Skip to main content
Skip to content
Case File
kaggle-ho-020295House Oversight

Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel

Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel The passage suggests that a sensitive NSA file naming Chancellor Angela Merkel as a target (not an asset) appeared in German media weeks after Snowden’s Hong Kong hand‑over, implying an unknown party accessed classified material after Snowden fled to Russia. This raises a concrete lead – identify who supplied the Merkel file to Der Spiegel and when – and involves high‑level officials (the German chancellor, NSA, and possibly Russian intermediaries). The claim is not widely reported, offers specific names and timelines, and could trigger a major diplomatic and intelligence investigation if verified. Key insights: Der Spiegel published a story naming Merkel as an NSA target, citing a document not found in the 58,000 files Snowden gave journalists in Hong Kong.; Journalist Laura Poitras texted Snowden for background after the story broke, indicating she lacked the document beforehand.; James Bamford, reviewing the Hong Kong dump, found no Merkel‑related file, supporting the claim of a later leak.

Date
Unknown
Source
House Oversight
Reference
kaggle-ho-020295
Pages
1
Persons
2
Integrity
No Hash Available

Summary

Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel The passage suggests that a sensitive NSA file naming Chancellor Angela Merkel as a target (not an asset) appeared in German media weeks after Snowden’s Hong Kong hand‑over, implying an unknown party accessed classified material after Snowden fled to Russia. This raises a concrete lead – identify who supplied the Merkel file to Der Spiegel and when – and involves high‑level officials (the German chancellor, NSA, and possibly Russian intermediaries). The claim is not widely reported, offers specific names and timelines, and could trigger a major diplomatic and intelligence investigation if verified. Key insights: Der Spiegel published a story naming Merkel as an NSA target, citing a document not found in the 58,000 files Snowden gave journalists in Hong Kong.; Journalist Laura Poitras texted Snowden for background after the story broke, indicating she lacked the document beforehand.; James Bamford, reviewing the Hong Kong dump, found no Merkel‑related file, supporting the claim of a later leak.

Persons Referenced (2)

Tags

kagglehouse-oversighthigh-importancensasurveillanceangela-merkelder-spiegellaura-poitras

Ask AI About This Document

0Share
PostReddit
Review This Document

Extracted Text (OCR)

EFTA Disclosure
Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
143 had released this document, it would be consistent with Kucherena’s assertion that Snowden had access to the archive. Adding to the intrigue, Poitras was apparently caught by surprise when the Merkel story broke in Der Spiegel. She urgently texted Snowden on what she called “background” (which ordinarily means that a journalist will not attribute information to a source.) She asked him in the text to explain the NSA’s actions. Snowden explained to her that Merkel was listed by her true name (and not by a codename) in the NSA document because the German chancellor was a NSA “target not an asset.” Presumably, Poitras would have already known that distinction if she had the document referred to in Der Spiegel. If the Merkel document was not among the data given to Poitras in Hong Kong , how did it get to the authors of the Der Spiegel article? One of the authors, Appelbaum, as discussed earlier, had been in contact with Snowden before he went public. He had served as Poitras’ co-interrogator of Snowden while he was still working at the NSA in May 2013. Appelbaum also, was one of the leading supporters of Wikileaks. Since he was famously an advocate of revealing government secrets, it seems unlikely that he would have delayed releasing such a bombshell about Merkel’s phone if Snowden had given him this document before he had left Hong Kong in June 2013. Why would Appelbaum kept it secret for more than four months? The same pressure to publish would also apply to the journalists Snowden had dealt with in Hong Kong. If Snowden had given Poitras, Greenwald, Lam or MacAskill the Merkel document, or even told them about it in their interviews with him in Hong Kong, the Guardian would have certainly rushed out such a scoop. According to source with knowledge of the Snowden investigation, there was no document referencing any spying on Merkel’s phone among the 58,000 documents on the thumb drive that Snowden had given Poitras and Greenwald in Hong Kong. That absence would explain why Poitras had to send a text to Snowden in Moscow to ask for an explanation after the story broke. Further confirmation of the absence of this document in the material Snowden provided journalists in Hong Kong comes from James Bamford, a well-respected expert on the NSA. In the course of researching his 2014 article on Snowden for Wired magazine, he was given access to all the documents Snowden gave to Poitras, Greenwald and Gellman. Bamford used a sophisticated indexing program to search through the database specifically for The Merkel material. , Even so, he did not find any. He reported that no document that even mentioned Merkel given to journalists in Hong Kong mentioned Merkel. It therefore appeared that the Merkel document was provided to Der Spiegel after Snowden went to Moscow in June. If so, some party had access to NSA documents after Snowden arrived in Russia and provided the authors of the Der Spiegel story with the scoop. In that context, it may have not been a pure coincide that Kucherena’s disclosed that Snowden had access to documents which he had not given to journalists in Hong Kong shortly before just such a document was [published in Germany. For his part, Bamford explored the possibility that there might be another mole in the NSA. Was it possible another person in the NSA was stealing documents? He wrote Poitras and asked

Related Documents (6)

House OversightUnknown

Chinese intelligence cyber‑espionage harvests millions of U.S. government personnel files and defense contractor data

