EFTA01297082

NAME SEARCHED: Erika Kellerhals PWM BIS-RESEARCH performed due diligence research in accordance with the standards set by AML Compliance for your business. We completed thorough searches on your subject name(s) in the required databases and have attached the search results under the correct heading below. Significant negative media results may require escalation to senior business, Legal and Compliance management. Also, all accounts involving PEPs must be escalated. Search: Result: Click here for results: Revitmer Comments (as necessary): RU0 El No Hit O Not Required O Ilia t. RDC Results No RDC Alert(please see attached) PCR Egi No Hit • Not Required II. PCR Results No PCR Alen(please see attached) O Hit Ms III. Negai is c Nleclia No Information Found O Yes 0 No Not Required . IV. Non-Ncimi i% c \ I eska No Information Found . V. Other Language media No Information Found D&B ' Not required Results? • Yes M 0 Not Required Smartlinx VII. Smattlinx Result found(please see attached) Residte !Ts Yes O No • Not Required Court Cases ii: Review by Legal May VIII. Court Cases Result found(please see attached) he Required El No Results O Search not required Prepared by: Shreya parashar Date: 07/11/2017 Research Analyst Instructions: I. Review and confirm that all results arc returned for your client. 2. Please note that you are still required to perform any Martindale-Hubbell search (if applicable) on each search subject. We have attached the web link below for your convenience:filartindale-Hubbellhttp://www.martindak.comhp/Nlartindalelhome.xml 3. As needed. provide comment for any negative results. 4. If applicable, please obtain clearance from Compliance for all alerts. 5. Save any changes you make to this document and attach file to your KYC. Please note: Submission of a signed KYC is your confinnation that you hive fully reviewed the research documents. For internal use only S0NY_BM_00059957 CONFIDENTIAL — PURSUANT TO FED R. CRIM. P. 6(e) CONFIDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022781 EFTA_00170501 EFTA01297082 Page 2 OFAC RESULTS RDC: No. . ,. Match GCIS a c. „,,.UNITED Date of 11604604 Birth• Found 00000499664 Erika Kellerhals STATES I PCR: C20170738204806 Erika Kellerhals 12998482 NCA customised Auto-Closed No-Hit 12/07/2017 BIS RESULTS: Negative Media: No Information Found Non-Negative Media: No Information Found Other Language Media: No Information Found Public Record: 1 OF 1 RECORD(S) FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY Copyright 2017 LexisNexis a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All Rights Reserved. Date: 7/11/2017 Report processed by: DEUTSCHE BANK AGII Full Name Address County Phone KELLERHALS, ER IIKA A RICHMOND STATEN ISLAND, NY RICHMOND COUNTY ADDITIONAL PERSONAL INFORMATION SSN DOB MXXXX (Age 42) Subject Summary Gender For internal use only LexID(sm) 001368644215 SDNY_GM_00059958 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022782 EFTA 00170502 EFTA01297083 Page 2 Name Variations 1: KELLERHALES, ERICKA A 2: KELLERHALLS. ERIKA A 3: KELLERHALS, E A 4: KELLERHALS. ERIKA 5: KELLERHALS. ERIKA A SSNs Summary No. SSN State Iss. Date Iss. Warnings Most frequent SSN attributed to subject: 1 -XXXX New York Possible E-Mail Addresses Others Using SSN - 2 records found # Full Name SSN DOB 1 KELLERHALS. ENER >0OO( 11 YOUNG. MICHAEL S XXXX Address Summary - 14 records found No. 1 STATEN ISLAND. NY RICHMOND COUNTY 2: 9053 SUGAR EST STE 101 ST THOMAS. VI 00802-3653 ST. THOMAS COUNTY 3: JUPITER. FL PALM BEACH COUNTY 4: 9053 ESTATE THOMAS APT 101 ST THOMAS. VI 00802 ST. THOMAS COUNTY I Social Services Facility 5: 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3602 ST. THOMAS COUNTY 6: 9053 ESTATE THOMAS STE 10 ST THOMAS. VI 00802 ST. THOMAS COUNTY 7: PO BOX 608 ST THOMAS, VI a ST. THOMAS COUNTY 8: PO BOX 6347 ST THOMAS. VI =6347 ST. THOMAS COUNTY 9: 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 2 ST THOMAS. VI 00802-3602 For internal use only SDNY_GM_000 59959 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022783 EFTA_00 I 70503 EFTA01297084 Page 3 No. Address ST. THOMAS COUNTY 10: 12: 13: 14: BROOKLYN. NY KINGS COUNTY BROOKLYN. NY KINGS COUNTY BROOKLYN, NY KINGS COUNTY STATEN ISLAND, NY RICHMOND COUNTY STATEN ISLAND, NY RICHMOND COUNTY Adt darli m STATEN ISLAND, NY Address Dates 2/1994 - 4/2017 STATEN ISLAND. NY RICHMOND COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age' 47 Median Income: $82,353 Median Home Value: $584,337 Median Education: 14 years Household Members DAHLING. MELISSA A KELLERHALS, EDWARD KELLERHALS, EDWARD A KELLERHALS. ENER KELLERHALS. KATHLEEN M Other Associates HANRATTY, THOMAS E 2: 9053 SUGAR EST STE 101 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3653 Address Dates Phone 9053 SUGAR EST STE 101 6/2017 -6/2017 ST THOMAS. VI 00802.3653 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed 3: JUPITER. FL PALM BEACH COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region JUPITER, FL For internal use only Dates Phone 4/2017 - 5/2017 SDNY_GM_00059960 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022784 EFTA_00170504 EFTA01297085 Page 4 Median Head of Household Age: 63 Median Income: $126:306 Median Home Value: $728,954 Median Education: 16 years Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed 4: 9053 ESTATE THOMAS APT 101 ST THOMAS, VI 00802 Address Dates Phone 9053 ESTATE THOMAS APT 101 6/2016 - 10/2016 ST THOMAS, VI 00802 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed 5: 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3602 Address Dates Phone 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 12/2003 - 6/2016 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3602 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members None Listed Other Associates BETZ, SHAUNA L 6: 9053 ESTATE THOMAS STE 10 ST THOMAS, VI 00802 Address Dates 9053 ESTATE THOMAS STE 10 5/2016 - 5/2016 ST THOMAS, VI 00802 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed Phone 7: PO BOX 608 ST THOMAS, VI Address Dates Phone PO BOX 608 3/2004 - 11/2015 ST THOMAS. VI ST THOMAS COUNTY Household Members KELLERHALS, EDWARD A Other Associates FERGUSON, GREG J 8: PO BOX 6347 ST THOMAS, VI =4347 Address Dates Phone PO BOX 6347 3/2004 - 4/2009 ST THOMAS. VI =-6347 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members KELLERHALS. EDWARD A Other Associates FERGUSON. GREG J For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059961 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022785 EFTA_00 170505 EFTA01297086 Page 5 9: 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 2 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3602 Address Dates Phone 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 2 7/2003 - 6,2004 ST THOMAS. VI 00802-3602 ST. THOMAS COUNTY Household Members KELLERHALS. EDWARD A Other Associates None Listed 10: BROOKLYN, NY KINGS COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age: 34 Median Income: $127,273 Median Home Value: $741,587 Median Education: 18 years Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed BROOKLYN, NY 11: BROOKLYN, NY KINGS COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age: 34 Median Income: $127,273 Median Home Value: $741,587 Median Education: 18 years Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed BROOKLYN, NY 12: BROOKLYN. NY KINGS COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age: 34 Median Income: $127,273 Median Home Value: $741,587 Median Education: 18 years Household Members KELLERHALS. KATHLEEN M BROOKLYN, NY Other Associates None Listed 13: STATEN ISLAND, NY STATEN ISLAND, NY For internal use only Dates Phone 11/1997 - 11/1997 Dates Phone 10/1997 - 11/1997 Dates Phone 2/1994 - 10/1997 Dates 2/1994 - 2/1994 Phone SDNY_GM_00059962 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022786 EFTA_00 170506 EFTA01297087 Page 6 RICHMOND COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age. 47 Median Income: $74,028 Median Home Value: $483.978 Median Education: 13 years Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed 14: STATEN ISLAND, NY Address Dates Phone 2/1994 - 2/1994 STATEN ISLAND. NY RICHMOND COUNTY Census Data for Geographical Region Median Head of Household Age: 42 Median Income: $95,399 Median Home Value: $462,729 Median Education: 13 years Household Members None Listed Other Associates None Listed Voter Registrations -1 records found 1: New York Voter Registration Registrant Information Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Residential Address: STATEN ISLAND, NY OND COUNTY SSN: X Date of Birth: Gender: Female Voter Information Last Vote Date: 2002 Party Affiliation: DEMOCRAT Active Status: ACTIVE Driver Licenses - 0 records found Professional Licenses - 0 records found Health Care Providers - 0 records found Health Care Sanctions - 0 records found Pilot Licenses - 0 records found Sport Licenses - 0 records found Real Property - 0 records found Motor Vehicle Registrations - 4 records found 1: FL MVR Registrant Information Registrant: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A DOB: Address: JUPITER, FL PALM BEACH COUNTY For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059963 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022787 EFTA_00 170507 EFTA01297088 Page 7 Original Registration Date: Registration Date: Registration Expiration Date: Decal Number: VIN: Class: Model Year: Make: Model: Series: Body Style: Color: License Plate Type: License Plate Number: Plate State: Data Source: 2: FL MVR nformation VIN: Class: PASSENGER CAR/LIGHT TRUCK Model Year: 2017 Make: Toyota Model: 4Runner Series: SR5/LIMITED/SR5 P Body Style: 4 Dr Wagon Sport Utility Color: White Owner Information Name: KELLERHALS. ERIKA A Registration Information 4/17/2017 4/17/2017 10/13/2017 20117043 Vehicle Information PASSENGER CAR/LIGHT TRUCK 2017 Toyota 4Runner SR5/LIMITED/SR5 P 4 Dr Wagon Sport Utility white Plate Information FL FL Source Information GOVERNMENTAL DOB: Address: JUPITER, FL PALM BEACH COUNTY Lienholder Information Name: USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK Address: PO BOX 25145 LEHIGH VALLEY. PA 18002-5145 NORTHAMPTON COUNTY Title Information Title Number: Title Transfer Date: Title Issue Date: Data Source: 3: NY MVR 4/17/2017 5/5/2017 Source Information GOVERNMENTAL Registrant Information Registrant: KELLERHALS. ERIKA A DOB: Address: STATEN ISLAND. NY RICHMOND COUNTY Registration Information Original Registration Date: 1/30/2002 Registration Date: 1/30/2002 Registration Expiration Date: 1/29/2004 For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059964 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022788 EFTA_00 I 70508 EFTA01297089 Page 8 Vehicle Information 4: NY MVR VIN: Class: Model Year: Make: Model: Series: Body Style: Weight: License Plate Type: License Plate Number: Plate State: Data Source: PASSENGER CAR/LIGHT TRUCK 2002 Volkswagen Passat as Sedan 4 Door 3196 Plate Information Pri NY Source Information GOVERNMENTAL Vehicle Information VIN: Class: PASSENGER CAR/LIGHT TRUCK Model Year: 2002 Make: Volkswagen Model: Passat Series: as Body Style: Sedan 4 Door Weight: 3196 Owner Information Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A DOB: Address: STATEN ISLAND, NY RICHMOND COUNTY Lienholder Information Name: CHASE MANHATTAN BANKUSA NA Address: PO BOX 5210 NEW HYDE PARK, NY 11042-5210 NASSAU COUNTY Title Information Title Transfer Date: 3/6/2002 Title Issue Date: 3/6/2002 Source Information Data Source: GOVERNMENTAL Boats - 0 records found Aircraft - 0 records found Bankruptcy Information - 0 records found Judgments/Liens - 0 records found UCC Liens - 0 records found Fictitious Businesses - 0 records found Notice Of Defaults - 0 records found Potential Relatives - 10 records found 1st Degree: 6. 