EYE ON THE MARKET

EYE ON THE MARKET OUTLOOK 2012 J.P. Morgan Private Bank STimatos /4/P--r . mows- • erre/Ls k trikaz," Zsz 4 `WWRE~,''yEnµS Il MIME 44 'Pt FUROProp I /6 A•", The post-stimulus economy 2012 marks a transition away from extreme global monetary and fiscal stimulus, as illustrated by the setting sun. The private sector recovery will mostly have to make it on its own from here. The news is better in the US than in Europe or Japan. Asia is expanding, but tighter policy rates are bringing growth back to earth. The height of each tree shows the recovery in each variable relative to its decline during the recession. See inside cover for more details. JP Morgan EFTA01077755 In the wake of the recession, a lot of stimulus was added to the global economy. The level of global policy rates and fiscal deficits defines the trajectory of the sun. Fiscal tightening is scheduled almost everywhere for 2012. On monetary policy, while inflation appears to be cresting. this more often prevents planned policy rate increases, rather than ushering in another period of substantial easing. More monetary policy responses in Europe are likely, but they are mostly intended to prevent a collapse of the Monetary Union as banks and governments de-lever. The height of each tree shows how much each variable has recovered, relative to its prior decline. For example, S&P profits, high-end retail and German GDP have now recovered almost all of what they lost during the recession, while US home prices and European peripheral employment are still close to their post-recession lows. The three comparison points for computing the recovery are the pre-cycle peak: the lowest level of the last four years; and the current value. One exception: US household balance sheet repair is computed as the decline in real per household debt from the peak. Commodity countries like Canada. Brazil and Australia. whose GDP in aggregate is much larger than Southern Europe. recovered rapidly. The speedboat is Asia. whose production and output suffered only minor declines. and which have long since eclipsed pre-recession levels. However, credit and policy rate tightening have caused a slowdown to the Asian speedboat and the rest of the emerging world, compared to the booming growth rates of 2010. The deflated volleyball is the European Economic and Monetary Union. See sources and definitions at the end of this publication. EFTA01077756 MARY CALLAHAN ERDOES Chief Executive Officer J.P. Morgan Asset Management As we turn the page and head into a new year, it is important for us to reflect on the current landscape, and to give you our best thinking on where the world is heading. The past twelve months were filled with unprecedented events. We witnessed Arab Spring uprisings and subsequent governmental changes, a devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the first ever downgrade of U.S. debt, a continuously evolving European sovereign debt crisis, and the formal conclusion of a near decade-long conflict in Iraq. Amidst such transformational events around the world, we recognize that our job of sifting through all of this and finding appropriate investment opportunities for the future is even more important. Our Chief Investment Officer Michael Cembalest, in partnership with our investment teams across the world, has created an insightful framework for understanding and assessing the global opportunities and risks that we can expect in the coming year. I hope you enjoy the clever cover picture Michael commissioned to capture on one page the progress that has been made (or lack thereof) since the global recession of 2008—zoog. We wish you a healthy and happy new year. And most importantly, we thank you for your continued trust and confidence in J.P. Morgan. Most sincerely, EFTA01077757 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan The Post-Stimulus Economy isn't all bad (there are as many tall trees on the cover as short ones), but its risks and uncertainties have not declined that much from a year ago. One historical frame of reference we have been using is shown in the first chart: a prior period of monetary and fiscal uncertainty during which markets were volatile, and sideways. The bull market began in 1982 when there was a clear path forward, even though a lot of the prior mess hadn't been completely dealt with. Where are we this time in terms of monetary and fiscal uncertainty? While fiscal deficits are being reined in and household balance sheets are healing, the long-term debt questions of the West remain mostly unanswered as of December 2011 (c2, c3). (c1) 1970s post-recovery equity market wilderness S&P 500 level 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 300 30% 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 Gerrnany DAX level I Period of airtime' 800 I monetary and fisca uncestaint 700 600 500 400 (c2) OECD debt levels Percent of GDP. gross 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% (c3) OECD budget deficits Percentof GDP 46% 44% 42% 40% 38% 36% 34% 32% 30% 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 2012 Public expenditure With fiscal stimulus coining to an end and with only modest monetary policy easing in the pipeline (see inside cover for more details), the private sector will increasingly have to make it on its own. The US is showing some resilience (c4), while Europe and Asia are showing more signs of a slowdown. The big issue for 2012 will be how deep the European recession turns out to be. Prior sovereign debt crises were almost always solved by a combination of currency devaluation, higher growth and aggressive monetary easing (c5). In contrast, Europe is taking the path of most resistance: no growth, no devaluation, lots of austerity and the decision to turn the ECB into a Bad Bank repository. (c4) Global manufacturing surveys Purchasing Managers Index, sa 65 US (c5) Fiscal adjustments, then & now Ir Prior 4.0% European and Latin djustments 1975.2000 e 3.5% £ 3.0% 2 2.5% 0 D. 2.0% 0 O 1.5% 1.0% 0O Europe today 0.5% Currency Devaluation, 5% 35% 65% 95% (c6) Real S&P 500 earnings yield Trailing earnings yield lesscore CPI 8% As of 7% 12/16111 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% -1% -2% 1956 1965 Assuming a 15% decline in earnings 1974 1983 1992 2001 2010 Equity markets are aware of this, priced as cheaply as they have been in decades (c6). Even assuming a 15% earnings decline", the S&P 500 would still be priced at the cheap end of history. Factoring in valuation, volatility and the risks (both known and unknown), our equity weightings are modestly lower than normal; the US is our largest regional position, and we remain very underweight Europe. In this document, we walk through our views on Europe, the US and Asia, and our investment priorities for 2012. It's a narrative in pictures; when many things are at their widest extremes in decades (equity valuations, government debt, central bank balance sheets, depressed labor incomes, housing inventory, etc.), pictures are better than words. In the appendix, some thoughts on Iran, and a history of European austerity and its connection to social unrest. On the December EU summit. The European debt bubble will be unwound more slowly given the decision by the ECB and member central banks to finance just about every asset held by EU banks. Bilateral lending facilities for sovereigns may also be expanded if necessary. The risk of a 2012 Europe meltdown may have melted, but what remains is a slow burn from a recession, a credit contraction and investors possibly selling all they've got to the ECB and other non-economic buyers. Michael Cembalest Chief Investment Officer " In Q4 2011, the percent of negative S&P 500 earnings pre-announcements matched its 2001 and 2008 peak. Another sign: companies reporting before Alcoa beat consensus earnings for the last 9 quarters, while in Q4, they trailed estimates by 2%. 1 EFTA01077758 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan EUROPE: soul-searchine into a recession A year ago, we noted that Jacques Odors (a principal architect of the Euro) said that Europe needed "to find its soul". As of the time of this writing, they are still looking for it. In Delors' latest interview, he conceded that the Euro was flawed from the start. One of our most frequently used charts (c7) shows how: look at the gap in industrial production between Germany and Italy, which began like clockwork with the European Monetary Union. In prior notes, we highlighted how European North-South disparities in growth and employment have never been larger than they are now, even during the era of frequent devaluation and inflation in Southern Europe. A project designed to foster integration has ended up jeopardizing it. (c7) Death in Venice Industrial Production Index, 1998 = 100, sa 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 1982 1986 1990 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 Euro exchange I rate fixed Germany (c8) Sovereign 10-year yields Percent 7.5% 6.5% 5.5% 4.5% 3.5% 2.5% Jan-10 Jun-10 Nov-10 Apr-11 Sep-11 Italy Belgium Spain (c9) Maturing debt, interest due and primary deficits in 2012, Percentof GDP 30% ■ Maturing debtand interest 25% • •Primary deficit€327bn 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% E355bn France Italy E203bn Spain I will avoid the endless diagnoses of the problems, and skip to the endgame: a mid-flight redesign of the Euro since markets have lost confidence in it (c8). While Greece, Ireland and Portugal are wards of the state, 2012 borrowing needs of larger countries are in question as well (c9). In Q1 2012 alone, Italy must issue 112 billion in bills and bonds. The ECB balance sheet (c10) may have to grow by I trillion to support sovereigns (ell) and under-capitalized, under-reserved banks (c 1 2, c13), despite opposition from Germany'. This is not just a sovereign/banking crisis, as noted by the rise in corporate debt, particularly in Spain and Portugal (c14). Chart c5 shows that external devaluation is the road typically taken. Europe is taking the internal devaluation route, but so far, Ireland is the only country that has made progress (c15). As for Ireland, we'd be more optimistic if it weren't for a crippling 140% debt to GNP ratio, a consequence of its decision to bail out EU depositors in Irish banks. (c10) Central bank balance sheets Percentof GDP 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (c13 Loan loss provisions on performing credit loans, Percent 5% ECB plus El trillion 4% 3% 2% 1% 1 IIIII los i milollillial IIIIII....t, 0% US banks EU banks (c11) Italian debt/GDP, Total gross general government debt/GDP, percent 160% 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% . . 