Case 21-770, Document 17-1, 04/01/2021. 3068296. Pagel of 31

Case 21-770, Document 17-1, 04/01/2021. 3068296. Pagel of 31 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Thurgood NI ars ball U.S. Courthouse 40 Foley Square, New York, NY 10007 Telephone: 212-857-8500 MOTION INFORMATION STATEMENT Docket Number(s): 21-770/21-58 Caution fuse short tilcl Millman: Pretrial Release Set forth bebw precise. complete statement of relief sough: Ghislaine Maxwell requests that this Court set reasonable bail or in the alternative, remand for an evidentiary hearing. MOVING PARTY: Ghislaine Maxwell United States of America v. Ghislaine Maxwell OPPOSING PARTY: United States of America DPlaintiff ODefenchnt FlAprellantPetiimer DArpelke/Respandent MOVING ATTORNEY: David Oscar Markus OPPOSING ATTORNEY: Won. S. Shin, AUSA [name of attorney. win lynx address, phone number and e-mail] Markus/Moss PLLC United States Attorney's Office, So. Dist. of NY 40 NW Third Street, PH 1, Miami, FL 33128 1 St. Andrew's Plaza, New York, New York 10007 court- kids& Agency appealed from Alison J. Nathan, Southern District of New York Please check appropriate boxes: FOR EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS AND INJUCIlONS PENDING APPEAL: Has movant notiftdr Apositg counsel (requird by Local Rule 27.1): Oyes INo (eybi): Oppositg counsel's position on motion: jUncpposed EOpposedripon't Kmw Does counsel intend a response: Yes Oso t Know Has this request for relief been made bekrJa Has thiS relief been previously sought in this caul? Requested return date and expltnatbn of emergency: es Yes No Is oral argument on :notion requested? El Yes 0,30 (requests for oral argunrnt will not ircessart) be granted) Has argunent date of appeal been set? ❑Yes ON° If yes. enter dare: Signature of Moving Attorney. IS/ David Oscar Markus Date: 04/01/2021 Service by ECM/EU DOther [Attach proof of semi:el Form T- 1080 (rev.12-I3) EFTA00093044 Case 21-770, Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page2 of 31 No. 21-770 & 21-58 In the Mufti) Sates' Court of 5Appeats for the £ieconb (Circuit UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Appellee, v. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 20-CR-330 (MN) Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion for Pretrial Release David Oscar Markus MARKUS/MOSS PLLC 40 N.W. Third Street Penthouse One Miami, Florida 33128 EFTA00093045 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page3 of 31 Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell's Motion for Pretrial Release Ghislaine Maxwell has a Constitutional right to be able to prepare effectively for trial. The conditions of her pretrial detention deprive her of that right. For over 280 days, she has been held in the equivalent of solitary confinement, in deteriorating health and mental condition from lack of sleep because she is intentionally awakened every 15 minutes by lights shined directly into her small cell, inadequate food, the constant glare of neon light, and intrusive searches, including having hands forced into her mouth in a squalid facility where COVID has run rampant. The medical literature is unanimous that such conditions produce mental deterioration, which prevents her from effective participation in trial preparation. Worse, even if Ms. Maxwell were able to be fully alert and mentally acute, she must review over 2,500,000 prosecution pages on a gutted computer, which does not have the ability to search, edit, or print. Because of the pandemic, in-person lawyer visits are risky, so Ms. Maxwell sees her trial lawyers over a video screen, where she can review one page of the discovery at a time that is projected on a wall three feet away. EFTA00093046 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page4 of 31 These conditions would support a complaint for cruel and unusual punishment for a convicted felon. Ms. Maxwell is not one. She is innocent unless and until she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — an event which is highly unlikely given the lack of evidence against her. Despite the district court's exhortations regarding the strength of the evidence against Ms. Maxwell, the truth is that the government's so-called "evidence," though voluminous, is palpably weak. It consists of anonymous, untested hearsay accusations about events that are alleged to have occurred decades ago, accusations which only surfaced when the government faced public outrage over the inexplicable death of Jeffrey Epstein, while in their custody. The "Epstein Effect" clouded the judgment of the prosecutors into charging Ms. Maxwell because it needed a scapegoat, the Bureau of Prisons into putting Ms. Maxwell on suicide watch because Epstein died on their watch, the media into an absolute frenzy, and many other fair- minded people into viewing Ms. Maxwell as guilty even though no evidence has been presented against her. 2 EFTA00093047 Case 21-770, Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page5 of 31 Notwithstanding the cries of the mob, Ms. Maxwell is presumed innocent and is entitled to defend herself. Accordingly, Ms. Maxwell moves this Court for her immediate release. Fed. R. App. P. 9; 18 U.S.C. §§3142 and 3145. * * * 3 EFTA00093048 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page6 of 31 ISSUES PRESENTED 1. Whether Ms. Maxwell can effectively prepare her defense where she is being subjected to horrific conditions of detention during a global pandemic, including: • not being able to regularly see her lawyers in person to prepare for trial; • being kept awake all night to make sure she does not commit suicide even though nothing suggests she is a suicide risk; • having her every movement videotaped on multiple cameras focused on her every move; • being stuck in de facto solitary confinement without safe, in person visitation; • being forced to review millions of pages of documents on a stripped down computer without adequate hardware or software such that Ms. Maxwell cannot open tens of thousands of pages of discovery and for those she can open, only has the ability to review them one page at a time and cannot search, edit, copy, or print; • having no writing surface in her solitary cell; and • not consistently provided edible food or drinkable water. 2. Whether the trial court erred by relying on the government's proffer — which was comprised of nothing but extremely old, anonymous, unconfronted, hearsay accusations — to refuse to set reasonable bail. 4 EFTA00093049 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page7 of 31 FACTS Ghislaine Maxwell is a 59-year-old, law-abiding United States citizen with no criminal history. In July 2020, she was living peacefully in her New Hampshire home and was in contact, through her attorneys, with the U.S. Attorney's office in the Southern District New York, which had opened an investigation into her only after the death of Jeffrey Epstein. Instead of asking her to surrender, that office had her arrested by a SWAT team and other unnecessary but intentionally showy tactics. That same day, the acting U.S. Attorney held a press conference with large charts, pausing for pictures for the media,' before Ms. Maxwell had even appeared in the Southern District of New York. Since her arrest, Ms. Maxwell has faced nightmarish conditions. See, e.g., Ex.M. Though she is a model prisoner who poses no danger to society and has done literally nothing to prompt "special" treatment, she is kept in isolation — conditions fitting for Hannibal Lecter but not a 59-year old woman who poses no threat to anyone. She is subjected to multiple invasive searches every day. Her every movement is captured on multiple video cameras. She is deprived of any real sleep by having a 1 The press conference is available online at https://tinyurl.com/bku2av7t EFTA00093050 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page8 of 31 flashlight pointed into her cell every 15 minutes. For months, her food was microwaved with a plastic covering, which rendered it inedible after the plastic melted into the food.2 The water is often cloudy and is not drinkable. Because of the pandemic, it is not safe to meet with her lawyers in person, so she cannot adequately prepare for trial. She is on suicide watch for no reason. She continues to lose weight, her hair, and her ability to concentrate. It is obvious that the BOP is subjecting Ms. Maxwell to this behavior because of the death of Epstein (and subsequent fallout). But how is this permissible? Since when are the conditions for one inmate dictated by the fate of another? Perhaps never in the history of the U.S. Justice System has the public relations imperatives of the government permitted such wildly inappropriate and unconstitutional treatment of an innocent human being. It is impossible for Ms. Maxwell to participate effectively in the preparation of her defense under these conditions. The charges related to three of the anonymous accusers in the operative indictment are 25 years old, alleging actions from 1994-1997, 2 The prison has now promised to heat the food properly. 6 EFTA00093051 Case 21-770, Document 17-1. 04/01/2021. 3068296. Page9 of 31 while the just added accuser involves allegations from 2001-04.3 That the indictment exists at all is a function — solely — of the untimely death of Jeffrey Epstein and the media frenzy that followed. The indictment against Ms. Maxwell was brought only in the search for a scapegoat after the same U.S. Attorney's Office had to dismiss its case against Epstein because of his death at MCC. If there truly was any case against Ms. Maxwell, she would have been charged with Epstein in the SDNY in 2019. But she was not. She also was not charged — or even named — in the 2008 Epstein case in Florida. She would never be facing charges now if Epstein were alive. Although there have been a number of orders related to bond in this case, the district court held only one detention hearing. At that hearing the government stated that Ms. Maxwell was a flight risk and that its case was strong. But it did not proffer any actual evidence in support of its contention, or the district court's conclusion, that the weight of the evidence against Maxwell was strong. Ex.A. Instead, it pointed again and again only to the fact that the grand jury returned an 3 The government superceded the indictment on March 29, just months before the July trial, adding two counts involving a fourth anonymous accuser. 7 EFTA00093052 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Pagel 0 of 31 indictment (which is, of course, true in every criminal case) and to the nature of the charges in the abstract. The district court bought into the government's conclusory allegations, stating without support that: "Mindful of the presumption of innocence, the Court remains of the view that in light of the proffered strength and nature of the Government's case, the weight of the evidence supports detention." (emphasis added). The court fundamentally erred in relying on the government's empty assertions that its case is strong. There was no principled way for the court to reach such a conclusion without hearing any evidence and without knowing anything at all about the allegations, especially here where the case is so old and based on anonymous hearsay which the defense has never been able to confront. The government did not even proffer that these anonymous accusers even made their claims under oath. Prosecutors refuse to disclose their names, their statements, the specifics of their allegations, or anything about them. This case is anything but strong. Ms. Maxwell should be granted bail or, at the very least, the case should be remanded for an 8 EFTA00093053 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Pagel 1 of 31 evidentiary hearing to test whether the government's case even marginally supports detention. PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. The arrest and bail applications Ghislaine Maxwell was arrested on July 2, 2020 and since that date has been detained in jaw-droppingly appalling conditions. The government claims that Ms. Maxwell was Jeffrey Epstein's "associate" and helped him "groom" minors for sex back in the 1990s and early 2000s. Doc. 187. The indictment does not name these accusers and the government has refused to disclose their names or the specific dates that Ms. Maxwell supposedly did anything criminal. After her arrest, the government