2nd Degree: 4 No. Full Name 1. KELLERHALS, ENER SON.ISCOCX DOB: (Age: 42) Address/Phone BROOKLYN, NY STATEN ISLAND, NY For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059965 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022789 EFTA_00 I 70509 EFTA01297090 Page 9 No. Full Name 2. KELLERHALS, EDWARD A • AKA RELLERMALS, EDWARD A • AKA KELLERNALS, EDW SSN:EXXXX DOB: (Age: 72) 3. KELLERHALS, KATHLEEN M • AKA KELLERHAL, KATHLEEN M • AKA KELLERHALS, KATHLEEN • AKA KELLERHALS, K M • AKA KELLERHALS, KATHEEN • AKA KELLERBALS. KATHLEEN M • AKA KELLERHALS, KATHLEEN M SSN:EXXXX DOB: (Age: 68) 4. KELLERHALS, EDWARD 5. DAHLING. ROBERT J SSN:EXXXX DOB: (Age: 46) 5.A. DAHLING. PATRICIA M • AKA DAHLING. P SSN:MXXXX MN° NY NY PO BOX 608 ST THOMAS. VI 00804-0608 PO BOX 6347 ST THOMAS. VI 00804-6347 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 2 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-3602 NY D. NY BROOKLYN, NY BROOKLYN, NY STATE D, NY WEST ISLIP, NY STAT N IS AND, NY STATEN ISLAND. NY PO BOX STATEN ISLAND, NY TA N For internal use only D. NY NY SDNY_GM_000 59966 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022790 EFTA_00 1 705 10 EFTA01297091 Page 10 No. Full Narne DOB: (Age: 74) 5.B. DAHLING. MICHAEL A • AKA DAHLIG, MICHAEL SSN:EXXXX DOB: (Age: 43) S.C. MAYFIELD, JESSICA E Address/Phone NY STATEN ISLAND, NY PHOENIX, AZ GOODYEAR, AZ TEMPE, AZ CHANDLER, AZ NY PHOENIX, AZ • AKA, DAHLING. JESSICA A • AKA MAYFIELD, JESSIE • AKA MAYFIELD, JESSI PHOENIX AZ • AKA MORRIS. JESSICA • AKA BUCCOLA. JESSIE SAN DIEGO. CA SSMIXXX DOB: (Age: 39) Sae AZ 6. DAHLING, MELISSA A NY • AKA KELLERHALS, MELISSA A SSN:liaXXX DOB: STATEN ISLAND, NY (Age: 45) D. NY NY 6.A. DAHLING, ROBERT J D, NY SSN:EIXXX DOB: (Age: 76) For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059967 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022791 EFTA_00 I 705 I I EFTA01297092 Page I I No. Full Name Address/Phone STATEN ISLAND, NY STATEN ISLAND. NY Business Associates -1 records found 1: KELLERHALS FERGUSON FLETCHER KROBLIN PLLC Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Address: 501 E KENNEDY BLVD STE 802 TAMPA, FL 33602-5201 Status: INACTIVE State: FL Corporation Number: M13000002984 Descriptive Status: INACTIVE Title: MEMBER MANAGER Record Type: CURRENT Record Date: 12/5/2016 Filing Date: 1/6/2014 Person Associates - 7 records found No. Full Name Address SSN 1: BETZ, SHAUNA L 6501 RED HOOK PLZ STE 1=-XXXX 201 ST THOMAS, VI 00802- 1373 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 3602 5600 ROYAL DANE MALL STE 51 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 6410 DENVER, CO DENVER. CO 2: FERGUSON, GREG J 9100 PORT OF SALE FERGUSON. GREGORY J MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS, VI 00802- 3602 PO BOX lir MAS. VI PO BOX 608 ST THOMAS, VI 00804- 0608 PO BOX 6347 For internal use only Phone DOB SDNY_GM_00059968 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022792 EFTA_00 I 705 I 2 EFTA01297093 Page 12 No. Full Name 3: HANRATTY, THOMAS E 4: ROBINSON, KELLY M TRAYNOR, KELLY 5: TRAYNOR, CARA ROBINSON. CARA Address ST THOMAS, VI 00804- 6347 MESA. AZ AND, NY STATEN ISLAND. NY iliallAND, NY 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 22 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 3602 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 3602 ST THOMAS, VI TS OMAS, VI ST THOMAS. VI SSN 1=-)(xxx 9100 PORT OF SALE MXXXX MALL STE 22 ST THOMAS, VI 00802- 3602 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS, VI 00802- 3602 11 -1OMAS. VI "TOMAS. VI For internal use only Phone DOB SDNY_GM_00059969 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022793 EFTA_001705B EFTA01297094 Page 13 No. Full Name 6: GEARY. BRETT A A 7: THOMAS. WILLIAM AVERY Address SSN Phone DOB ST THOMAS, VI 9053 ESTATE THOMAS APT 101 CHARLOTTE AMALIE. VI 00802 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 22 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 3602 DUMFRIES, VA I= 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS. VI 00802- 3602 PO BOX iii HOMAS. VI XXXX 10/1984 DALLAS. TX NORMAN. OK APT 2 NORMAN, OK 1S WATER, OK 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 ST THOMAS, VI 00802- 3602 Nei hbors - 10 records found STATEN ISLAND, NY Name dress CAHILL, JAMES BRIAN CARDO, ERICA STATEN ISLAND, NY BURKE, MATTHEW L JR STATEN ISLAND. ASSENZA. CHRISTOPHER M ASSENZA, MICHAEL P STATEN ISLAND. NY CATALFUMO, ANA M CATALFUMO. MICHAEL J For internal use only Phone SDNY_GM_00069970 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022794 EFTA_00I 705 I4 EFTA01297095 Page 14 CIRIGLIANO. SUZANNE GUIRACOCHA, JULIO CESAR GUIRACOCHA, CARLOS A MIRO, FRANK AGUSTIN PACCIONE, PAMELA J r4 A7AROV, MICHELLE J KRUSE. ADAM M KRUSE. BRANDON G KRUSE, DONNA V KRUSE, JOHN J KRUSE, VICTORIA M PRIOLO. ANNMARIE R CUSACK, CHRISTOPH J CUSACK, MARIE E MCMILLAN, MAUREEN A MCMILLAN, ROBERT W MCMILLAN, ROBERT M STATEN ISLAND. N..= STATEN ISLAND, NY STATEN ISLAND, NY STATEN ISLAND. NY STATEN ISLAND. NY STATEN ISLAND. STATEN ISLAND. NY Employment Locator -15 records found 1: 2: 3: 4: Company Name: GRATITUDE AMERICA LTD Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA Address: 9053 ESTATE THOMAS SUITE 101 MAS, VI 00802 SSN: 111XXXX Confidence: High Company Name: KELLERHALS FERGUSON FLETCHER KROBLIN PLLC Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Title: mamagR MANAGER SSN: XXXX Confidence: Medium Company Name: THERAPY ASSOCIATION AND DISABILITIES ADVOCATES INC Name: KELLERHALS. ERIKAA Address: PO BOX 6016 latMAS. VI 00804-6016 SSN: XXXX Confidence: High Company Name: THE MAHOGANY RUN HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION Name: KELLERHALS. ERIKAA Title: VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR For internal use only SDNY_GM_000599n CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CONE IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022795 EFTA_00I 70515 EFTA01297096 Page IS Address: 6501 RED HOOK PLZ STE 201 ST THOMAS, VI 00802-1373 5: 6: 7: 8: 9: 10: 11: SSN: Phone: Confidence: Medium Company Name: PATIENT ASSIST VI Name: KELLERHALS. ERIKA A Address: 9100 PORT OF SALE MALL STE 15 .1 1HDMAS. VI 00802-3602 SSN: XXXX Confidence: High Company Name: VISF Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Title: VICE PRESIDENT Address: PO BOX 1605 KINGSHILL. VI 00851-1605 SSN: MO( Phone: Confidence: Medium Company Name: KELLERHALS P.0 Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Title: PARTNER Address: PO BOX 608 T THOMAS. VI 00804-0608 SSN: XXXX Phone: Confidence: Medium Company Name: THERAPY ASSOCIATION AND DISABILITIES ADVOCATES INC Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Address: PO BOX 608 MAS, VI 00804-0608 SSN: XXXX Confidence: High Company Name: ERIKA A. KELLERHALS P.0 Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Address: PO BOX 608 MAS, VI 00804-0608 SSN: Phone: Confidence: Medium Company Name: ERIKA A. KELLERHALS P.0 Name: KELLERHALS. ERIKA Title: Address: SSN: Phone: Confidence: Company Name: Name: Medium PRESIDENT PO BOX 608 OMAS. VI 00804-0608 MARJORIE RAWLS ROBERTS P.0 KELLERHALS, ERIKA A For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059972 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022796 EFTA_00I 705 I 6 EFTA01297097 Page 16 12: 13: 14: 15: Title: ATTORNEY Address: PO BOX 6347 OMAS. VI 00804-6347 SSN: Phone: Confidence: Medium Company Name: ROBERTS, MARJORIE RAWLS Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA A Title: ASSOCIATE Address: PO BOX 6347 T THOMAS, VI 00804-6347 SSN: Phone: Confidence: High Company Name: THE LALTJ LIMITED PARTNERSHIP Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA MS Title: CONTACT Address: 17 STATE ST NEW YORK, NY 10004-1501 SSN: =-XXXX Confidence: High Company Name: ERIKA A. KELLERHALS, P.C. Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKAA Title: SSN: XXXX Phone: Confidence: High Company Name: MARJORIE BAWLS ROBERTS P.0 Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKAA Address: PO BOX 6347 OMAS, VI 00804-6347 SSN: Phone: Confidence: Medium Criminal Filings - 0 records found Cellular & Alternate Phones -1 records found 1: Personal Information Name: KELLERHALS, ERIKA Address: NY Phone Number: Phone Type: Mobile Carrier Information Carrier: NEW CINGULAR WRLS GA Carrier City: CHARLOTTE AMALIE (SAINT T Carrier State: VI Sources - 48 records found All Sources Corporate Affiliations Email addresses Historical Person Locator For internal use only 48 Source Document(s) 1 Source Documents) 7 Source Document(s) 10 Source Document(s) SDNY_GM_00059973 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022797 EFTA_00170517 EFTA01297098 Page 17 Motor Vehicle Registrations 5 Source Document(s) Person Locator 1 12 Source Document(s) Person Locator 2 4 Source Document(s) Phone 4 Source Document(s) PhonesPlus Records 1 Source Document(s) Utility Locator 3 Source Document(s) Voter Registrations 1 Source Document(s) Key AHigh Risk Indicator. These symbols may prompt you to investigate further. I Moderate Risk Indicator. These symbols may prompt you to investigate further. PAGeneral Information Indicator. These symbols inform you that additional information is provided. VThe most recent telephone listing as reported by the EDA source. Important: The Public Records and commercially available data sources used on reports have errors. Data is sometimes entered poorly, processed incorrectly and is generally not free from defect. This system should not be relied upon as definitively accurate. Before relying on any data this system supplies, it should be independently verified. For Secretary of State documents. the following data is for information purposes only and is not an official record. Certified copies may be obtained from that individual state's Department of State. Your OPPA Permissible Use is: Debt Recovery/Fraud Your GLBA Permissible Use is: Legal Compliance Copyright. 2017 LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. D& B: Not required LEGAL RESULTS: Court Cases: JAMES P. CARROLL v. DAWN PROSSER Civil Action No. 08-147 United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas and St. John Division 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534 June 6, 2012, Decided June 6, 2012, Filed SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Affirmed by Prosser v. Carroll (In re Prosser), 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15853 (3d Cir. V.I., Aug. 1, 2013) For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059974 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022798 EFTA_00I705 IS EFTA01297099 Page 18 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534, * PRIOR HISTORY: Carroll v. Prosser, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54960, 50 V.I. 389 (2008) CORE TERMS: matter of law, insolvency, badge, "actual fraud, transferred, new trial, defraud, actual intent, fraudulent transfers, jury verdict, failed to present, essential element, post-petition, hinder, proven, deliberations, jewelry, transfers of property, failed to prove, citations omitted, instructing, fraudulent, waived, personal bank account, contra-equity, fraudulently. ownership, intent to hinder, direct evidence, unauthorized COUNSEL: fl i Bernard C. Pattie, Law Offices of Barnard Pattie P.C., St. Croix, USVI; Fred Stevens, Yann Geron, Fox Rothschild LP, New York, NY; Samuel H. Israel, FoxRothchild LLP, Philadelphia, PA, For James P. Carroll, Plaintiff. Christopher A. Kroblin, Erika Kellerhals P.C., St. Thomas, USVI; Jeffrey B. C. Moorhead, Christiansted, USVI; Mark W. Eckard, Groner & Eckard, P.C., Christiansted, USVI; Norman Anthony Abood, Law Office of Norman A. Abood, Toledo, OH; Robert F. Craig, Robert F. Craig, P.C., Omaha, NE, For Dawn Prosser, Defendant. JUDGES: SANCHEZ, J. OPINION BY: Juan R. Sanchez OPINION MEMORANDUM (June 6. 20121 In this turnover action, James P. Carroll, the Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of non-party Debtor Jeffrey Prosser, seeks to restore to the estate pre-petition fraudulent transfers and post-petition unauthorized transfers made from Debtor Jeffrey Prosser to his wife, Defendant Dawn Prosser. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Trustee Carroll and against Prosser. Thereafter, Prosser moved for judgment as a matter of law and, in the alternative, filed a ["2] "protective" motion for a new trial. The Trustee moved for judgment on the jury verdict. 1 By agreement of al parties. this case was tried contemporaneously with the parallel Chapter 11 case. Sten Springs! v. Dawn Prosser. No. 08-146 (D.V.I.) to two separate juries. Although the two juries heard the overlapping evidence in the two cases at the same time as each other. each jury heard a separate opening and closing. each jury was charged independent,/ of the other, and each jury deliberated separately. In her motion for judgment as a matter of law, Prosser argues Carroll failed to present any evidence that Jeffrey Prosser owned the assets at the time of their transfer. Specifically, Prosser argues the evidence was necessarily insufficient because the jury in the parallel Chapter 11 case, Stan Springel v. Dawn Prosser, No, 08-146 (D.V.I.), found the transfers were made directly from Jeffrey Prosser's company to his wife for fair value and without For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059975 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022799 EFTA_00I 70519 EFTA01297100 Page 19 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534, * fraud, indicating Jeffrey Prosser never owned the assets. In addition, Prosser argues Carroll failed to prove Jeffrey Prosser's insolvency at the time of each transfer, an essential element of Carroll's claims, Carroll contends these two issues [*3] have been waived because Prosser failed to raise them in a motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to submission of all the evidence to the jury. Alternatively, Carroll asserts Prosser's arguments fail as a matter of law. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, which was amended in 2006, permits a court to grant judgment as a matter of law "only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability." Price v. Trans Union, L.L. C., No. 09-1332, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36176, at *7, [WL], at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16,2012) (quoting LePage's' Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2003)). In determining whether to grant this "sparingly invoked remedy," the court must "refrain from weighing the evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or substituting [itsj own version of the facts for that of the jury." Marra v. Phila. Nous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A motion for judgment as a matter of law may "be made at any time before the case is submitted to the jury." FED R. Civ. P. 50(a)(2). raj As long as the motion was raised before the jury received the case, the movant may renew the motion within 28 days after entry of judgment. FED. R. CR/. P. 50(b). However, failure to make a motion for judgment as a matter of law during trial 'Wholly waives the right to mount any post-trial attack on the sufficiency of the evidence." Murphy v. City of Phila. DepY of Recreation, No. 07-4104, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94358, at *9, [WL], at *3 n.l (E.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2011) (citations omitted); see also Jeckell v. Crestwood Area Sch. Dist, No. 04-1135, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71380, at *1, [WL), at *2-3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2008). Although Prosser made a Rule 50 motion during trial, her argument, as it related to the Chapter 7 case, was only that Trustee Carroll did not adduce proof of actual intent by Jeffrey Prosser to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. This is not the same as arguing Trustee Carroll failed to prove Jeffrey Prosser owned the assets he transferred to his wife. In addition, Prosser asserted an insolvency argument, however this argument related only to the solvency of Jeffrey Prosser's company, and not to himself personally. Thus, because Prosser did not raise either of the arguments she seeks to raise herein at trial, they [* 5] are deemed waived. Prosser contends it would he unfair and inequitable to find waiver, as her arguments could not have been raised until the jury in the Chapter 11 case delivered its verdict. Prosser thus contends this Court should view the Chapter 11 jury verdict as newly discovered evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (permitting a court to relieve a party from a final judgment for, inter alia, "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)"). This Court disagrees. The verdict in the parallel Chapter 11 case is entirely irrelevant to the issue of whether Prosser could have raised the arguments made here before the jury's deliberations. Indeed, the Chapter 11 jury's finding was based on evidence submitted prior to that jury's deliberations. If, based on the evidence submitted at trial, the Chapter 11 jury could find For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059976 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022800 EFTA_00I 70520 EFTA01297101 Page 20 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534, * the transfers at issue in that ease were made directly from Jeffrey Prosser's company to his wife for fair value and without fraud, so too Prosser could have argued — "at any time" during the course of the trial, and certainly once all the evidence had been submitted [' 6] to the jury -- that Carroll failed to present evidence showing Jeffrey Prosser owned the assets he transferred to his wife, and failed to present evidence showing Jeffrey Prosser's insolvency at the time of each transfer. There is no reason why Prosser had to wait for the jury verdict in the parallel case before raising either of those arguments. Even if this Court were to find Prosser's arguments not waived, however, the motion is denied as a matter of law. Upon review of the evidence submitted to the jury, this Court finds Trustee Carroll submitted sufficient evidence regarding Jeffrey Prosser's ownership of the assets he fraudulently transferred to his wife to support the verdict in this case. In addition, the Court finds Jeffrey Prosser's insolvency at the time of each transfer is not an essential element of Trustee Carroll's claims. Trustee Carroll presented Alan Barbree, a forensic accounting expert, to testify about Jeffrey Prosser's ownership of each of the five categories of assets Carroll sought to recover in his case: (1) cash; (2) jewelry: (3) improvements to the Shoys Estate; (4) furniture; and (5) fine art and antiques. As to the first two categories, Barbee testified that r7] Jeffrey Prosset transferred cash and jewelry to his wife via payments made directly from his personal bank account. Trial Tr. 118:3-120:7, 12.1:7-124:19,125:2-15,129: 8- 130:23,132:2-17,135:11-136:5,136:18-141:16,141:20-142:11, June 7, 2011. These transfers were explained in detail at trial, and supporting documentation was included With Barbree's summary of the transfers, all of which was provided to the jury during its deliberations so it could track the payments. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded Jeffrey Prosser's personal bank account was the point of origin for the cash and jewelry transferred. See id.; see also Trial Exs. 201 - 203, 216. Barbree further testified that the remaining three categories of assets Trustee Carroll sought to recover (improvements to the Shoys mansion, furniture, and art and antiques) were paid for either through Jeffrey Prosser's personal bank account or through a "contra- equity account" set up at Jeffrey Prosser's company for his use. Trial Tr. 143:17-24, 144:20-145:8, 147:3-161:22, June 7, 2011. As stipulated by the parties, payments made through this contra-equity account were "distributions" made solely for the benefit rsj of the shareholder, Jeffrey Prosser, and thus were Prosser's personal funds. Id. at 163. These transfers were also explained in detail at trial, and supporting documentation was again provided to the jury at the time of its deliberations so it could also track these payments. See Trial Exs. 213-215, 217. From this evidence alone, a jury could reasonably conclude the assets paid for through the contra-equity account, as distributions to Jeffrey Prosser, were owned by Jeffrey Prosser, and were in fact transfers from Jeffrey Prosser to his wife. Moreover, Prosser herself tetified these items were gifts from her husband, providing further evidence of her husband's initial ownership. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 224:6-25 (jewelry), June 7, 2011. As a result, this Court finds Trustee Carroll presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Jeffrey Prosser owned the particular assets at issue which he men fraudulently transferred to his wife. Prosser next argues Trustee Carroll failed to present evidence of Jeffrey Prosser's insolvency at the time of each transfer, which Prosser contends was an essential element of each of Carroll's claims. Trustee Carroll asserted three types of claims against [' 9] For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059977 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022801 EFTA_00170521 EFTA01297102 Page 21 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534, * Prosser. The first two types of claims were based on "actual fraud," meaning that Trustee Carroll bore the burden of proof to show Jeffrey Prosser made transfers to his wife with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (actual fraud provision); In re Valley Bldg. & Constr. Corp., 435 B.R. 276, 285 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010) (stating actual fraud provisions require the trustee to establish the debtor made payments with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor). Because "individuals are rarely willing to admit intent, actual fraud is rarely proven by direct evidence," In re Pa. Gear Corp., Bankr. No. 02-36436, Adv. Nos. 03-940, 03-942, 2008 WL 2370169, at *9 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2008). Instead, courts consider various factors, or "badges of fraud," in determining whether fraud has been proven by circumstantial evidence. In re Am. Rehab & Physical Therapy, Inc., Bankr. No. 04-14562, Adv. No. 04-847, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1440, at *49, [WL], at *15-16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. May 18, 2006). One such badge of fraud is insolvency of the debtor, but not all badges of fraud need to be shown to prove a claim of actual fraud. In re Valley Bldg. & Constr. Corp., 435 B.R. at 286 [*10] (detailing 11 badges of fraud courts may consider in determining actual intent, not all of which must be proven to support a claim of actual fraud, and noting this list is "non-exhaustive"); In re Fedders N.Am., Inc., 405 B.R. 527, 545 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) ("The presence or absence of any single badge of fraud is not conclusive." (citation omitted)). Thus, while insolvency of the debtor is a factor that may support a claim for actual fraud, it is not an essential element of such a claim. The third type of claim brought by Trustee Carroll sought to recover unauthorized post-petition transfers from Jeffrey Prosser to his wife, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §549, which permits a trustee to avoid transfers of property belonging to the estate that occur after the commencement of the case and are not authorized under the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. § 549(a); see also In re Pa. Gear Corp., 2008 WL 2370169, at *6. To prevail on this type of claim, a trustee must show that after the commencement of the case at issue, property of the estate was transferred, and the transfer was not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or any provision of the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 549; In re PSA, Inc., 335 B.R. 580, 584-85 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005). rig Insolvency is thus not a required element for this type of claim either. See In re Kennesaw Mint Inc., 32 B.R. 799, 803 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) ("Section 549(a) does not require the trustee to prove insolvency in order to avoid post-petition transfers."). Moreover, the jury instructions for all three claims brought by Trustee Carroll, which were agreed upon by all parties in this case, are consistent with this law. See Trial Tr. 158-162, June 9, 2011 (instructing jury, as to the first type of fraudulent transfer claim, that "[a]Ithough the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor is often difficult to prove by direct evidence, certain fact patterns, or badges of fraud, will usually show fraudulent intent. When seeking to avoid a fraudulent transfer on the basis of actual fraud, a trustee must prove a "goodly" number of badges of fraud. No one particular badge of fraud must be proven to demonstrate intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" (and listing various badges of fraud, including insolvency of debtor)); id. at 163 (instructing, as to the second type of fraudulent transfer claim brought by Trustee Carroll pursuant to United States Virgin Islands law, that the jury "must find that [*1 2] transfers were fraudulent if Trustee Carroll has proved that Dawn Prosser received or was the beneficiary of certain transfers of property of Jeffrey Prosser, and each of those transfers was made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud then present or future creditors"); id at 166 (instructing jury, as to me third type of fraudulent transfer claim brought by Trustee Carroll, that "[i]n order for For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059978 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022802 EFTA_00 170522 EFTA01297103 Page 22 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79534, * Trustee Carroll to recover from Dawn Prosser[] on Trustee Carroll's post-petition transfer claims based on Section 549 of the Bankruptcy Code, you must find Trustee Carroll has proved the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence. One, Dawn Prosser received or was the beneficiary of certain transfers of property of Jeffrey Prosser. Two, such transfers were received after the petition date of Jeffrey Prosser. Three, such transfers were not approved by the Bankruptcy Court or authorized by the Bankruptcy Code"). Given that Trustee Carroll did not need to prove insolvency of the Debtor at the time of each transfer, Prosser's argument fails, and based on the entire record before this Court, Prosser's motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. Alternatively, Prosser r13] argues she is entitled to a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) because the jury verdict is unsupportable and because judgment should be entered in favor of Prosser. Rule 59 provides, "[t]he court may, on motion, grant anew trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action in federal court." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Generally, a district court may grant a motion for new trial pursuant to Rule 59 "if it determines that the verdict is inconsistent with substantial justice beeause the verdict is against the weight of the evidence; the damages are excessive; the trial was unfair; or that substantial errors were made in the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions." Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 1385, 1397 (E.D.Pa. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ne. Women's Or., Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd in relevant part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989). The decision to grant a new trial lies within the discretion of the district court, although "such requests are disfavored." State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lincow, 715 F. Supp. 2d 617, 626 (ED. Pa. 2010) ["14] (internal citations omitted). Prosser argues she is entitled to a new trial for essentially the same reasons advanced in her motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, Prosser argues Trustee Carroll failed to prove Jeffrey Prosser owned the assets he fraudulently transferred to his wife in his individual capacity, and not as an officer of his company, and Trustee Carroll did not prove Jeffrey Prosser was insolvent at the time of each transfer. This motion is therefore denied for the same reasons that Prosser's motion for judgment as a matter of law was denied. An appropriate Order follows. JULITO A. FRANCIS, Petitioner v. DEBRA L. WRIGHT- FRANCIS, Respondent Family No. ST-10-DI-226 Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059979 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(FIDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022803 EFTA_001 70523 EFTA01297104 Page 23 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45; 61 V.I. 13 July 14, 2014, Decided July 14, 2014, Filed CASE SUMMARY: OVERVIEW: HOLDINGS. [1]-When the parties had lived in the marital home for 7 years of their 21-year marriage, the husband's mother occupied an apartment on the property, the wife had the means to secure alternative housing and had not shown the need or desire to remain there. and the husband acquired the property...Lam his mother, the husband was awarded possession under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33. §IM(d). minus an award to the wife for her interest and contributions: [2]-The wife's medical degree was not marital property under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16. § 109, as the husband had not been compelled to delay or relinquish his own education or goals, offered no evidence with which to calculate the value of the degree. and himself had an advanced degree: (3J-The husband had not wasted marital assets by withdrawing funds from his annuity. as they were used to pay reasonable and necessary expenses. OUTCOME: The court distributed the parties' marital homestead and personal property. CORE TERMS: marital, homestead, marriage. divorce, dollars. equitable, marital property, personal property, pension, spouse's, career, educational, apartment, retirement accounts, daughter, couple, mortgage, real property, retirement plans, divide, standard of living, ownership, household, jointly, dissolution, retirement, terminated, occupied, earnings, net worth LexisNexis(R) Headnotes Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Equitable Distribution > General Overview Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Partition Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Judges > Discretion [HN1) In an action for divorce, the court has the authority to equitably divide joint personal property •eal property, limited to the marital homestead as defined in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, § (d). Real property owned by the couple, other than the marital homestead, is divided by way of a civil partition action. When determining the equity of the distribution, the court also has broad discretion to consider the case's most salient facts. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands further refined the court's discretion to divide property by eliminating marital fault as a factor in dividing the homestead. The doctrine of equitable distribution is applied to effectuate a fair and just division of the property between the For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059980 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QP .NEIDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022804 EFTA_00I 70524 EFTA01297105 Page 24 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** parties. As its name suggests, equitable distribution does not necessarily mean "equal," only "equitable." Family Law > Marital Duties & Rights > 12toaerty Rights > Homestead Rights [HN2I Pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, §=(a). a homestead is defined as the abode including land and buildings, owned by, and actually occupied by, a person, or by members of his family free of rental charges. Although the Virgin Islands Code does not expressly define a marital homestead, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Appellate Division of the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands have interpreted § (a), (c) to hold that a "marital homestead" is any homestead in which a husband and wife both reside during the marriage and that is owned by one or both of the spouses. Civil Procedure > Judicial Officers > Judges > Discretion Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Characterization > Marital Property Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Characterization > Separate Property Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Equitable Distribution > General Overview [HN3I The court may distribute personal property in accordance with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 16, § 109(4). However, the statute does not define marital property. Whether an asset is marital property or separate property for purposes of distribution of the marital estate is a matter reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. Once these distinctions have been made, the trial judge has broad equitable powers in disposing of marital property. Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Characterization > Marital Property [HN4I Although not specifically defined, marital property has been construed to encompass any property which the couple acquired during the marriage and which is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Characterization > Marital Property Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Classification > Retirement Benefits > Pensions [HN51 Considering the tremendous statutory examples and case law from other jurisdictions holding pension funds as marital property, the Virgin Islands has determined that a pension fund is marital personal property, subject to claim by the other spouse upon divorce. To the extent earned during the marriage, the pension benefits represent compensation for marital effort and are substitutes for current earnings which would have increased the marital standard of living or would have been converted into other assets divisible at dissolution. Subjecting the benefits to division is just, because in most cases the retirement benefits constitute the most valuable asset the couple has acquired and they both have relied upon their pension payments for security in their older years. For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059981 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(FIDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022805 EFTA_00170525 EFTA01297106 Page 25 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Classification > Degrees, Licenses & Enhanced Earnings [HN6I Most states hold that an educational degree is not marital property. Courts have consistently considered whether one spouse had postponed his or her own career and educational goals to support and contribute to the career and educational goals of the other spouse. They also acknowledge the injustice that occurs after a couple collectively works towards the attainment of an advanced educational degree or career goal, the expectation of a higher standard of living in the future can be frustrated by the dissolution of a marriage. Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > Classification > Degrees, Licenses & Enhanced Earnings [HN7I Many states have compared professional degrees to pension or retirement plans when establishing what constitutes marital property. Pension and retirement plans entitle an owner to a definite amount at a certain date, which an individual has a contractual right to receive. Professional degrees rely on uncertain future events and provide only an expectation of enhanced income. The value of a professional degree is speculative and dependent upon the attributes and future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued. Family Law > Marriage > General Overview [HNBI The Virgin Islands has long viewed marriage as a partnership or joint venture, whereby both parties collaborate for a common purpose and contribute toward its success. Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Jurisdiction > General Overview Family Law > Marital Termination & Spousal Support > Dissolution & Divorce > Property Distribution > General Overview [HN9I The court has the authority to divide the personal property in divorce action even after a divorce decree has been issued. The trial court will be required to issue rulings on post-divorce ownership of personal property such as cars, boats, electronics, jewelry, shares of stock, bonds and monies deposited with financial institutions. Civil Procedure > Sanctions > Contempt > Civil Contempt [HN10] A party may be held in civil contempt for failure to comply with a court order if (1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner. SUMMARY: Division of property in divorce case. The Superior Court, Watlington, J., divided the parties' real and personal property. HEADNOTES VIRGIN ISLANDS OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES For internal use only CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL SDNY_GM_00059982 DB-SDNY-0022806 EFTA_00I 70526 EFTA01297107 Page 26 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** (Headnotes classified to Virgin Islands Digest] 1. Divorce § 11.50--Division of Property--Power of Court In an action for divorce, the court has the authority to equitably divide joint personal property and real property, limited to the marital homestead. Real property owned by the couple, other than the marital homestead, is divided by way of a civil partition action. When determining the equity of the distribution, the court also has broad discretion to consider the case's most salient facts. The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands further refined the court's discretion to divide property by eliminating marital fault as a factor in dividing the homestead. The doctrine of equitable distribution is applied to effectuate a fair and just division of the property between the parties. As its name suggests, eqiaole distribution does not necessarily mean "equal," only "equitable." 33 V.I.C. § (d). 2. Property § 15.05--Homestead--Generally A homestead is defined as the abode including land and buildings, owned by, and actually occupied by, a person, or by members of his family free of rental charges. Although the Virgin Islands Code does not expressly define a marital homestead, both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Appellate Division of the United States District Court for the Virgin Islands have interpreted the applicable statute to hold that a "marital homestead" is any homestead in which a husband and wife both reside during the marriage and that is owned by one or both of the spouses. 33 V.I.C. § a), (c). 3. Property § 15.30--Homestead--Divorce When the divorcing parties had lived in the marital homestead for 7 years of their 21-year marriage, the husband's mother occupied an apartment on the property, the wife had the means to secure alternative housing and had not shown the need or desire to remain there, and the husband had acquired the ["14] property from his mother, the husband was awardaossession, minus an award to the wife for her interest and contributions. 