Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel
Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel The passage suggests that a sensitive NSA file naming Chancellor Angela Merkel as a target (not an asset) appeared in German media weeks after Snowden’s Hong Kong hand‑over, implying an unknown party accessed classified material after Snowden fled to Russia. This raises a concrete lead – identify who supplied the Merkel file to Der Spiegel and when – and involves high‑level officials (the German chancellor, NSA, and possibly Russian intermediaries). The claim is not widely reported, offers specific names and timelines, and could trigger a major diplomatic and intelligence investigation if verified. Key insights: Der Spiegel published a story naming Merkel as an NSA target, citing a document not found in the 58,000 files Snowden gave journalists in Hong Kong.; Journalist Laura Poitras texted Snowden for background after the story broke, indicating she lacked the document beforehand.; James Bamford, reviewing the Hong Kong dump, found no Merkel‑related file, supporting the claim of a later leak.
Summary
Possible post‑Snowden leak of NSA document on German Chancellor Merkel to Der Spiegel The passage suggests that a sensitive NSA file naming Chancellor Angela Merkel as a target (not an asset) appeared in German media weeks after Snowden’s Hong Kong hand‑over, implying an unknown party accessed classified material after Snowden fled to Russia. This raises a concrete lead – identify who supplied the Merkel file to Der Spiegel and when – and involves high‑level officials (the German chancellor, NSA, and possibly Russian intermediaries). The claim is not widely reported, offers specific names and timelines, and could trigger a major diplomatic and intelligence investigation if verified. Key insights: Der Spiegel published a story naming Merkel as an NSA target, citing a document not found in the 58,000 files Snowden gave journalists in Hong Kong.; Journalist Laura Poitras texted Snowden for background after the story broke, indicating she lacked the document beforehand.; James Bamford, reviewing the Hong Kong dump, found no Merkel‑related file, supporting the claim of a later leak.
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