moved for detention. Ex.A. The defense responded. Ex.B. And the government replied. Ex.C. The trial judge held the arraignment and bond hearing over Zoom. Ex.D. The government did not call any of the accusers in the indictment or present any witnesses related to flight, danger, or the strength of its case. The government conceded that it was not asking for detention based on danger to the community. The court ordered Ms. Maxwell detained at the conclusion of the hearing. Ex.D. 9 EFTA00093054 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page12 of 31 The court said it was detaining Ms. Maxwell, in part, because the government proffered that its "witness testimony will be corroborated by significant contemporaneous documentary evidence." Ex.D at 82. The court also pointed to Ms. Maxwell's lack of "significant family ties" in the United States, her unclear financial picture, the "circumstances of her arrest," and that although she is a U.S. citizen, she is also a citizen of France and Britain. Id. at 82-87. Ms. Maxwell filed a second motion for bail and addressed each of these concerns. Ex.E. For starters, the defense explained that none of anonymous accusers' testimony of abuse was corroborated and that it all related to Epstein, not Ms. Maxwell. In addition, Ms. Maxwell does have significant ties to the United States, her assets were thoroughly disclosed and vetted, and she is willing to waive extradition. The government responded. Ex.F. The defense replied. Ex.G. The judge again denied bail, relying, for the second time, on the "strong" evidence, even though nQ evidence was presented to the court to rely on.4 Ms. Maxwell filed a third motion for bail. Ex.I. In this application, she offered to renounce her foreign citizenship and also to have her 4 Ms. Maxwell filed a notice of appeal from this Order, which is docketed in Case No. 21-58. 10 EFTA00093055 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page13 of 31 assets controlled and monitored by a former federal judge and former U.S. Attorney. She also cited the 12 pretrial motions she filed. "Without prejudicing the merits of any of those pending motions," the judge again denied Ms. Maxwell's motion for bail, relying in part on the "proffered strength and nature of the Government's case," even though, again, no evidence was actually submitted to or reviewed by the trial court. This appeal follows. In each of her bail requests and in separate pleadings, Ms. Maxwell has documented the Kafkaesque conditions that she is forced to endure. See, e.g., Ex.M. B. The pretrial motions Ms. Maxwell filed 12 substantial pretrial motions. Docs. 119-26; 133-48. These include motions to dismiss for violation of the statute of limitations (Does. 143-44) and for pre-indictment delay (Docs. 137-38) because the conduct is so old. And to dismiss because the government violated the non-prosecution agreement it reached with Epstein that protected any alleged co-conspirator from prosecution. Docs 141-42. The government needed 212 pages to respond to these motions. These 11 EFTA00093056 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page14 of 31 motions are pending and raise significant legal bars to the prosecution of this matter. C. The proposed bail package Ghislaine Maxwell has proposed a significant, compelling, and unprecedented bail package, which gives up or puts at risk everything that she has — her British and French citizenship, all of her and her spouse's assets ($22.5 million),5 her family's livelihood, and the financial security of her closest friends and family (totaling $5 million). A security company, which will monitor and secure Ms. Maxwell at her home, will also post an unprecedented $1 million bond. Ex.E, I. Ms. Maxwell looks forward to confronting the accusers and clearing her name. She has no intention of fleeing and will be unable to do so if released on bond. This bail package demonstrates these facts in a real way, unlike the government's claims that the evidence against her is strong. Even though a guarantee of appearance is not necessary, the bail package in this case is as close to a guarantee as one can get. There is no legally permissible basis to deny bail. 5 Her spouse would retain $400,000 for living and other expenses. 12 EFTA00093057 Case 21-770, Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page15 of 31 STANDARD OF REVIEW The question of whether a bail package will reasonably assure the defendant's presence is a mixed question of law and fact. United States u. Horton, 653 F. App'x 46, 47 (2d Cir. 2016). This Court reviews the district court's purely factual findings for clear error. Id. However, the district court's ultimate finding "may be subject to plenary review if it rests on a predicate finding which reflects a misperception of a legal rule applicable to the particular factor involved." Id. at 319-20 (quoting United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1987)). That is, "even if the court's finding of a historical fact relevant to that factor is not clearly erroneous, [the appellate court] may reverse if the court evinces a misunderstanding of the legal significance of that historical fact and if that misunderstanding infects the court's ultimate finding." Shakur, 817 F.2d at 197. MEMORANDUM OF LAW I. Ghislaine Maxwell should be released under §3142(i) because she cannot effectively prepare her defense under the horrific conditions she is facing. Trying to defend against exceedingly old, anonymous allegations is hard enough. Doing so while in de facto solitary confinement without 13 EFTA00093058 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page16 of 31 the real ability to meet with your lawyers face-to-face while being kept up all night and being given inedible food makes it virtually impossible, and violates Ms. Maxwell's constitutional rights. Section 3142(i) makes clear that defendants must have the ability to consult with counsel and effectively prepare for their defense. If this is not possible in custody, release is required. United States v. Chandler, 1:19-CR-867 (PAC), 2020 WL 1528120, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) (extraordinary burdens imposed by the coronavirus pandemic, in conjunction with detainee's right to prepare for his defense, constituted compelling reason to order temporary release from Metropolitan Correction Center). The COVID epidemic is still raging and conditions at MDC are unsafe.6 Ms. Maxwell's continued detention would be wrong at any point in this nation's history, even when stealing a loaf of bread was a felony. It is especially unwarranted now. "The hazards of a pandemic are immediate and dire, and still the rights of criminal defendants who are 6 Just for example, the air is not properly filtered in the small, enclosed attorney visit rooms at MDC and has been described as "a death trap" for lawyers and inmates. Ex.K, n.8. Even though the prison is technically open for legal visits, lawyers are understandably not willing to walk into a viral petri dish. 14 EFTA00093059 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page17 of 31 subject to the weight of federal power are always a special concern of the judiciary." Chandler, 2020 WL 1528120, at *2; United States v. Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d 65-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that "the obstacles the current public health crisis poses to the preparation of the Defendant's defense constitute a compelling reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)"); United States v. Weigand, 20-CR-188-1 (JSR), 2020 WL 5887602, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2020) (holding that a wealthy defendant, who the government claimed was a flight risk, would be allowed to obtain his release pending trial during the coronavirus pandemic). "The right to consult with legal counsel about being released on bond, entering a plea, negotiating and accepting a plea agreement, going to trial, testifying at trial, locating trial witnesses, and other decisions confronting the detained suspect, whose innocence is presumed, is a right inextricably linked to the legitimacy of our criminal justice system." Fed. Defs. of N.Y. v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 954 F.3d 118, 134 (2d Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) ("In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception."). 15 EFTA00093060 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page18 of 31 In United States v. Clark, 448 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1155 (D. Kan. 2020), the court emphasized that "[m]ost courts addressing a motion for temporary release under §3142(i) have done so in the context of evaluating the necessity of the defendant assisting with preparing his or her defense ... This extends to the current COVID-19 pandemic [because of] the pandemic's impact on counsel's difficulties communicating with the defendant." See, e.g., Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 65-67 (finding "the obstacles the current public health crisis poses to the preparation of the Defendant's defense constitute a compelling reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)"); United States v. Robertson, 17-Cr- 2949, Doc. 306 (D.N.M. February 6, 2021).7 The defendant in Robertson was charged with "frightening allegations" involving a shooting. He had previously violated bond. And he had a criminal record involving guns and drugs. But the court ordered him released because of his inability to prepare for trial while in custody during the pandemic: Mr. Robertson's release is necessary for the preparation of his trial defense under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). That section allows a judicial 7 The 10th Circuit has stayed the Robertson order while it considers the government's appeal. 16 EFTA00093061 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page19 of 31 officer who issued an order of detention to, by subsequent order, "permit the temporary release of the person ... to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be necessary for preparation of the person's defense or for another compelling reason." § 3142(i). The presumption of innocence should not be paid mere lip service, the court held, and being held without the ability to see counsel face-to-face was "no way to prepare for trial." Ms. Maxwell presents a more compelling case than Robertson for temporary release under § 3142(i). Courts considering whether pretrial release is necessary have considered: "(1) [the] time and opportunity the defendant has to prepare for the trial and to participate in his defense; (2) the complexity of the case and volume of information; and (3) expense and inconvenience associated with preparing while incarcerated." Robertson, (citing United States v. Boatwright, 2020 WL 1639855, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 2, 2020) (unreported) (citations omitted). Trial is set for July. There is precious little time left to prepare and participate in that preparation. The discovery involves millions of pages of documents. Ms. Maxwell cannot conduct searches of these documents; she cannot print them and spread them out on a desk for review; she cannot make notes on the documents; and she cannot move 17 EFTA00093062 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page20 of 31 the files around into a different order. She is stuck looking at one page at a time over a screen three feet away without a lawyer in the same room. These are textbook untenable conditions. Stephens, 447 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (explaining the importance of legal visits and ordering bail during pandemic); Weigand, 2020 WL 5887602, at *2 (ordering bail during pandemic because defendant needed ability to review the discovery in complex, document-heavy case). This is no way to prepare for a trial where the government will be asking for a sentence that will imprison her for the rest of her life. Ex.A This Court has recognized that, after a relatively short time, pretrial detention turns into prohibited, unconstitutional punishment. United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1987) ("grave due process concerns" are implicated by a seven-month period of pretrial detention); United States v. Melendez-Carrions, 790 F.2d 984, 1008 (2d Cir. 1986) (Feinberg, J. concurring) ("[G]eneral requirements of due process compel us