1861 1886 1911 1936 1961 1986 2011 Impf I a a.• WWII (c14) Change in non-financial corp. debt from 2000.2010, Percent of GDP 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% -20% 125 11J111 1 120 115 110 rliSP log tiff 100 95 tgWl-yCCI=YCht IRCLeiui6E2i On (c12) Europe: bigger banks, bigger problems, Liabilities, multiple of GDP 7x 6x 5x 4x 3x lx Ox IForeign banks I Domestic baths CC O acCwa in i LL t& < CC (c15) Long road to convergence Unitlaborcost, index, O1 2000 = 100, sa 140 135 130 Enu- OZ (-In , 2000 2002 The boy stamping his feet in the ECB chart is from Die Geschichte vom Suppen-Kaspar (Struwveelpeter). 2004 Ireland Spain Italy France Germany 2006 2009 2011 2 EFTA01077759 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan The irony of Italy in the eye of the storm is that since 1991, its primary budget has been in surplus (c16). However, Italy has no choice given its debt burden of 1.9 trillion Euros (el 1), a by-product of its 1980's fiscal crises. Italy has paid a price for this austerity (and its low productivity), generating almost the lowest growth rate in the OECD over the last 20 years, ahead of only Japan (el 7). It's going to take a lot of work to convince markets that Italy is solvent, and that its debt is declining. We don't think it is: c18 shows an optimistic and pessimistic case, although neither represents possible extremes. We assume near-term funding costs of —6%, which as Italian debt matures, bring its overall average cost of debt from 3.9% to 4.4% by 2014. (c16) Italian primary balance Surplus/clef icit before interest, % of GDP 8% 6% Cyclically 4% adjusted 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% 1970 1977 1984 1991 1998 2005 2012 As reported (c17) 20-year growth rates, 1991-2011 (c18) Can Italy's debt stabilize? Percent Govemmentdebt, percentof GDP 7% 134% 6% 131% 5% 122% 119% 128% 4% 3% 125% 2% NYFg'41i16grcjElegEiNtR5E8kEE'grE... 116% Pessimistic case: Real GDP of -1.5%/-0.5% Primary balance: 1.3%12.2% Optimistic case: Real GDP of 0.5%10.5% Primary balance: 2.6Nd4,1% 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Will Maastricht 2.0 "work", promising deficit limits that turn Italy and Spain into a Mediterranean Germany? • Germany's long-term plan appears to be: a heavy dose of austerity to reduce sovereign debt trajectories; commitments to run German fiscal policy; a Franco-German governance framework to enforce it; after all of that, a lot more help from the ECB; a lower Euro; and then, eventually, some kind of federalism (Eurobonds or other quasi-permanent transfers). • It's a risky strategy given the risk of a prolonged recession, superimposed on a region with 20 trillion in sovereign and financial sector debt outstanding (el 9). Spain's economy, for example, is in free fall. Sec Appendix A for charts on how bad things arc in Spain, and a history of austerity and unrest in Europe over the last century. • It's not clear that the only difference between Germany and Italy/Spain is a slate of structural reforms. Even if reforms are put in motion, they have a short-term growth cost, particularly when applied to labor markets (c20). So far, Italy's proposed adjustment is based more on higher taxes than lower spending; there has been less of a focus on addressing Italy's yawning productivity gaps vs. Germany, which are also noticeable in France (c2 I ). On the matter of France, it is difficult to believe that it will live by a 0.5% structural budget deficit limit; as shown a couple of weeks ago, it flies in the face of French budgetary history. • Investors are unconvinced: in 2011, US money market funds cut exposure to EU banks in half, and dollar bond issuance by EU banks fell by 70%. Stress tests applied to EU banks, whose gross leverage is 26:1, are seen by many investors as unrealistic (e.g., the latest round stressed sovereign debt, but not household or corporate debt). As the EFSF, the IMF and other non-economic buyers increase exposure, private investors may see this as an opportunity to exit (see Appendix C for some history). • Europe will try to finance budget deficits through the use of bilateral and ECB facilities. But they don't address the region's large current account deficits which finance domestic consumption, particularly in France, Italy and Spain. • A lot of master plans look good on paper; so did Maastricht 1.0. Our sense is that Germany and other AAA countries will not be able or willing to bear the ultimate cost-. If so, Mr. Delors will have to look for Europe's soul someplace other than Berlin. (c19 Outstanding debt in Euro Area Trillions, EUR 14.0 Financial 125 , corporations 11.0 - 9.5 - 8.0 - 6.5 • 5.0 2001 2003 2005 2CO 7 2009 General government 2011 (c20) Growth response to structural (c21) Vive la difference] reforms, Cumulative percent change in Fteal exports, France as a percentof Germany real GDP percapita 64% Trade Reform 4% 59% 3% Tax Reform 2% 54% 1% 0% 49% -1% Financial Reform 44% -2% -3% Labor Reform O 3 6 9 Years 12 39% 1970 1978 1986 1994 2002 2010 2 Debt to GDP levels in France (85%) and Germany (81%) are already elevated. Based on estimates of growth and gov't deficits, the German ratio is projected to decline, while the French one peaks at 87% in 2014. After including pro rata shares of existing and future bilateral guarantees, assumed guarantees of Central Bank SMP purchases and risk of deficit slippage, both ratios rise well over 90%. 3 EFTA01077760 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1. 2012 .J.P.Morgan UNITED STATES: some decounline from Europe and Asia, and the kindness of strangers The US has generated better titan expected news recently, including surveys of manufacturing (c22), light truck sales, consumer spending, etc. Household balance sheets continue to heal, noted by the decline in credit card delinquency rates (c23). But the strong spending data is a bit of a mystery. Some of it can be explained by the decline in debt service (rather than debt levels; c24). But housing isn't contributing much of a boost, given negative pricing trends and massive shadow inventory (c25). There's also the question of how much spending can rise when disposable income is weak (c26); the income measure below includes government transfers, and would look much weaker without them (c57 vs. c58). Perhaps the fact that the wealthiest 10% account for 30%-40% of spending explains its resilience. It looks like parts of the labor market are recovering (c27); if job losses in construction, government and finance stop getting worse, the jobs picture would look much better. Labor incomes are at multi-decade lows relative to corporate sales and GDP, but prospects for the large number of unemployed may be getting better on the margin, based on jobless claims, manpower surveys, the household survey, and a survey of small business (NFIB). (c22) Some better news from (c23) Credit card delinquencies manufacturing surveys, index, sa Percent,90+ daysdelinquent 70 3.5% 60 50 40 30 20 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 (c25) Shadow housing inventory Millions of units 9 Current but unuenvater—s 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2003 Bank-owned real estate. Foreclosed 90+ days delinquen 2005 2007 2009 2011 3.0% 2.5% 2.0% 1.5% 1.0% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (c26) Spending vs. income Percentchange,QoQ, real, annualized, sa 10% 6% 2% -2% -6% -10% 1990 Consumption Disposable income, including govt. transfers 1994 1998 2002 2008 2010 (c24) Household debt and debt service, Percent of disposable income 140% - - - 14.0% 130% 120% 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 1980 Debt service—, (RHS) 1990 2000 (c27) Bipolar labor market Millions 39 38 37 38 35 34 - 33 1998 13.5% 13.0% 12.5% 12.0% 11.5% 11.0% 10.5% 2010 Construction + government + finance (LHS) Total excluding construction + government + finance (RHS) 2001 2004 2007 2010 100 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 This year's 8% jump in capital spending (c28) was not a surprise. Since 2009 was the first year since 1932 in which the net capital stock declined (c29), the rise was catch-up for a period of underinvestment. We have seen conflicting surveys regarding capex intentions for 2012, with some higher (Citi) and some lower (ISM). We expect a positive contribution from the business sector in 2012, and an economy-wide growth rate of--2.25%. Commercial and industrial loan growth has been rising (c30), offsetting continued weakness in residential loan demand, which supports some optimism on business spending for next year. (c28) Billions 12 11 • Capital spending recovery of 2005 USD (c29) Percentchange, 10% 8% Capital stock YoY (c30) Percentchange, 25% - 20% • 15% - C&I loan growth YoY Estimate for 2011 6% r I 1 I 1 10% • 10 - 4% 5% - 2% r -5% - 9 0% -10% • -15% - 8 -2% -20% 2003 200.5 2007 2009 2011 '60 70 SO '90 '00 '10 2008 2009 2010 2011 '50 2007 4 EFTA01077761 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan 4 The elephant in the room: US government debt The failure of the Super Committee to agree to a deficit reduction plan cannot be dismissed by saying, "at least they will have mandatory sequestered cuts instead". The Super Committee was supposed to be the beginning of a process, not the end. If it ends here, the government debt burden is not