Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 1 of 163

Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 1 of 163 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Jane Doe 1, individually ) and on behalf of all others similarly ) situated, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) ) v. ) ) Deutsche Bank ) Aktiengesellschaft, ) Deutsche Bank AG New York ) Branch, Deutsche Bank Trust ) Company Americas, ) ) Defendants. ) / FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Case No.: 22-cv-10018-JSR FIRST AMENDED INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 files this first amended individual and civil class action complaint for damages and other relief under (among other provisions of law) the United States federal anti-sex-trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591-95, et seq.— the Trafficking Victim Protection Act ("TVPA")—and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68, et seq.—the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), as well as for aiding and abetting, intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence related to the commission of chapter one hundred thirty New York sex offenses, timely under the New York Adult Survivors Act. This suit arises from Defendants Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft's, Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch's, and 1 EFTA00161958 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 2 of 163 Deutsche Bank Trust Company America's (hereinafter referred to collected as "Deutsche Bank"), participating in and financially benefitting from their direct and intentional involvement in Jeffrey Epstein's sex-trafficking venture by providing the financial lifeblood and infrastructure for the venture's continued operation. Deutsche Bank knowingly benefited and received things of value for assisting, supporting, facilitating, and otherwise providing the most critical tool for the Jeffrey Epstein sex-trafficking organization to successfully rape, sexually assault, and coercively sex traffic Plaintiff and the numerous other members of the class proposed below (the "Class"). Deutsche Bank knew that Epstein was regularly committing violations of New York Penal Law Art. 130, including and especially New York Penal Law §§ 130.20 (sexual misconduct), 130.35 (rape in the first degree), 130.50 (criminal sexual acts in the first degree), 130.52 (forcible touching), 130.66 (aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree) and 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree). Deutsche Bank aided and abetted those crimes, as well as acted in a negligent manner to directly and proximately cause those crimes, enabling Epstein to commit such offenses against countless young women. Deutsche Bank also knew that Epstein would use means of force, threats of force, fraud, abuse of legal process, and a variety of other forms of coercion to cause young women and girls to engage in commercial sex acts. Deutsche Bank also engaged in repeated acts of racketeering activity to support the Epstein organization. 2 EFTA00161959 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 3 of 163 Knowing that they would earn millions of dollars from facilitating Epstein's sex trafficking, and from its relationship with Epstein, Deutsche Bank chose financial gain over following the law. Specifically, Deutsche Bank chose to facilitate a sex trafficking operation in order to churn profits. Jane Doe makes the following allegations on information and belief and believes that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery: I. JURISDICTION, VENUE, AND TIMELINESS 1. This action is brought pursuant to various federal and state statutes, including the TVPA, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 through § 1595. This Court has federal- question subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331, because Jane Doe 1—individually and on behalf of the other Class Members—proceeds under the TWA. 2. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction of the state law claims recounted below pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), because all claims alleged herein are part of a uniform pattern and practice and form part of the same case or controversy. 3. This Court is "an appropriate district court of the United States" in accordance with18 U.S.C. § 1595, in which to bring this action. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), because Jeffrey Epstein, his co- 3 EFTA00161960 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 4 of 163 conspirators, and Deutsche Bank all conducted substantial activities in this District. Deutsche Bank knowingly aided and abetted, facilitated, and directly participated in Epstein's illegal venture through actions that originated in this District. In addition, Epstein sexually abused and trafficked Jane Doe 1, and Members of the Class is this District. 4. These acts of sexual abuse and commercial sex committed by Jeffrey Epstein and certain select friends of his often took place in Epstein's New York mansion, located within this District at 9 East 71st Street, New York City. Epstein also used his New York mansion to harbor his victims and as a base from which to transport them to other locations outside of New York. 5. A substantial part of the acts, events, and omissions giving rise to this cause of action occurred in this District. 6. This action has been timely filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1), which provides that a plaintiff shall have ten years after the cause of action arose to file suit against any person who knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known violated the laws against sex trafficking. This action involves a long- running conspiracy, which Deutsche Bank joined while it was on-going. Deutsche Bank ratified the earlier-committed acts of the conspiracy. This action is also timely under RICO and New York's Adult Survivors Act. 4 EFTA00161961 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 5 of 163 II. PARTIES 7. Jane Doe 1 is a United States citizen and was at all relevant times a resident of and domiciled in the State of New York. 8. Jane Doe 1 is using a pseudonym to protect her identity because of the sensitive and highly personal nature of this matter, which involves sexual assault and abuse. See Order Granting Motion for Leave to Proceed Anonymously, Dkt. 28. 9. Jane Doe 1 is also at serious risk of retaliatory harm because the co- conspirators who participated in the Epstein sex-trafficking venture had—and continue to possess-tremendous wealth and power and have demonstrated a clear ability to cause her serious harm. 10. Jane Doe l's safety, right to privacy, and security outweigh the public interest in her identification. 11. Jane Doe l's legitimate concerns outweigh any prejudice to Defendants by allowing her to proceed anonymously. 12. As discussed below, many other women, who are victims and survivors of sexual abuse and trafficking are similarly situated to Jane Doe 1 and also need to proceed anonymously for the same reasons. The identities of many of these other women are known to Defendants and in other proceedings the identities of the other Epstein victims have been protected. 13. Defendant Deutsche Bank AG is a global financial institution 5 EFTA00161962 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 6 of 163 headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany. 14. Defendant Deutsche Bank AG is licensed by the New York State Department of Financial Services to operate a foreign bank branch in the State of New York, the Deutsche Bank AG New York Branch (the "New York Branch"), and also operates a trust company, Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas ("DBTCA"), which is likewise licensed and supervised by the Department. 15. Unless otherwise indicated, the three Defendants—Deutsche Bank AG, the New York Branch, and DBTCA—are referred to collectively as "Deutsche Bank" in this complaint. 16. Defendants Deutsche Bank AG, the New York Branch, and DBTCA all currently conduct substantial business in this District and conducted substantial business at the time of events covered in this complaint. 17. As one example of business conducted in this District, Deutsche Bank ordinarily trades shares on the New York Stock Exchange, located in this District. As another example, Deutsche Bank maintains branch banks within this District. 18. Deutsche Bank's financial activities, including the events alleged herein, were in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce. In connection with the acts alleged in this complaint, Defendants, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the mails, interstate telephone communications, and the facilities of national securities 6 EFTA00161963 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 7 of 163 markets. 19. Deutsche Bank is responsible, under United States law and otherwise, for the acts of its officers, directors, employees, and agents, including for the acts described in this complaint. The acts alleged were committed by Deutsche Bank's officers, directors, employees, and agents within the scope of their employment and with the intention, at least in part, to benefit Deutsche Bank. 20. Numerous Deutsche Bank employees, including Paul Morris, Charles Packard and Patrick Harris, were integral in onboarding Epstein and the many Epstein-related entities to Deutsche Bank. 21. Paul Morris joined Deutsche Bank as a relationship manager in November 2012. During his tenure, he was involved in bringing Jeffrey Epstein over to Deutsche Bank from JP Morgan Chase as a client and maintaining Epstein as a client. 22. Charles Packard was co-head of Deutsche Bank's Wealth Management Americas Group when Epstein became a client. Packard was involved in approving Epstein as a Deutsche Bank client and maintaining Epstein as a client. 23. Patrick Harris was the Chief Operating Officer of Wealth Management Americas for Deutsche Bank. Harris was involved in approving and maintaining Epstein as a Deutsche Bank client. III. INTRODUCTION 7 EFTA00161964 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 8 of 163 A. Overview of the Jeffrey Epstein Sex-Trafficking Venture and Conspiracy. 24. Before Jeffrey Epstein was ever brought over to Deutsche Bank, he was well known as a registered sex offender and sex trafficker who spent his day-to-day life sexually abusing young females and constantly recruiting others. He had previously established a sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy, which was on-going at the time Deutsche Bank became his banker. That conspiracy began in 1998, if not earlier. 25. Epstein's sex-trafficking venture operated in many respects as a sex- themed cult designed to ensnare vulnerable young women and indoctrinate them into Epstein's carefully constructed world in which Epstein was their messiah and sex abuser. 26. Each victim was led to believe that Epstein was the most powerful man in the world, with the most powerful connections. Epstein and his co-conspirators preached the Gospel of Epstein. Epstein's victims were taught to do what he said and he would protect them; but disobey him, and he would punish them and cause them serious harm from which they could never recover. 27. Once in Epstein's clutches, each victim was taught and led to believe that she must be completely compliant with every wish or demand Epstein had for her; otherwise, she would certainly suffer serious reputational, financial, property, and psychological harm. By using these and other means of force, threats of force, 8 EFTA00161965 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 9 of 163 fraud, threats of abuse of the legal process, and coercion, Epstein and his co- conspirators sexually trafficked and sexually abused Plaintiff Jane Doe 1 and the other Members of the Class. 28. As is evident from this complaint and public reporting on Epstein, he was indeed an enormously powerful man, known to have close personal relationships with former U.S. Presidents, politicians, billionaires, other world leaders, and British Royalty, and to have the backing and support of powerful banking institutions which was essential to maintaining Epstein's persona as a respectable and powerful person despite the fact that he was a sex-trafficking serial abuser. 