to draw the line [of permissible pretrial detention] well short of Q eight months."). Under the current conditions, it can hardly be disputed that Ms. Maxwell is being punished, which in itself 18 EFTA00093063 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page21 of 31 requires relief. Add to that the barriers she is facing to preparing her defense and this Court should order her release under 3142(i). II. The trial court erred in relying on the government's proffer—which comprised nothing but old, anonymous, unconfronted, hearsay accusations—to refuse to set reasonable bail for Ghislaine Maxwell. The government stressed the strength of its case in seeking detention, highlighting the "strength of the Government's evidence" on page 1 of its application for detention. Ex.A. For support, the government made the circular argument that the evidence is strong because of "the facts set forth in the Indictment." Id. at 5. It made the same argument in the reply. Ex.0 at 4 (arguing the case is strong because "the superseding indictment makes plain" the allegations against Ms. Maxwell). Of course, the Indictment is not evidence. See United States v. Giampino, 680 F.2d 898, 901 n. 3 (2d. Cir. 1982). Every circuit with published pattern instructions inform juries that they are not to consider the indictment as evidence. See, e.g., Third Circuit ("An indictment is simply a description of the charge(s) against a defendant. It is an accusation only. An indictment is not evidence of anything, and you should not give any weight to the fact that (name) has been indicted 19 EFTA00093064 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page22 of 31 in making your decision in this case); Fifth Circuit: ("The indictment ... is only an accusation, nothing more. It is not proof of guilt or anything else. The defendant therefore starts out with a clean slate."); Sixth Circuit: ("The indictment ... does not even raise any suspicion of guilt."). The government did not provide one single document to the court to back up its claims that the accusers' allegations about events from 1994-97 were truthful. The government has refused to disclose even the names of these accusers. Contrary to its assertions to the lower court, its allegations are not corroborated. Ex.E at 30-33 ("[T]he discovery contains not a single contemporaneous email, text message, phone record, diary entry, police report, or recording that implicates Ms. Maxwell in the 1994-1997 conduct underlying the conspiracy charged in the indictment."). The government only made these allegations after Epstein's inexplicable death at MCC. Ms. Maxwell was not named in Epstein's indictment as a defendant or a co-conspirator. She was charged as a substitute for Epstein. Reverse engineering a charge many years later because of the main target's death is not the makings of a strong case. 20 EFTA00093065 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page23 of 31 Recognizing this weakness, the Government relies on the statutory maximum penalty to argue that the case is serious and that Ms. Maxwell poses a risk of flight. But the statutory maximum is hardly relevant to determine risk of flight. In the vast majority of federal cases, the statutory maximum penalties are sky-high and are not reflective of the real potential penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1658(b) (statutory maximum of life imprisonment for turning off a light in a lighthouse to expose a ship to danger). Even if there were evidence to back up the four anonymous accusers, the Second Circuit "require[s] more than evidence of the commission of a serious crime and the fact of a potential long sentence to support a finding of risk of flight." United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d. Cir. 1988) (district court's finding that defendant posed a risk of flight was clearly erroneous, despite potential for "long sentence of incarceration"); Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 65, 76-77 (reversing detention order where defendants agreed to significant physical and financial restrictions, despite the fact that they faced a "lengthy term of incarceration"). 21 EFTA00093066 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page24 of 31 This is why defendants charged under the same statute in the Southern District of New York are regularly granted bond. United States v. Hussain, 18-mj-08262-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2018) (defendant charged with 18 U.S.C. 2422 violations granted $100,000 personal recognizance bond with home detention, electronic monitoring, and other conditions); United States v. Buser, 17-mj-07599-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2017) (defendant charged with 18 U.S.C. 2422 and 2423 violations granted $100,000 personal recognizance bond, secured by $10,000 cash, with electronic monitoring and other conditions); United States v. Acosta, 16-mj-08569-UA (S.D.N.Y Mar. 29, 2016) (denying the Government's detention application after argument and granting defendant charged with 18 U.S.C. 2422 violations $100,000 personal recognizance bond with home detention, electronic monitoring, and other conditions); United States v. McFadden, 17-mj-04708-UA (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017) (defendant charged with 18 U.S.C. 2422 and 2423 violations granted $250,000 personal recognizance bond, secured by property, with home detention, electronic monitoring and other conditions). 22 EFTA00093067 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page25 of 31 The government shotguns manufactured assertions in support of the supposed flight risk. First, the ridiculous contention that she was hiding before her arrest. In fact, she was living in, and arrested in, her own home in New Hampshire. She was in touch with her lawyers and as the government has to concede, her lawyers were communicating with the government. Ex.D at 27. Despite plenty of opportunities, she had not left the United States since Epstein's arrest, and had been living in the United States for 30 years. She became a U.S. citizen. She lived and worked here for 30 years. The government knew exactly where she was. (FBI New York Assistant Director William Sweeney Jr.: "We'd been discretely keeping tabs on Maxwell's whereabouts as we worked this investigation.") The fact that she was holed up in her home because she was being relentlessly harassed by the media is not evidence of hiding from the government. In fact, one sensational tabloid put a £10,000 bounty on her. "Wanted: The Sun is offering a £10,000 reward for information on Ghislaine Maxwell," The Sun, November 20, 2019, available at: https://tinyurl.com/3vewtnx3. Anyone facing these unprecedented safety concerns from the media mob would try to keep a low profile. But a low 23 EFTA00093068 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page26 of 31 profile is not flight. Ms. Maxwell could have left the United States had she wanted to flee. She did not want to do that and she did not do that. Instead, she chose to stay here and fight the bogus charges against her. This factor weighs heavily in favor of bond. The government's next argument is that she has foreign ties and significant assets. But Ms. Maxwell addressed those concerns by renouncing her British and French citizenship and by agreeing to have her and her spouse's assets (other than basic living expenses and legal fees) placed in a new account that will be monitored by a retired federal district judge and former U.S. Attorney who will have authority over them. Ex.I. Even someone with the government's imagination can't conjure up anything else Ms. Maxwell could do to show that she is serious about staying here to fight the allegations against her. She will agree to whatever condition the court orders and she will take the extraordinary step of renouncing her foreign citizenship. The government cannot explain how Ms. Maxwell could flee. She will have no assets (other than living expenses). She will have no country that will protect her. Her family and friends will be at risk. She will be heavily and 24 EFTA00093069 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page27 of 31 constantly monitored. And of course, she is recognizable around the globe. The truth is that wealthy men charged with similar or more serious offenses, many of whom have foreign ties, are routinely granted bail so that they can effectively prepare for trial. Bernie Madoff. Harvey Weinstein. Bill Cosby. John Gotti. Marc Dreier. Dominique Strauss- Kahn. Ali Sadr. Adnan Khashoggi. Mahender Sabhnani. The list goes on and on. In each case, the court set reasonable conditions of bond and the defendants appeared, despite similar arguments by the government that the defendant faced serious charges or that the evidence was strong or that he had foreign ties or that he had great wealth. Ms. Maxwell is entitled to the same opportunity as male defendants to prepare her defense. Even putting aside the pandemic and the current conditions of Ms. Maxwell's confinement, pretrial detention "is an extraordinary remedy" that should be reserved for only a very "limited group of offenders." United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1987). For this reason, a judge may deny a defendant bail "only for the strongest of reasons." Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1329 (1978) (Brennan, 25 EFTA00093070 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page28 of 31 J.). The Constitution's "prohibitions on the deprivation of liberty without due process and of excessive bail require careful review of pretrial detention orders to ensure that the statutory mandate [of the Bail Reform Act] has been respected." United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.). Because the consequence of error — the unjust deprivation of liberty from an individual who is presumed innocent — is contrary to our Constitution, "doubts regarding the propriety of release should be resolved in favor of the defendant." Id. Even where the government is able to prove that an accused is an actual flight risk, pretrial detention generally remains inappropriate. United States v. Berrios-Berrios, 791 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1986) ("the presumption in favor of bail still applies where the defendant is found to be a risk of flight") (emphasis added). Where the only question is whether the defendant is a risk of flight, "the law still favors pre-trial release subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination of conditions, that the court determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required." Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75. 26 EFTA00093071 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296. Page29 of 31 The Supreme Court has explained that when "the Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal, and no more." The government simply has not come close to satisfying its heavy burden of proving that "no conditions" exist that will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's presence. It has not articulated with any evidence, let alone specific and credible evidence, how Ms. Maxwell could manage to flee under the proposed bail conditions. Speculation is not permitted. United States v. Bodmer, No. 03-cr-947(SAS), 2004 WL 169790 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2004) (where government's argument that no conditions could assure defendant's future presence was based, "in large part, on speculation," defendant was released to home confinement with GPS monitoring). We challenge the government to point to a high profile defendant who in the recent past has 1) fled and 2) gotten away with it. The reality is that defendants with far greater likelihood of conviction than Ms. Maxwell are granted bond and appear in court. Ms. Maxwell should not be treated differently. 