stabilized (c31), and another $5 trillion in deficit reduction over 10 years would still be needed to reach the sustainable debt levels projected in the latest CBO estimate. The problem: almost all government revenues are already spoken for through mandatory programs or interest (c32), and the 2012 budget deficit is still projected at 6%-8%. As a result, there is not that much "fiscal democracy" left, as described by Eugene Steuerle of Brookings, leaving most members of Congress with little to do but fight over the scraps that remain. US gross debt to GDP passed 100% for only the second time in its history last month (c33). The last time this happened, the US was fighting a two-front war and preparing a land invasion of Japan ("Operation Downfall"). As Walt Kelly's Pogo once said, "We have met the enemy, and he is us". An extension of the payroll tax cut that is not fully funded reduces the austerity burden next year (c34), and leaves the Federal debt issue to be dealt with in the future. So far, the US Treasury has survived based on the kindness of strangers: foreign central banks increasing their holdings (c35), and purchases by the Fed (c36). It pays to be the world's reserve currency (c37), which is helping prevent the kind of market revolt that sent European debt markets reeling. However, with the backdrop below, I am reminded of the following remark from late MIT economist Rudiger Dornbusch: "Crisis takes a much longer time coming than you think, and then it happens much faster than you would have thought." (c31) Long-term debt scenarios Net debt to GDP, percent 110% 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% Budget Control Act Phases 1 & 2. S5 trillion CBO August Baseline 30% 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 (c34) Fiscal adj. in 2012, Change in cyclically•adjusted fiscal deficit, %of GDP 4% Fiscaltightening Assuming payroll tax cuts & unemployment insurance benefits are extended -5% J Fiscal easing 1963 1971 1979 1987 1995 2003 2011 (c37) Reserve currency status does not last forever US Britain France Nether' Spain Portugal C a Year 1400 1575 1750 1925 2100 (c32) Percent of gov't. revenue not committed to mandatory spending 70% C BO J une Alternative case s 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% 1962 1971 1980 1989 1998 2007 2016 (c35) Foreign holdings of US debt Percent of total net debt outstanding 35% 30% 15% 10% 5% 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 (c38) Quarterly state tax revenue growth, Percent change, YoY 18 14 10 6 2 Official sector -2 -6 -10 -14 -18 1999 2003 2007 2011 (c33) The US reaches its Pogo moment, Gross debt to GDP, percent 120,0 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 1922 1944 1966 1988 2010 (c36) Fed holdings of US debt Percent of total net debt outstanding 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% - 6% 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 Some good news for municipal bond buyers: state tax revenues have picked up after some tax rate increases, and states have also been shrinking their payrolls and capex plans to balance budgets. This has a broader economic cost, but in isolation, supports the credit risk of many state and local issuers, particularly general obligation and essential service revenue bonds. C EFTA01077762 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1, 2012 J.P.Morgan ASIA: finding out what growth looks like without all the stimulus 2011 should have been a good year for Asian financial assets; after all, Asia generated the best combination of real GDP growth and corporate profits growth of the three major regions (c39). We had positioned for this, but were not rewarded for it, as Asian equities underperformed. The first problem: Asia over-stimulated, bringing policy rates net of headline inflation to zero. While the recovery in GDP growth was V-shaped, it also brought with it much higher inflation (c40). Blunt policy measures were then needed to rein it in. China is one illustrative example: money supply growth had to fall by more than half (from 30% to 13%) in order to bring inflation under control (c41). The good news is that inflation is now in retreat, with the latest reading close to 4%. The rate of Chinese RMB appreciation will probably slow, as it did from July 2008 to July 2010 when growth slowed down. (c39) 2011 real GDP and earnings (c40) Asla over-stimulated growth. Percent change, YoY Percentchange, YoY 16% 11% Rea I GDP 1 \ 2% US 14% 10% (LHS) 12% Dev. 6897: 10% • Asia ex. 8% Japan 6% Europe 5% 4% 4% 3% 0% 2% Real GDP EamIngs 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 (an Chinese Inflation comes down as money supply tightens 8% %,YoY, lagging 6 months 7% 30% 10% CPI 6% (RHS) 8% 5% 25% - 4% 20% 3% 2% 15% - 1% YoY 6% 4% 2% 0% 2011 0% 10% 2% 1998 2000 2003 . 2006 1 2009 I 2011 . The second problem is European bank deleveraging, which runs the risk of a credit contraction in Asia, as the region was the primary beneficiary of the expansion in EU and UK bank balance sheets (c42). While organic growth in Asia is real, in places like China, growth has become more reliant on more and more credit (c43). The impact of monetary tightening, credit tightening and slower growth in Europe can be seen in the decline in Chinese exports and manufacturing surveys (c44). (c42) Bankenstein's Monster Billions, USD 1,000 - 900 - 800 • 700 - 600 - 500 • 400 - 300 - 200 • 100 -. European bank claims on Asia ex. Japan 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (c43) Heavy reliance on credit, China's (c44) Chinese exports & manufacturing society-wide credit as % of nominal GOP survey, Percent change, YoY Index, sa 240% 60% Exports 220% • 50% n us1 (RHS) 140% ronri l l i -10% 120% -20% -30% 40% 200% 30% 180% 20% 10% 160% 0% 100% 40% 2002 2003 2005 2006 2008 2009 2011 2005 2007 2009 2011 58 56 54 52 50 48 46 44 42 40 We are still optimistic on the region for the long haul. Consumer spending in China is growing at a rapid pace: pay attention to growth rates in spending, rather than its share of GDP (c45). The region has been running current account surpluses for years, reducing sensitivity to external shocks (c46). Reduced financing from Europe will be felt, but can be made up by domestic sources given high saving rates. We expect 2012 to be an improvement over 2011, even at lower projected growth rates (c47). (c45) Chinese consumer watch the (c46) Asia's current account balance (c47) Asla ex. Japan real GDP growth level, not the share, % of GDP Yuan Percentof GDP rates, Percent change, YoY 50% - 13.303 6% - 11% Annual retail IMI 47% , sales per capita 11,3C0 10% Historical forecast (RHS) 4% 9% 440,4 -, 9,300 8% 41% . Household 7,300 2% 70/0 consumption/GDP ChinalJapan 6% 38% - (LHS) 5.300 5% 0% 4% 35% • 3.300 3% 32% 1.300 -2% 2 /0 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 1994 1997 2000 2003 2005 2008 2011 Consensus forecast 6 EFTA01077763 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Niforgan INVESTMENTS Concerns about the world's imbalances have resulted in more idle cash than I have seen in 25 years. The first 3 charts below look at some of it, parked in US commercial bank retail deposit accounts, central bank and sovereign wealth funds, and corporate balance sheets. A related example: $700 billion in unspent leveraged buyout, real estate and venture capital commitments as of Q3 2011. Measures of short interest and market sentiment also show extreme levels of pessimism. Putting some investment capital to work today seems reasonable; the investments described below are where we are focusing in 2012. On a portfolio basis, our equity weightings are below normal, for all the reasons explained in the prior sections. (c48) US commercial bank excess (c49) Foreign exchange reserves (c50) US corporate cash balances deposits, Trillions, USD Trillions, USD Cash and equivalents/ tangible assets 9 8• 14% 8 Deposits 7 Emerging Markets 12% 7 - 6 5• 10% 6 - Loans 4• 5 3 • Japan 8% 4 2 • 1 - 6% 3 0 4% . . . 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 70 '80 '90 '00 '10 1952 1960 1968 197619841992 2000 2008 Multinational equities, technology and equity income funds The grids below show characteristics of select global and European multinational stocks. These companies have dividend yields of 3%-5%, valuations at 10-11x 2012 earnings, and international revenue exposure. There are a lot of ways to gain exposure to these companies, which we think should comprise a large part of any 2012 equity portfolio. On technology, the sector no longer trades at any premium to the broad market. While growth expectations have come down in a world of deleveraging, the pricing of technology stocks might be one of the cheapest options on a better outcome (c53). Stock selection is critical: over the last 4 years, return differentials between individual stocks have been greater in technology than healthcare, materials and financials. (c51) Global Multinationals (c52) Oversold European Multinationals Average characteristics Average characteristics Market Cap ($bn) 131.5 11.0x 3.2% 13.7x .13% 69% Market Cap ($bn) 93.3 9.8x 4" 29% 0.7 51% Forward PIE Forward PIE Dividend Yield Dividend Yield Historical PIE Return on Equity %from 52•Week High Net Debt to EBITDA %of Revenue Exposure outside Home Country %of Revenue Exposure outside Europe Another part of our equity portfolio inc udes equity income funds. Dividend stocks have to be chosen carefully, since their P/Es are high relative to history, particularly in the US utility and consumer staples sectors. The scope for dividend increases is rising given corporate cash balances (c54). One preferred strategy focuses on companies with high dividend yields, but low dividend payout ratios (c55); these companies have outperformed, perhaps due to the ability to reinvest in their core businesses. (c54 Scope for dividend increases (c55) Companies that can afford high Percent dividends outperform, Total return 70% 13% 12% 35°% (c53) Forward PIE of S&P 500 and S&P 500 Tech Index, Multiples 70 60 - S&P 500Tech Index 50 - 40 30 20 10 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 60% - SO% - 40% 30% 20% 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 Cashto tangible assets (RHS 11% 10% 250% 9% 150% 8% 7% 50% 6% 5% 50% 1990 High dividend yield. low payout 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 7 EFTA01077764 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan Equity valuations: low and likely to stay that way in 2012 Valuation multiples have fallen sharply from their historical averages (c56), on both a price-to-book and price-to-earnings basis. However, we are not optimistic about multiple expansion until the imbalances of this cycle are reduced. One example of why: consider where profitability has come from in the US. In contrast to prior cycles (c57), current cycle profits have been boosted by very low labor compensation (c58). Given the fiscal, social and political issues this creates, it's hard to pay a very high multiple for this kind of profits boom. A resolution of the US long-term budget deficit would be very bullish for PIE multiples. (c56) The men who fell to earth (c57) Past 5 recoveries (c58) Current recovery PIE and PiB ratios vs. long-term averages Billions of 2005 USD Billions of 2005 USD 16x • 900 , P a E 14x • I . i iiii .... 