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efta-efta01071708DOJ Data Set 9Other

The Board Room

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DOJ Data Set 9
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efta-efta01071708
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EFTA Disclosure
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The Board Room guide to hacking Vincenzo lozzo EFTA01071708 "GET YOUR FACTS FIRST, THEN DISTORT THEM AS IOU PIE MARK TWAIN Lifehack Quotes EFTA01071709 Are you compromised? Yes EFTA01071710 Why is everyone compromised? 1 Your network is a replicable monoculture 2. Compromising is a one-way street: You can't "un- compromise" something 3. The internet and your network are a graph of trust: compromising is viral and exponential 4. Your defense is reactive and slow, it must be proactive and fast EFTA01071711 I' k ly r bf. Or • t et , . ' rs. „ r Re • IA: r)xt;•, :Jr 444104 4 ".,t4 6 EFTA01071712 Monoculture • The attacker can download the same software you have and attack it until he finds a way in. • An attacker can replicate an almost-exact copy of your machine and go at it until he finds an "in" • Once the attacker is on a machine he can experiment and explore the trusted neighbors until he finds an "in" EFTA01071713 EFTA01071714 "Un-compromise"-able • A maxim: there's always a deep enough level in a machine that is not defended/defendable • It used to be the kernel, now it's the bios, the firmware, the hardware, the secret co-processor, you name it • You can't "un-compromise" because it's impossible to know what's compromised EFTA01071715 EFTA01071716 Graphs of trust • A lot of security today happens at the "perimeter", once you're in it's game over. This is called "lateral movement" • Implicit trust: we trust somebody else servers to download executables, we trust certificate authorities keys, we trust our partner servers • This means that your threat model is in large part outside of your control EFTA01071717 EFTA01071718 Reactive and slow • Most security tools today work by identifying an attack somewhere else and then try to protect everyone else • This is reactive in nature and ineffective: most attacks stay latent for a very long time • Even with almost-real time detection, the attacker needs to beat you at the race just once EFTA01071719 EFTA01071720 The recursive guide to compromise anything 1. Compromise a machine (exploit, social engineering, backdoor, physical access) 2. The maxim: there's always a deep enough level in a machine that is not defended/defendable. Go there and stay put 3. For every node in the graph that trusts your machine, go to 1 and be fast EFTA01071721 Digital immune system EFTA01071722 Digital immune system • We have the technology to build 80% of the digital immune system • We need network effects and board-level decisions to make the remaining 20% true • This will not solve computer security but it will leap it ahead by a lot EFTA01071723 EFTA01071724 "Shape-shifting" software • No two copies of the same app, (kernel, firmware, etc etc) should behave the same way at the micro level • Code should adapt to its users/owners, detect and log anomalous behavior on a distributed ledger EFTA01071725 "Accountability breeds response- ability." -Stephen Covey QuoteAddicts EFTA01071726 Code Signing • Every piece of code that is executed on a machine should be signed by a trusted entity • We can't trust a single company/machine: create a distributed ledger of valid signatures for every piece of code EFTA01071727 EFTA01071728 Self-destructing machines • Every machine should have a "known-good" state to revert to • Every time a machine is thought to be compromised it should be destroyed immediately and reverted back to the "known-good" state EFTA01071729 EFTA01071730 Adaptive network structure • The trusting neighbors of a machine must be able to shut down communication with the allegedly compromised machine • The trusting neighbors should be able to adapt their network topology to use a mirror copy of the compromised machine EFTA01071731 4 EFTA01071732 The Al future • In the future a lot of offensive security will be Al/ML- driven • In the future security will be much faster and much more complicated • We can't have proper defense against that without these building blocks EFTA01071733 CAA EFTA01071734

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