27 EFTA00093072 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page30 of 31 CONCLUSION Ms. Maxwell faces old, anonymous accusations that have never been tested. In any other case, she would have been released long ago. But because of the "Epstein effect," she is being detained and in truly unacceptable conditions. All we are asking for is a chance to defend the case. We respectfully request that Ms. Maxwell be released on reasonable conditions of bail or that the case be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Respectfully submitted, MARKUS/MOSS PLLC 40 N.W. Third Street Penthouse One markuslaw.com By: /s/ David Oscar Markus DAVID OSCAR MARKUS Florida Bar Number 119318 28 EFTA00093073 Case 21-770. Document 17-1, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page31 of 31 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I CERTIFY that this petition complies with the type-volume limitation of FED. R. APP. P. 27. According to Microsoft Word, the numbered pages of this petition contains 5,185 words, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(d)(2). This petition complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 27 because it has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Century Schoolbook 14-point font. /s/ David Oscar Markus David Oscar Markus CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e- filed this Pt day of April, 2021. /s/ David Oscar Markus David Oscar Markus 29 EFTA00093074 Case 21-770. Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Pagel of 351 No. 21-770 & 21-58 In the uiteD £itateg Court of ppeals for the Omit (Circuit UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, (20-CR-330 (MN) Appellant Ghislaine Maxwell's Appendix to the Motion for Pretrial Release David Oscar Markus MARKUS/MOSS PLLC 40 N.W. Third Street Penthouse One Miami, Florida 33128 Tel: (305) 379-6667 markuslaw.com EFTA00093075 Case 21-770. Document 17-2. 04'01'2021, 3068296, Paget of 351 Appendix Doc. 4 The Government's Memorandum in Support of Detention A Doc. 18 Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell In Opposition to the Government's Motion for Detention Doc. 22 The Government's Reply Memorandum in Support of Detention Transcript from Bail Hearing July 14, 2020 Doc. 97 Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Renewed Motion for Bail Doc. 100 The Government's Memorandum in Support to the Defendant's Renewed Motion for Release F' Doc. 103 Reply Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Renewed Motion for Bail Doc. 106 Opinion & Order Doc. 160 Memorandum in Support of Ghislaine Maxwell's Third Motion for Release on Bail Doc. 165 The Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Third Motion for Release on Bail Doc. 171 Reply Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell in Support of Her Third Motion for Bail Doc. 169 Order Doc. 159 Ghislaine Maxwell's Letter Regarding MDC Conditions EFTA00093076 Case 21-770. Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page3 of 351 Doc. 306 United States v. Dashawn Robertson, Case Number 17-cr-02949-MV1, District of New Mexico Memorandum Opinion and Order Respectfully submitted, MARKUS/MOSS PLLC 40 N.W. Third Street Penthouse One markuslaw.com By: /s/ David Oscar Markus DAVID OSCAR MARKUS Florida Bar Number 119318 dmarkus@markuslaw.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was e-filed this 1st day of April, 2021. /s/ David Oscar Markus David Oscar Markus 2 EFTA00093077 Case 21-770. Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page4 of 351 Exhibit A Doe. 4 The Government's Memorandum in Support of Detention EFTA00093078 CG93€1.20-Z7f0CC30040Thlit 131361IPWM5t142Ceiled$0619223120Paifieof b$10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 Cr. 330 (AIN) GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DETENTION Acting United States Attorney Southern District of New York Attorney for the United States of America Assistant United States Attorneys - Of Counsel - EFTA00093079 CGas 20-Z7LiDC30040Thit DINEU 04360 42 012de OCriint2OP aifjeo2 ad. 1O UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 Cr. 330 (AIN) GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. x THE GOVERNMENT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DETENTION For the reasons set forth herein, the Government respectfully submits that Ghislaine Maxwell, the defendant, poses an extreme risk of flight; that she will not be able to rebut the statutory presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3XE); and that the Court should therefore order her detained. The charges in this case are unquestionably serious: the Indictment alleges that Ghislaine Maxwell, in partnership with Jeffrey Epstein, a serial sexual predator, exploited and abused young girls for years. As a result of her disturbing and callous conduct, Maxwell now faces the very real prospect of serving many years in prison. The strength of the Government's evidence and the substantial prison term the defendant would face upon conviction all create a strong incentive for the defendant to flee. That risk is only amplified by the defendant's extensive international ties, her citizenship in two foreign countries, her wealth, and her lack of meaningful ties to the United States. In short, Maxwell has three passports, large sums of money, extensive international connections, and absolutely no reason to stay in the United States and face the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence. 1 EFTA00093080 cGge 20-teriDdacciaatin t Otb)St142Ceiledin al° e OP al:feat ?a$ 10 BACKGROUND On June 29, 2020, a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned a sealed indictment (the "Indictment") charging the defendant with one count of conspiracy to entice minors to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of enticing a minor to travel to engage in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422 and 2; one count of conspiracy to transport minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; one count of transporting minors to participate in illegal sex acts, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and 2; and two counts of perjury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The charges arise from a scheme to sexually abuse underage girls at Epstein's properties in New York, Florida, and New Mexico, between approximately 1994 and 1997. During that time, Maxwell had a personal and professional relationship with Epstein and was one of his closest associates. Beginning in at least 1994, the defendant enticed and groomed multiple minor girls to engage in sex acts with Epstein, through a variety of means and methods. In particular, she played a key role in Epstein's abuse of minors by helping Epstein to identify, groom, and ultimately abuse underage girls. As a part of their scheme, the defendant and Epstein enticed and caused minor victims to travel to Epstein's residences in different states, which the defendant knew and intended would result in their grooming for and subjection to sexual abuse. As the Indictment details, the defendant enticed and groomed minor girls to be abused in multiple ways. For example, she attempted to befriend certain victims by asking them about their lives, taking them to the movies or on shopping trips, and encouraging their interactions with Epstein. She put victims at ease by providing the assurance and comfort of an adult woman who seemingly approved of Epstein's behavior. Additionally, to make victims feel indebted to Epstein, 2 EFTA00093081 CCiges 2D-Z7411CC300401341 t Obeli iWit142CeiledO51292.0Peajtc4 44 10 the defendant would encourage victims to accept Epstein's offers of financial assistance, including offers to pay for travel or educational expenses. The victims were as young as 14 years old when they were groomed and abused by Maxwell and Epstein, both of whom knew that their victims were minors. The Indictment further alleges that the defendant lied under oath to conceal her crimes. In 2016, the defendant gave deposition testimony in connection with a civil lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. During the deposition, the defendant was asked questions about her role in facilitating the abuse of minors. The defendant repeatedly lied under oath when questioned about her conduct with minor girls. ARGUMENT I. Applicable Law Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq.. federal courts are empowered to order a defendant's detention pending trial upon a determination that the defendant is either a danger to the community or a risk of night. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). A finding of risk of flight must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789, 793 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Jackson, 823 F.2d 4, 5 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Chimurenga, 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). A finding of dangerousness must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ferranti, 66 F.3d MO, 542 (2d Cir. 1995); Patriarca, 948 F.2d at 792; Chimurenga, 760 F.2d at 405. The Bail Reform Act lists four factors to be considered in the detention analysis: (I) the nature and circumstances of the crimes charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant, including the person's "character . . . Land] financial resources"; and (4) the seriousness of the danger posed by the defendant's release. See 3 EFTA00093082 Cdssei.Z11-Z7(06100dMtint tittkur9tf3t5tt4202i1effl a`4 e OP aS a5510 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Evidentiary rules do not apply at detention hearings, and the Government is entitled to present evidence by way of proffer, among other means. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); see also United States v. LaFontaine, 210 F.3d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2000) (Government entitled to proceed by proffer in detention hearings). Where a judicial officer concludes after a hearing that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX1). Additionally, where, as here, a defendant is charged with committing an offense involving a minor victim under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 or 2423, it shall be presumed, subject to rebuttal, that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required and the safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(eX3)(E). II. Discussion For the reasons set forth below, the defendant presents an extreme risk of flight, and therefore she cannot overcome the statutory presumption in favor of detention in this case. Every one of the relevant factors to be considered as to flight risk — the nature and circumstances of the offense, the strength of the evidence, and the history and characteristics of the defendant — counsel strongly in favor of detention. A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense and the Strength of the Evidence The "nature and circumstances" of this offense favor detention. As the Indictment alleges, the defendant committed serious crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(gX1) (specifically enumerating "whether the offense. . . involves a minor victim" as a factor in bail applications). Indeed, the crimes of enticing and transporting minors for illegal sex 4 EFTA00093083 i:lcsee12207di000430i4A0i* 113theriteitaRallear6atee2farfaba et MO acts are so serious that both crimes carry a statutory presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (e)(3XE). The defendant repeatedly engaged in this conduct, targeting girls as young as 14 years old, for a period of years, and involving multiple minors. These offenses carry significant penalties, and the defendant faces up to 35 years' imprisonment if convicted. The possibility of a substantial sentence is a significant factor in assessing the risk of flight. See United States v. Moscaritolo, No. 10 Cr. 4 (JL), 2010 WL 309679, at •2 (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 2010) ("IT Jhe steeper the potential sentence, the more probable the flight risk is, especially considering the strong case of the government.. .") (quoting United States v. Alindato-Pere:, 627 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66 (D.P.R. 2009)). Here, the defendant is facing a statutory maximum of decades in prison. This fact alone would provide a compelling incentive for anyone to flee from prosecution, but the incentive to flee is especially strong for this defendant, who, at age 58, faces the very real prospect of spending a substantial portion of the rest of her life in prison. The strength of the evidence in this case underscores the risk that the defendant will become a fugitive. As the facts set forth in the Indictment make plain, the evidence in this case is strong. Multiple victims have provided detailed, credible, and corroborated information against the defendant. The victims are backed up contemporaneous documents, records, witness testimony, and other evidence. For example, flight records, diary entries, business records, and other evidence corroborate the victims' account of events. This will be compelling evidence of guilt at any trial in this case, which weighs heavily in favor of detention. The passage of time between the defendant's conduct and these charges does not counsel otherwise. M an initial matter, all of the conduct is timely charged, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3283, which was amended in 2003 to extend the limitations period for conduct that was timely as of the 5 EFTA00093084 Clexie122076006aaegAONt 1136thMefitithf OalleZICM2f2(FaRabb Ciff 6E110 date of the amendment,' to permit a prosecution at any point during the lifetime of the minor victim. See United States v. Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006) (fmding that because Congress extended the statute of limitations for sex offenses involving minors during the time the previous statute was still running, the extension was permissible); United States v. Pierre-Louis, No. 16 Cr. 541 (CM), 2018 WL 4043140, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2018) (same). Moreover, while the conduct alleged in the Indictment may have occurred years ago, the risk of a significant term of incarceration — and thus the motive to flee — is of course only very recent. Each of these factors — the seriousness of the allegations, the strength of the evidence, and the possibility of lengthy incarceration — creates an extraordinary incentive to flee. And as further described below, the defendant has the means and money to do so. B. The Characteristics of the Defendant The history and characteristics of the defendant also strongly support detention. As an initial matter, the defendant's extensive international ties would make it exceptionally easy for her to flee and live abroad. The defendant was born in France and raised in the United Kingdom, where she attended school. Although she became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 2002, she also remains a citizen of the United Kingdom and France. Travel records from United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") reflect that she has engaged in frequent international travel, including at least fifteen international flights in the last three years to locations including the United Kingdom, Japan, and Qatar. In addition, CBP records reflect that, consistent with her citizenship status, the defendant appears to possess passports from the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Prior to the amendment, the statute of limitations for sexual offenses involving minors ran until the victim reached the age of 25, and as such, all of the relevant charges in the Indictment remained timely as of the 2003 amendment described above. 6 EFTA00093085 cliesse1220700C4MAGNt 10eittiekeit/40111eaDIMMI'affebe d5310 In addition, the defendant appears to have access to significant financial resources that would enable her flight from prosecution. Based on the Government's investigation to date. the Government has identified more than 15 different bank accounts held by or associated with the defendant from 2016 to the present, and during that same period, the total balances of those accounts have ranged from a total of hundreds of thousands of dollars to more titan S20 million. During the same period, the defendant engaged in transfers between her accounts of hundreds of thousands of dollars at a time, including at least several such significant transfers as recently as 2019. For example. the defendant transferred $500,000 from one of her accounts to another in March 2019, and transferred more than $300,000 from one of her accounts to another in July 2019. She has also reported, including as recently as 2019, that she holds one or more foreign bank accounts containing more than a million dollars. The defendant also appears to have reaped substantial income from a 2016 property sale. In particular, in 2016, the defendant appears to have sold a New York City residence for S15 million through a limited liability company. On or about the date of the sale, amounts totaling more than S14 million were then deposited into an account for which the defendant was listed as the owner. Several days later. more than S14 million was transferred from that account into another account opened in the name of the defendant.' In short. the defendant's financial resources appear to be substantial, and her numerous accounts and substantial money movements render her total financial picture opaque and indeterminate, even upon a review of bank records available to the Government. 2 The Government additionally notes that, somewhat further back in time, in transactions occurring between 2007 and 2011, approximately more than S20 million was transferred from accounts associated with Jeffrey Epstein to accounts associated with the defendant, including amounts in the millions of dollars that were then subsequently transferred back to accounts associated with Epstein. 7 EFTA00093086 Clesee12207600641304AONt libekiftf4t0it OrlleaC67982f2(Fafrabe Of a5J10 The defendant's international connections and significant financial means would present a clear risk of flight under normal circumstances, but in this case, the risk of flight is exacerbated by the transient nature of defendant's current lifestyle. In particular, the defendant has effectively been in hiding for approximately a year, since an indictment against Epstein was unsealed in July 2019. Thereafter, the defendant — who had previously made many public appearances — stopped appearing in public entirely, instead hiding out in locations in New England. Moreover, it appears that she made intentional efforts to avoid detection, including moving locations at least twice, switching her primary phone number (which she registered under the name "G Max") and email address, and ordering packages for delivery with a different person listed on the shipping label. Most recently, the defendant appears to have been hiding on a 156-acre property acquired in an all-cash purchase in December 2019 (through a carefully anonymized LLC) in Bradford, New Hampshire, an area to which she has no other known connections. The defendant appears to have no ties that would motivate her to remain in the United States. She has no children, does not reside with any immediate family members, and does not appear to have any employment that would require her to remain in the United States. Nor does she appear to have any permanent ties to any particular location in the United States. As such, the Government respectfully submits that the defendant will not be able to meet her burden of overcoming the presumption of detention, because there are no bail conditions that could reasonably assure the defendant's continued appearance in this case. In particular, home confinement with electronic monitoring would be inadequate to mitigate the high risk that the defendant would flee, as she could easily remove a monitoring device. At best, home confinement with electronic monitoring would merely reduce her head start should she decide to flee. See United Stares v. Zinger, No. 00 Cr. 773, 2000 WL 1134364, at •1 8 EFTA00093087 C6sesel.213-Thilg240401Mt Db~t9tad420Ei1O3 tth M10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2000) (Gleeson, J.) (rejecting defendant's application for bail in part because home detention with electronic monitoring "at best . . . limits a fleeing defendant's head start"); United States v. Benatar, No. 02 Cr. 099, 2002 WL 31410262, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2002) (same); see also United States v. Casteneda, No. 18 Cr. 047, 2018 WL 888744, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2018) (same); United States v. Anderson, 384 F. Supp. 2d 32, 41 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). CONCLUSION As set forth above, the defendant is an extreme risk of flight. The Government respectfully submits that the defendant cannot meet her burden of overcoming the statutory presumption in favor of detention. There are no conditions of bail that would assure the defendant's presence in court proceedings in this case. Accordingly, any application for bail should be denied. Dated: New York, New York July 2, 2020 Respectfully submitted, Acting United States Attorney By: 9 EFTA00093088 Case 21-770, Document 17-2, 04/01/2021, 3068296, Page15 of 351 Exhibit B Doc. 18 Memorandum of Ghislaine Maxwell In Opposition to the Government's Motion for Detention EFTA00093089 cimil lyZ7lbifistuxtriitridcdniZAliPlOs%dV*719A)Pkje'hetffW1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. GHISLAINE MAXWELL, Defendant. • • • • x 20 Cr. 330 (AJN) MEMORANDUM OF GHISLAINE MAXWELL JN OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR DETENTION Mark S. Cohen Christian R. Everdell COHEN & GRESSER LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, NY 10022 Phone: Jeffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hoc vice admission pending) Laura A. Menninger HADDON, MORGAN & FORMAN P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver Colorado 80203 Phone: Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell EFTA00093090 cggeei%Jdfod-Asouxatiptddcdniiii91O3W4d#SPAPdgeWcfrigisl TABLE OF CONTENTS Page PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 1 ARGUMENT 5 I. The Conditions Created by the COVID-19 Pandemic Mandate the Release of Ms. Maxwell 5 II. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142. 9 A. Applicable Law 9 B. Ms. Maxwell Has Rebutted the Presumption That She Poses a Flight Risk, and the Government Has Not Carried Its Burden That No Combination of Conditions Can Be Imposed To Reasonably Assure Her Presence In Court 11 1. Ms. Maxwell's Personal History and Characteristics Demonstrate That She Is Not a Flight Risk 12 2. The Nature and Circumstances of the Charges and the Weight of the Evidence Militate in Favor of Bail 17 3. The Proposed Bail Package Is More Than Adequate to Secure Ms. Maxwell's Presence 20 CONCLUSION 22 EFTA00093091 cggeq WcTMANNAlittiltdcicgrrIMIPiPg4d ?ft Pdg# tet#2%51 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases Hung v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326 (1978) 16 United States v. Abdellatif El Mokadem, No. 19-CR-646 (AJN), 2020 WL 3440515 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020) 17 United States v. Alindato-Perez, 627 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.P.R. 2009) 18 United States v. Bodmer, No. 03-cr-947(SAS), 2004 WL 169790 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28. 2004) 16 United States v. Boustani, 932 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2019) 20 United States v. Carrillo-Villa, 20-MJ-3073 (SLC) 8 United States v. Chandler, I9-CR-867 (PAC), 2020 WL 1528120 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) 8, 9 United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756 MAG(DMR), 2011 WL 3421321 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011) 10, 18 United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) 1 I United States v. Deutsch, No. 18-CR-502 (FB), 2020 WL 3577398 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2020) II, 18 United States v. DiGiacomo, 746 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Mass. 1990) 14 United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986) 10 United States v. Dreier, 596 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 21 United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 2011) 10, 11 ii EFTA00093092 cQ@&€i 'Is.rafåeffiAl,figtdc7cdniii-iPl&PW4d?!»