4iii A 700 E ,' ,SPi ll,./ 500 61 , la • t • 111/ 7 ,'" JPN , , • v • , • 4 AU.: 0 US 300 m 10x . i FR 4,111 yr/ %stir icHN OLT average ',Current 100 -100 8x Sales Labor compensation 08 1.3 1.8 2.3 2.8 0 Price to book value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Quarters since trough 900 700 - 500 • 300 - 100 - -100 -300 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Quarters since trough Europe: no appetite yet for a contrarian call, and looking for bank loan sales instead A warning to skeptics like us: markets are underweight Europe, valuations are low (particularly banks, c59), and the larger toolkit announced at the EU summit will slow the rate of deleveraging. However, our view is that while buying equities and credit in the middle of a recession has proved fruitful for forward-looking investors (see October 21, 2009 EoTM for more details), investing at the beginning of a recession rarely is. Secondly, while European bank valuations are low, they are not that different from levels reached in prior banking crises (c60). A contrarian call for 2012 would be an overweight to European equities. This is not a call we are ready to make (yet), and remain underweight Europe, and overweight the US. Here's what we are focused on instead: purchases of loans from deleveraging European banks, which rely way more on volatile, wholesale funding3 than their counterparts in the US or Japan (c61). Here are some recent transactions from our managers: • Spain: performing consumer loans at a discount of 5014 • Netherlands: 7,200 performing consumer loans at 64 cents on the Euro, sold by a failing bank • 2 billion Euros in non-performing commercial mortgage loans in the UK, Germany and 6 other countries at a 58% discount • UK: performing residential mortgage loans at a 36% discount to par (c59) European banks Price-to-book ratio, Eurostoxx Banks Index 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 - 0.3 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (c60) How bad can banks get in a crisis? Trough price to tangible book 1.0 • 0.2 - III 0.8 - 0.6 - 0.4 MMIIIII 0.0 st; ! o lc ic A a 0 > z 0 p (c61) G-3 banking sector loan to deposit ratios 1.8 1.6 - 1.4 1.2 - 1.0 0.8 0.6 Median • Weighted average Western US Japan Europe To be clear, we do not have a view on when/if the constituency of the Eurozone might change. It is not clear that anyone would have enough inside knowledge of Germany's real breaking point to know; or even if Germany itself has figured this out. Nor do we have a very strong view on the bilateral $-Euro pair for 2012. Our concerns are focused on European equities and sovereign credit, which we believe may suffer more underperformance vs. other regions. 3 A recent Bridgewater Associates report estimated that European banks own around $4 trillion in dollar-denominated assets, and that 90% of these assets are funded on a wholesale basis (compared to their domestic Euro-denominated assets, which are funded 30% with wholesale money). While the Fed recently lowered the cost of a dollar liquidity facility made available to EU banks, eventually, many of these assets will probably migrate to other private sector owners. 8 EFTA01077765 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan Private mezzanine debt, US high yield and leveraged loans Investment grade and high yield spreads rallied sharply from 2009 to 2011. However, these spreads masked the reality that many companies did not have the same kind of access they did before the credit bubble burst. As a result, some issuers have had to look to private credit markets for financing, particularly newer issuers finding it more difficult to issue in public markets. As shown below (c62), private credit lending through "mezzanine" (subordinated) debt may offer substantial yields, cash coupons, substantial debt service coverage, call protection and equity beneath the mezzanine positions. However, these returns come at a price: private lending portfolios are illiquid, can be concentrated by sector, and are usually less diversified (20-30 positions) than high yield mutual funds. US high yield bond prices fell sharply in the wake of the US downgrade by S&P in August (c63). Current prices imply default rates of around 40% over a 5-year period. These implied default rates are above the losses experienced during the prior two recessions (c64), but lower than what was priced in during March 2009. We see value in the high yield market for unleveraged investors who can ride out the volatility. Leveraged loans, currently priced at a spread of around 6.5% over 3-month Libor, are another area of focus, given the implicit (and admittedly remote) inflation hedge. (c62) Private credit fund characteristics Equal-weighted averages Corporate Comm. RIE Yield to call 15.2%- 18.8% 12.7% 13.1%- 14.2% 12.6% Yield to maturity Cash coupon 8.6% - 10.4% 10.1% 4.7 -6.5 yrs 4.9 yrs Years to maturity Debt / EBITDA 5.0x- 6.'lx n/a 23% - 42% 33% Estimated equity cushion Debt service 2.3x- 2.5x 1.2x coverage (c63 High yield vs. US government bonds, Total return index, O4 2010=100 112 110 108 106 104 102 100 98 96 Jan-11 5.7 year Treasuries Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 (c64) Market implied 5-year cumulative default rates, Percent, assuming 30% recovery and 0% break-even return 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Worst default rate for entire HY universe (1989-94 and 1999.04) March 2009 Current Two caveats on credit. First, while the supply/demand dynamic in credit looks good for 2012 and 2013 (when credit demand from portfolio buyers is expected to substantially exceed credit supply), maturities pick up substantially in 2014 and beyond (c65). Second, credit volatility and bid/offer ratios are higher now, as dealer inventories have declined (c66), a function of regulatory and other industry changes. (c65) High yield loan and bond maturities, Billions. USD High yield 300 ;11 Leveraged loansl 1 1 \ 1 250 - 200 150 100 50 • 0 '12 (c66) Primary dealer corporate bond positions, Billions, USD 250 200 • 150 100 • 50 • '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20. 2003 (c67) US commercial real estate Percent of decline since peak 5% - -5% -15% -25% -35% -45% -55% 65% 2005 2006 2008 2009 2011 Oc -07 Distressed properties Jan-09 Apr-10 Major properties in major markets Overall properties, Jul-11 Commercial real estate The search for yield resulted in a recovery in "core" real estate prices, shown above as "major properties in major markets" (c67). As a result, we have seen better value in the distressed sector, assuming of course that it can be priced right, and diversified. Usually, distressed transactions require motivated sellers, such as undercapitalized regional US banks; healthy banks looking to sell foreclosed real estate; sub-investment grade companies looking to raise cash by selling wholly owned real estate; and REITs looking to scale back their geographical or sector footprint. One example: a portfolio of 60 suburban office properties sold at roughly $108 psf (a 40% discount to replacement cost), for a 9.3% cap rate based on 84% occupancy. Another example of distress (not for the faint of heart): a neglected Boston-area office building that's only 48% occupied, sold at $176 psf; that's around 50% of replacement cost. The benefit of acquiring buildings at steep discounts to replacement cost: there's limited risk of new supply, and property owners can bid aggressively to attract tenants from other buildings. 