29. Epstein began his sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy in 1998 and perhaps earlier. From its inception until Jeffrey Epstein's arrest by the FBI for sex trafficking in 2019 (and his subsequent death on August 10, 2019, by apparent suicide), the venture operated with a purpose of luring young women and girls into a position where Jeffrey Epstein and his co-conspirators could coerce them to engage in commercial sex acts and commit sexual offenses against them. His venture also operated to conceal its sex trafficking from law enforcement organizations. And his venture operated with a purpose to provide financial and other benefits to those who assisted and enabled the venture. 30. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy was well-structured 9 EFTA00161966 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 10 of 163 from at least 1998 and grew increasingly more powerful as it victimized more young women. 31. Epstein did not, and could not, act alone. He created and maintained his sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy with the assistance of other influential individuals and entities who knew he was sexually trafficking young women and girls yet supported his sex-trafficking operation in order to obtain financial and other favors from Epstein. 32. Epstein's sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy was not possible without the assistance and knowing complicity of a financial institution— specifically, a banking institution—which provided his operation not only with the means to conduct sex trafficking but also with an appearance of legitimacy, thereby ensuring its continued operation without fear of being reported to law enforcement or being arrested. Without the financial institution's knowing participation, Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme could not have logistically operated and Epstein's appearance to the outside world, including his victims, as a powerful and protected person could not have been maintained. 33. Epstein's victims were young women and girls, who suffered severe abuse as Epstein's sex-trafficking victims and who believed they had to remain loyal to the venture at all costs in order to survive. During the times relevant to this action, Epstein victimized hundreds of young women and girls. 10 EFTA00161967 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 11 of 163 34. Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme was supported by virtually unlimited wealth, although Deutsche Bank knew that Epstein's self-professed job of "money manager to billionaires" was false. 35. Epstein masterfully assessed the specific needs and vulnerability of each of his targeted victims. He then closed the trap on his victims with offers of money, food, shelter, medical care travel, schooling, and career opportunities for them or family members. Epstein groomed the young women and girls, indoctrinating them to believe that the sexual abuse was normal. 36. Epstein fraudulently represented to the victims that he would take care of them in various ways, which ultimately allowed Epstein to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts with himself (and, on occasion, others), as well as to create the opportunity for Epstein to sexually abuse them. 37. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture's and conspiracy's purpose included enticing, obtaining, harboring, and transporting the young victims for Epstein to sexually abuse without drawing unwanted attention from law enforcement. The venture had everything a sex-trafficking organization needed— funding, infrastructure, the appearance of legitimacy, and, most importantly, a complicit banking institution to ensure the illegal operation could continue to grow undetected by law enforcement. By many accounts, it was the most powerful and wealthiest sex-trafficking venture ever created. 11 EFTA00161968 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 12 of 163 38. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture knowingly used means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion (including threats of serious harm or physical restraint), and abuse of law and the legal process, to cause Jane Doe 1 and many dozens of others similarly situated to engage in commercial sex acts. 39. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture operated in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce. Epstein recruited, solicited, coerced, harbored, transported, and enticed some of his victims, including Jane Doe 1 and others similarly situated, to engage in commercial sex acts in, among other places, New York (including the Southern District of Nev, York), Florida, the U.S. Virgin Islands, England, and France. 40. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture operated throughout the world from (at least) in and around 1998 through in and around August 10, 2019, when Epstein died by apparent suicide. 41. After Epstein's death, to and including the date of this complaint, members of the sex-trafficking venture continued to further the venture by concealing the activities and extent of the venture. 42. In 2006, Jeffrey Epstein was arrested in Florida after state and federal law enforcement discovered that he had sexually abused more than 30 children in his Palm Beach, Florida mansion. During that investigation, it was concluded that Epstein and his co-conspirators had committed federal criminal acts constituting 12 EFTA00161969 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 13 of 163 violations of 18 U.S.0 §§ 2422(b), 2422(2), 2423(f), 2423(b), 2424(e), 18 U.S.0 § 371, 18 U.S.0 § 1591(c)(1) and 1591(a)(1) & (2), as well as state crimes in violation of Florida Statutes §§ 796.07 and 796.03. Epstein committed these crimes against dozens of young women and girls, some as young as 14 years old. With respect to the specific discoveries, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida found that some of the victims "went to Mr. Epstein's house only once, some went there as much as 100 times or more." 43. As a consequence of the Florida investigation, Epstein pled guilty to two felony sex offenses, and was permanently labeled as a "Registered Sex Offender." He was jailed for these felonies in 2008. 44. The 2006 criminal investigation uncovered a mountain of evidence that became public, including documents obtained through trash pulls outside Epstein's home, documents discovered in a search warrant, and extensive travel records. This evidence revealed details about Epstein's life-style, daily activities, and the unique manner of operation for his sex-trafficking venture. 45. Epstein's criminal case in Florida and the many related police reports and news reports left no doubt about Epstein's extraordinary penchant for sexually abusing and trafficking young women and girls from (at least) about 2005 onwards. For instance, it was revealed that until the time of his Florida arrest, Epstein was sexually abusing three to four young females per day, in every location he was in at 13 EFTA00161970 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 14 of 163 the time. Sexually abusing young girls and women was a full-time job for him, from which he never took a vacation or hiatus. 46. Beginning with his Florida arrest and for years after, Epstein was embroiled in dozens of highly public lawsuits documenting his sexual abuse of his victims. Thousands of news stories circulated worldwide about his sexual crimes. 47. The manner and means of Epstein's sex trafficking operation was widely publicized after his 2006 arrest. It was well-known that he would lure young women or girls to one of his luxurious mansions, under the guise of being a wealthy philanthropist. Epstein would claim to be able to provide them something they needed or wanted, such as cash money, advancement of careers, education, or other life necessities. Once his victim was under Epstein's control, he would force his victim into providing a massage that would turn sexual, and from there he would sexually abuse them and cause them to engage in a variety of forced commercial sex acts. 48. Once in Epstein's presence, each victim knew there was no realistic option to disobey him. It was well known and understood that he was one of the most powerful and connected people in the United States, able to help any of these young victims if they complied, and through his coercive techniques Epstein made clear that he was also able to significantly harm any of his victims of they refused his wishes. 14 EFTA00161971 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 15 of 163 49. While Epstein's first sexual abuse occurred in the early 1990s with the complicity of his then-paramour, Ghislaine Maxwell, Epstein's appetite for sexual abusing young women and girls grew over the years. His sex-trafficking and abuse had crystalized in a well- organized and well-defined conspiracy by as early as 1998. 50. The Florida criminal investigation uncovered that Epstein's sex- trafficking operation grew its number of victims exponentially in the early 2000s. 51. One major reason why Epstein's sex-trafficking venture accumulated new victims at an alarming rate beginning in 2000 was his access to unlimited amounts of cash and a bank that would knowingly support and protect his sex- trafficking operation. 52. Without exorbitantly large amounts of cash, his operation could not run, as newly recruited victims were each paid hundreds of dollars in cash immediately after Epstein sexually abused them, as hush money. 53. Each victim was also informed that she would be paid hundreds of dollars in cash for each additional victim she recruited, and Epstein made good on that promise of large cash payments. 54. The public police reports, documents, and articles stemming from the 2006 arrest made abundantly clear that Epstein was doling out thousands of dollars in cash every day as hush money to victims he was sexually abusing and to victims he was using to recruit additional victims. 15 EFTA00161972 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 16 of 163 55. If Epstein paid every victim, including the young children, with wire transfers, his illegal sex trafficking operation would have been easily uncovered; however, with access to unlimited amounts of cash, Epstein was able to commit the most egregious sexual crimes many times a day without leaving a trail for each sex crime he committed. 56. Because Epstein's vast wealth—said to have been more than a billion dollars—was maintained in seemingly legitimate financial institutions, he had greater power to wield in order to coerce his victims. 57. In order to access the large amount of cash needed to maintain his active sexual abuse of young women, Epstein needed the financial institution where he banked to be complicit in his operation. More specifically, Epstein needed a bank that would allow him to constantly withdraw cash from his accounts, without regard to anti-money laundering prohibitions and currency transaction reporting requirements. 58. This scheme of paying victims to bring other victims worked effectively because it not only allowed expansion through the recruitment of other victims in a pyramid-scheme fashion, but it also allowed each victim a possibility to avoid future sexual abuse—she could bring someone else who would be abused in her place. 59. This constant expansion of sex-trafficking victims required cash on 16 EFTA00161973 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 17 of 163 hand for Epstein to pay many of his victims on the spot at the time of the abuse as hush money for the sexual abuse she was suffering as well as each victim's finder's fee for bringing another victim. 60. In addition to the inner workings of Epstein's sex-trafficking scheme being public when he served his jail time in Florida, other relevant information about Epstein was widely published: he had no college degree, had never obtained any specialized license, none of the companies with whom he was associated had any legitimate business structure or purpose, and he had no documented expertise that would provide the requisite skill or knowledge to amass his vast wealth. 