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efta-efta01367352DOJ Data Set 10CorrespondenceEFTA Document EFTA01367352
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31 May 2015
Integrated Oil
US Integrated Oils
The key uncertainties around the global oil supply impact of any final
agreement stem from question marks around 1) the agreed upon pace of the
removal of sanctions (John Kerry suggesting 4 months to one year while the
Iranians are calling for an immediately removal), 2) the actual amount of
floating storage holding Iranian barrels (IEA references reports suggesting -30
mmbbl's, or 180kb/d for 6 months. Wood Mackenzie offers a smaller
estimate), 31 the amount of reservoir and facility degradation in the key mature
oil fields (main source of Iranian crude production) post years of
underinvestment and need for secondary and FOR to boost production, and 4)
the pace of IOCs involvement (list of priority 49 upstream/28 oil field projects
released with formal details and the new Iran Petroleum Contract (IPC) (with
much better fiscal terms than its predecessor) expected in September). While
Bijan Zanganeh's (Iranian oil minister) promise of output levels of 3.8 Mb/d
within 6 months of the deal (implying an increase in exports of -1 Mb/d) is on
the optimistic side of forecasts (Wood Mackenzie at +450kb/d in exports in
mid-2016, assuming sanctions fully lifted in mid-'16, IEA suggesting
sustainable production capacity at -700kb/d above April 2015's production
levels). the risk of a notable amount of Iranian crude hitting the market by end
of '1 5/mid-'16 remains the key wildcard to our outlook.
A Random Walk Through The Rest of OPEC.
While this publication is not meant to address OPEC production growth in
great detail, we attempt to present context around current trends and the
potential risks to our outlook. Below we highlight several of the key questions
(in addition to the previously discussed impact from finalizing an Iran deal) we
entertained in "stress-testing" our outlook from an admittedly more
abstract/qualitative angle (what else is there?).
What is the potential upside to OPEC production from a return of a normalized
(or should we say abnormal?). Ubya devoid of conflict? While many point to
2012 production of nearly -1400 Mb/d as a starting point for quantifying a
potential 'blue sky' outlook for Libya production, the country has changed
significantly since the conflict first erupted in 2013. Infrastructure damage and
potential degradation to field reservoir quality has resulted in a cut to the lEA
estimated sustainable crude production to only 500 Mb/d for 2015. The lEA
anticipates a gradual capacity creep with levels expected to reach -980 Mb/d
2020 - still short of previous levels. While not as conservative, (productive
capacity estimated at -800 Mb/d for 2015) Wood Mackenzie estimates are
also consistent with a view of limited upside to recent production trends out of
Libya (-500 Mb/d in March and April). In our outlook we assume Libya
production flat to 2014 levels of -460 Mb/d.
Is the recent production burst from OPEC likely to last? During the month of
May, OPEC crude production is estimated to have averaged 31.6 MMb/d (vs.
31.5 MMb/d in April) averaged or 1.5 MMb/d higher than in February.
Production growth from Saudi Arabia and Iraq accounts for - 75% of the
increase (- 550 Mb/d in incremental production each). The original question
can be translated into: how to assess from sustained production levels from
both Iraq and Saudi going forward.
a) Iraq Near-Term Production Outlook Risk Likely Upper Bound: Iraq
production (inclusive of exports from the Kurdish Regional
Government) ramped up to an estimated 3.9 MMb/d in May, -550
Mb/d higher than 2014 levels amid strong production from Northern
Iraq following the December agreement with the Kurdish Regional
Page 34
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)
DB-SDNY-0058885
CONFIDENTIAL
SDNY_GM_00205069
EFTA01367352
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