9 EFTA01077766 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P. Morgan Oil and Gas investments In November, we wrote our annual Thanksgiving piece on the outlook for conventional and renewable energy sources, and related investments. It's worth a read if you are interested in the subject matter; it was based on a day we spent with Vaclav Smil and his 2010 book, "Energy Myths and Realities". One trend we noted towards the end of the piece is that projections for global liquids production and US dry gas production both assume substantial contributions from non-conventional sources (c69, c70). This creates opportunities across the entire value chain, including exploration and production, distribution and services. On natural gas, new finds have been rewarding, even with natural gas prices at current low levels (c68), since large major oil and gas companies aggregate proven reserves, and are willing to pay a premium for them given their long-term horizons. On crude oil, many of our investments focus on so-called "renaissance" plays, which entail older, mostly depleted fields which majors sell as they reshuffle their reserve mix to higher-growth assets. Service companies include firms providing enhanced oil recovery, fracking and waste-water management. Other servicing investments are related to deep-sea fields recently discovered off the coast of Brazil. We have discussed these projects before (EoTM September 2009). The sub-salt fields in Brazil lie 7 kilometers below the surface of the ocean, beneath a thick salt canopy in the Lower Tertiary region. Oil extraction can be quite complicated due to the low permeability and porosity of the salt canopy, and tar pockets. Our investments in this region are linked to providing services, rather than owning exploration and production assets themselves. (c68) Natural gas spot price (c69) Global liquids production (CO) US dry gas production USDirn m Btu Million barrels per day Trillion cubic feet per year 16 120- 30 - 14 12 10 8 6 4 • 2 - 0 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 100 • ao • so ao 20 0• 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 OPEC Conventional U ncomrentiOna I Non-OPEC Conventional 25 20 15 10 5 0 1990 History Projections Net imports Shale gas Non-associated offshore Non-associated onshore Tight gas ' Alaska Coalbed methane c • 2000 2010 2020 2030 Gold, macro hedge funds and oil Gold has been correlated to lots of things (c7 I): credit spreads on European sovereigns (directly); the yield on inflation protected bonds (inversely) and the highly liquid money supply (directly). Gold markets are volatile, have attracted a lot of hot money that needs to book profits from time to time, and are always at risk of Central Banks unloading supply. However, until the variables mentioned (sovereign spreads, the monetary base and inflation fears) move back to where they started, we would not sell gold here. Last year we wrote that we expected gold to be volatile in 2011, but end the year higher than it began. We have the same view for 2012. We generally use hedge funds as a complement to underweight positions in equities. One of the more successful strategies involves macro hedge funds. As shown (c72), individual macro hedge funds generate a lot of volatility. When grouped (even randomly) into pods of 5 funds, low correlation tends to reduce return, but reduce volatility even more. That's a tradeoff we see as sensible. As for oil markets, we are expecting below-trend oil demand growth in 2012 given the recession in Europe and slower GDP growth in Asia in the first half of the year, but still an increase in oil demand overall. As inflation comes off the boil in Asia, we expect oil demand to pick up later in the year. Any supply increases from Libya and Iraq might be offset by Gulf countries returning to pre-Libyan war production levels; since July 2010, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE increased production by 2 million barrels per day. The wild card for oil markets in 2012 is Iran and its continuing quest to enrich uranium (see Appendix B). Bottom line: any 10%+ declines in oil prices would represent good value. (c71) Gold is correlated to everything Highly liquid-0 ' money supply (5) 10y TIPS yield (Inverted, %) Gold price (51 ounce) Oct-11 stem Europe Sovereign Sy CDS spread (Bps) Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 (c72 Macro hedge funds require diversification, 5•yr annualized return 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% -10% • Indlv. funds • 5 random funds • -20% Volatility 0% 25% 50% 75% 10 EFTA01077767 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan jAppendix Al The pain in Spain, and a history of European austerity and social unrest Other than exports (c78), the news in Spain is very downbeat. If there are socioeconomic limits to how much austerity a country can take in order to remain in a currency union, we are likely to find out in Spain, where unemployment is 23%, youth unemployment is over 40%, and there are large budget deficit and current account deficit adjustments still to come. (c73) Spanish services activity survey (c74) Spanish unemployment rate Purchasing Managers Index, sa 65 -- 60 - 55- 50- 45 - 40 - 35 - 3o - 25 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 (c76) Spanish cement consumption Millions, tons 60 55 50 45 40 35 30- 95- 90 - 20 15 85 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2003 Percent 10% - 7% 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 (c77 Spanish retail sales Index, January 2003 =100 115 110 105 - 100 - 25 2005 2007 2009 2011 (c75) Spanish Industrial production Index, January2007=100 105 100 95 90 85 80 75 70 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 (c78) Spanish exports Percentchange, YoY 16% 12% 8% -HI 4% 0% -4% -8% • -12% 16% 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Austerity and Unrest. Austerity sounds straightforward as a policy, until the consequences bite. It remains unclear that the road Europe is taking is less costly in the long run, in economic, political and social terms. The history of Europe over the last 100 years shows that austerity can have severe consequences and outcomes. A paper from the Centre for Economic Policy Research looks at the unrest that resulted from austerity in 32 European countries since 19194. They found a very clear pattern of rising demonstrations, riots and strikes (and worse) after expenditure cuts took place (c79). The authors tested to see if results varied with ethnic fragmentation, inflation, penetration of mass media and the quality of government institutions; they did not. Results are also consistent across time, covering interwar and postwar periods. The independent variable that did result in more unrest: higher levels of government debt in the first place. Compounding the problem is the way some decisions are being taken, which may reinforce perceptions of a "democratic deficit" at the EU level, an issue highlighted by Germany's Constitutional Court. It remains to be seen if Europe can sustain cohesion around its path of most resistance. One sign of rising tensions: the following (staggering) comment by the head of the Bank of France: "A downgrade does not appear to me to be justified when considering economic fundamentals," Noyer said. "Otherwise, they should start by downgrading Britain which has more deficits, as much debt, more inflation, less growth than us and where credit is slumping." At a time of increasing budgetary pressures and declining growth, I suppose there are limits to European solidarity. (c79) Austerity and unrest in Europe, 1919 - 2008 Number of incidents per county per year 1.5 1 0.5 - 0 Expenditure increases Expenditure reduction >1% ■ Expenditure reduction >2% ■ Expenditure reduction >3% ■ Expenditure reduction >5% Demonstrations Riots Measures of Instability 4 "Austerity and Anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in Europe, 1919-2008", Ponticelli and Voth, International Macroeconomics and Economic History Initiative, CEPR, December 2011. General strikes 11 EFTA01077768 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 .J.P.Morgan JAppendix B1 Learnine to live with a nuclear Iran Investors have to factor in more than just finance and economics. As we head into 2012, oil markets are at risk from ongoing issues surrounding Iran's quest to enrich uranium. Here are a few things to keep in mind regarding this issue: • The International Atomic Energy Agency now believes that Iran has undertaken most steps necessary to design, manufacture, test and deliver a nuclear weapon, including the modification of a ballistic missile to accommodate a nuclear payload, and computer modeling of the process to compress and detonate enriched uranium. loschIca Fischer, Germany's foreign minister and vice chancellor from 1998 to 2005, noted in a November article that Iran only has one civilian nuclear reactor (fuel rods supplied by Russia), and that the Iranian technology being developed cannot be used in it. • Iran may be motivated by what happened elsewhere in the Gulf. After the NATO intervention in Libya, Ayatollah Khamenei gave a speech saying that Ghaddati's mistake was giving up his nuclear program, as it made him vulnerable to outside intervention. This reduces the chances of a deal whereby Iran agrees to meaningful compromises. • Nevertheless, the likelihood of a US military strike appears low. Last month, Secretary of Defense Panetta reiterated the position of prior Defense Secretary Gates that an attack on Iran would be difficult, citing "unintended consequences". Capitol Hill has been more hawkish, but there appears to be considerable resistance in the intelligence and military establishments against an Iranian attack. For more context around the Iran hawks and doves within the US political and military establishment, and the history of National Intelligence Estimates which claim that Iran has not yet moved towards weaponization, see "The domestic politics of America's response to Iran's nuclear programme", Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Ido Oren, December 2011. According to sources we spoke with, the world might only have a few weeks to respond if Iran moves towards weaponization, a process that could be signaled by banning IAEA inspectors, or changes in inventory levels of uranium enriched to 3.5% or 20% (90% is needed for weapons). The time required to enrich uranium from 20% to 90% is much shorter than the time required to enrich uranium from 0% to 200/05; it is not linear. • There have been some successes through unattributed covert operations to slow down Iran's progress. David Albright at the Institute for Science and International Security walked me through the nuances of the Stuxnet computer virus that apparently wreaked havoc with vibration sensors, pressure gauges and frequency converters at one of Iran's centrifuge facilities. A more recent virus (Duqu) appears designed to gather intelligence, perhaps in preparation for a future operation. However, there may be limits to what can be accomplished, as supply chains and security procedures are tightened. • If there were circumstances that resulted in Iran deciding to cease oil exports to the