61. Despite the rumors that Epstein had created to conceal his true "business," he was exposed as literally nothing other than an expert sex trafficker and abuser of young females-a fact easily discernible by any responsible financial institution with whom he was banking. 62. Epstein's aptitude as a sex trafficker and appetite as a sexual abuser did not suffer because of his Florida incarceration in 2008. 63. Even while he was in jail in Florida, he continued to sexually abuse young girls and women while he was on "work release" to his office that he opened under the name "Florida Science Center." 64. Once out of jail and off work release, Epstein continued to collect young women and lure them through force, fraud, or coercion into one of his 17 EFTA00161974 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 18 of 163 mansions, primarily his townhouse located at 9 East 71s1 Street, New York, where he would sexually abuse each one. 65. His sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy continued in the same manner and mode as it had in the past, although it involved more phony companies, more bank accounts, more withdrawals of large amounts of cash, and more delivery of funds to victims and co-conspirators through wires, payroll, direct deposits, and other means—means known to his financial institution as evidence of Epstein continuing his criminal sex trafficking scheme. 66. As time went by, while Epstein sought to create cover as a well- connected "money manager to billionaires," the news articles and lawsuits continued to mount expressing skepticism of the source(s) of his money and more confirming information became publicly available that Epstein was abusing young women. 67. As a registered sex offender known to be sexually abusing multiple young women each day through a pyramid-type recruiting scheme that required the transfer of millions of dollars to continue the operation, a complicit bank was essential, without which he could not sexually abuse in the way he did and his organization could not operate. 68. From approximately 1998 through around August 2013, JP Morgan was the bank complicit in seeing to it that Epstein could sexually abuse countless young females and could operate his sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy. 18 EFTA00161975 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 19 of 163 69. Epstein's relationship with James "Jes" Staley was a key alliance that enabled Epstein to run his illegal operation through JP Morgan. 70. Staley and JP Morgan built the financial infrastructure that allowed for Epstein's sex trafficking operation to become what it was. They had a business relationship with Epstein when he was arrested, when he was required to register as a sex offender, and even continued to enable and support his sex trafficking operation after he was released from jail. As an employee and agent of JP Morgan, Staley knew exactly what he was doing, and so did JP Morgan. 71. Staley left JP Morgan in 2013, and JP Morgan, knowing that Epstein was a sex trafficker running a publicly known sex trafficking operation, with no other legitimate business, began to create the perception of distancing itself from Epstein. 72. In 2013, when Epstein was perhaps the most infamous sex offender in the world, he was on the precipice of losing his accounts at JP Morgan—the bank that had protected him and participated in his operation for nearly 15 years. He immediately needed a financial institution that would partner with him to continue the operation of his sex-trafficking venture. He found that partner in Deutsche Bank. 73. Deutsche Bank picked up exactly where JP Morgan left off and worked quickly and diligently to figure out exactly what they needed to do (and not do) in order to conceal Epstein's illegal venture and conspiracy and ensure that it could 19 EFTA00161976 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 20 of 163 continue to run without a hitch. B. An Overview of Deutsche Bank's Role in the Epstein Sex-Trafficking Venture. 74. Various banks and bankers were a critical part of Jeffrey Epstein's particular sex-trafficking venture. Due to the extensive publicity about Epstein's illegal sexual activities, in 2013 his longtime financial banking institution, JP Morgan, had decided it would no longer serve as his banker. 75. By 2013, Epstein needed a new banking institution that would provide the necessary appearance of legitimacy for his operation. This institution would need to allow him to open many accounts for illegitimate companies, ignore blatant red flags, permit him to transfer money without questioning, give him access to abundant cash in direct violation of federal law, coach Epstein and his organization leaders on how to avoid reporting or scrutiny, and to otherwise intentionally participate in and facilitate the commercial aspect of his commercial sex-trafficking enterprise. 76. From on or about August 19, 2013, through about 2018, Deutsche Bank was the key bank participating, and playing an essential role in, the Epstein sex- trafficking venture. Deutsche Bank continued to conceal what it had done through about July 2020. Deutsche Bank developed a special—and illegal—banking relationship with Epstein. 77. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally participated in the Epstein 20 EFTA00161977 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 21 of 163 sex-trafficking venture by, among other things, providing the financial underpinnings for Epstein to have ready and reliable access to resources—including cash—to recruit, lure, coerce, and entice young women and girls to be sexually abused and to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts and other degradations. 78. Deutsche Bank assisted and participated in Epstein's sex-trafficking venture by knowingly enabling him to make payments to victims, including directly or indirectly Jane Doe 1, and others similarly situated, and obtain large sums of cash from his various accounts in violation of structuring laws in order to finance his well- known, cash-driven, sex-trafficking venture. 79. Deutsche Bank participated in Epstein's violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act by knowingly facilitating, assisting, and enabling Epstein's illegal conduct. Deutsche Bank's conduct violated the TVPA, which forbids benefiting financially by participating in a sex trafficking venture knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, abuse of process, and combination of those means have been used to cause young women and girls to engage in commercial sex acts. 80. Deutsche Bank also conspired with Epstein (and others) to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591. It knew that it was joining a sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy that had been on-going for many years (at least since 2005). It adopted the goals of the venture and conspiracy and took specific actions in this District and elsewhere 21 EFTA00161978 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 22 of 163 in furtherance of it. 81. When considering whether to participate in the sex-trafficking venture, and before on-boarding Epstein, Deutsche Bank estimated that it would earn between $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 annually by funding the sex-trafficking venture and handling the accounts of Epstein-related entities. 82. Ultimately, Deutsche Bank did financially benefit by earning millions of dollars for its participation in the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. 83. Throughout its relationship with Epstein, Deutsche Bank violated numerous regulations in order to continue its lucrative venture of facilitating the Epstein sex trafficking scheme. These violations were intentional and for the sole purpose of aiding and assisting Epstein in his sex trafficking venture and conspiracy. 84. Paul Morris, a former JP Morgan banker, brought Epstein over from JP Morgan to Deutsche Bank in around August 2013. All knowledge acquired by JP Morgan about Epstein's sex-trafficking venture while Morris was at JP Morgan, became known to Deutsche Bank. Morris knew that Epstein was continuing his on- going sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy. Morris had a special relationship with Epstein. 85. In addition to Morris's knowledge and considering the known reputation of Epstein as a sex-trafficker, when Deutsche Bank was on-boarding Epstein, it had a responsibility to make all available inquiries to any other entity who 22 EFTA00161979 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 23 of 163 had been associated with Epstein to learn if Epstein had retired from his illegal sex- trafficking operation. Reasonable inquiries would have quickly revealed that he had not. And, through Morris and other information, Deutsche Bank quickly learned that he had not. 86. Financial institutions must conduct Know Your Customer ("KYC") reviews for each client relationship at intervals commensurate to the Anti-Money Laundering ("AML") risks posed by the client. These reviews included reviewing account activity to determine whether such activity fits with what would have been expected given the nature of the account. Each client's AML risk should also be re- assessed if new information or unexpected account activity is identified. 87. Financial institutions must also establish criteria for determining when a client relationship poses too high of a risk and therefore must be terminated. A financial institution may facilitate illegal activity—and be liable under applicable laws—if it maintains such a relationship despite repeated indications of facilitation of improper transactions. 88. Without Deutsche Bank's participation and assistance, Epstein could not have sexually abused or trafficked the hundreds of young women he did between 2013 and 2018. 89. Deutsche Bank knew that in order to onboard Epstein and his related entities and maintain that relationship, it would have to intentionally circumvent 23 EFTA00161980 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 24 of 163 banking rules and regulations and work with Epstein to aid in the operation of the sex trafficking venture—and Deutsche Bank did exactly that. 90. On July 6, 2020, Deutsche Bank agreed to pay a fine of $150 million to the New York State Department of Financial Services for, among other things, its failures to meet banking regulations in connection with its relationship to Epstein. Until that date, Deutsche Bank concealed who it had adopted the goals of the Epstein sex trafficking venture and conspiracy and worked to further those goals. IV. THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT 91. The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) forbids sex trafficking activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce or take place within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Courts must broadly construe the TVPA because it serves a remedial purpose and uses intentionally broad language. 92. The TVPA forbids the following sex-trafficking conduct: (a) Whoever knowingly— (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or, except where the act constituting the violation of paragraph is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of 24 EFTA00161981 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 25 of 163 force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in acommercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 93. The TVPA also contains a conspiracy provision, which forbids conspiring with a person to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591. 94. The TVPA also contains an explicit "civil remedy" provision which allows an individual who is a victim of a violation of Chapter 77 of Title 18 (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591-95) to bring a civil action against the perpetrator and any person or entity who knowingly benefits financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in an illegal sex-trafficking venture. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). 95. Unlike the criminal penalties provisions in the TVPA, the civil remedies provision contains a "constructive knowledge" provision. This provision allows a civil action to be brought not only against a person or entity who participated in a venture known to have engaged in illegal sex trafficking but also against a person or entity who participated in a venture that the person or entity should have known had engaged in illegal sex trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). This expansive provision is known as the "constructive knowledge" provision, which provides an alternative to proving actual knowledge as part of civil damages claim. 96. In this complaint, Jane Doe 1 and other members of the Class allege 25 EFTA00161982 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 26 of 163 that Deutsche Bank acted outrageously and intentionally. But additionally, in the paragraphs that follow, wherever Jane Doe 1 and the other members of the Class allege that Defendants acted with actual knowledge, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that the Epstein sex-trafficking venture used means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, abuse of process, or some combination thereof to cause a person to engage in commercial sex acts, Jane Doe 1 and other members of the Class also allege that, at a bare minimum, Defendants should have known that the Epstein sex- trafficking venture had used such means to engage in illegal sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591-94—i.e., that they had constructive knowledge of Epstein's sex trafficking. 97. In this complaint, Jane Doe 1 and other members of the Class also allege that Deutsche Bank was willfully blind to the fact that was facilitating and participating in Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. V. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT 98. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) forbids racketeering activities that affect interstate or foreign commerce or take place within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 99. As with the TVPA, courts must broadly construe RICO because it serves a remedial purpose and uses intentionally broad language. The Act provides that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its 26 EFTA00161983 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 27 of 163 remedial purposes." Pub.L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922,947 (1970). 100. RICO forbids the following racketeering activities: It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). 101. RICO also contains provision making it illegal for any person to conspire with others to violate any of RICO's prohibitions. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). 102. RICO also contains an explicit "civil remedy" provision which allows an individual who is injured in his business or property by virtue of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 to sue to recover threefold the damages sustained. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 103. In the paragraphs that follow, Jane Doe 1 and other members of the Class allege that Deutsche Bank violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962 and injured them in 27 EFTA00161984 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 28 of 163 various ways, including injury to their businesses and property. VI. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS A. The Epstein Sex-Trafficking Venture and Conspiracy. 104. During all times relevant to this complaint, Jeffrey Epstein was an extraordinarily wealthy man with multiple residences in the United States, including a New York City mansion, a New Mexico Ranch, an apartment in Paris, France, a Palm Beach mansion, and an island in the U.S. Virgin Islands. 105. Beginning in about 1998 (and perhaps earlier) and continuing through the summer of 2019, Epstein knowingly established and ran a sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591-95. As part of the venture and conspiracy, Epstein used means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, abuse of legal process, and a combination of these means to cause young women and girls from all over the world to engage in commercial sex acts and to sexually abuse them. 106. In creating and maintaining this network of victims in multiple states and in other countries to sexually abuse and exploit, Epstein worked and conspired with others, including employees and associates who facilitated his conduct by, among other things, recruiting victims, coercing victims, paying victims, and scheduling their sexual abuse by Epstein at each of his residences, most predominantly in New York. 107. In this District and elsewhere, Epstein perpetuated this abuse in similar 28 EFTA00161985 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 29 of 163 ways. Epstein and his co-conspirators lured new victims into his home for seemingly innocuous activity. Victims were initially recruited to speak with an alleged philanthropic Epstein and provide "massages" to him. Once at Epstein's home and trapped in his bedroom, the victims were instructed to remove their clothing. Epstein would then force the massages to become increasingly sexual in nature, typically including one or more sex acts. Epstein would use means of force, threats of force, or fraud to coerce the victims to participate in these sex acts and to cause them to return and continue to engage in commercial sex acts with him. Epstein and his associates then paid his victims hundreds of dollars in cash for each sexual encounter and for maintaining silence about the encounter. 108. Moreover, Epstein actively encouraged and coerced his victims to recruit additional girls to be similarly sexually abused. Epstein incentivized his victims to become recruiters by paying these victim-recruiters hundreds of dollars for each girl that they brought to Epstein. In so doing, Epstein, through this system of paying victims to recruit others whom he would also pay for being sexually abused as well as for recruiting, created a sex-trafficking spider web and maintained a steady supply of new victims to exploit. 109. Epstein was skilled at ascertaining his victim's greatest fears and aspirations and targeted those fears and aspirations to coerce and trap his victims into performing commercial sex acts and to be subject to sexual abuse. 29 EFTA00161986 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 30 of 163 110. Among other things, Epstein caused and coerced his victims to engage in commercial sex acts, specifically sex acts for which his victims received things of value, such as cash, promises of educational and career advancement, and promises that Epstein would provide various forms of assistance. 111. Among other things, Epstein provided things of value to his victims in order to cause and coerce them to engage sex acts with him and on occasion his friends, co-conspirators, or other victims. 112. As one means of causing and coercing victims to engage in commercial sex acts, Epstein and his co-conspirators threatened that harm would come to victims if they did not comply with his demands that they perform commercial sex acts. 113. As another means of causing and coercing victims to engage in commercial sex acts, Epstein and his co-conspirators fraudulently promised to further victims' educational or career aspirations if they would comply with his sexual demands. These promises were a quid pro quo for the sex acts that occurred. 114. Epstein and his co-conspirators falsely promised Jane Doe 1 and other Class Members various employment and professional opportunities, which prevented them from pursuing other employment opportunities. These false promises were part of the Enterprise's operation, because they forced and caused Epstein's victims to participate in commercial sex acts. Forcing sex-trafficking victims into a position of economic dependency on their traffickers is a well-known 30 EFTA00161987 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 31 of 163 means of coercion, which Epstein used against Jane Doe 1 and the Class Members. 115. As one means of causing and coercing victims to engage in commercial sex acts, Epstein and his co-conspirators would "gift" his victims money and provide them with living accommodations, clothing, education, or other necessities. Epstein and his co-conspirators would then force them to pay off the "debt" by complying with Epstein's sexual demands. 116. In addition to coercing commercial sex acts from his victims, Epstein also committed intentional torts and sexual offenses against them as defined in New York Penal Law § 130, as described in greater detail below. 117. From around 1998 through about July 2019, Epstein's sex-trafficking venture recruited, solicited, enticed, harbored, obtained, provided, and transported hundreds of victims to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts with Epstein and Epstein's friends. Epstein was reliant on banking institutions to help make the racketeering activity successful. 118. Epstein recruited, solicited, enticed, harbored, obtained, provided, and transported his victims to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts in ways that were in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, including using means of interstate communications (such as cell phones) and means of interstate and foreign travel (such as aircraft that he owned and controlled). 119. Epstein transported his victims in interstate and foreign commerce, 31 EFTA00161988 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 32 of 163 including transportation to and from his New York mansion in this District. 120. The Epstein sex-trafficking venture transported victims across state boundaries between New York, Florida, New Mexico, New Jersey, Massachusetts, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and elsewhere, and in foreign commerce to places abroad, especially Eastern Europe. 121. At all times relevant to this complaint, the Epstein sex-trafficking venture was a group of two or more individuals associated in fact, even if they were not a formal legal entity. Indeed, members of the Epstein sex-trafficking venture referred to it as "The Organization." Epstein was continuously at the hub of The Organization, which operated continuous throughout the times indicated in this complaint. 122. On July 2, 2019, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York filed a sealed, two-count Indictment against Epstein, including one count of sex-trafficking conspiracy and one count of sex trafficking for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, in part due to Epstein's criminal activities in his New York Mansion located at 9 East 71st Street. See United States v. Jeffrey Epstein, Case No. 1:19-cr-00490 (S.D.N.Y.). 123. On July 8, 2019, Epstein was arrested pursuant to the Southern District of New York Indictment. 124. On August 10, 2019, prison guards found Epstein unresponsive in his 32 EFTA00161989 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 33 of 163 Metropolitan Correctional Center jail cell, where he was awaiting trial on the federal sex trafficking charges. He was later pronounced dead from apparent suicide. 125. In July 2020, Epstein's co-conspirator in the origin of the sex- trafficking venture, Ghislaine Maxwell, was arrested on federal sex trafficking charges filed in this Court. The charges alleged that she had assisted, facilitated, and contributed to Epstein's abuse of sex trafficking victims, helping Epstein to recruit, groom, and ultimately abuse his victims. See United States v. Maxwell, Case No. 1:20-cr-00330 (S.D.N.Y.). 126. On December 29, 2021, Maxwell was found guilty in this Court on five federal sex-trafficking counts in this Court. B. Consistent With Jeffrey Epstein's Uniform Pattern and Practice, Jane Doe 1 Was Assaulted Within the Definition of New York Penal Law Section 130 and Forced to Engage in Commercial Sex Acts With Epstein by Means of Force, Fraud, and Coercion. 127. In about 2003, Jane Doe 1 moved to New York City where she was introduced to and sexually abused by Jeffrey Epstein. 