?6/92% (BåtW1190,f2%51 United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) 17 United States v. Esposito, 309 F. Supp. 3d 24 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 21 United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1988) 13, 18 United States v. Hansen, 108 F. App'x 331 (6th Cir. 2004) 16 United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009) 16 United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2004) 16 United States v. Kashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 16 United States v. Mattis, No. 20-1713, 2020 WL 3536277 (2d Cir. June 30, 2020) 10 United States v. Moscaritolo, No. 10 Cr. 4 (JL), 2010 WL 309679 (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 2010) 18 United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2007) 9, 10, 16, 18 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 9 United States v. Stephens, 15-CR-95 (AJN), 2020 WL 1295155 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) 5, 6, 7, 8 United States v. Veres, No. 3:20-CR-18-J-32JBT, 2020 WL 1042051 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2020) 18 United States v. Williams-Bethea, No. 18-CR-78 (MN), 2020 WL 2848098 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2020) 6 Statutes 18 U.S.C. § 3142 passim iii EFTA00093093 cggeei ThOesttuAlitqltdeggniL4(P1 t?Pk8d ?ORA P9004412%51 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Ghislaine Maxwell respectfully submits this Memorandum in Opposition to the government's July 2, 2020 Memorandum in Support of Detention ("Gov. Mem."). It is difficult to recall a recent case that has garnered more public attention than the government's prosecution of Jeffrey Epstein ("Epstein"). In July 2019, Epstein was indicted for offenses relating to sexual misconduct, amid overwhelming media attention focused on the nature of the charges and Epstein's wealth and lifestyle. On August 10, 2019, Epstein died in federal custody, and the media focus quickly shifted to our client—wrongly trying to substitute her for Epstein—even though she'd had no contact with Epstein for more than a decade, had never been charged with a crime or been found liable in any civil litigation, and has always denied any allegations of claimed misconduct. Many of these stories and online posts were threatening and harassing to our client and those close to her. But sometimes the simplest point is the most critical one: Ghislaine Maxwell is not Jeffrey Epstein. She was not named in the government's indictment of Epstein in 2019, despite the fact that the government has been investigating this case for years. Instead, the current indictment is based on allegations of conduct that allegedly occurred roughly twenty-five years ago. Ms. Maxwell vigorously denies the charges, intends to fight them, and is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Far from "hiding," she has lived in the United States since 1991, has litigated civil cases arising from her supposed ties to Epstein, and has not left the country even once since Epstein's arrest a year ago, even though she was aware of the pending, and highly publicized, criminal investigation. She should be treated like any other defendant who comes before this Court, including as to bail. Under the Bail Reform Act, case law in this Circuit and other circuits, as well as decisions of this Court, Ms. Maxwell should be released on bail, subject to the strict conditions proposed below. EFTA00093094 Gime, b-zifacgsgagt(rdecankAypiemd ?ffigighiPogsVcifigisl Background. Ms. Maxwell, 58, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has resided in the United States since 1991. She is also a citizen of France, where she was born, and of the United Kingdom, where she was educated and spent her childhood and formative years. Ms. Maxwell graduated from Oxford University. She moved to the United States in 1991, and has lived in this country ever since that time. Ms. Maxwell has maintained extremely close relationships with her six siblings and her nephews and nieces. They all stood by her in the aftermath of the July 2019 indictment of Epstein and continue to stand by her now. She is especially close to two of her sisters and their children, all of whom reside in the United States. Ms. Maxwell also has numerous friends in the United States who themselves have children, and she is a godmother to many of them. Ms. Maxwell's family and friends have remained committed to her because they do not believe the allegations against her, which do not match the person they have known for decades. The Government's Position. The government has the burden of persuasion in showing that detention is warranted, and that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that will secure a defendant's appearance in court. In seeking to carry this burden, the government relies on the presumption of detention in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E), and argues that Ms. Maxwell poses a flight risk because she supposedly lacks ties to the United States; is a citizen of the United Kingdom and France, as well as a citizen of the United States, and has passports for each country; has traveled internationally in the past; and has financial means. And echoing recent media stories, the government speculates that Ms. Maxwell was "hiding" from law enforcement during the pendency of the investigation, even though she has been in regular contact with the government, through counsel, since Epstein's arrest. Finally, the government argues that the nature and circumstances of the offense and the weight of the evidence warrant 2 EFTA00093095 cg§eq b- focgiSNAlitkitricicerfrail-1910 3%d#figii% Pdeje42dr2t51 detention. Importantly, in contrast with the bail position it took with Epstein, the government does not and cannot assert that Ms. Maxwell presents a danger to the community under Section 3142(g)(4). Ms. Maxwell's Response. The Court should exercise its discretion to grant bail to Ms. Maxwell, on the strict conditions proposed below (or as modified by the Court), for two compelling reasons. First, the COVID-I9 crisis and its impact on detained defendants warrants release. As this Court has noted, the COVID-19 pandemic represents an unprecedented health risk to incarcerated individuals, and COVID-19-related restrictions on attorney communications with pretrial detainees significantly impair a defendant's ability to prepare her defense. Simply put, under these circumstances, if Ms. Maxwell continues to be detained, her health will be at serious risk and she will not be able to receive a fair trial. (See infra Section I, pages 5 to 9). Second, the Court should grant bail because the government has not met its burden under the Bail Reform Act and controlling case law. The presumption relied on by the government may be rebutted, and is so here. Ms. Maxwell has strong ties to the community: she is a U.S. citizen and has lived in this country for almost 30 years; she ran a non-profit company based in the United States until the recent media frenzy about this case forced her to wind it down to protect her professional colleagues and their organizations; and she has very close ties with family members and friends in New York and the rest of the country. Nor does her conduct indicate that she is a flight risk: she has no prior criminal record; has spent years contesting civil litigation arising from her supposed ties to Epstein; and has remained in the United States from the time of Epstein's arrest until the present, with her counsel in regular contact with the government. She did not flee, but rather left the public eye, for the entirely understandable 3 EFTA00093096 cggeq ?flq?6/9A) P940643c0f2b51 purpose of protecting herself and those close to her from the crush of media and online attention and its very real harms—those close to her have suffered the loss of jobs, work opportunities, and reputational damage simply for knowing her. The government's remaining arguments— about Ms. Maxwell's passports, citizenship, travel and financial means— also fail because they would require that every defendant with multiple citizenship and financial means be denied bail, which is simply not the law. Finally, as discussed below, the government's position regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense and weight of its evidence, which relates to alleged conduct that is roughly twenty-five years old, is not persuasive and does not alter the bail analysis. (See infra Section II, pages 9 to 21). Proposed Bail Conditions. In light of the above, we propose the following bail conditions, which are consistent with those that courts in this Circuit have imposed in analogous situations: (i) a $5 million personal recognizance bond, co-signed by six financially responsible people, all of whom have strong ties to Ms. Maxwell, and secured by real property in the United Kingdom worth over $3.75 million; (ii) travel restricted to the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York; (iii) surrender of all travel documents with no new applications; (iv) strict supervision by Pretrial Services; (v) home confinement at a residence in the Southern District of New York with electronic GPS monitoring; (vi) visitors limited to Ms. Maxwell's immediate family, close friends and counsel; (vii) travel limited to Court appearances and to counsel's office, except upon application to Pretrial Services and the government; and (viii) such other terms as the Court may deem appropriate under Section 3142. The Bail Reform Act does not discard the presumption of innocence; Ms. Maxwell is entitled to that presumption here, as she is in all aspects of this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) ("Nothing in this section [3142] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of 4 EFTA00093097 cg04€1 13-7G-7C0cPiesttAliqtricketniZAt(cieildd ?ffifelfit Pdijn460241351 innocence."). The government has failed to meet its burden of establishing that Ms. Maxwell presents an "actual risk of flight" and must be detained under Section 3142. The strict bail conditions outlined above are appropriate under the circumstances and are the "least restrictive" set of conditions that will "reasonably assure" Ms. Maxwell's appearance in Court, without the health and access to counsel risks inherent in the government's request that Ms. Maxwell be detained pending trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (c)(1)(B). Under the controlling legal standards, Ms. Maxwell should be released on bail. ARGUMENT There are two compelling reasons why the Court should order Ms. Maxwell's release on bail pursuant to the strict conditions she has proposed: First, Ms. Maxwell will be at significant risk of contracting COVID-19 if she is detained, and she will not be able to meaningfully participate in the preparation of her defense due to the restrictions that have been placed on attorney visits and phone calls in light of the pandemic. Second, the government has failed to carry its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 that no combination of conditions can be imposed that will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's presence in court. 1. The Conditions Created by the COV1D-19 Pandemic Mandate the Release of pus. Maxwell. Impact of COVID-I 9 on the Prison Population. We submit that the conditions created by the COVID-I9 pandemic compel Ms. Maxwell's release pursuant to appropriate bail conditions. Four months ago, this Court held in United States v. Stephens, I 5-CR-95 (AN), 2020 WL 1295155 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020), that COVID-19 is an "unprecedented and extraordinarily dangerous" threat that justifies release on bail. Id. at *2. In that case, the defendant, who had no underlying medical conditions, filed an emergency motion for reconsideration of the Court's 5 EFTA00093098 cSst:26:67-60936-AutlibbNaiiiitAgs WW2efF'alitefe eF 2§1 prior detention order based in part on the risks brought on by COVID-19. At the time, COVID- 19 had only begun to take its devastating toll on New York, and there was no known outbreak in the prison population. Nevertheless, the Court noted that "inmates may be at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 should an outbreak develop," and, based in part on this changed circumstance, ordered the defendant released. Id. Since the Court issued its opinion in Stephens, the COVID-19 risks to inmates have increased dramatically, as there have been significant outbreaks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities. In the last month alone, the number of prison inmates known to have COVID-19 has doubled to 68,000, and prison deaths tied to COVID-19 have increased by 73 percent.' Indeed, as of July 2, 2020, nine of the ten largest known clusters of the coronavirus in the United States are in federal prisons and county jails.2 As this Court noted last month, "the `inability [of] individuals to socially distance, shared communal spaces, and limited access to hygiene products' [in correctional facilities] make community spread all but unavoidable." United States v. Williams-Bethea, No. 18-CR-78 (AJN), 2020 WL 2848098, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The risks are further enhanced by the possibility of a second wave of coronavirus cases.3 In particular, COVID-19 has begun to spread through the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), where Ms. Maxwell has been housed since the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) transferred her there on July 6, 2020. According to the MDC's statistics, as of April 3, 2020, two inmates and Timothy Williams, et al., Coronavirus Cases Rise Sharp& in Prisons Even as They Plateau Nationwide, N.Y. Times, available at httnslAvww.nytimes.com/2020/06/16/uskoronavirus-inmates-prisons-iails.html (last updated June 30, 2020). 