OECD, some combination of Libyan, Iraqi and other Gulf production might be able to take up the slack. However, given tight conditions in oil markets, prices would probably spike. Here are some of the numbers. Rising Libyan and Iraqi production could provide a supply cushion in case Iranian exports to the OECD were cut off (c80). There is also reason to believe that other Gulf countries could increase production as well; over the last few months, Saudi, Kuwaiti and UAE production rose around 2 million barrels per day above prior estimates, as they responded to the situation in Libya (c81). However, oil markets overall are pretty tight. OPEC countries are running at very high levels of production, and the IEA decision to release strategic reserves during the Libya crisis is an indication that they see limits to OPEC production increases. As a result, we believe that oil prices will remain well bid in 2012, despite declining expectations for global GDP growth. If a crisis occurred in Iran, oil prices would likely head sharply higher. (c80) Possible offsets to an Iranian supply shock /Anions of barrels per day, as of October 2011 (c81) Millions 2.2 1.8 Increased production vs. mid-2010 output of barrels per day • Saudi Arabia ■ United Arab Emirates Production Domestic Consumption Exports YE2012 Exports (Est.) Change in Exports Iraq 2.7 0.8 12 2.6 0.7 1.4 ;. Kuwait Libya 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 Total: 1.6 0.6 Iranian Evorts to OECD: 1.2 0.2 -0.2 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 5 See "The New !AEA Report: Beyond Weaponization", U.S. Bipartisan Policy Center, November 10, 2011. 12 EFTA01077769 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2O12 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan Hopes that Iranians will effect regime change appear overstated. There is conflicting evidence on conditions in Iran: o IMF data on real per capita income growth show that Iran has the 2nd best results in the region since 1990, behind only Qatar (which spreads its natural gas riches over 1.7 million people). Other factors that might contribute to cohesion: "freedom shares", handed out as part of a $100 bn privatization program; and the recognition of progress in human development. Since 1990, of the 94 countries in the United Nations Human Development Report ranked as "high" or "very high", Iran recorded the single largest improvement, reflecting progress in life expectancy and education. o On the other hand, a recent Gallup poll shows that 26% of Iranians are economically "suffering", compared to 14% in 2008, in part a reflection of the removal of domestic energy subsidies. IMF data rely on official Iranian statistics, which may understate actual inflation; there are reports that capital flight is rampant. Economists inside and outside of Iran, and European governments, have questioned the accuracy of the IMF's data. According to Karim Sadjadpour at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Iran ranks higher than Egypt and Tunisia in terms of economic malaise (inflation and unemployment) and corruption. Household incomes have fallen versus prior generations, and people under the age of 30 now account for 70% of all unemployed persons; youth unemployment itself is around 23%. As for sanctions, recent ones are aimed at Iran's gas, oil and petrochemical industries (the US Government Accountability Office reports that only 16 firms are currently active in Iran, down from 43 in 2010). Other sanctions are aimed at its banks, and potentially at its Central Bank. The sanctions have impeded the modernization of its natural gas industry, led to shortages in construction materials affecting small and medium sized businesses, and reduced available trade finance. The bottom line is that it does not appear that regime change from within is something to be expected in Iran. Investors don't necessarily need another reason to hold gold, but this appears to be another issue with no resolution in 2012. jAppendix CI Sovereign defaults, preferred creditors, and what "pari-passu" means (not that much) 6 Every sovereign default is like a snowflake, with a story all its own. But there are often common factors: high levels of hard currency sovereign debt, a monetary anchor of some kind, and a balance of payments problem. Some Southern European countries have aspects of all three. While EU 2011 debt levels are above those associated with most prior debt crises (c82), the help these countries might get from outside lenders (and the ECB) is also larger; it's premature to know how deep those latter pockets are. When thinking about where we go from here, I remind our investors of the following: 1. In prior debt crises, IMF and other bilateral facilities did not prevent a subsequent decline in securities prices (c83-c86) 2. The lack of a legal framework around sovereign debt restructurings can increase the risks for bondholders when things go wrong On the latter point, there have been thousands of pages of legalese written on the topic. Here are some observations on sovereign defaults, preferred creditors and risks to bondholders: • Most sovereign bonds contain a clause referring to their pari-passu (equal) treatment vs. other indebtedness of the same issuer. Such clauses tend to work well in a corporate setting, where bankruptcy courts in a given country enforce clauses across creditor classes. • However, sovereign issuers are not subject to a bankruptcy code, their own, or anyone else's. They have the freedom to discriminate amongst creditors, and often do. Sovereign entities in distress rarely pay all creditors on a "ratable" basis, where "ratable" signifies equal treatment in terms of priority, magnitude and timing of payment. • The pari-passu clause does not prevent issuers, as a matter of practice, from discriminating in favor of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. As a result, should an eventual writedown of debt be needed, it might have to be absorbed by a smaller universe of private sector creditors. In this regard, increased commitments by official sector lenders may not change the risk equation for bondholders in the long run'. (c82) Sovereign debt levels in prior crises vs. Europe 2011, Debt to GDP, percent, by countryand year 140% 120% 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% _PA FriapqrrinfgPV41454, 6 This section draws on "The Pari-Passu Debt Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments", Buchheit and Pam, Emory Law Journal, 2004. Lee Buchheit is with Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, which represents many sovereign issuers in distress/default. I have a lot of respect for Lee's judgment and decades of experience, but also believe that such commentary should be considered in light of what sovereign counsel normally does: seek maximum flexibility for sovereign issuers, sometimes at the expense of private creditors. 7 On a related matter, I wouldn't put too much importance on the decision by EU governments to remove "private sector involvement" language as a pm-condition for lending via the ESM (European Stability Mechanism). Just because they removed it from the ESM doesn't mean investors won't be required to share the pain in the future. 13 EFTA01077770 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan • The IMF and World Bank are not the only ones given preferred treatment. In the proposed Greek debt exchange, Greek Social Security Funds holding its sovereign debt were reportedly not scheduled to participate. And in prior sovereign debt restructurings, t-bills were excluded, further concentrating losses on the remaining bondholders. • In the world of corporate credit, lenders have a wide variety of remedies they can use when seeking to ensure equal treatment: sharing clauses, the use of a trustee to distribute payments ratably, inter-creditor agreements among lenders to share payments and losses equally, and subordination agreements. These remedies are generally not used by lenders to governments, most likely because it would be difficult (if not impossible) to enforce them. • A notable exception: in the year 2000, a hedge fund sought to block Peruvian payments on its Brady bonds, since Peru didn't pay interest on the fund's Peruvian loans (the fund opted not to participate in the Brady bond exchange). The hedge fund's injunction was granted by a New York Federal Court and a Belgian Court of Appeals, and the hedge fund was fully paid. As an investor, I have a lot of sympathy for creditors that are actually able to get their contracts enforced. In recent years, other creditors have not been as successful in the wake of the Peru case in getting the phrase "pari-passu" to mean what markets often assume it to means. The reality: it may mean very little, if anything. All things considered, the history suggests that investors seek a very large potential reward before taking risk on sovereign debt, once a crisis hits. Here are the charts referenced above on how official sector credit facilities did not prevent further deterioration in securities markets of the countries involved. In Argentina and Russia these declines were permanent. In Mexico and Indonesia, the declines were temporary; after 50%-70% currency devaluations eventually re-established a more stable equilibrium, their sovereign bond prices recovered. (c83) Argentina So 20vereign debt price: 113t 2017 1 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 Jan-98 JS-99 (c85) Russia Sovereign debt price: GKO (T-Bill)3/10/1999 90 ^ Jan-01 Jul-02 Jan-04 Banks. the IM-, LADS and span promise $40 bn in aid. Ibis should improve the investment climate, and together with enhanceddomestic and external confidence, lay the ground for sustained economicArgentine growth- -IMF Managing Director 1121001 80 ^ 70 - 60 - 50 - 40 - Jan-98 The IMF Executive Board completed the review of the Extended Fund Faciity,and agreed to disburse a $700 million tranche bringing the program back on track. "Up to this pOilt, the optimi3ts on Russia have been more right than the pessimists. There is good reason to believethe o pti mists wi II continue to be right." Stanley Fischer, IMF Managing Director [01/98] Russia stocks and bonds soared after the promise of $22.6 bn in loans led by the IMF - Bloomber• 07198 Feb-98 Apr-98 May-98 Jul-98 (c84) Mexico Sovereign BradyBond debtprice: 6" 2019 85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 Dec-93 Creation of $20 bn Exchange Stabilization Fund (2/95) Creation of permanent $6.7 bn line of credit for Mexico from the United States and Canada [4/94) Mar-94 Jun-94 Sep-94 Dec-94 Mar-95 (c86) Indonesia Sovereign debt price:73g 2006 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 Jul-96 Jan-97 Jul-97 Jan-98 Jul-98 IMF likely to resume lending under $40 bn package [04/98] Il 'We've been very impresse \ by the negotiations with the \./I new Cabiner— IMF (04/981 L 8 See "Debt Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises", Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, MIT Press, 2006, p. 71 and table 3.1. 