128. From about 2003 until the time that Jane Doe 1 escaped, Epstein committed numerous intentional torts and acts against Jane Doe 1 on a regular and frequent basis, which constitute sexual offenses as defined in New York Penal Law § 130, including but not limited to the following: a. Sexual misconduct as defined in §130.20, as Epstein engaged in sexual intercourse with Jane Doe without her consent; 33 EFTA00161990 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 34 of 163 b. Rape in the first degree as defined in §130.35, as Epstein engaged in sexual intercourse with Jane Doe by forcible compulsion; c. Criminal sexual act in the first degree as defined in §130.50, as Epstein engaged in oral sexual conduct with Jane Doe by forcible compulsion; d. Forcible touching as defined in §130.52, as Epstein, intentionally and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly sexual touched Jane Doe for the purpose of degrading or abusing her or for the purpose of gratifying his own sexual desire; e. Sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in §130.66, as Epstein inserted a foreign object in the vagina of Jane Doe by forcible compulsion; f. Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in §130.70, as Epstein inserted a foreign object in Jane Doe's vagina causing physical injury, by forcible compulsion. 129. Epstein and his co-conspirators had a long history of grooming, indoctrinating, controlling, and ultimately committing sexual offenses against young, vulnerable women like Jane Doe 1. Epstein and his co-conspirators constantly reminded Jane Doe 1 how powerful and important Epstein was. 130. The well-oiled Epstein sex-abuse and sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy included frequent statements to Jane Doe 1, and other victims, by Epstein 34 EFTA00161991 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 35 of 163 and his co-conspirators that: (1) Epstein possessed extraordinary wealth, power and influence; (2) Epstein's business and political friends, including world leaders, included some of the most powerful people in the world; (3) Epstein had the ability to advance or destroy nearly anyone financially, reputationally, and otherwise; (4) medical and normal life necessities would be denied victims if they, including Jane Doe 1, did not allow Epstein to sexually abuse them and failed to perform commercial sex acts for Epstein; and (5) Epstein could take away Jane Doe l's and other victims' life needs such as shelter or housing if they failed to allow sexual abuse or to perform those acts. 131. As with his other chosen victims, Jane Doe 1 was vulnerable to being victimized by Epstein and was sexually abused by Epstein at his sole direction almost every day she was in his presence, as was customary practice for Epstein. Jane Doe 1 was soon forced to remain in contact with Epstein, was unable to extricate herself, and had no real choice but to comply with Epstein's every command or risk suffering serious harm. 132. Jane Doe 1 was sexually abused and trafficked by Epstein for numerous years and was not able to escape from Epstein until about 2018. Having been conditioned that the sexual abuse was "normal" and knowing that everyone surrounding Epstein, including accountants, lawyers, bankers, and other important people, were aware of the sex abuse, Jane Doe 1 was coerced into a cult-like life 35 EFTA00161992 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 36 of 163 controlled by Epstein and others to be sexually abused and sexually trafficked. 133. From about 2003 through about 2018, Epstein sexually abused Jane Doe 1 in this District. 134. Epstein used means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, abuse of process, and a combination of such means to sexually abuse Jane Doe 1 and to cause her to engage in commercial sex acts. 135. Epstein recruited Jane Doe 1 to, among other things, cause her to engage in commercial sex acts in ways that were in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, including through use of cell phones and means of interstate transportation such as aircraft that he owned or controlled. 136. Epstein transported Jane Doe 1 from New York to other states to sexually abuse her and to cause her to engage in commercial sex acts. 137. As the years of abuse continued, Jane Doe 1 wanted to escape from the Epstein organization, yet Epstein and his supporting team of co-conspirators increased the tactics of fraud, force, and coercion to cause her to remain compliant in allowing Epstein to sexually abuse and traffic her, making it clear she would suffer serious harm if she were to try to leave the organization. 138. Epstein threatened Jane Doe 1 that she would lose contact with people in her social circle who were connected with Epstein if she failed to comply with his demands. 36 EFTA00161993 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 37 of 163 139. Epstein would alternate between usually false promises and threats to secure Jane Doe 1 's compliance with his demands, including demands that she engage in commercial sex acts with him and others. In some instances, Epstein would pay Jane Doe 1 directly in cash for sex acts and in other instances she was provided other things of value such as medical care, housing, transportation, schooling, and job opportunity. 140. From 2003, when Doe was first introduced to Epstein, and through her eventual separation from Epstein and his organization 15 years later, Epstein and his co-conspirators used extreme measures of force, fraud and coercion to cause Jane Doe 1 to engage in commercial sex and to remain obedient to the organization. 141. Epstein introduced Jane Doe 1 to powerful individuals, made clear he could destroy anyone who disobeyed him, including Jane Doe 1. 142. Even when Epstein was in Florida jail, Doe 1 was required to be in Florida for the hours during the day when Epstein was on work release. 143. Doe I never had a say in anything, including sex, and had to be compliant to Epstein's every wish and was trained that she had to express gratitude and appear appreciative for Epstein and all he could do for her, knowing that he would cause her serious harm if she did not comply. 144. Epstein controlled where Doe 1 lived, and he housed her at his victim stash houses that he owned at 310 East 66 Street, NY, NY. 37 EFTA00161994 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 38 of 163 145. When Epstein demanded Doe 1 be on flights to anywhere in the world at a moments notice, she had to be there, and co-conspirators for Epstein passed out schedules for Doe 1 so she knew where she had to be and when. 146. When Epstein was in civil or criminal trouble, Epstein provided gifts or promises of gifts or promises of employment or schooling to prevent Doe 1 from turning on Epstein. 147. Epstein forced Doe 1 into relationships that would be advantageous to Epstein, and Doe I was given no choice but to comply. 148. Epstein forced Doe 1 to be at his beckon call to participate in whatever sexual encounter he commanded at the time, wherever he commanded, with whoever he commanded. 149. Epstein's sexual abuse of exploitation of Plaintiff grew more painful as Jane Doe 1 aged, yet Doe 1 was explicitly told she could not leave the Epstein organization's grasp without the risk of suffering serious harm. 150. As late as 2017 and 2018, Epstein continued to demand sexual compliance from Doe 1 and Doe 1 continued to ask out of the organization peacefully. However, as was Epstein's known coercive style, Epstein and co- conspirators of his made it clear she would suffer serious harm if she would try to separate from the Epstein organization, and that if she did separate it would need to be on terms outlines by the organization. 38 EFTA00161995 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 39 of 163 151. Certain coercive tactics employed by Epstein and his co-conspirators included forced relationships directed by Epstein, legal entanglements with Epstein related entities, the threat that Doe 1 would go bankrupt in legal processes if she left, threats that the organization would protect her if she remained compliant, yet she would suffer if she did not. 152. Once Doe 1 was lured in, Epstein's coercive tactics increased over time to ensure that Jane Doe 1 could never escape. 153. Epstein and his co-conspirators continued to coerce Jane Doe 1 into commercial sex in various ways until her ultimate escape from Epstein and his organization in about 2018. C. Deutsche Bank's Participation in Epstein's Sex-Trafficking Venture 1. Overview of Deutsche Bank's participation in the venture. 154. From on or about August 19, 2013, through about July 2020, Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally participated in the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, conspiracy, and racketeering activity by (among other things) providing the financial underpinnings for the venture. Deutsche Bank's conduct, as described below, was outrageous and intentional. After Deutsche Bank joined the venture and conspiracy, it became aware that Epstein venture and conspiracy had been on-going for many years and it adopted the goals and ratified the venture's and conspiracy's earlier actions, racketeering conduct, and crimes. 39 EFTA00161996 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 40 of 163 155. Deutsche Bank enabled Epstein to have ready and reliable access to resources—including cash—to recruit, solicit, entice, harbor, obtain, provide, and transport young women and girls (including Jane Doe 1) to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts. 156. Deutsche Bank participated in Epstein's violations of the TWA by knowingly assisting, supporting, facilitating, and enabling Epstein's illegal sexual abuse and sex-trafficking venture, including in particular his coercive sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(I). 157. Deutsche Bank's conduct knowingly and intentionally violated the TWA, which forbids benefitting financially from participating in a venture that, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, has recruited, solicited, enticed, transported, harbored, provided, or obtained a person knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that the person has been caused to engage in a commercial sex act by means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion, abuse of process, or a combination of such means. 158. Deutsche Bank's actions knowingly and intentionally furthered the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, including specifically Epstein's sex trafficking. For example, Deutsche Bank provided cash to Epstein knowing that he would use the cash to pay for commercial sex acts—including sexualized massages during which Epstein penetrated Jane Doe 1—forcing all Jane Does to engage in sexual activity. 40 EFTA00161997 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 41 of 163 Deutsche Bank also provided funds through wire transfers and by mail. 159. Deutsche Bank also aided and abetted Epstein's sex-trafficking venture by, among other things, providing the financial underpinnings for the venture. 160. Deutsche Bank also conspired with Epstein and others to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1591, by, among other things, adopting the purpose of providing victims for Epstein to sexually abuse. 161. Deutsche Bank enabled Epstein to have ready and reliable access to resources—including cash and a variety of bank accounts and other financial tools— to recruit, entice, solicit, harbor, provide, obtain, and transport young women and girls to sexually abuse them and to cause them to engage in commercial sex acts. 162. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally benefited financially and in other ways from its participation in Epstein's sex-trafficking venture with knowledge, or with reckless disregard to the fact, that Epstein used means of force, threats of force, fraud, and coercion (and combinations thereof) to force young women and girls to be sexually abused and to engage in commercial sex acts. 163. When considering whether to participate in the sex-trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank estimated that it would earn between $2,000,000 to $4,000,000 annually from serving as Epstein's banker. Deutsche Bank knew that being Epstein's banker required joining in the purposes of the sex-trafficking venture and funding the venture. 