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Presidential Statements Declaring Legislative Veto Provisions Unconstitutional
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kaggle-ho-012391House Oversight

Presidential Statements Declaring Legislative Veto Provisions Unconstitutional

Presidential Statements Declaring Legislative Veto Provisions Unconstitutional The document merely compiles historical presidential remarks about constitutional objections to legislative veto clauses. It contains no specific allegations, financial flows, or misconduct involving current officials, and offers no actionable leads for investigation. Key insights: Multiple presidents (Kennedy through Bush) cited constitutional concerns over legislative veto provisions.; Presidents framed such provisions as nullities or requests for information to avoid enforcement.; The excerpt includes a 19th‑century example from President Grant.

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Presidential Statements Declaring Legislative Veto Provisions Unconstitutional The document merely compiles historical presidential remarks about constitutional objections to legislative veto clauses. It contains no specific allegations, financial flows, or misconduct involving current officials, and offers no actionable leads for investigation. Key insights: Multiple presidents (Kennedy through Bush) cited constitutional concerns over legislative veto provisions.; Presidents framed such provisions as nullities or requests for information to avoid enforcement.; The excerpt includes a 19th‑century example from President Grant.

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kagglehouse-oversightconstitutional-lawlegislative-vetopresidential-statementshistorical-record

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a 3) Memorandum on Informing Congressional Committees of Changes Involving Foreign Economic Assistance Funds, Pub. Papers of John F. Kennedy 6 (Jan. 9, 1963): President Kennedy stated that a provision in the bill he was signing contained an unconstitutional legislative veto. He announced that "[i]t is therefore my intention .. . to treat this provision as a request for information." Id. 4) Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works Appropriations Act, Pub. Papers of Lyndon B. Johnson 104 (Dec. 31, 1963): President Johnson also found that a legislative veto provision was unconstitutional and stated that he would treat it as a request for information. 5) Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, Pub. Papers of Richard Nixon 686 (June.17, 1972): President Nixon stated that a clause conditioning the use of authority by the executive branch on the approval of a congressional committee was unconstitutional. He ordered the agency involved to comply with "the acceptable procedures" in the bill “without regard to the unconstitutional provisions I have previously referred to." Id: at 687. 6) Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1976, Pub. Papers of Gerald R. Ford 241 (Feb. 10, 1976): President Ford stated that a committee approval mechanism was unconstitutional and announced that he would "treat the unconstitutional provision . . . to the extent it requires further Congressional committee approval, as a complete nullity." Id. at 242. 7) Statement on Signing Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. Papers of Jimmy Carter 2335 (Oct. 18, 1980): President Carter stated that a legislative veto provision was unconstitutional and that any attempt at a legislative veto would "not [be] regarded as legally binding." Id. 8) Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981, Pub. Papers of Ronald Reagan 1207 (Dec. 29, 1981): President Reagan stated that a legislative veto was unconstitutional and announced that "[t]he Secretary of Transportation will not... regard himself as legally bound by any such resolution." Id. 9) Statement On Signing the National and Community Service Act of 1990, Pub. Papers of George Bush 1613 (Nov. 16, 1990): President Bush rejected the constitutionality of provisions that required a Presidentially appointed board exercising executive authority to include, among its 21 members, “seven members nominated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives... [and] seven members nominated by the Majority Leader of the Senate." Id. at 1614. He announced that the restrictions on his choice of nominees to the board "are without legal force or effect." Id. 10) 7 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 377 (Aug. 14, 1876) (Pres. Grant): This is one of the earliest of many instances of a President "construing" a provision (to avoid constitutional problems) in a way that seems to amount to a refusal to enforce a provision of it. An 1876 statute directed that notices be sent to certain diplomatic and consular officers "to close their offices." President Grant, in signing the bill, stated that, “[iJn the literal sense of this direction it would be an invasion of the constitutional prerogatives and duty of the Executive." Id. In order to avoid this problem, President Grant "constru[ed]" this provision "only to exercise the constitutional prerogative of Congress over the expenditures of the Government," not to "imply{] a right in the legislative branch to direct the closing or discontinuing of any of the diplomatic or consular offices of the Government." Id. at 378. _ Other Presidential Documents 1) A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353 (1953): This was a legal opinion from President Franklin Roosevelt to Attorney General Jackson. President Roosevelt stated that he was signing the Lend-Lease Act despite a provision providing for a legislative veto, "a provision which, in

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