33 V.I.C. § 4. Divorce § 11.50--Division of Property--Power of Court The court may distribute personal property in accordance with the statute governing final orders in divorce cases. However, the statute does not define marital property. Whether an asset is marital property or separate property for purposes of distribution of the marital estate is a matter reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court. Once these distinctions have been made, the trial judge has broad equitable powers in disposing of marital property. 16 V.I.C. § 109. 5. Divorce § 11.70--Division of Property--Types of Property Interests Although not specifically defined, marital property has been construed to encompass any property which the couple acquired during the marriage and which is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. 6. Divorce § 11.45--Division of Property--Pensions Considering the tremendous statutory examples and case law from other jurisdictions holding pension funds as marital property, the Virgin Islands has determined that a pension fund is marital personal property, subject to claim by the other spouse upon divorce. To the extent earned during For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059983 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022807 EFTA_00I 70527 EFTA01297108 Page 27 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** the marriage, the pension benefits represent compensation for marital effort and are substitutes for current earnings which would have increased the marital standard of living or would have been converted into other assets divisible at dissolution. Subjecting the benefits to division is just, because in most cases the retirement benefits constitute the most valuable asset the couple has acquired and they both have relied upon their pension payments for security in their older years. 7. Divorce § 11.40--Division of Property--Particular Cases When neither party had made sufficient information available to the court to justify the division of their respective retirement accounts, but it appeared that they had about the same amount in their funds, each party was entitled to retain his or her existing interest in his or her account. 16 V.I.C. § 109. 8. Divorce § 11.70--Division of Property--Types of Property Interests Most states hold that an educational degree is not marital property. Courts have consistently considered whether one spouse had postponed his or her own career and educational goals to support and contribute to the career and educational goals of the other spouse. They also acknowledge the injustice that occurs after a couple collectively works towards the attainment of an advanced educational degree or career goal, the expectation of a higher standard of living in the future can be frustrated by the dissolution of a marriage. ["15] 9. Divorce § 11.70--Division of Property--Types of Property Interests Many states have compared professional degrees to pension or retirement plans when establishing what constitutes marital property. Pension and retirement plans entitle an owner to a definite amount at a certain date, which an individual has a contractual right to receive. Professional degrees rely on uncertain future events and provide only an expectation of enhanced income. The value of a professional degree is speculative and dependent upon the attributes and future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued. 10. Divorce § 11.40--Division of Property--Particular Cases The wife's medical degree was not marital property subject to equitable distribution, as the husband had not been compelled to delay or relinquish his own education or goals, he offered no evidence with which to calculate the value of the degree, and he himself had an advanced degree. 16 V.I.C. § 109. 11. Marriage § 1.50--Generally--Definition and Nature The Virgin Islands has long viewed marriage as a partnership or joint venture, whereby both parties collaborate for a common purpose and contribute toward its success. 12. Divorce § 11.50--Division of Property--Power of Court The court has the authority to divide the personal property in divorce action even after a divorce decree has been issued. The trial court will be required to issue rulings on post-divorce ownership of personal property such as cars, boats, electronics, jewelry, shares of stock, bonds and monies deposited with financial institutions. For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059984 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022808 EFTA_00I 70528 EFTA01297109 Page 28 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** 13. Divorce § 11.40--Division of Property—Particular Cases Although there was some evidence that the husband in a divorce case withdrew $220,179.93 from his annuity between 2011 and 2012, there was no evidence that he deliberately destroyed, concealed or harmed the parties' property. The money was used to pay reasonable and necessary expenses, including expenses associated with his children's care, the marital homestead, businesses and living expenses; furthermore, the husband had been terminated from his employment and used his investments to support his obligations and standard of living. 14. Contempt § 5.10—Noncompliance With Court Order--Generally A party may be held in civil contempt for failure to comply with a court order if (1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner. COUNSEL: rli ANDREW L. CAPDEVILLE, Eso., Law Offices of Andrew Capdeville, St. Thomas, USVI, Attorney for the Petitioner. [**16] JULIE GERMAN EVERT, Ext., Law Offices of Julie German Evert, St. Thomas, USVI, Attorney for the Respondent. JUDGES: WATLINGTON, Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin islands OPINION BY: DEBRA S. WATLINGTON OPINION MEMORANDUM OPNON 1.1tey 14.2014) This matter came on for a trial on April 8, 2014, before the Honorable Debra S. Watlington, Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for the determination of the parties' personal property and the marital homestead. Petitioner/Husband Mr. Julito A. Francis appeared with counsel Andrew L. Capdeville, Esq., and Respondent/Wife Dr. Wright- Francis appeared with counsel Julie German Evert, Esq., The Court heard sworn testimony from Mr. Francis, Dr. Wright-Francis, Mrs. Joan Francis, and Erica Kellerhals, Esq. 1 Julie German Evert. Esq., entered her notice of appearance in this matter on behalf of Or. Wright Francis on February 12. 2014. Vincerd k Fuller, Esq.. was the attorney of record at the previous hearing. PREUM1NARY MATTERS Prior to commencing the trial, the Court addressed stipulations and outstanding motions of both parties. The [* 2] parties stipulated to the admission of Civil Complaint, ST-14-CV- For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059985 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(FIDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022809 EFTA 00170529 EFTA01297110 Page 29 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** 188, Balbo Corporation v. Julito Francis & Debra Francis, filed by Mr. Gerard Castor. However, they do not stipulate or concede to the amount of monetary relief alleged in the pleading.= The parties also stipulated that the marital homestead, IB-29 Estate Solberg, St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, is valued at Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($725,000.00) subject to a mortgage of One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00). The parties further stipulated that the Court may make its determination of [**17] jointly owned marital household furniture based on evidence submitted from the January 13, 2014 hearing.= 2 Gerald Castor is the owner of Balbo Construction which performed construction work for the parties on the marital homestead located at 16-29 Estate Solberg. In the civil action. Balbo alleges that the parties are liable for outstanding payments amounting to Three Hundred Ninety Six Thousand. Five Hundred Forty Four Dollars and Seventy Six Cents (5396.544.76). 3 This matter came before the Court for a final hearing on January 13 2014. to resolve the outstanding issues regarding distribution of personal property. r31 Thereafter, the pending motions were addressed as follows: 1) Dr. Wright-Francis' Motion to Exclude Gerard Castor's testimony was rendered moot in light of the parties' stipulation; 2) the Court denied Dr. Wright-Francis' Motion to Exclude Mr. Francis and his mother, Joan A. Francis, from testifying that she has an interest in the parties' marital homestead; 3) the Court denied Mr. Francis' request to exclude the expert testimony and report of Attomey Erika Kellerhals; 4) the Court denied Dr. Wright-Francis' Motion to Exclude Mr. Francis from testifying that he is entitled to money from her earnings; and 5) the Court granted Dr. Wright Francis' Motion to Exclude testimony concerning the value of the parties' real and personal property located in the state of Georgia. 4 The Court's jurisdiction in this matter is limited to jointly owned personal property and the marital homestead. UNDISPUTED FACTS The parties, Mr. Julito Francis and Dr. Debra Wright-Francis, were married on August 17, 1991 in Opelika, Alabama. They have one minor child, Brooklyn J. Francis, born on March 6, 2000 and one adult daughter, Saryn J. Francis, born on January 27, 1993. The parties both resided in Georgia until [*4] Mr. Francis relocated in 2004 to St. Thomas; while Dr. Wright-Francis and their daughters joined him in 2005. The parties resided at No. IB-29 Estate Solberg, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands during their marriage. A Decree of Divorce was entered on July 25, 2012, dissolving the marriage. Mr. Francis is the son of Joan Francis and brother to Diane A. Marsh. Joan Francis and her daughter, Diane, acquired the property known as 1B-29 Estate Solberg from the Virgin Islands Housing Finance Authority which required them to build on the land within a set time period. After realizing that they would not be able to comply with program regulations, they transferred ownership to Mr. Francis to begin construction to help secure financing to build. Mr. Francis' mother and sister conveyed Parcel No. IB-29 Estate Solberg to Mr. Francis and Joan Francis by Warranty Deed on April 12, 1995. Subsequently, on October For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059986 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.WAII(E IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022810 EFTA_OOI 70530 EFTA01297111 Page 30 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** 29, 1997, Joan Francis rug executed a Quitclaim Deed transferring her interest in Parcel No. IB-29 Estate Solberg solely to Mr. Francis., A dwelling structure was completed in 1988 which Joan Francis moved into in 2000. At that point, Joan Francis began contributing to the mortgage and the utility bill rsi on a monthly basis until 2006. In January 2014, Joan Francis resumed making contributions of six hundred dollars ($600.00) per month not including utilities. 5 W. Francis filed copies of the 1995 Warranty Deed and 1997 Quitclaim Deed with his exhibit list on March 28. 2014. No. IB-29 Estate Solberg, is a two (2) level structure and has three (3) units. The upper level has three (3) bedrooms and two (2) bathrooms and the lower level is split into two (2) separate one (1) bedroom, one (1) bathroom units. Dr. Wright-Francis continues to occupy the main level of the marital homestead while Mr. Francis has remained in the one (1) bedroom unit which he previously used as his office. Joan Francis, resides in the other one (1) bedroom apartment on the lower level. Mr. Francis is responsible for the mortgage payments for the property. Dr. Wright-Francis assisted with some maintenance of the property. In January 2014, Dr. Wright-Francis purchased an apartment at the Towers Condominiums in Estate Contant which she uses for rental purposes., The marital homestead has structure problems and has deteriorated throughout the parties' marriage.' Notwithstanding the purported poor condition of the home, Mr. r6] Francis would like to retain the marital homestead. 6 At. Francis bled a copy of Dr. Wright Francis's Warranty Deed and Mortgage for Apartment No. F-15, The Towers Condominiums located at No. 7A Southside Quarter, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, with his Motion to the homestead. 7 Me. Francis' exhibits 10(c), 10(d), 10(e), 10(f). 