Chinese intelligence cyber‑espionage harvests millions of U.S. government personnel files and defense contractor data The passage provides concrete, though unverified, claims that China’s Ministry of State Security inserted malware into up to 700,000 U.S. computers, penetrated major tech firms, and stole 20 million federal employee records and 14 million background checks. These specifics (numbers, targets, dates) give a clear investigative trail (e.g., request OPM breach logs, examine contracts with Booz Allen, trace malware signatures). The allegations involve high‑level U.S. agencies (NSA, CIA, OPM) and a foreign power, making it moderately controversial and potentially actionable, but the claims are broadly known in the cyber‑espionage discourse, limiting novelty. Key insights: Chinese MSS allegedly inserted “zombie” programs into ~700,000 U.S. computers by 2007.; Hackers accessed contractors such as Booz Allen Hamilton, Google, Yahoo, Symantec, Adobe.; Estimated theft of 20 million federal employee files and 14 million intelligence background checks by 2015.

1p
House OversightUnknown

Document cites multiple sources linking Edward Snowden’s Moscow stay to Russian officials, lawyers, and possible covert operations

Document cites multiple sources linking Edward Snowden’s Moscow stay to Russian officials, lawyers, and possible covert operations The passage aggregates a variety of references—interviews, news articles, and alleged statements—suggesting that Snowden’s presence in Moscow involved Russian legal counsel, possible secret services cooperation, and high‑profile commentators. While it provides many names and sources, it lacks concrete transaction details or direct evidence of wrongdoing, limiting immediate investigative action but offering several leads for follow‑up. Key insights: Mentions Oliver Stone paying $1 million for a Russian lawyer’s novel about Snowden (source: Mike Fleming Jr.); Cites a “special operation” by Russian secret services with WikiLeaks (Gridasov, Yavlyansky, Gorkovskaya); References interviews with Russian figures (Kucherena, Shevardnadze, Sonkine) about Snowden’s communications

1p
House OversightUnknown

Former NSA employee Ronald Pelton allegedly aided a joint NSA‑CIA‑Navy cable‑tap operation and received $30,000 from the KGB

Former NSA employee Ronald Pelton allegedly aided a joint NSA‑CIA‑Navy cable‑tap operation and received $30,000 from the KGB The passage provides a concrete claim that a former NSA contractor (Ronald Pelton) participated in a covert undersea cable‑tap operation with U.S. agencies and was paid by the KGB, linking intelligence services of two superpowers and suggesting a financial flow. It names specific individuals, agencies, dates, and amounts, offering actionable leads for verification, but the details are uncorroborated and the overall claim is not novel enough to be a blockbuster. Key insights: Pelton debriefed for 15 days about "Project A," a joint NSA‑CIA‑Navy operation tapping Soviet undersea cables in the Sea of Okhotsk.; Pelton allegedly received $30,000 from the KGB for his cooperation.; The operation supposedly allowed the KGB to feed false information to the NSA via the compromised tap.

1p
House OversightUnknown

Citations of alleged deep‑state ties and historic espionage recruitments in a House oversight document

Citations of alleged deep‑state ties and historic espionage recruitments in a House oversight document The passage merely repeats previously published quotations about Cold‑War espionage (Ames, Hanssen, Pelton) and a generic “deep state” claim. It offers no new names, dates, transactions, or actionable leads beyond well‑known historical facts, limiting investigative value. However, it does reference a former CIA officer (Victor Cherkashin) and a former NSA employee (Pelton), which could be marginally useful for contextual background, placing it in the low‑to‑moderate range. Key insights: Quotes claim existence of a “deep state” from a Nation article.; Reference to Victor Cherkashin’s interview linking him to Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen recruitment.; Mention of former NSA employee James E. Pelton’s espionage conviction (1986).

1p
House OversightUnknown

KGB debriefed ex‑NSA employee Ronald Pelton in Vienna, receiving cash and suggesting a model for future Russian extraction of Snowden’s knowledge

KGB debriefed ex‑NSA employee Ronald Pelton in Vienna, receiving cash and suggesting a model for future Russian extraction of Snowden’s knowledge The passage provides specific details – names (Ronald Pelton, Anatoly Slavnov, Cherkashin), cash payments ($5,000 and $30,000), locations (Vienna, Soviet embassy), and a timeline – that could be pursued to verify a KGB operation against a U.S. intelligence worker. If corroborated, it would illuminate a historic Soviet espionage method and suggest a precedent for Russian interest in Edward Snowden, a highly sensitive and politically charged topic. The lead is moderately novel and points to actionable investigative steps (e.g., seeking declassified NSA/FBI files, Austrian diplomatic records, KGB archives). Key insights: Pelton, a former NSA civilian, was flown to Vienna and debriefed by KGB operatives.; He received $5,000 cash and a plane ticket, then an additional $30,000 after a 15‑day debrief.; KGB electronic communications expert Anatoly Slavnov supervised the debriefings.

1p
DOJ Data Set 10Financial RecordUnknown

EFTA01658816

39p

Forum Discussions

This document was digitized, indexed, and cross-referenced with 1,500+ persons in the Epstein files. 100% free, ad-free, and independent.

Support This ProjectSupported by 1,550+ people worldwide
Annotations powered by Hypothesis. Select any text on this page to annotate or highlight it.