41 EFTA00161998 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 42 of 163 164. As recounted more fully in the paragraphs that follow, Deutsche Bank did financially benefit by earning millions of dollars from its participation in the Epstein-sex-trafficking venture. The benefits that Deutsche Bank received came directly from its participation in the sex-trafficking venture and because of its participation in that venture. In other words, there was a causal relationship between Deutsche Bank's conduct furthering Epstein's sex-trafficking venture and its receipt of the financial benefits with actual (and constructive) knowledge of that causal relationship. 165. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally financed Epstein's illegal sex-trafficking venture. Deutsche Bank knew that if it did not finance Epstein's illegal sex-trafficking venture, then it would lose valuable Epstein-related accounts. Faced with the choice between profiting from Epstein's sex-trafficking venture or following the law, Deutsche Bank intentionally chose to profit. 166. In violation of various banking laws and regulations, including various "Know Your Customer" and anti-money laundering laws, Deutsche Bank regularly authorized cash withdrawals and deposits for the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, as well as wire transfers, which allowed Epstein, his co-conspirators, and those they directed to conduct the business of the sex-trafficking venture. 167. Deutsche Bank's knowing and intentional banking law violations allowed Epstein and his various corporations to stay "under the radar" and continue 42 EFTA00161999 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 43 of 163 the sex trafficking operation without close scrutiny or interference. 168. By facilitating and financing Epstein's sexual abuse and commercial sex acts in interstate and foreign commerce, Deutsche Bank earned interest, commissions, fees, and other financial benefits directly from its connection with Epstein, Epstein-related entities, and others acting in concert with Epstein. Epstein provided those financial benefits to Deutsche Bank precisely because it was facilitating his sex-trafficking venture—and Deutsche Bank knew that was the reason that Epstein was providing them with those financial benefits. 169. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally benefited financially from Epstein's sexual abuse and sex-trafficking venture by obtaining customer accounts. Epstein and his co-conspirators even forced Jane Doe 1 to open an account at Deutsche Bank, which financially benefited Deutsche Bank and simultaneously created greater connection between Jane Doe 1 and the Epstein organization, making escape more difficult. 170. Deutsche Bank knowingly and intentionally benefited financially from Epstein's sexual abuse and sex-trafficking venture by profiting from the funds that Epstein, his co-conspirators, and his wealthy associates deposited with Deutsche Bank. 171. For example, Deutsche Bank profited financially from funds deposited by or controlled by (among other Epstein-related entities): (1) Southern Trust 43 EFTA00162000 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 44 of 163 Company, Inc., (2) Southern Financial LLC, (3) The Butterfly Trust, (4) Global Markets Account, and (5) Gratitude America. 172. Deutsche Bank benefited by receiving things of value from its participation in Epstein's sexual abuse and the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. Among the various things of value it received were: (1) connections with Epstein, his co-conspirators, and his wealthy friends and associates; (2) additional deposits from Epstein, his co-conspirators, and his wealthy friends and associates; (3) the ability to charge above-normal fees to Epstein because he was a "high risk, high reward" customer; and (4) the opportunity to earn financial benefits from the funds that had been deposited with it. Deutsche Bank knowingly received these things of value as a direct result of its participation in the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, which included actively concealing the illegality of it in order to keep the trafficking organization in business. 173. Among the women and girls whose sex trafficking and sex abuse Deutsche Bank furthered were Jane Doe 1 and the Class Members, as each would not have been abused by this scheme but for Deutsche Bank's knowing venture with Epstein to provide the financial infrastructure to the sex-trafficking criminal enterprise. 174. On July 20, 2020, the New York State Department of Financial Service (hereinafter "New York Banking Regulators") and Deutsche Bank agreed to a 44 EFTA00162001 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 45 of 163 Consent Order, which resolved the Department's investigation into Deutsche Bank's relationship with Epstein and Epstein-related entities. Deutsche Bank agreed to pay a penalty of $150 million to resolve the investigation regarding Epstein and two other customers. 175. The New York Banking Regulators found, accurately, that Deutsche Bank conducted business regarding Epstein in an unsafe and unsound manner, in violation of New York Banking Law § 44. 176. The New York Banking Regulators found, accurately, that Deutsche Bank failed to maintain an effective and compliant anti-money laundering program, in violation of 3 NYCRR § 116.2. 177. While this complaint refers to facts found by the New York Banking Regulators, the allegations made in this complaint extend beyond those facts. In particular, the regulators did not address issues surrounding Deutsche Bank's criminal liability for participating in Epstein's sex trafficking venture. This complaint sweeps more broadly and accurately alleges that Deutsche Bank engaged in intentional criminal behavior in participating in Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. 2. Banking Regulations Exist to Help Prevent Funding of Criminal Ventures. 178. The Federal Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") requires financial institutions to have adequate anti-money laundering ("AML") policies and systems in place. New York state law requires financial institutions to devise and implement systems 45 EFTA00162002 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 46 of 163 reasonably designed to identify and report suspicious activity and block transactions prohibited by law. 179. All regulated institutions are expected to configure systems based on their unique risk factors, incorporating parameters such as institution size, presence in high-risk jurisdictions, and the specific lines of business involved, and the institutions have an affirmative duty to ensure that their systems run effectively. 180. In addition to having effective AML controls in place, it is also necessary for financial institutions to monitor their customers for the purpose of preventing their customers from facilitating criminal activity using the institutions' facilities. 181. As part of preventing criminal activity, Know Your Customer ("KYC") and customer due diligence are critically important, and financial institutions must collect customer information at the time of establishing new relationships with clients, including as necessary to assess the risks associated with the client. To properly consider these risks, financial institutions must consider relevant factors such as the nature of the client's business, the purpose of the client's accounts, and the nature and duration of the relationship. 182. Financial institutions must also conduct KYC reviews for each client relationship at intervals commensurate to the AML risks posed by the client, including reviewing account activity to determine whether such activity fits with 46 EFTA00162003 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 47 of 163 what would have been expected given the nature of the account. Each client's AML risk should also be re-assessed if material new information or unexpected account activity is identified. 183. Financial institutions must also file reports with federal authorities of suspicious activities by their customers, including suspicious cash activities, known as Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs"). 184. Financial institutions must also establish criteria for determining when a client relationship poses too high of a risk and therefore must be terminated. A financial institution may facilitate illegal activity—and be liable under applicable laws—if it maintains such a relationship despite repeated indications of facilitation of improper transactions. 3. Deutsche Bank's Knowledge about the Epstein Venture. 185. The New York Banking Regulators determined, accurately, that Deutsche Bank failed in various respects to meet its Know Your Customer and other obligations fully with respect to its relationship with Jeffrey Epstein and entities related to Epstein. The motive for those failures was simple: the bank was making millions of dollars for its knowing participation in and concealment of Epstein's criminal organization. 186. In around 2013, Deutsche Bank was aware that Epstein was a wealthy man with hundreds of millions of dollars in assets and an extensive network of 47 EFTA00162004 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 48 of 163 friends and connections that included prominent financial institutions, politicians, royalty, and billionaires. 187. In around 2013, Deutsche Bank was aware that Epstein also had a well- publicized reputation related to the sexual trafficking and sexual abuse of young women. 188. Allegations against Epstein began appearing in the press as early as 2005, with the accusation that he paid a 14-year-old girl for a "massage." 189. That year, the Palm Beach Police Department in Florida began an investigation into allegations against Epstein related to his sexual abuse in Palm Beach. The investigation quickly uncovered dozens of other Epstein sex-abuse victims. The investigation also identified the Epstein sex-trafficking venture, which included a number of individuals who were responsible for recruiting young women to come to Epstein's Palm Beach mansion to give "massages" or otherwise furthering his abuse. 190. In 2006, the Palm Beach State Attorney handling the case referred the matter to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which subsequently opened its own investigation and interviewed potential witnesses and victims. 191. In September 2007, Epstein agreed to plead guilty to two felony sex offenses in Florida state court, in exchange for a federal Non-Prosecution Agreement ("NPA") providing him and his co-conspirators (including Lesley Groff, Sarah 48 EFTA00162005 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 49 of 163 Kellen, Adriana Ross, and Nadia Marcinkova) with immunity from federal prosecution for extensive federal sex-trafficking charges in Florida. The deal included incarceration and for Epstein to register as a "Sex Offender." 192. In the summer of 2008, Epstein's NPA with the U.S. Department of Justice was made public when it was unsealed in connection with a challenge brought to the NPA by two of his victims. The agreement, among other things, outlined charges that could have resulted from the investigation, including that Epstein conspired to use a facility or means of interstate commerce to induce minors to engage in prostitution, to engage in illicit sexual conduct with minors, conspiring with others to do the same, and trafficking minors. That agreement also noted that the United States had compiled "a list of individuals whom it [had] identified as victims," and that Epstein would pay for legal representation for these alleged victims. 193. Court proceedings involving the challenge to Epstein's NPA continued between 2008 and 2013 (and beyond) and attracted extensive media attention. 