10(g), 10(k), and 10(m), which were admitted into evidence are photos depicting the deteriorated state of the home and its structural problems. The parties acquired multiple assets throughout their marriage in the form of real property in the Virgin Islands and Georgia; individual retirement accounts; and other investment accounts. Mr. Francis was employed with the U.S. Virgin Islands Government, first as the Executive Director of the Public Finance Authority (PFA), then as the Chief Executive Officer of the Virgin Islands Next Generation Network (VINGN). He was later terminated in October of 2011 from VINGN where he received an annual salary of One Hundred Seventy One r 19] Thousand Dollars ($171,000.00). He challenged his termination but after an employment mediation, the decision was upheld. After being terminated, Mr. Francis, an investment manager, has focused on his r7]wealth management business, known as ACSB Capital Management LLC. Dr. Wright-Francis, a medical OB-GYN, contracts medical services with the East End Medical Clinic as an OB-GYN for an annual amount of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) and with Schneider Regional Medical Center for about Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) per-week for on-call services. For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059987 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022811 EFTA_00I7053 I EFTA01297112 Page 31 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** PROCEDURAL HISTORY Julito Francis filed a verified Petition for Divorce on November 4, 2010. On February 3, 2011, Dr. Wright-Francis filed an answer to Mr. Francis' petition and on March 29, 2011 the Court referred the parties to mediation. The parties mediated but were not able to reach an agreement. During the mediation period, the parties filed motions concerning custody and wasting of marital assets. Consequently, the Court issued an Order on December 22, 2011, prohibiting them from "disrupting" their children and "destroying, removing, concealing or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both of the parties.". On March 26, 2012, the Court held a final pretrial conference to set deadlines for trial. The Court also maintained the parties' visitation agreement.. 8 See. Paragraph (2) (b) of this Coin's Order in r8) this matter dated December 22. 2011. 9 At. Francis informed the Court. in his Motion to Restrain Respondent From Denying Petitioner Access to Former Marital Residence that the parties negotiated a visitation agreement in September of 2011, whereby both parties have custody of their minor daughter. Brooldyn. for fifteen (15) days of each month. Such agreement was not contested by Dr. Wright Francis. On July 16, 2012, Dr. Wright-Francis filed an Emergency Motion for Issuance of Show Cause Order, alleging that Mr. Francis violated the Court's December 22, 2011 Order by withdrawing Two Hundred Twenty Thousand, One Hundred Seventy Nine Dollars and Ninety Three Cents ($220.179.93) from his Fidelity Rollover IRA account. While the Court initially granted Dr. Wright-Francis' motion on July 17, 2012, that Order was later vacated on July 25, 2012. The Court reasoned that it was not able to make a determination since discovery had not been completed. ("20] Instead, the Court instructed the parties to retain a Certified Personal Accountant (CPA) to appraise all of their jointly owned properties and to recommend how the marital assets should be divided. The parties never complied with the order to retain r 9] an accountants. 10 See Court's July 25. 2012 Order. On July 25, 2012, the Court issued a Divorce Decree to the parties and reserved determination on issues of custody, alimony, personal and real property for a later date. Meanwhile, the parties continued to live in separate sections of the marital homestead. During a June 17, 2013 hearing, the parties informed the Court that they were able to resolve the issues of custody and visitation amicably, consistent with their earlier agreement. On July 12, 2013 the parties were referred back to mediation. After the second mediation session, the mediator reported that the parties had reached a total impasse. However, in a status conference held on September 10, 2013, the parties advised the Court that they had reached an agreement and through counsel, the terms were read onto the record. Each party confirmed that the terms were accurate and they agreed to them. The Court acknowledged the terms and ordered counsel for both parties to reduce the agreement to writing and submit it with their client's respective signatures. Instead each party submitted separate draft settlements that differed slightly from the oral agreement For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059988 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.WN(f IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022812 EFTA_00 170532 EFTA01297113 Page 32 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** articulated in Court. As a rloi result, the Court entered an Order on November 4, 2013 that incorporated the negotiated terms which the parties stipulated to on the record in the September 10, 2013 hearing. On November 18, 2013, this Court entered an Order which granted a Motion to Amend filed by Dr. Wright-Francis. The Order amended the previous November 4, 2013 Order which instructed Mr. Francis to pay his settlement amount by certified check or bank draft instead of transferring the sum from his retirement account directly to Dr. Wright-Francis' account or to her personally by electronic means. Mr. Francis objected to Dr. Wright-Francis' method of payment request, filed a timely opposition on November 20, 2013, and requested the Court to reconsider its Amended Order entered on November 18, 2013.11 11 On November 18.2013 the Court entered an Order on Dr. Wright-Francis's November 6. 2014 Motion to Amend. two (2) days before the fourteen (14) day statutory period for Mr. Francis to respond ended. pursuant to Rule 15(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Francis Ned his opposition to the Motion to Amend on November 20. 2013. [**21] Having reviewed the parties conflicting requests, the Court vacated its November 18, 2013 Order because it found that the parties' settlement rig agreement lacked mutual assent since the parties could not agree on the method of payment. The parties also claimed that they would incur injury if payment was not made as each requested. The Court determined that the parties negotiated and accepted the agreement based on two (2) different interpretations of its terms. As a result, this matter was scheduled for trial. Subsequently, Mr. Francis moved the Court on February 12, 2014 for permission to return to the marital homestead since his existing apartment poorly accommodated him and his daughter for their monthly visitation and Dr. Wright-Francis had recently purchased property on St. Thomas. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS Mr. Francis advised the Court that he is solely responsible for the mortgage on 1B-29 Estate Solberg.,, Mr. Francis also informed the Court that he paid all of the household expenses without any contribution from Dr. Wright-Francis and continues to pay those expenses. He also claims that he has made payments on the balance owed to Balbo for construction work on IB-29 Estate Solberg. 12 The mortgage for the Solberg property stipulates that only Mr. Franca signed the promissory note despite both parties being listed on the document ri2] as "Borrower? Mr. Francis seeks a portion of Dr. Wright-Francis' current and future earnings since he claims that he supported her financially while she completed medical school in 1992. As a result, Mr. Francis asserts that Dr. Wright-Francis' medical license is marital property which is divisible like the parties' other assets. Additionally, Mr. Francis contends that Dr. Wright-Francis' net worth is Two Million One Hundred Three Thousand, Eight Hundred Fifty Seven Dollars and Twenty Four Cents ($2,103,857.24). He claims that his net worth is One Million One Hundred Nine Thousand, For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059989 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022813 EFTA_00I 70533 EFTA01297114 Page 33 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** Nine Hundred Twelve Dollars and Eighty Two Cents ($1,109,912.82). Mr. Francis seeks Four Hundred Ninety Six Thousand Dollars ($496,000.00), to make his r221 net worth equal to Dr. Wright-Francis.* Mr. Francis also expressed a willingness to rescind his request, if Dr. Wright-Francis relinquishes her interest in the marital homestead. 13 It the Court were to add both of the parties' purported net worth, divide them in half, arid then subtract Mr. Francis individual net worth it would amount to 5495.000.00. Mr. Francis denied accusations of depleting any marital property. Instead, Mr. Francis contends that he withdrew [.13] money from his retirement account to pay off expenses, including mortgage payments, other property expenses and travel expenses back and forth to Washington D.C. where he visits with the parties' older daughter and cultivates business for his company, ACSB Capital Management LLC.- 14 The parties' older daughter. Saryn J. Francis. born on January 27. 1993, is an undergraduate student at Howard University located in Washington. D C. The Court also heard sworn expert testimony from Erika Kellerhals, Esq., (hereafter Kellerhals) on behalf of Dr. Wright-Francis. Kellerhals testified that she analyzed Mr. Francis' financial records. She advised the Court that she submitted her findings in two (2) reports: the first one analyzed Mr. Francis' bank accounts, investments, credit cards and retirement account and the second report assessed the financial reports Mr. Francis submitted to the Court as exhibits for trial.* Kellerhals testified that the records she received from Mr. Francis were incomplete and that it appears that Mr. Francis was commingling funds since she was not able to distinguish between his personal and business expenditures. Kellerhals also refuted Mr. Francis' claim that he has been [14] cultivating business in Washington, D.C. since his records do not show evidence that he has any clients outside the territory of the U.S. Virgin Islands. With respect to the money owed to Balbo, Kellerhals testified that financial records show that Mr. Francis has paid Balbo about Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000.00) and Dr. Wright-Francis has paid approximately Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00). 15 Kellerhals' Curriculum Vitae reflects her education and expertise in legal tax related assessments and financial analyses. Kellerhals claim that although in deposition Mr. Francis submitted incomplete bank account information to 2011-2012,* she found that Mr. Francis spent approximately One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Five ["23] Dollars and One Cent ($117,005.01)." For the year 2012, Mr. Francis submitted his 1040 tax form, and again, Kellerhals found that Mr. Francis spent about One Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Twenty One Dollars ($179,021.00).* 16 Mr. Francis submitted Fidelity IRA and 401K statements for December 2011-February 2012. April 2012-May 2012: Charles Schwab IRAstatements for November 2012-December 2012; an AmEx credit card spending report for the year of 2011; and For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059990 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.WINI(E IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022814 EFTA_00 170534 EFTA01297115 Page 34 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** Marriott Credit Card (16] statements for December 24. 2011-December 23. 2012 Mr. Francis also submitted Texas Credit Union statements for December 2012-January 2013 and Banco Popular statements for March-May 2013. which are outside the scope of investigation. 