14 EFTA01077771 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1.2012 J.P.Morgan Chart sources (el) Bloomberg, December 1983 (c44) China Customs, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Markit, November 2011 (e2) OECD, December 2011 (c45) IMF, China State Statistical Bureau, China National Bureau of Statistics, Q4 2010 (6) OECD, December 2011 (c46) IMF, Q4 2011 (c4) Markit, Institute for Supply Management, J.P. Morgan (c47) IMF, Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, September 2011 Securities LLC, November 2011 (c5) IMF, OECD, Barclays Capital, Bloomberg (c48) FRB, December 2011 (c6) Bloomberg, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Empirical Research (c49) Ministry of Finance Japan, IMF, J.P. Morgan Securities LW, October Partners, December 2011 2011 (c7) Statistisches Bundesamt/Deutsche Bundesbank and Istituto (60) FRB, Q3 2011 Nazionale di Statistica, October 2011 (e8) Bloomberg, December 2011 (c51) J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Bloomberg, Company filings, December 2011 (e9) European Commission, Bloomberg. September 2011 (c52) J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Bloomberg, Company filings, December 2011 (c10) FRB, BEA, ECB, Eurostat, Bank of England, UK Office for (c53) Fame, December 2011 National Statistics, Bank of Japan, Japan Cabinet Office, Heinrich Hoffinann, November 2011 (ell) Reinhart. Carmen M. and Kenneth S. Rogoff, "From Financial (c54) FRB, Standard & Poor's, Q3 2011 Crash to Debt Crisis," NBER Working Paper 15795, March 2010 (c12) FRB, ECB, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Q4 2010 (c55) Credit Suisse quantitative equity research, November 2011 (c13) European Banking Authority, US 10-Ks, December 2010 (c56) J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, December 2011 (c14) OECD, Bank for International Settlements, "The real effects of debt", Cecchetti. Mohanty and Zampolli. Sept. 2011 (c57) BEA, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Q3 2011 (els) OECD, QI 2011 (c58) BEA, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Q3 2011 (c16) OECD, December 2011 (c59) Bloomberg. December 2011 (c17) IMF, September 2011 (c60) Estimates based on Thomson Reuters, Credit Suisse HOLT, Credit Suisse research, September 2011 (els) IMF, National Inst. of Statistics, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Q3 (61) J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Bloomberg, November 2011 2011 (c19) Statistical Office of the European Communities, Haver (c62) J.P. Morgan Private Bank, November 2011 Analytics, Q2 2011 (c20) IMF, November 2011 (c63) Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Barclays Capital, iBoxx, December 2011 (e21) OECD, Q2 2011 (c64) Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, December 201 I (c22) Institute for Supply Management, November 2011 (c65) J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, December 2011 (c23) Bloomberg, November 2011 (c66) FRB, November 2011 (c24) FRB, BEA, Q3 2011 (c67) Moody's Commercial Property Price Indices, August 2011 (c25) National Association of Realtors, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, (c68) Bloomberg, December 2011 Amherst Securities, Mortgage Bankers Association, Dec. 2011 (c26) BEA, Q3 2011 (c69) U.S. Energy Information Administration, December 2010 (c27) Bureau of Labor Statistics, November 2011 (c70) U.S. Energy Information Administration, September 2011 (c28) BEA, Q3 2011 (c71) Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Markit, Bloomberg, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, December 2011 (c29) BEA, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, August 2011 (c72) Hedge Fund Research, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, September 2011 (c30) FRB, November 2011 (c73) Markit, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, November 2011 (al) CBO, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, December 2011 (c74) Eurostat, October 2011 (c32) CBO, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, August 2011 (c75) Institute Nacional de Estadistica, Haver Analytics, October 2011 (c33) US Treasury, BEA, December 2011 (c76) Oficemen, October 2011 (e34) J.P. Morgan Securities LW, CBO, September 2011 (c77) Eurostat, J.P. Morgan Securities LW, October 2011 (c35) FRB, US Treasury, November 2011 (c78) Institute Nacional de Estadistica, Haver Analytics, Q3 2011 (c36) FRB, US Treasury, November 2011 (c79) Austerity and Anarchy Budget Cuts and Social Unrest In Europe, 1919-2008. Jacopo Ponticelli and Hans-Joachim Voth, Centre for Economic Policy Research, August 2011 (c37) Hong Kong Monetary Authority. December 2011 (do) J.P. Morgan Securities LW, Government Agencies, News Reports, October 2011 (c38) Census Bureau, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Rockefeller (di) J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Government Agencies, News Reports. Institute, Q3 2011 October 2011 (c39) J.P. Morgan Securities LW, December 2011 (c82) Gramercy Capital, OECD, December 201 I (c40) J.P. Morgan Securities LW, October 2011 (c83) Bloomberg, December 2011 (c41) China National Bureau of Statistics, People's Bank of China, (c84) Bloomberg, December 2011 November 2011 (c42) Bank for International Settlements, Q2 2011 (c85) Bloomberg, IMF, December 201! (c43) China National Bureau of Statistics, People's Bank of China, (c86) Bloomberg, December 2011 J.P. Morgan Private Bank. Q3 2011 15 EFTA01077772 Eye on the Market I OUTLOOK 2012 January 1.2012 J.P. Morgan Cover art data sources Banco de Espana, Bank for International Settlements, Bloomberg, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Case-Shiller, China National Bureau of Statistics, Dealogic, Deutsche Boise, Eurostat, Federal Reserve Board, G7 Governments, Gallup, Inc., Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, International Monetary Fund, Intervention General de la Administration del Estado, J.P. Morgan Private Bank, J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, Ministere de l'Economie des Finances et de l'Industrie, Ministero dell'Economia e delle Finanze, MSCI, The National Institute for Statistics of Italy, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Standard & Poor's, US Census Bureau, US Treasury. Periphery includes Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece. High end retail proxied by the Deutsche Borst World Luxury Index. Low end retail proxied by the S&P Department Stores Index. All data are the latest available as of November 30, 2011, except the global policy rates and global fiscal deficits, which are as of tune 30, 2011. Acronyms BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis CBO Congressional Budget Office CDS Credit Default Swaps EBITDA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization ECB European Central Bank EU European Union EMU European Economic and Monetary Union EBA European Banking Authority EFSF European Financial Stability Facility FRB Federal Reserve Board GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IEA International Energy Agency IMF International Monetary Fund ISM Institute for Supply Management NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NFIB National Federation of Independent Business OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PMI Purchasing Managers Index REIT Real Estate Investment Trust RMB Renminbi PSF Per square foot SMP Securities Markets Program TIPS Treasury Inflation Protected Securities UAE United Arab Emirates The material contained herein is intended as a general marker commentary. Opinions expressed herein are those of Michael Cembalest and may differ from those of other J.P. Morgan employees and affiliates. This information in no way constitutes J.P. Morgan research and should not be treated as such. Further, the views expressed herein may differ from that contained in J.P. Morgan research reports. The above summaniprkys/quotesistatistics have been obtained from sources deemed to be reliable. but we do not guarantee their accuracy or completeness. Past performance is nor a guarantee offuture results. Investment products are not insured by the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: are not guaranteed by the bank or thrift affiliates: and may lose value. Nor all investment ideas referenced are suitable for all investors. These recommendations may not be suitable for all investors. Speak with ;our J.P. Morgan representative concerning your personal situation. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. Private investments often engage in leveraging and other speculative investment practices that may increase the risk of investment loss. can be highly illiquid, are not required to provide periodic pricing or valuation information to investors and may involve complex tax structures and delays in distributing important tax information. Typically, such investment ideas can only be offered to suitable investors through a confidential offering memorandum. which ful4 Pelescribes all tams, conditions and risks. In the United Kingdom, this material is approved by J.P. Morgan International Bank Limited (JPMCB) with the registered office located at 125 London Wall EC2Y registered in England No. 03838766 and is authorized and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. In addition. this material may be distributed by: JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (JPMCB) Paris branch, which is regulated by the French banking authorities Autorite de Contriile Pradentiel and Autorite des Marches Financiers: J.P. Morgan (Suisse) Se, regulated by the Sits Financial Market Supervisory Authority; JPMCB Bahrain branch, licensed as a conventional wholesale bank by the Central Bank of Bahrain (for professional clients only): JPMCB Dubai branch. regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority. In Hong Kong. this material is distributed by JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA. (JPMCB) Hong Kong branch except to recipients having an account at JPMCB Singapore branch and where this material relates to a Collective Investment Scheme (other than private fiords such as private equity and hedge funds)• in which case it is distributed by J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (JPMSAPL). Both JPMCB Hong Kong branch and JPMSAPL are regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. In Singapore• this material is distributed by JPMCB Singapore branch except to recipients having an account at JPMCB Singapore branch and where this material relates to a Collective Investment Scheme (other than private funds such as a private equity and hedge funds), in which case it is distributed by J.P. Morgan (SEA.) Limited (JPMSEAL). Both JPMCB Singapore branch and JPMS£AL are regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Cover illustration C Dan Williams, 2012 C.02012JPAIorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. 011.1.&0.1 16 EFTA01077773 MICHAEL CEMBALEST is Global Head of Investment Strategy for J.P. Morgan's Asset Management business. In that role, he leads Asset Management's analyses of global markets for $1.8 trillion of client assets worldwide. In addition, as Chief Investment Officer for global private banking at J.P. Morgan, Mr. Cembalest is responsible for the day-to-day strategic and tactical asset allocation for $700 billion in client assets. Mr. Cembalest is also a member of the J.P. Morgan Asset Management Investment Committee and a member of the Investment Committee for the J.P. Morgan Retirement Plan for the firm's 240,000 employees. Mr. Cembalest was formerly head of a fixed income division of J.P. Morgan Investment Management with responsibility for high grade, high yield, emerging markets and municipal bonds. Prior to joining Asset Management, Mr. Cembalest served as head strategist for Emerging Markets Fixed Income at J.P. Morgan Securities. Mr. Cembalest joined J.P. Morgan in 1987 as a member of the firm's Corporate Finance division. Mr. Cembalest earned an M.A. from the Columbia School of International and Public Affairs in 1986 and a B.A. from Tufts University in 1984. INVESTMENT STRATEGY TEAM RICHARD MADIGAN is Managing Director, Chief Investment Officer and Head of the Investment Team managing the Global Access Portfolios and Access Funds at J.P. Morgan. With over 20 years of experience in portfolio management and international capital markets, he is a senior member of the J.P. Morgan Private Bank Global Strategy Team, where he is responsible for the development of investment strategy, including tactical and strategic asset allocation. He is also responsible for the Private Bank's Global Portfolio Construction effort. In addition, Mr. Madigan is Chairman of the Hedge Fund Advisory Council and an officer of J.P. Morgan Private Investments, Inc. Prior to his current role with J.P. Morgan, Mr. Madigan served as Managing Director, Head of Emerging Markets Investments and Senior Portfolio Manager at Offitbank, a New-York-based wealth management boutique, where he managed the firm's emerging markets assets and investment team, including the firm's flagship emerging markets mutual fund. Mr. Madigan's commentaries have appeared in the Financial Times, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg and Reuters. He has been a guest speaker on CNBC, CNN and Bloomberg News, as well as at various industry conferences. Mr. Madigan holds a master's degree from New York University, where he majored in Finance and International Business. MICHAEL VAKNIN serves as Chief Economist for J.P. Morgan Private Bank. In this role, he is responsible for the global, macroeconomic and market research that underpins the firm's long-term views and, by extension, how client portfolios are positioned. Mr. Vaknin is also a member of the Private Bank Investment Team, which guides asset allocation and market strategy decision-making for J.P. Morgan private clients across the globe. Prior to joining J.P. Morgan, Mr. Vaknin was a Senior Global Markets Economist at Goldman Sachs International in London, where he supported global economic research and macro-based rates strategy and analysis. With extensive expertise in interest rates, credit, currencies and macroeconomics, his views were published regularly in various communications. Previous to Goldman, Mr. Vaknin worked as an economist at the Falk Institute for Economic Research and lectured on international finance and monetary economics at Columbia University. While earning an M.A. and Ph.D. in Economics and Finance from Columbia University, he worked as a research assistant to Nobel Laureates Joseph Stiglitz and Edmund Phelps as well as for Richard Clarida, former Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. 17 EFTA01077774 111 IVAN LEUNG is a Managing Director and the Chief Investment Strategist for J.P. Morgan Private Bank in Asia. Mr. Leung is responsible for setting the regional investment strategy as well as managing the model portfolio that is implemented for discretionary portfolios. He is a member of the Global Private Bank Investment Team and chairs the Asia Local Investment Committee. Before joining J.P. Morgan in 2007, Mr. Leung served at UBS Wealth Management for six years and was the regional head of portfolio specialists. There, he created and managed customized portfolio solutions for ultra-high-net-worth and institutional clients. Prior to that, Mr. Leung worked for Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank in portfolio manager roles. Mr. Leung speaks frequently to the financial media. His articles and interviews have appeared in newspapers and newswires, including the Financial Times, Business Times, The Edge Singapore and Bloomberg. He holds a Bachelor of Applied Science degree from the University of Toronto and an M.B.A. from the Schulich School of Business. CESAR PEREZ is Chief Investment Strategist for EMEA. He was most recently at Al Rajhi Capital Bank in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, where he was responsible for investment strategy, portfolio construction and risk management. Mr. Perez has worked in the investment management business for the past 17 years, including two years at Credit Suisse Asset Management, where he was head of equities, five years at M&G Investments in London and nine years at J.P. Morgan Investment Management in Madrid, London and New York. Throughout his career, Mr. Perez has worked across all asset classes and regions for both institutional and private clients, serving in roles ranging from portfolio management to sales and relationship management. PHIL GUARCO is Chief Investment Strategist for J.P. Morgan Private Bank, Latin America. He is part of the team responsible for Global Investments and Portfolio Strategy for J.P. Morgan international client relationships. Mr. Guarco began his career with Citibank as a financial institutions banker in New York. He subsequently served as a corporate and investment banker for Citibank in Mexico between 1992 and 1995. Additionally, Mr. Guarco worked for Citicorp in New York in its political risk insurance subsidiary as a Senior Underwriter. He was also a Senior Credit Officer for Latin American financial institutions at Moody's from 1997 to 2006. His commentaries have been frequently covered in the local Latin American press, as well as in the international press, such as the Financial Times, The New York Times, and The Wall Street JournaL He has also been a guest speaker on Bloomberg and Reuters News and has been cited frequently in World Bank and IMF publications. Mr. Guarco obtained his B.A. degree in Economics and Spanish from Grinnell College, and a master's degree in International Affairs and Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. ANTHONY CHAN currently serves as the Chief Economist for Private Wealth Management. His responsibilities include economic analysis and research supporting J.P. Morgan's Wealth Management businesses and the Private Bank's strategy group. Mr. Chan has also served on the Economic Advisory Committee of the American Banker's Association. After completing his doctoral studies, Mr. Chan was a Professor of Economics at the University of Dayton after which he was an Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a Senior Economist at Barclays de Zoete Wedd Government Securities. He has been quoted in many media outlets, including The Wall Street Journal, Barron's, The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and Investor's Daily. He periodically appears on CNBC, Bloomberg TV and public television's Nightly Business Report. Mr. Chan received his B.B.A. in Finance and Investments from Baruch College and his Masters and Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Maryland. 18 EFTA01077775 ASIA AMERICAS EUROPE MIDDLE EAST WORLD HEADQUARTERS Hong Kong United States France Dubai 270 Park Avenue Singapore Brazil Germany New York, NY 10017 Chile Italy Mexico Spain Peru Switzerland Venezuela United Kingdom EFTA01077776