194. Indeed, between around 2006 and 2013, press reports outlined the allegations underlying the NPA and to varying degrees detailed the involvement of Epstein's alleged co-conspirators, including Lesley Groff, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcinkova. 195. The names of these women and other alleged co-conspirators were 49 EFTA00162006 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 50 of 163 publicly known by 2013. 196. Additionally, press reports during this time noted allegations that Epstein was involved with Eastern European women in particular and that a modeling agency he helped fund along with a known sexual abuser Jean Luc Brunel brought "young girls ... often from Eastern Europe" to the U.S. on Epstein's private jets. 197. By the time Deutsche Bank onboarded Epstein and during the relationship between the bank and Epstein and his many related entities, hundreds of pages of police reports, countless news articles, dozens of public civil lawsuits and corresponding settlements, Epstein's sexual offender registration, numerous depositions, and other overwhelming evidence of Epstein's sexual abuse was public and known to Deutsche Bank. 198. Deutsche Bank was aware of the foregoing information and more about Epstein's sex abuse and sex trafficking activities by around 2013, and also of the fact that JP Morgan was terminating its relationship with Epstein when it considered whether to begin a banking relationship with Epstein. 199. Deutsche Bank took in Epstein as a client because it knew this was an opportunity to take in a wealthy criminal that no other bank would take and make significant profits providing the infrastructure Epstein's sex trafficking operation desperately needed to continue. 50 EFTA00162007 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 51 of 163 4. Deutsche Bank Agrees to Become Epstein's Banker in 2013. 200. In 2013, Epstein, who had been banking with one of Deutsche Bank's competitors, .n) Morgan, began the process of moving his assets to Deutsche Bank. 201. The relationship between Deutsche Bank and Epstein came about through a Deutsche Bank relationship manager, Paul Morris, who had left JP Morgan bank ("JP Morgan") to join the Bank's private wealth department. At JP Morgan, Morris had been a member of the team servicing Epstein's accounts and he was aware of JP Morgan's role of facilitating Epstein's sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy. 202. Paul Morris joined Deutsche Bank in November 2012, bringing with him the knowledge he had acquired at JP Morgan about Epstein's sex-trafficking venture and conspiracy. Soon after joining Deutsche Bank, Morris suggested to senior management that Epstein was a potential client who could generate millions of dollars of revenue as well as leads for other lucrative clients to Deutsche Bank. Morris and Epstein began discussions in the spring of 2013 about a potential relationship between Deutsche Bank and Epstein. 203. In April of 2013, in preparation for establishing Deutsche Bank's relationship with Epstein, a junior relationship coordinator on the Epstein account (herein, "Relationship Coordinator-1") prepared a memorandum for Paul Morris to send to Deutsche Bank's then co-head of the Wealth Management Americas Group, 51 EFTA00162008 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 52 of 163 Charles Packard, and Patrick Harris, the Chief Operating Officer of Wealth Management Americas. 204. Among other things, the memorandum contained information concerning Epstein's previous plea deal and prison sentence for sex-trafficking related crimes. In particular, the memorandum stated that "Epstein was charged with soliciting an underage prostitution [sic] in 2007," that "[h]e served 13 months out of his 18-month sentence," and that "[h]e was accused of paying young woman [sic] for massages in his Florida home." It also highlighted that Epstein was involved in 17 out-of-court civil sex abuse settlements related to his 2007 conviction. 205. In the email to Charles Packard and Patrick Harris attaching the memorandum, Paul Moths noted how lucrative becoming Epstein's banker could be, stating "[e]stimated flows of $100-300 [million] overtime [sic] (possibly more) w/ revenue of $2-4 million annually over time." In the same email, Moths proposed that all Epstein-related accounts be for "entities" affiliated with Epstein, "not personal accounts." 206. On May 5, 2013, Charles Packard sent an email (hereinafter, the "Approval Email") to Moths, which read "spoke with [the Head of AML Compliance for Deutsche Bank Americas and the then-General Counsel for Deutsche Bank Americas, who at that time served as chair of the Bank's Americas Reputational Risk Committee ("ARRC")]. Neither suggest [that the Epstein 52 EFTA00162009 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 53 of 163 relationship] requires rep risk and we can move ahead so long as nothing further is identified through KYC and AML client adoptions." The ARRC did not meet in connection with the initial onboarding of Epstein. 207. "Rep risk" as referenced in the Approval Email referred to a review by the relevant regional reputational risk committee. Deutsche Bank's policies and procedures provided that, should a Deutsche Bank business or compliance unit identify a client that they believe could pose a reputational risk to the Bank, it must escalate that client for review by the attendant reputational risk committee. In the case of the onboarding of the Epstein relationship, this was the ARRC. 208. At the time, Deutsche Bank was aggressively expanding its U.S. wealth management business under its new co-chief executive, Anshu Jain, and was courting wealthy clients shunned by other banks. Indeed, attractive earnings multiples had driven strong investment from Deutsche Bank into asset and wealth management, as they consumed less capital than the investment banking business. Deutsche Bank officials have repeatedly called the Bank's private banking wealth management business in the Americas as a "key geographic region." Karimi et al. v. Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft et at, Case No. 2:20-cv-08978-ES-JRA (case later transferred to this Court, Case No. 1:22-cv-02854-JSR) ("Karim?), Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 37) at ¶ 84 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2021). 209. According to confidential witnesses in another case before this Court, 53 EFTA00162010 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 54 of 163 no formal KYC investigation was ever ultimately undertaken for Epstein. See Karimi, Opinion and Order (Dkt. 86) at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2022). Deutsche Bank intentionally avoided conducting such an investigation because it knew what the investigation would reveal, and that it would not be able to serve Epstein after such an investigation based on his well-documented and publicized history of sex trafficking. 210. The relationship between Deutsche Bank and Epstein officially began on August 19, 2013, when the Bank opened brokerage accounts for Southern Trust Company Inc., a self-described "database company and services" founded in the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2011, and Southern Financial LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Southern Trust Company Inc. According to the KYC record, the purposes of the brokerage accounts were to "hold marketable securities and cash" and "to invest long term [sic] with the bank," respectively. Over the course of the relationship, Epstein, his related entities, and associates would eventually open and fund more than 40 accounts at Deutsche Bank, with more than $110 million in just one of the accounts. See Karimi, Dkt. 37 at ¶ 96. 5. Epstein Uses Deutsche Bank Accounts for the Sex-Trafficking Venture. 211. From the time of Epstein's onboarding, the relationship was classified by Deutsche Bank as "high-risk" and therefore subject to enhanced due diligence requirements. Although the Bank did not initially classify Epstein as a politically 54 EFTA00162011 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 55 of 163 exposed person ("PEP"), the Bank did designate him an "Honorary PEP" because of his connections to prominent political figures. The high-risk classification and informal designation as an Honorary PEP should have resulted in enhanced transaction monitoring of activity within Epstein's accounts. However, and as discussed below, this required monitoring scrutiny was not followed. The reason that Deutsche Bank did not give this scrutiny to Epstein is that it knew that doing so would more fully reveal Deutsche Bank's participation in and responsibility for Epstein's sex-trafficking venture. 212. As early as November 1, 2013, Epstein and other co-conspirators in his sex-trafficking venture began using Deutsche Bank accounts to make wire transfers of money to facilitate Epstein's sex abuse and his sex-trafficking venture. Over the course of the relationship, Epstein and his representatives used Deutsche Bank accounts to send dozens of wires, directly and indirectly, including at least 18 wires in the amount of $10,000 or more to then known co-conspirators in the sex- trafficking venture, including Lesley Groff, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcinkova— individuals who were listed as Epstein's co-conspirators in his Non-Prosecution Agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office in Florida. 213. Deutsche Bank was aware that the recipients of some of these wire transfers described in the previous paragraph were to Epstein's co-conspirators, as described further below. Deutsche Bank was aware that its wire transfers were in 55 EFTA00162012 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 56 of 163 furtherance of Epstein's sexual abuse and the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. 214. On January 24, 2014, Deutsche Bank opened checking and money market accounts for an Epstein-related trust named "The Butterfly Trust." The Butterfly Trust included a number of beneficiaries, including, among others, Lesley Groff, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcinkova, and a number of women with Eastern European surnames. When Deutsche Bank personnel asked Epstein and Epstein's representatives about his relationship with the beneficiaries, Epstein represented that they were employees or friends. Deutsche Bank's KYC records state that the purpose of the money market account was "to pay all expenses/disbursements related to the trust [such as] taxes, trust fee [sic], etc." 215. The Butterfly Trust accounts were, like the overall Epstein relationship itself, approved for onboarding based on the earlier Approval Email from Charles Packard, despite obvious reputational and possible financial crime risks. Specifically, the beneficiaries of the Butterfly Trust included, among others, known criminal co-conspirators Lesley Groff, Sarah Kellen, and Nadia Marcinkova. The existence of co-conspirators as beneficiaries of the trust further established Deutsche Bank's actual and constructive knowledge that payments through the Trust would be used to further or coverup criminal activity and to endanger more young women and girls as victims of Epstein's sexual abuse and the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. In addition, Paul Morris had actual and constructive knowledge of 56 EFTA00162013 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 57 of 163 Epstein's sex-trafficking venture because of his previous time at JP Morgan. 216. At the time of onboarding of the Butterfly Trust accounts, Deutsche Bank was aware that the Trust's beneficiaries were co-conspirators of Epstein's prior sex trafficking-related offenses. In October 2013, a compliance officer performed background checks on the beneficiaries of the trust and flagged for Paul Morris that one of the beneficiaries, Sarah Kellen, had been alleged to be one of Epstein's co- conspirators. In reply, Morris confirmed that Kellen "was accused as a co- conspirator in a case but was never brought to trial nor ever convicted. The account for which she will be associated is a trust account which names her as a beneficiary." The alert was cleared citing the Approval Email from Paul Morris. Morris had knowledge that Kellen was part of the Epstein sex-trafficking venture. 