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11 December 2013
GEM Equity Strategy Outlook 2014
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No concrete measures in Plenum to deal with debt fiscal issue
The authorities in Beijing need to completely re-engineer the fiscal system to
address the issue of underfunding of local government in order to deal with the
rapid build-up in debt at the corporate and local government level.
Unfortunately, while the post-Plenum document devoted a lot of space to a
discussion of fiscal issues, this appears to have been more a declaration of
intent rather than a programme of specific measures for implementation.
Michael Spencer who has a much more bullish view of the prospects for China
than we do, believes that significant fiscal reforms will only take place on a
ten-year time horizon; my own view is that this timescale will be far too long
for borrowers and investors alike to keep pumping cash into sectors where the
returns are visibly deteriorating.
Blurred boundaries between state and private sector impede financial reforms
The bulls argue that China can grow round the fiscal and debt problems by
financial reforms which will help to promote the private sector at the expense
of the state enterprises. Whilst this may appear a coherent strategy from a
macro perspective, it breaks down at a micro level in our view because of the
blurred boundaries between private and state-controlled companies, which are
the main characteristic of the vast majority of privately-controlled listed
Industrials and Materials companies above the SME level. Most firms which
are nominally private have close links with central or local government and are
in receipt of subsidised cost inputs which may include cheap loans or power,
free or cheap land, and direct cash subsidies (usually booked as operating
income). Moreover, the boundaries are even more blurred for many non-listed
companies in many industries, as local government officials may derive
personal benefit from their links with nominally private companies. The most
pure private companies exist at the SME level and it is significant that many of
these companies are currently struggling in operational and financial terms.
Risk of a debt trap E nore as i g which should eventually lead to devaluation
The post-Plenum rhetoric from the authorities in Beijing has been carefully
calibrated to maintain the confidence among both corporate and financers
alike that structural reforms will enable China to grow at an acceptable level of
7% plus over the medium term without having to undergo a financial crisis.
We believe that this is extremely unlikely given that there is an increasingly
visible risk of a debt trap at the corporate level. Figure 36 and Figure 37 show
listed Industrials and Materials companies cutting back on capex relative to
Deutsche Bank AG/London
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