2 Coronavirus in the U.S: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. Times, available at https://ww.w.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/uskoronavirus-us-cases.html#clusters (last updated July 2, 2020). 3 See, e.g., Audrey Cher, WHO's Chief Scientist Says There's a "Vey Real Risk" of a Second Wave of Coronavirus As Economies Reopen, CNBC, June 9, 2020, available at https://www.cnbc.com./2020/06/I0/who-says-theres-real- risk-of-second-coronavirus-wave-as-economies-reonen.html. 6 EFTA00093099 ccsistio:gizdogapivawbbUmOdiglallgli @PAW ?a/Jeff 912(51 five staff had tested positive; by June 30, 2020, those numbers had risen to 14 and 41, respectively.' The increased spread among prisons means that the COVID-19 risks that were present in the Stephens case four months ago are far more serious for Ms. Maxwell now and mandate her release. Impact of COVID-19 on the Ability to Prepare the Defense. The Stephens opinion provides yet another independent basis that, we submit, requires Ms. Maxwell's release: if she is detained, her ability to meet with her attorneys and prepare for her defense will be significantly impaired and she will not be able to meaningfully participate in the preparation of her defense. In Stephens, the Court found that this factor required the defendant's release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), which provides for temporary release based on a determination that such release is "necessary for preparation of the person's defense." Stephens, 2020 WL 1295155 at *3. The Court noted that the spread of COVID-19 had compelled the BOP to suspend all in- person visits, including legal visits, except as allowed on a case-by-case basis. Id. at *3. That suspension persists to this day.s In a case such as this, which will require assessing evidence relating to events that occurred approximately twenty-five years ago, including documents and personal recollections, numerous in-person meetings between counsel and Ms. Maxwell will be critical to the preparation of the defense. The recent resurgence of the pandemic calls into question whether these meetings will ever be able to happen in advance of her trial. As in 4 See April 3, 2020 Report from the BOP regarding the Metropolitan Detention Center and Metropolitan Correctional Center ("MDC and MCC Report"), available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/filesireports/bop/20200403 BOP Report.pdf and June 30, 2020 MDC and MCC Report, available at httpslAvww.nved.uscourts.gov/pub/bop/MDC MCC 20200630 071147.pdf. 5 See BOP COV1D-19 Modified Operations Plan, available at https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/covidl9 status.isp. 7 EFTA00093100 Cisist:26:gdatitTIADR1Watial4aPileii driAti2e4:Pawiefiet2e1 Stephens, Ms. Maxwell's inability to meet with her attorneys while this policy is in effect constitutes a "compelling reason" requiring her release. Stephens, 2020 WL 1295155 at *3.6 Even speaking by phone with Ms. Maxwell presents daunting challenges due to COVID- 19-related protocols requiring at least 72 hours' notice to schedule a call, unless it is urgent, in which case counsel can email a request to the MDC. As counsel learned this past week, however, even an urgent call request does not mean the call will take place in the time required. At approximately 5:30 p.m. on July 6, 2020, the Court ordered us to confer with Ms. Maxwell about waiving her physical presence at the arraignment, initial appearance, and bail hearing, and ordered counsel for both sides to jointly report back by 9:00 p.m. that night with a proposed date and time for these proceedings. We promptly emailed the MDC to request an urgent call, making specific reference to the Court's Order, but were not connected with Ms. Maxwell until 9:00 p.m. There will no doubt be other orders of the Court with no guarantees we will be able to reach our client in time if she is detained.' In addition, during this past week, Ms. Maxwell has not been able to physically review documents and has had limited access to writing materials. The prohibition on in-person visits means we must read to her any documents requiring her review, and she has virtually no ability to take notes. The age of the allegations in this case compound these problems. Under the current circumstances, Ms. Maxwell cannot review 6 Since the Court issued its opinion in Stephens, numerous other courts in this District have ordered defendants released on bail, over the government's objection, due to the pandemic and its impact on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo-Villa, 20-MJ-3073 (SLC) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2020) (releasing undocumented defendant in drug conspiracy case because of inability to meaningfully communicate with lawyer and risk of COVID-19); United States v. Hudson, 19-CR-496 (CM) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (releasing defendant in drug conspiracy, loansharking, and extortion case, whose two prior, pre-COVID-19 bail applications were denied, because of inability to prepare for upcoming trial and risk of COVID-19); United States v. Chandler, 19-CR-867 (PAC), 2020 WL 1528120, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2020) (releasing defendant on felon in possession case, with prior manslaughter conviction, due to inability to prepare for trial due to COVID-19 restrictions). 7 The government has recently worked with the BOP to set up a standing call between counsel and Ms. Maxwell each morning until the initial appearance to facilitate attorney-client communications. While we greatly appreciate these efforts, they are a short-term patch to a persistent problem that shows no signs of abating. Nor would it be appropriate, on an ongoing basis, for the prosecutors to be involved in and dictate the date and time of our communications with our client in connection with the preparation of our defense. 8 EFTA00093101 ccsist:26:67-dogimailfiebb&?mgritcttiqgb F4ef§ si A% 1 documents and other evidence from approximately twenty-five years ago and meaningfully assist in the preparation of her defense. These restrictions are additional "compelling reasons" justifying her release. See ids II. The Government Has Not Carried Its Burden Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142, The grave concerns raised by the current COVID-19 crisis notwithstanding, Ms. Maxwell must be released because she has met her limited burden of production showing that she does not pose a flight risk, and the government has entirely failed to demonstrate that no release condition or combination of conditions exist that will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's presence in court. A. Applicable Law As the Supreme Court has recognized, "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). Pretrial detention is appropriate only where "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the [defendant]." United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)). The Bail Reform Act provides that a court "shall order the pretrial release" of the defendant (18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)) (emphasis added), but may impose bail conditions if "such release will not reasonably assure the appearance" of the defendant in court. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). Where conditions are necessary, such release shall be "subject to the least restrictive ... set of conditions that [the court] determines will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Consequently, "[u]nder this statutory scheme, `it is only a limited group of offenders who should be denied bail pending trial.'" Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also Letter of Sean Hecker to Hon. Margo K. Brodie (July 8, 2020), Federal Defenders of New York Inc. v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et at, No. 19 Civ. 660 (E.D.N.Y.) (Doc. No. 78) (detailing absence of in-person visitation, highly limited VTC and telephone call capacity, and issues pertaining to legal mail and legal documents). 9 EFTA00093102 ccAsc:26:giztio5)95-vogibbNalaPigis iltAti2efFailjtefl et 1 The government bears a dual burden in seeking pre-trial detention. First, the government must show "by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant . . . presents an actual risk of flight." Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75 (emphasis added). If the government is able to satisfy this burden, it must then "demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that no condition or combination of conditions could be imposed on the defendant that would reasonably assure his presence in court." Id. In determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant, the court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). In this case, unlike in the Epstein case, the government does not contend that Ms. Maxwell poses any danger to the community, and therefore the fourth factor does not apply. The Bail Reform Act contains a rebuttable presumption, applicable based on certain of the crimes charged here, that no conditions will reasonably assure against flight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(E). In cases where this presumption applies, the "defendant bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence that [she] does not pose . . . a risk of flight." See United States v. English, 629 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). This rebuttable presumption can be readily satisfied, United States v. Conway, No. 4-11-70756 MAG (DMR), 2011 WL 3421321, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), and "[a]ny evidence favorable to a defendant that comes within a category listed in § 3142(g) can affect the operation" of the presumption. United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Mattis, No. 20-1713, 10 EFTA00093103 cist.stI0:gdogistwoRibb&Algtiig13 49ga OA 2efPaiNq9 8O61 2020 WL 3536277, at *4-5 (2d Cir. June 30, 2020). Although the presumption "remains a factor to be considered" even after the defendant has met her burden of production, "[a]t all times ... the government retains the ultimate burden of persuasion by ... a preponderance of the evidence" that the defendant poses a flight risk that cannot be addressed by any bail conditions. English, 629 F.3d at 319 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Deutsch, No. 18-CR-502 (FB), 2020 WL 3577398, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2020). And regardless of the presence of the presumption or the nature of the charges alleged, "[n]othing in this section [3142] shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of innocence." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j); see also United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (those charged with crimes involving minors "continue to enjoy the presumption of innocence in setting conditions of release."). B. frls. Maxwell Has Rebutted the Presumntion That She Poses a Fli°ht Risk. and the Government Has Not Carried Its Burden That No Combination of Conditions Can Be Imposed To Reasonably. Assure Her Presence In Court The government has not carried its burden of establishing that no set of conditions will reasonably assure Ms. Maxwell's appearance in court. As set forth below, Ms. Maxwell's personal history, her family and other ties to this country, and her conduct prior to her arrest easily rebut the presumption that she presents a risk of flight. For these same reasons, the government cannot establish that the strict bail conditions she proposes, which are consistent with a number of cases in this Circuit in which courts have ordered release, will not "reasonably assure" her presence in court. Accordingly, the Court should order Ms. Maxwell released pursuant to her proposed conditions. 11 EFTA00093104 Cist.st:264?