Case File
efta-efta01071708DOJ Data Set 9OtherThe Board Room
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Unknown
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DOJ Data Set 9
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efta-efta01071708
Pages
27
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0
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Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
The Board Room
guide to hacking
Vincenzo lozzo
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"GET YOUR
FACTS FIRST, THEN
DISTORT
THEM AS IOU PIE
MARK TWAIN
Lifehack Quotes
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Are you compromised?
Yes
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Why is everyone
compromised?
1 Your network is a replicable monoculture
2. Compromising is a one-way street: You can't "un-
compromise" something
3. The internet and your network are a graph of trust:
compromising is viral and exponential
4. Your defense is reactive and slow, it must be
proactive and fast
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Monoculture
• The attacker can download the same software you
have and attack it until he finds a way in.
• An attacker can replicate an almost-exact copy of
your machine and go at it until he finds an "in"
• Once the attacker is on a machine he can
experiment and explore the trusted neighbors until
he finds an "in"
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"Un-compromise"-able
• A maxim: there's always a deep enough level in a
machine that is not defended/defendable
• It used to be the kernel, now it's the bios, the
firmware, the hardware, the secret co-processor,
you name it
• You can't "un-compromise" because it's impossible
to know what's compromised
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Graphs of trust
• A lot of security today happens at the "perimeter",
once you're in it's game over. This is called "lateral
movement"
• Implicit trust: we trust somebody else servers to
download executables, we trust certificate
authorities keys, we trust our partner servers
• This means that your threat model is in large part
outside of your control
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Reactive and slow
• Most security tools today work by identifying an
attack somewhere else and then try to protect
everyone else
• This is reactive in nature and ineffective: most
attacks stay latent for a very long time
• Even with almost-real time detection, the attacker
needs to beat you at the race just once
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The recursive guide to
compromise anything
1. Compromise a machine (exploit, social
engineering, backdoor, physical access)
2. The maxim: there's always a deep enough level in
a machine that is not defended/defendable. Go
there and stay put
3. For every node in the graph that trusts your
machine, go to 1 and be fast
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Digital immune system
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Digital immune system
• We have the technology to build 80% of the digital
immune system
• We need network effects and board-level decisions
to make the remaining 20% true
• This will not solve computer security but it will leap
it ahead by a lot
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"Shape-shifting" software
• No two copies of the same app, (kernel, firmware,
etc etc) should behave the same way at the micro
level
• Code should adapt to its users/owners, detect and
log anomalous behavior on a distributed ledger
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"Accountability
breeds response-
ability."
-Stephen Covey
QuoteAddicts
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Code Signing
• Every piece of code that is executed on a machine
should be signed by a trusted entity
• We can't trust a single company/machine: create a
distributed ledger of valid signatures for every
piece of code
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Self-destructing machines
• Every machine should have a "known-good" state
to revert to
• Every time a machine is thought to be
compromised it should be destroyed immediately
and reverted back to the "known-good" state
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Adaptive network structure
• The trusting neighbors of a machine must be able
to shut down communication with the allegedly
compromised machine
• The trusting neighbors should be able to adapt
their network topology to use a mirror copy of the
compromised machine
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4
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The Al future
• In the future a lot of offensive security will be Al/ML-
driven
• In the future security will be much faster and much
more complicated
• We can't have proper defense against that without
these building blocks
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CAA
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Forum Discussions
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