217. While Epstein held accounts at Deutsche Bank, he used the Butterfly Trust account and various other accounts to send over 120 wires totaling $2.65 million to beneficiaries of the Butterfly Trust. These transfers furthered his sex abuse and the sex-trafficking venture, including funds paying directly for coercive and commercial sex acts, funds paid to professionals for carrying out illegal acts for the operation of the sex-trafficking venture, and paying funds to others for committing crimes necessary to continue the operation of the sex trafficking venture. 218. Epstein used Deutsche Bank accounts to pay for coerced commercial sex acts by Jane Doe 1, an individual Morris and others at Deutsche Bank knew was 57 EFTA00162014 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 58 of 163 a victim of Epstein's illegal operation. 219. Given Deutsche Bank's knowledge about Epstein's past sex trafficking, its continuation of its financial relationship with Epstein after January 24, 2014 (and earlier) was, at a minimum, in reckless disregard of the fact that Epstein was using means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion (and a combination of such means) to cause and coerce Epstein's victims to engage in commercial sex acts. 220. By way of another example of the flagrant nature of Epstein's coercive sex-trafficking operation, in around 2013 certain of Epstein's foreign victims (who essentially lived with Epstein as commercial sex slaves) began having immigration problems and risked the possibility of deportation. Epstein's solution was to force certain of his American victims to enter into same-sex marriages with his foreign victims in order to prevent deportation and to exercise even greater control over all of the victims he caused to many one another. 221. One way in which Epstein obtained victims to sexually abuse was by using sham marriages to keep control over select victims and keep them in the country. Epstein was paying fees from his Deutsche Bank account to a particular immigration attorney to coach the women who did not want to participate on what to say. Epstein also had his personal attorney — the same one that was corresponding with Deutsche Bank to coach him on circumventing reporting requirements in violation of federal structuring laws — meeting with the immigration attorney and 58 EFTA00162015 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 59 of 163 advising the women and signing related checks. 222. Epstein even arranged for Deutsche Bank to open accounts in the names of certain of his victims. In doing all this, Epstein needed to know, with absolute certainty, that his bank would not report this highly suspicious and obviously illegal activity. Even though his relationship with Deutsche Bank was brand new, he knew the bank would assist him in this multi-layered criminal aspect of his sexually abusive international operation. And the reason Epstein knew this is that Deutsche Bank had, at a minimum, tacitly agreed to participate in his sex- trafficking venture and was well aware that Epstein was a sex trafficker in need of a bank to aid in his illegal and abusive venture. 223. With the marriages, like any other aspect of their lives under the rule of Epstein, the abuse victims were given no choice about whether to marry one another. 224. Epstein demanded that they comply, and the "professionals" closest to Epstein choreographed the entire arrangement, from hiring and paying the crooked immigration attorney to falsifying records, to facilitating wire transfers, to establishing a bank account at Deutsche Bank. 225. The sham marriage scheme, which was designed solely to perpetrate continued sexual abuse and trafficking through immigration and marriage fraud, was just another example of Epstein's brazen criminality that he could never have pulled off without a complicit bank protecting him. 59 EFTA00162016 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 60 of 163 226. Epstein used Deutsche Bank for all matters relating to his criminal sex- trafficking enterprise because he knew that Deutsche Bank had agreed to disregard the fact that Epstein was using the account as part of his sex-trafficking venture. 227. Deutsche Bank financially benefited from the accounts that Epstein used for his sex-trafficking operation, including the accounts for his many related entities, the personal accounts for his longtime attorney, and the accounts for some of his victims. 228. Deutsche Bank, by providing the financial infrastructure to Epstein's illegal operation, was also able to justify charging Epstein higher. 229. In addition to actual knowledge that it was facilitating the Epstein sex- trafficking venture, Deutsche Bank benefited financially by participating in a venture that it should have known had engaged in coercive sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). 6. ARRC's Consideration of the Epstein Relationship 230. Deutsche Bank's awareness that it was facilitating Epstein's sex- trafficking venture continued to grow after January 24, 2014. 231. In 2014 and into 2015, Deutsche Bank's Anti-Financial Crime department alerted Deutsche Bank's senior management to issues concerning Epstein's sex trafficking. Deutsche Bank's senior management chose to ignore Epstein's coercion of his victims because Deutsche Bank was profiting handsomely 60 EFTA00162017 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 61 of 163 from facilitating Epstein's sex abuse and sex trafficking. 232. One issue regarding Epstein's sex trafficking arose in connection with the Bank's opening of a Global Markets account for Epstein. In January 2015, during the onboarding process for that account, a Deutsche Bank AML Compliance Officer ("AML Officer-11 identified recent developments in the press concerning Epstein, including: (1) a June 2014 federal appeals court ruling that some of Epstein's alleged victims would receive information supporting their challenge to Epstein's 2008 non-prosecution agreement, potentially reopening criminal cases for federal sex offenses against Epstein, and (2) additional allegations in the press regarding Epstein's relationships with a prominent former U.S. politician and a member of a European royal family. 233. AML Officer-1 escalated these issues to a more senior AML officer ("AML Officer-2"). In response, AML Officer-2 initially noted that the same negative allegations against Epstein had been approved by Charles Packard, the former Head of AML and the former General Counsel for the Americas and attached a copy of the Approval Email. AML Officer-1 responded that they should still run the issue by the then-Head of AFC Americas because: (1) the Approval Email was "not a direct approval by [the Head of AML Compliance for Deutsche Bank Americas and the [then] General Counsel for Deutsche Bank Americas]; it's a statement by a front office MD about his conversation with them and their alleged 61 EFTA00162018 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 62 of 163 opinion not to escalate to Rep Risk;" (2) the Head of AML Compliance was no longer at the Bank; and (3) there were new developments in Epstein's case that could lead to the reopening of his 2008 plea deal. 234. As a result of these discussions and additional media reports regarding Epstein's association with prominent political figures, AML Officer-2 put the question of whether to escalate before Patrick Harris, who agreed to escalate to the ARRC. In the email to Patrick Harris, AML Officer-2 noted that the communication underpinning the Approval Letter occurred before these new developments and for further background also noted, among other things, that "[b]y 2011, 40 underage girls had come forward with testimony of Epstein sexually assaulting them" and that "Epstein [had] managed to settle at least 17 lawsuits out of court." 235. Later that month, on January 22, 2015, in preparation for the ARRC meeting, Charles Packard and Paul Morris met privately and in person with Epstein at his New York home. The private meeting was held in Epstein's Manhattan mansion. During the meeting, Packard asked Epstein about his involvement in sex trafficking. In response, Epstein allegedly "explained away" suspicious transactions, including large cash withdrawals and payments to Russian accounts that appeared suspicious in that they may have been indicators of sex trafficking and coercive commercial sex acts. Epstein's denials were not credible. 236. During the meeting at Epstein's home, trafficking victims were in the 62 EFTA00162019 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 63 of 163 house, as they always were, and openly observable by Packard and Morris. 237. Tellingly, and perhaps because of what Packard and Morris saw, Packard and Morris did not make any contemporaneous record of their meeting with Epstein. The reason they did not make a record of Epstein's denials was that any such record would have been utterly implausible. 238. Through information and belief, other Deutsche Bank employees also met with Epstein personally outside the bank and made observations consistent with Epstein's daily sex trafficking activities, which included being surrounded by certain of his victims. 239. Other than perfunctory, private meetings with Epstein to get their stories straight, Deutsche Bank did not take any other steps at the time to investigate the veracity of the allegations about Epstein being involved in sex abuse and sex trafficking. The reason Deutsche Bank did not take further steps to investigate the veracity of the allegations is because it knew that such investigation would only further confirm the allegations. 240. On January 30, 2015, members of the ARRC, including Stuart Clarke, Chief Operating Officer for the Americas and General Manager of Deutsche Bank's New York branch, and Jan Ford, a Managing Director and Deutsche Bank Americas Head of Compliance and a member of the North America Executive Committee and the Global Compliance Executive Committee, met to discuss the Epstein 63 EFTA00162020 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 64 of 163 relationship. Despite the fact that Deutsche Bank's policies and procedures mandate that detailed minutes of such meetings be kept, Deutsche Bank did not make any record of this important meeting. Deutsche Bank decided not to make a record of this meeting because a record would have demonstrated that it knew, and was acting in reckless disregard of the fact, that Epstein was using his Deutsche Bank accounts to cause his victims, thorough means of force, fraud, and coercion, to be sexually abused and to engage in commercial sex acts. 241. In a recent case before this Court, it was alleged that a confidential witness (identified only as "CW1") reported that the way this meeting was conducted flouted all of Deutsche Bank's rules about how such meetings should be handled. Specifically, the private meeting at Epstein's bar has been described as a "due diligence meeting" by Deutsche Bank. However, Deutsche Bank's own rules lay out how such diligence meetings are to be conducted when dealing with high risk clients. CW1 explained: "There are meant to be minutes taken, there is meant to be a thorough record of the meeting, allegations are meant to be put to the client in writing and the client is generally expected to have his lawyer or advisor, and often also his accountant, with him." Both sides are meant to sign off on the minutes of such meetings. Failing to abide by these regulations is a disciplinary offense at Deutsche Bank. According to CW1, however, neither Packard nor Monis were ever disciplined. See Karimi, Dkt. 37 at ¶ 87. 64 EFTA00162021 Case 1:22-cv-10018-JSR Document 42 Filed 01/13/23 Page 65 of 163 242. The reason that Deutsche Bank did not comply with its own rules described in the preceding paragraph is that it knew that compliance with the rules would create a paper trail about its awareness of its complicitly in Epstein's sex- trafficking. 243. Later that day, a member of the ARRC emailed Charles Packard to say, without explanation, that the committee was "comfortable with thing