17 See. Respondent's Exhibit 3A 18 See. Respondent's Exhibit 3A Kellerhals concluded that Mr. Francis' spending habits increased drastically since the parties divorced on July 25, 2012, in violation of the Court's December 22, 2011 Order. Kellerhals opined that: 1) retirement funds are marital assets; 2) Mr. Francis' wasted marital assets by withdrawing money from his annuity early to cover his excessive spending in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Seventy Nine Dollars and Ninety Three Cents ($220,179.93); and 3) that Dr. Wright-Francis is entitled one half of the 'Wasted" amount of about One Hundred Ten Thousand and Ninety Dollars ($110,090.00). Dr. Wright-Francis testified that Mr. Francis is not entitled to earnings resulting from her medical degree because the parties, collectively, paid off student loans by selling stocks that were jointly purchased. Dr. Wright-Francis also testified that she obtained her degree in 1992, just a year after [16] the parties were married. Dr. Wright-Francis further contends that she did not work for one (1) year in order to care for the parties' children in the early years. She contends that except for approximately two (2) to four (4) years, the parties' income were comparable. She confirmed her work contracts with the East End Medical Clinic and the Schneider Regional Medical Center. Dr. Wright-Francis acknowledged the purchase of a unit at the Towers Condominiums in Estate Contant on January 17, 2014, for which she currently collects a monthly rent. She confirmed that she continues to reside at IB-29 Estate Solberg with the parties' minor daughter. Dr. Wright-Francis informed the Court that she is seeking half of the value of the parties' marital homestead located at IB-29 Estate Solberg and half of the value of what Mr. Francis "wasted." She contends that Joan Francis does not have any ownership interest in the Solberg property ["24] and that the homestead should be sold if Mr. Francis is not able to buy her out. ANALYSIS [1] [HN1] In an action for divorce, this Court has the authority to equitably divide joint personal orooerty and real property, limited to the marital homestead as defined in Title 33 V.I.C. § Ml(d). Bradford v. Cramer, 54 V.I. 669, 676 (V.I. 2011). Real property raj owned by the couple, other than the marital homestead, is divided by way of a civil partition action. Fuentes v. Fuentes, 38 V.I. 29, 1997 WL 889532 (Terr. V.I. 1997). When determining the equity of the distribution, the Court also has broad discretion to consider the case's most salient facts. Charles v. Charles, 788 F.2d 960, 965 (3rd Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands further refined the Court's discretion to divide property by eliminating marital fault as a factor in dividing the homestead. Garcia v. Garcia, 59 V.I. 758 (V.I. 2013). "The doctrine of equitable distribution is applied to effectuate a fair and For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059991 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022815 EFTA_00 170535 EFTA01297116 Page 35 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** just division of the property between the parties. As its name suggests, equitable distribution does not necessarily mean 'equal,' only 'equitable.' " Fuentes, 38 V.I. at 40, 1997 WL 889532, at *5 (emphasis added). A Mantel Homestead [2] [HN2] Pursuant to Title 33 V.I.C. § a), a homestead is defined as "the abode including land and buildings, owned by, and actually occupied by, a person, or by members of his family free of rental charges." The Court in Garcia quoted Harvey v. Christopher, to explain that although the Virgin Islands Code does not expressly define a 'marital homestead,' both the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the Appellate Division of the District Court interpreted Title 33 V.I.C. §§-(a), (c) to hold that a "marital homestead' is any 'homestead' p18] in which a husband and wife both reside during the marriage and that is owned by one or both of the spouses." Garcia, 59 V.I. 758 (V.I. 2013) quoting, Harvey v. Christopher, 55 V.I. 565, 572 (V.I. 2011). Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, IB-29 Estate Solberg is valued at Seven Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Dollars ($725,000.00) subject to a One Hundred Ten Thousand Dollars ($110,000.00) mortgage. Although the parties dispute the amount owed to Balbo, they acknowledge that [**25] Balbo Construction is owed money for work it has done on the homestead:0 19 See Civil Complaint. Balbo v. Julito Francis & Debra Francis. ST-14-CV-188 Testimony revealed that Dr. Wright-Francis assumed responsibility for the children's school tuition and cost of other activities during the course of their marriage. Mr. Francis satisfied almost all expenses related to their home including the mortgage property and home insurance payments. Since the parties' divorce, the parties have shared equally their children's expenses and Mr. Francis has continued to pay all real property expenses. Here, the home located at IB-29 Estate Sit, St. Thomas appears to satisfy the requirements outlined in Title 33 V.I.C. § a) since Mr. Francis gained ownership rights when: 1) his mother and sister conveyed the property to him and 2) [*19] the parties resided in the home from 2005 until they terminated their marriage in 2012. However, the Supreme Court, through Garcia, required that further examination is needed when a purported marital homestead is comprised of multiple units like the Solberg property. In Garcia, the parties resided in a two level structure that was partitioned of into four (4) separate independent apartments. The wife argued that the marital homestead constituted all four (4) apartments and consequently, she was entitled to an equitable portion of the homestead. The husband opined that all of the apartments should not count towards the homestead since "(1) it had a dual nature, as portions of the building were rented to tenants, and (2) although Felipe and Edna resided there at some points during their marriage, there were large spans of time during which the parties did not occupy it together." 59 V.I. 758 (V.I. 2013). Ultimately, the Garcia Court remanded the matter back to the Superior Court for further consideration without determining which units comprised the marital abode. For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059992 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022816 EFTA_00 170536 EFTA01297117 Page 36 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** Here, the Solberg property is apportioned into three (3) units. The parties resided in the larger unit with their daughters for approximately seven r20] (7) years while Mr. Francis' mother lived in a smaller unit. The third unit was used as a home office by Mr. Francis, until he started to use it as his living quarters after the parties divorced. Unlike Garcia, the parties did not use their other units as rental property to produce income. Mr. Francis asserted that Joan Francis contributed to her household r.26] expenses for a portion of the time she has lived there. It is also important to note that Mr. Francis' mother resided on the property first and has been the only other resident. [3] The Court has considered that the parties resided in the Solberg home from 2005-2012 for approximately seven (7) of their twenty one (21) years of marriage with their children. Mr. Francis' mother has occupied an attached apartment on the same property since 2000. They have all contributed in various degrees to the subject property. Both parties are clearly capable of providing for themselves and their children, as they are both accomplished professionals and have already agreed to share equally in the costs of raising their children. Dr. Wright-Francis obviously has the capacity and means to secure alternative housing; and has neither demonstrated a need [* 21] or desire to remain in the marital homestead. This Court cannot disregard the fact that neither party purchased the real property upon which the marital homestead was built. Much consideration is given to the fact that Mr. Francis acquired the property from his mother to help her construct a home for her to live. While evidence shows that the parties together were able to finance the construction, they benefitted by living on the property with their children for seven (7) years of their twenty- one (21) years of marriage. Joan Francis has lived in an adjoining apartment for approximately fourteen (14) years. Thus, only the main residential unit (inclusive of what was the home office and children's area) that the parties occupied during their marriage constitute the marital homestead and not the entire property known as IB-29 Estate Solberg. In view of the circumstances surrounding the acquisition and construction of IB-29 Solberg, maintenance and occupancy of said property, the Court finds that based on a balancing of equities, Mr. Francis should retain possession of the marital homestead. Moreover, having considered the stipulated assessed value of the real property, and the debts associated [*22] with the property, and given serious consideration to the equities involved under the particular facts herein, the Court has determined that Dr. Wright-Francis has a thirty-five percent (35%) interest in the marital homestead which constitutes approximately seventy percent (70%) of the developed property. As a result Seventy Six Thousand, Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($76,650.00) plus $30,000.00 reimbursement for moneys expended for constructions costs represents a fair award to [**27] Dr. Wright-Francis for her contributions and interest in the marital homestead. Thus, Mr. Francis will be required to pay Dr. Wright Francis a total of One Hundred Six Thousand, Six Hundred Fifty Dollars ($106,650.00). 0. Personal Property [4] [HN3]The Court may distribute personal property in accordance with Title 16 V.I.C. § 109 (4). However, the statute does not define marital property. "Whether an asset is marital property or separate property for purposes of distribution of the marital estate, is a For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059993 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(FIDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022817 EFTA_00I70537 EFTA01297118 Page 37 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** matter reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court." See, Feddersen v. Feddersen, 68 F. Supp. 2d 585, 41 V.I. 230 (D.V.I. 1999). See also, MacAleer v. MacAleer, 1999 PA Super 35, 725 A.2d 829, 831 (1999). Once these distinctions have been made, the trial judge has broad equitable powers in disposing of marital property. Fuentes, 38 V.I. at 35, 1997 WL 889532, at '5. [5] IHN41Although not specifically defined, marital property [e23] has been construed to encompass any property which the couple acquired during the marriage and which is subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 247 F.Supp.2d 714 (2003). See, Felix v. Felix, 1998 WL 458499, *2 (D.V.I. 1998). Compare, 16 V.I.C. 68 (defining what constitutes 'separate property of a spouse, not subject to distribution). I. Equitable Ontlnbutron el flebremenl Accounts [6] IHN51Considering the tremendous statutory examples and case law from other jurisdictions holding pension funds as marital property, the Virgin Islands has determined that a pension fund is also marital personal property, subject to claim by the other spouse upon divorce. Fuentes, 38 V.I. at 40, 1997 WL 889532, at *8. The Fuentes Court goes on to rationalize its decision by quoting the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Stevenson v. Stevenson, 511 A.2d 961, 965 (R.I. 1986): To the extent earned during the marriage. the (pension) benefits represent compensation for marital effort and are substitutes for current earnings which would have increased the marital standard of living or would have been converted into other assets divisible at dissolution. Subjecting the benefits to division is just. because in most cases the retirement benefits constitute the most valuable asset the potpie has acquired and they both have relied upon their pension payments for ["28] security in their older years. Nej Family Lew and Practice. § 37.07111 at 37-81 (1985). Fuentes v. Fuentes, 38 V.I. 29, 1997 WL 889532 (Tern. V.I. 1997). The evidence shows that Mr. Francis has approximately Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) in his retirement account. While, Dr. Wright-Francis has an amount that exceeds Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00), the exact amount is unknown. According to the Court in Fuentes, both parties are entitled to an equitable share of the other's retirement account. The Fuentes Court further explains that there are two (2) different methods used to determine the percentage which spouses are entitled. The first method presumes a present value on the retirement plan based on the expected lifespan of the employee-spouse. Weir v. Weir, 173 N.J. Super. 130, 413 A.2d 638 (1980). This method requires the Court to determine values contingent on life expectancy and employee-spouse's share of the retirement pay. Fuentes, 38 V.I. at 41, 1997 WL 889532, at *7. The second method calculates the percentage that the non-employee is entitled to, based on length of employment and marriage. They receive benefits when they become available under the plan. Id. Both methods require basic knowledge of the retirement plans that includes, but are not limited to the following information: 1) present value; 2) account history; [e25] 3) retirement plan regulations; and 4) the distribution schedule. With regard to the retirement accounts, the parties have simply failed to submit sufficient information for the Court to make a determination. Mr. Francis' submission only demonstrates the balance of his Fidelity IRA account when the parties dissolved their marriage in 2012. The Court has no reliable evidence from Dr. Wright-Francis regarding her retirement fund other than her vague testimony. Neither party has made sufficient For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059994 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022818 EFTA_00I 70538 EFTA01297119 Page 38 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** information available to this Court, to justify the division of their respective individual accounts. [7] On July 25, 2012, the Court refused to make a determination on Dr. Wright-Francis' show cause motion because it lacked sufficient evidence and ordered the parties to commission a CPA supra. The parties failed to comply. As a result, the record is still void of evidence of a CPA analysis or recommendation to aid the Court. Kellerhals reports and testimony are not helpful in this regard since it was designed for the sole purpose of demonstrating waste of assets by Mr. Francis. Notwithstanding, [**29] it appears that the parties have approximately the same amount in their funds, or close thereto. Thus, a division is ["26] unnecessary and each party is entitled to retain their existing interest in their own accounts. 