 95
Nov-95
Create() ol permanent
$6.7 bn one of credit for
Mexico tram the United
States andCanada (494)
Creation of $20 On Exchange
Statrization Fund (2/96)
11
'Reentry Secretary Robert
Rubn. to Senate Foreign
RelaiCas Committee: low
probability event that few
could have anticipated" [4105)
Indonesia
Sovereign debt price: 734 2006
120
110 -
100-
90-
80 -
70 •
60 •
50 •
40 •
30
Jul 96
Dec-96
May-97
sec
'Although the entire East Asian
experience gives ground for
optimism over the prospects for
development, that is particularly true
of Malaysia. Indonesia and
Thailand' - INF Director on the
Race a Rim, (M96)
IMF likely to resume
lending under $40 bn
package (04198)
'We've been very
impressed by the
negotiations nth the new `4
Cabinet' - IA* (04,08)
Oct-97
Mar-98
Aug 98
The difference this time is that these countries didn't have the ECB as a potential lender (and buyer) of last resort. Will
the ECB continue to expand its balance sheet (shown below)? It is possible that the increasing risk of the ECB balance sheet,
rather than its increasing size, is what is bothering the Bundesbank and German members of the ECB.
There have been articles on Italy's extensive household
wealth, as well as 1.8 trillion Euros of state-owned assets
that could be sold to pay down debt On the former, there's
no question household wealth exists, but getting at it is another
issue. The Societa Italiana di Economia Pubblica and the
University of Linz estimate that Italy's tax evasion is the
highest in the OECD, and has been rising since the late 1980's.
On the sale of state-owned assets, it's a possibility, but Italy
only sold non-financial assets worth 2% of GDP in the
entire period from 1997 to 2006. Italy owns 17 billion in
publicly tradable shares, but the rest looks more complicated.
What's even more disturbing: an analysis showing that from
1997 to 2006, the improvement in Italy's debt ratio was almost
entirely due to temporary measures, with little improvement in
its structural deficit. Understanding Europe is like a visit to
the psychiatrist: every answer simply leads to another question.
Total public support to European banks and sovereigns
Billions, EUR
1,000
900
800
700
600
500 -
400 -
300 -
200 -
100 -
■ Purchases of collateralized bank bonds
■ Purchases of Periphery bonds (SMP)
■ Repo to Periphery Banks
■ Repo to Core Banks
II
I
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
2
EFTA01071576
Eye on the Market I
November 14,2011
J.P.Morgan
Topic: Challenges facing a new Italian government; the IMF effect; and good news of the week (since there was some)
Unrelated good news of the week, and what equity market pricing looks like
•
Continued improvement in US state and local tax collections
•
Signs that global inflation has peaked, including in China; we expect inflation to fall by around 1% or more in the next few
months, allowing for some easing in China next year
•
S&P 500 profits and top-line sales grew by 18% and 10%, respectively, in Q3 vs 2010. However, the magnitude of
earnings outperfonnance and CEO capital spending intentions are beginning to show signs of weakness
•
Modest improvements in high-frequency data in the US, including chain store sales, jobless claims, small business
sentiment, job openings and consumer credit
The simple observation is that there is a lot of worrying news about sovereign risk in the U.S. and Europe, and that equity
markets appear to be incorporating that. As shown below, the trailing earnings yield of the S&P 500, adjusted for inflation, is
close to the highest level seen in roughly 50 years. Even assuming a 15% decline in earnings next year, which would be a par-
for-the-course earnings recession, these yields would still be on the cheaper end of their historical range.
Real S&P 500 trailing earnings yield
Trailing earnings yield of the cap-weighted S&P 500 less core CPI
8%
7%
6%
5% -
4% -
3% -
1% -
0%
1%
Assuming a 15%
-2% -
decline in earnings
1956
1962
1968 1974
1980
1986
1992
1998
2004
2010
Michael Cembalest
Chief Investment Officer
As of 11 /11 /11
Components of labor market efficiency, as defined by the World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report
Cooperation in labor-employer relations; Flexibility of wage determination; Rigidity of employment; Hiring and firing
practices; Redundancy costs; Pay and productivity; Reliance on professional management; Brain drain; Female participation in
labor force
"Should Italy Sell Its Nonfinancial Assets to Reduce the Debt?", Stefania Fabrizio, IMF Policy Discussion Paper, April 2008
"The value added of underground activities: size and measurement of the shadow economies of 110 countries", Friedrich
Schneider, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, June 2002
The material contained herein is intended ar a general marker conzmentary. Opinions expressed herein are those of Michael Cembalest and may differ from those of other J.P.
Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan research and should nor be treated as such. Further. the views expressed herein may
differ from that contained in J.P. Morgan research reports. The above summary/prices/quotes/statistics have been obtained from sources deemed to be reliable. but we do not
guarantee their accuracy or completeness. any yield referenced is indicative and subject to change. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. References to the
performance or character of our portfolios generally refer to our Balanced Model Portfolios constructed by J.P. Morgan. It is a proxy for client perfomrance and may not
represent actual transactions or investments in client accounts. The model portfolio can be implemented across brokerage or managed accounts depending on the unique
objectives of each client and is serviced through distinct legal entities licensed for specific activities. Bank trust and investment management services are provided by J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank. N.A. and its affiliates. Securities are offered through J.P. Morgan Securities LLC (JPMS). Member NYSE. FINRA and SIPC and Chase Investment
Services Corp.. (CISC) member FINRA and SIPC. Securities products purchased or sold through !PAIS or CISC are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC"): are not deposits or other obligations of its bank or thrift affiliates and are nor guaranteed by its bank or thrift affiliates: and are subject to investment risks. including
possible loss of the principal invested. Not all investment ideas referenced are suitable for all investors. Speak with your J.P. Morgan Representative concerning your personal
situation. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. Private Investments may engage in leveraging and other
speculative practices that may increase the risk of investment loss. can be highly illiquid. are nor required to provide periodic pricing or valuations to investors and may involve
complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tar information. Typically such investment ideas can only be offered to suitable investors through a confidential
offering memorandum which fully describes all terms. conditions. and risks.
IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its affiliates do nor provide tax advice. Accordingly. any discussion of U.S. tax matters contained herein (including
any attachments) is nor intended or written to be used. and cannot be used. in connection with the promotion. marketing or recommendation by anyone unaffiliated with
!Morgan Chase & Co. of any of the matters addressed herein or for the purpose of avoiding U.S. tax-related penalties. Note that J.P. Morgan is not a licensed insurance
provider.
0 2011 JPMorgan Chase & Co: All rights reserved
3
EFTA01071577
Technical Artifacts (5)
View in Artifacts BrowserEmail addresses, URLs, phone numbers, and other technical indicators extracted from this document.
Phone
734 2006Wire Ref
ReferencesWire Ref
referencedWire Ref
referringWire Ref
refuelingForum Discussions
This document was digitized, indexed, and cross-referenced with 1,400+ persons in the Epstein files. 100% free, ad-free, and independent.
Annotations powered by Hypothesis. Select any text on this page to annotate or highlight it.