-60§1561ADFItZarigtit ?Ilia diffii 26 I:W*4 et 261 1. Ms. Maxwell's Personal History and Characteristics Demonstrate That She Is Not a Flight Risk a. Ms. Maxwell Has No Prior Criminal Record, and Has Significant Ties to the United States and the New YorkRegion Ms. Maxwell's history and characteristics do not "strongly support detention," as the government contends (Gov. Mem. at 6), but instead demonstrate that she is firmly rooted in this country and that her appearance can be reasonably assured with appropriate bail conditions. Ms. Maxwell has no criminal record, which includes the approximately twenty- five-year period from the time the conduct alleged in the indictment took place to the present. Ms. Maxwell also has significant ties to the United States. She has lived in this country for almost 30 years and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2002. Ms. Maxwell also has strong family ties to this country. Two of her sisters, who have agreed to co-sign her bond, live in the United States, and they have several children who are U.S.-born citizens. Ms. Maxwell is very close with her sisters and maintains regular contact with them, as well as with her nieces and nephews. Ms. Maxwell also has numerous close friends and professional colleagues who reside in this country. In sum, the United States has been Ms. Maxwell's home for decades. b. Ms. Maxwell Has Actively Litigated Civil Cases in this District and Has Not Left the United States Since Epstein's 2019Arrest Ms. Maxwell has never once attempted to "hide" from the government or her accusers, and has never shown any intent to leave the country. To the contrary, Ms. Maxwell has always vehemently denied that she was involved in illegal or improper conduct related to Epstein, and her conduct has been entirely consistent with someone who fully intends to remain in this country and fight any allegations brought against her. For example, since 2015, and continuing through today, Ms. Maxwell has actively litigated severalcivil 12 EFTA00093105 ccsvc:264?-dogisq-AoriebbZiMdicOMAls OrPfing2efPawtqf6121§1 cases related to Epstein in the Southern District of New York and has sat for depositions in those cases. Similarly, throughout the course of the criminal investigation of this case, which has been publicly reported on for nearly a year, Ms. Maxwell has remained in the United States. Indeed, on July 7, 2019, the day after Epstein's arrest, Ms. Maxwell reached out to the prosecutors in the Southern District of New York, through counsel, and maintained regular contact with them right up to the point of her arrest. The government's broad assertion that Ms. Maxwell has engaged in "frequent international travel" in the last three years (Gov. Mem. at 6) obscures the critical point: she has not left the country even once since Epstein's arrest. Ms. Maxwell's decision to remain in the United States after Epstein's arrest and subsequent death in August 2019 is particularly significant because any incentive she may have had to flee would have been even more acute at that time. Within days of Epstein's death, a steady stream of press articles began turning the public's attention to Ms. Maxwell—wrongly substituting her for Epstein—and speculating that she had become the prime target of the government's investigation.9 Adding even more fuel to this fire, several of the women claiming to be victims of Epstein's abuse began publicly calling for her immediate arrest and prosecution. Despite the increasing risk of being criminally charged, and the media firestorm that was redirected toward her after Epstein's death, and despite having ample opportunity to leave the country, Ms. Maxwell stayed in the United States for almost an entire year until she was arrested. These actions weigh heavily in favor of release. See United States v. Friedman, 9 See, e.g., Spotlight turns on Jeffrey Epstein's British socialite fixer' Ghislaine Maxwell after his suicide — but will she he prosecuted?, Daily Mail (Aug. 10, 2019), htleislAinvw.dailymail.co.uk/news/arlicle-7344765/Spodight-turns- Jeffrey-Ensteins-fixer-Ghislaine-Maxwell-suicide.html; Ghislaine Maxwell: the woman accused of helping Jeffrey Epstein groom girls, The Guardian (Aug. 12, 2019), httpslAvww.theguardian.comius-news/2019/aug/12/ghislaine- maxwell-woman-accused-ieffrev-enstein-groom-uirls- British socialite Ghislaine Maxwell in spotlight after Epstein's apparent suicide, NBC News (Aug. 12, 2019), htlus://www.nbcnews.corninews/us-newsibrilish-socialite- ghislaine-maxwell-spollight-after-epstein-s-apparent-suicide-n104111 I. 13 EFTA00093106 Cist.st:26:67-609361ADF4156Ziinglitql3 39ga &M FiDaWe el 261 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (overturning district court's decision that defendant posed a flight risk based in part on the ground that the defendant took "no steps" to flee jurisdiction in three-week period between execution of search warrant at home and arrest); United States v. DiGiacomo, 746 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-80 (D. Mass. 1990) (concluding defendants did not present a flight risk because each of them "for three years knew there was substantial evidence of the likely charges against them and did not attempt to flee before indictment"). 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (overturning district court's decision that defendant posed a flight risk based in part on the ground that the defendant took "no steps" to flee jurisdiction in three-week period between execution of search warrant at home and arrest); United States v. DiGiacomo, 746 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-80 (D. Mass. 1990) (concluding defendants did not present a flight risk because each of them "for three years knew there was substantial evidence of the likely charges against them and did not attempt to flee before indictment"). f Indeed, the absence of any allegation by the government that Ms. Maxwell was taking steps to leave the country at the time of her arrest is conspicuous. The government has offered no proof that she was making plans to leave the country. In fact, had the government alerted her counsel that she was about to be arrested, we would have arranged for Ms. Maxwell's prompt, voluntary surrender. Instead, the government arrested Ms. Maxwell without warning on the day before the July 4th holiday, thus ensuring that she would be in federal custody on the one-year anniversary of Epstein's arrest. c. Ms. Maxwell's Actions to Protect Herself From Intrusive Media Coverage and Death Threats Do Not Demonstrate an Intent to Flee Furthermore, the steps Ms. Maxwell took to leave the public eye after Epstein's arrest are not indicative of a risk of flight. The government notes that Ms. Maxwell dropped 14 EFTA00093107 cisistici:gridastiambb&?mAiicit3-4ga 26fPijiO4 8061 out of public view after Epstein's arrest, which the government seeks to portray as "hiding" from the law. The government further argues that she has taken several steps to avoid detection, including moving residences and switching her phone and email address. (Gov. Mem. at 8). But Ms. Maxwell did not take these steps to hide from law enforcement or evade prosecution. Instead, they were necessary measures that Ms. Maxwell was forced to 14 EFTA00093108 ccsist:26:67-doghtsworlibbZangtitcittiqga &PA 26 FP4e26 8O61 take to protect herself, her family members, her friends and colleagues, and their children, from unrelenting and intrusive media coverage, threats, and irreparable reputational harm. Ever since Epstein's arrest, Ms. Maxwell has been at the center of a crushing onslaught of press articles, television specials, and social media posts painting her in the most damning light possible and prejudging her guilt. The sheer volume of media reporting mentioning Ms. Maxwell is staggering. Since Epstein's arrest, she has been mentioned in literally thousands of media publications, news reports, and other online content. The media attention also spawned a carnival-like atmosphere of speculation about her whereabouts. In November 2019, the British tabloid, The Sun, even offered a £10,000 bounty for information about Ms. Maxwell's location. A headline reminiscent of a Wild West wanted poster read: "WANTED: The Sun is offering a 10,000 reward for information on Jeffrey Epstein pal Ghislaine Maxwell.'" And in the days leading up to her arrest, there was a deluge of media reports (all untrue) claiming that Ms. Maxwell was hiding out in an apartment in Paris to avoid questioning by the FBI.'1 She has seen helicopters flying over her home and reporters hiding in the bushes. Indeed, since Ms. Maxwell's arrest on July 2, 2020, her counsel has been flooded with hundreds of media inquiries and solicitations from members of the public. The "open season" declared on Ms. Maxwell after Epstein's death has come with an even darker cost - she has been the target of alarming physical threats, even death threats, and has had to hire security guards to ensure her safety. The media feeding frenzy, which has only intensified in recent months, has also deeply affected her family and friends. Some of Ms. Maxwell's closest friends who had nothing whatsoever to do with Epstein have lost their jobs or 10 See https://www.the-sun.cominews/74018/the-sun-is-offering-a- I 0000-reward-for-in formation-on-jeffrey-epstein- pal-ghislaine-maxwellt I I See, e.g., https://wvnv.dailymail.co.ulc/news/ article-8444B7/Jeffrey-Epsteins-fugitive-madam-Ghislaine- Maxwell-hiding-lwcury-Paris.html. 15 EFTA00093109 clAst:BiZzOoRspoiebacA4414104gis @PAW fPatitAe1g§1 suffered severe professional and reputational damage simply by being associated with her. Ms. Maxwell therefore did what any responsible person would do — she separated herself from everyone she cares about and removed herself from the public eye in order to keep herself and her friends out of harm's way.'2 Lacking any evidence required under the governing standard that Ms. Maxwell presents an "actual risk of flight," Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 75, the government's flight risk argument is reduced to the following: Ms. Maxwell is a woman of means who has foreign citizenship and has traveled internationally in the past, and who now faces serious charges. But if that were sufficient, then virtually every defendant with a foreign passport and any meaningful amount of funds would need to be detained as a flight risk. See Hung v. United States 439 U.S. 1326, 1329 (1978) (to detain based on risk of flight, government must show more than "opportunities for flight," and instead must establish an "inclination on the part of [the defendant] to flee"). That is not what the Bail Reform Act requires. Indeed, courts in this Circuit and elsewhere commonly find that bail conditions can adequately address risk of flight, even where individuals have foreign citizenship and passports or otherwise substantial foreign connections, and financial means. See, e.g., Sabhnani, 493 F.3d at 66; United States v. Hansen, 108 F. App'x 331 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hanson, 613 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. Bodmer, No. 03-cr-947(SAS), 2004 WL 169790, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28.2004); United States v. Karni, 298 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2004); United States v. Kashoggi, 717 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). Finally, the ongoing travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic would pose a significant hurdle to Ms. Maxwell's ability to flee the United States, particularly to 12 The media spotlight has also drawn out people who claim to speak for Ms. Maxwell, and even purport to have had direct communications with her, but who, in fact, have no ties to Ms. Maxwell whatsoever. One such person has even given numerous television interviews on news shows in the United Kingdom. 16 EFTA00093110 Ciscist:26:67-609stworinbauiralicIlaggh OPM,72efPgweiff (42(51 France and the United Kingdom.13 Notably, two weeks ago, this Court recognized in United States v. Abdellatif El Mokadem, No. I 9-CR-646 (AJN), 2020 WL 3440515 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2020) that "concerns regarding risk of flight are mitigated by the ongoing [COVID-19] pandemic, which has understandably curtailed travel across the country, and, indeed, around the world." Id. at *1. In that case, despite finding detention to be warranted on two prior occasions, the Court conclu