2 &notable Datinbteson Of The Medical Degree [8] Mr. Francis requests equitable distribution of Dr. Wright-Francis' medical degree, which was acquired after one (1) year of marriage. The U.S. Virgin Islands has not previously decided whether educational or professional degrees constitute marital property.. [HN6] Most states hold that an educational degree is not marital property. Courts have consistently considered whether one spouse had postponed his or her own career and educational goals to support and contribute to the career and educational goals of the other spouse. See, Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527, 531-32 (1982); In re the marriage of Sally K. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 678 (1987). They also acknowledge the injustice that occurs after "a couple collectively works towards the attainment of an advanced educational degree or career goal," the expectation of a higher standard of living in the future can be frustrated by the dissolution of a marriage. In re the marriage of Sally K. 0/ar, 747 P.2d 676, 678 (1987). They also acknowledge that injustice that occurs after "a couple collectively works towards the attainment of an advanced educational degree or career goal," the expectation of a higher standard of living in the 27] future by the dissolution of marriage. In re the marriage of Sally K. O/ar, 747 P2d. 676, 678 (1987). 2O For the purpose of this Order, education and professional degrees will be used interchangeably. [9] [HN7]Many states have compared professional degrees to pension or retirement plans when establishing what constitutes marital property. Pension and retirement plans entitle an owner to a definite amount at a certain date, which an individual has a contractual right to receive. See, Fuentes, 38 V.I. 29, 1997 WL 889532, at *5-6. See also, Kikkert v. Kikkert, 88 N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Professional degrees rely on uncertain future events and provide only an expectation of enhanced income. The value of a professional degree is speculative and dependent upon the attributes and future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued. See, In re the marriage of Sally K. Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679-80 (1987). See also, Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 [**30] (1985), citing Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 437 A2d 883 (1981). See also, Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527, 531-32 (1982). New York is the only jurisdiction so far to rule professional degrees are marital property subject to equitable distribution. See, O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059995 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022819 EFTA_00 170539 EFTA01297120 Page 39 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985). New York legislation provides that a court consider the efforts one spouse has made to the other spouse's career. See, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(3)(1), (5). In O'Brien v. O'Brien, the Defendant-wife sought equitable distribution of the Plaintiff/Husband's license to practice medicine. The Plaintiff commenced the action for divorce two (2) months [* 28] after obtaining such license. The Plaintiff began his postgraduate classes after the parties were married. For the majority of the parties nine (9) years of marriage, he was working towards a career in medicine. Meanwhile, the Defendant maintained their household, relinquished her opportunity to further her career, and provided financially for the parties. The Defendant provided expert testimony evaluating the present value of the Plaintiff's medical license. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985). [10] Here, Dr. Wright-Francis acquired her medical degree in 1992, she began working towards the degree years before the parties were married. There is no evidence that Mr. Francis was unjustly compelled to delay or relinquish his education or career goals in order for Dr. Wright-Francis to pursue her goals. Mr. Francis did not provide testimony on the amount in which he contributed to Dr. Wright-Francis' education. Furthermore, Mr. Francis does not offer personal or expert testimony on the potential or actual worth of Dr. Wright- Francis' degree. Two (2) decades have passed since Dr. Wright-Francis received her medical degree. Mr. Francis failed to provide the Court any substantial or credible evidence to calculate a value of Dr. [119] Wright-Francis' medical degree. [11] 01N8] The Virgin Islands has long viewed "marriage as a partnership or joint venture, whereby both parties collaborate for a common purpose and contribute toward its success." See, Fuentes v. Fuentes, 247 F. Supp. 2d 714 (2003); Felix v. Felix, 1998 WL 458499, *2 (D.V.I. 1998). It is important to note that Mr. Francis also received a higher education degree immediately before the marriage. Mr. Francis acquired his Master's in Business Administration in 1990 and is admittedly a well-qualified astute financial investment manager. The parties testified that [*.31] they supported each other with the help of their families in the early years of their relationship and marriage. Both degrees provided an expectancy of a better life, but this was not guaranteed by contract or other form of surety. Even so, both degrees launched successful and profitable careers for the parties. Both parties worked throughout the duration of the marriage and contributed financially to the marriage. Accordingly, Mr. Francis' evidence and testimony are insufficient to demonstrate that Dr. Wright-Francis' medical degree is marital property. In this instance, Dr. Wright-Francis' medical degree is her separate property and is not subject to equitable distribution. a Equ Rad. Oil °IMMO.) r301 of PlautMOICI FuMOur• aria WNW PrOp•rty LOC/Main an Etale soma!, [12] IHN9] The Court also has the authority to divide the personal property in divorce action even after a divorce decree has been issued. In Garcia, the Supreme Court explains that "the Superior Court will be required to issue rulings on post-divorce ownership of personal property ... such as cars, boats, electronics, jewelry, shares of stock, bonds and monies deposited with financial institutions ... ." Garcia, 59 V.I. 758. For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059996 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(FIDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022820 EFTA_00I 70540 EFTA01297121 Page 40 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** This Court is guided by Morris v. Morris, 20 V.I. 249, 1984 WL 998145 (Terr. V.I. 1984), and in the absence of provable ownership, the Court considers the personal property to be jointly owned in equal shares. With respect to the disposition of the household furniture, the evidence satisfies the Court that they are jointly owned by the parties and shall be distributed as set forth in Appendix A of this Opinion which is incorporated herein. C. Dot ammotion on Waste or Mama news In the Order entered by the Court on December 23, 2011, the parties were ordered to refrain from "destroying, removing, concealing or otherwise harming or reducing the value of the property of one or both of the parties.", In addition, the parties were authorized to engage in r3li acts reasonable and necessary to the conduct of the parties' usual business and occupation; make expenditures and incur indebtedness for reasonable attorney's fees: and make expenditures and incur indebtedness for [**32] reasonable and necessary living expenses for food, clothing, shelter, transportation, and medical care." 21 See. Paragraph (2) (b) of Order dated December 23. 2011 22 rd at Paragraph 5 Dr. Wright-Francis argues that Mr. Francis excessively spent and wasted assets. Dr. Wright-Francis submitted reports and sworn testimony analyzing Mr. Francis' income and expenses." 23 See. Respondent's Exhibits 3 and 3A [13] Although there is some evidence that Mr. Francis withdrew Two Hundred Twenty Thousand One Hundred Seventy Nine Dollars and Ninety Three Cents ($220,179.93) between 2011 and 2012, there is no evidence Mr. Francis deliberately destroyed, concealed or harmed the parties property. The money Mr. Francis withdrew from his annuity was used to pay expenses, including expenses associated with his children's care, the marital homestead, businesses and living expenses, they are reasonable and necessary.• The Court also considers the fact that Mr. Francis was terminated from his employment with VINGN and used his investments [*32] to support his obligations and standard of living. 24 Petitioners bank statements submitted al Deposition show payment to his attorney and reasonable and necessary business and living expenses [14] Moreover, the Supreme Court in Walters v. Walters explains that there must be sufficient evidence that a party intentionally disobeyed a Court order to be held in contempt. To clarify its position, The Walters Court quotes the Court of the Second Circuit of Appeals: [HN10] "A party may be held in civil contempt for failure to comply with a court order if '(1) the order the contemnor failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059997 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.QQN(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022821 EFTA_00170541 EFTA01297122 Page 41 2014 V.I. LEXIS 45, *; 61 V.I. 13, ** proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the contemnor has not diligently attempted to comply in a reasonable manner.' " Id. at 352 (quoting Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 655 (2d Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect Mr. Francis to use his available resources to finance his daily and regular obligations. Dr. Wright-Francis fails to provide clear and convincing evidence of intent to harm marital assets. For that reason, the Court cannot find that Mr. Francis excessively spent and wasted marital assets in 2011 and 2012, in violation of the Court Order entered on December 23, 2011. CONCLUSION Based [" 33] on all of the above the Court concludes that both parties individually possess sufficient financial and professional resources to continue to support themselves and their children with a standard of living equivalent to that enjoyed during the marriage. Thus, the post-divorce distribution of the marital homestead and personal property are decided in accordance with this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order of even date. ORDERED that a copy of this Order be directed to Andrew L. Capdeville, Esq. and Julie German Evert, Esq. *** THIS DATA IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY ' Copyright 2016 CourtLink Corporation UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA (Miami) Supermarket Source, Inc v. Dolphin Gourmet Market, Inc et al PLAINTIFF: Supermarket Source, Inc A Florida Corporation DEFENDANT: Dolphin Gourmet Market, Inc A Foreign Corporation; Ahmad, Nael Abdel Rahim DOCKET CASE NUMBER: 1:10cv23986 FILING DATE: 11/4/2010 JURISDICTION: Diversity JUDGE: Graham, Donald L NATURE OF SUIT: 190 Other Contract For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059998 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.cON(F IDENTIAL DB-SDNY-0022822 EFTA_00 170542 EFTA01297123 Page 42 Supermarket Source, Inc v. Dolphin Gourmet Market, Inc et al 1:10cv23986 FILING TYPE: Civil CAUSE: Diversity-Breach of Contract28 USC 1332 JURY DEMAND: None STATUS: Case Closed PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY(S): Gil, Francis Rene [COR LD NTC] 1041 Ives Dairy Road Suite 238 Miami. FL, USA 33179-2539 Fax: Email: DEFENDANT ATTORNEY(S): Kroblin, Christopher Allen [COR LD NTC] Erika A Kellerhals, PC PO Box 608 St Thomas. VI, USA <i>pro Hac Vice< I> Email: Yellin, Jonathan Andrew [COR LD NTC] Jonathan A Yellin, PA 1401 East Broward Boulevard Suite 204 Ft Lauderdale. FL, SA 33301 Fax: Email: THE COURT UPDATED THIS RECORD ON: 03/08/2011 12:00:00 AM For internal use only SDNY_GM_00059999 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CON(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022823 EFTA_OOI 70543 EFTA01297124