Text extracted via OCR from the original document. May contain errors from the scanning process.
Oro Tam
Class Attie.,
Personal Injury
Wrongful Death
Commercial Liogation
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing,
Edwards, Fistos Et Lehrman, P.L.
January 29, 2015
Wilfredo A. Ferrer
United States Attorney
Southern District of Florida
99 N.E. 4th Street
Miami, FL 33132
RE:
Jane Does I and 2 v. United States
Case No. 9:08-cv-80736-KAM
Dear Mr. Ferrer:
As you know, we have corresponded with you in the past on the Crime Victims' Rights
Act case captioned above. And you met with Jane Doe No. 1 several years ago, promising (as
we understood it) to do what could be done to help protect crime victims' rights in this case.
It is in that spirit that we are writing to request your assistance on three motions that we
are planning to make shortly in this case. We hope that you will be able to agree to all three
requests. We will be filing these motions on Friday, February 6, 2015. Accordingly, the favor of
a reply by Wednesday, February 4, 2015, is requested.
I. Motion to Amend the Victims' Petition to Conform to Evidence.
The first motion will be a motion to amend the victims' petition in this case to conform to
the evidence that has developed. As you may recall, Jane Doe No. 1 filed her petition for
enforcement of her rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, on
July 7, 2008. See Exhibit 1. At that time, Jane Doe No. 1 and the other victs were unaware of
the existence of a non-prosecution agreement (NPA). After that day, the victims gradually
became aware of the existence of the NPA, as reflected in Jane Doe's reply in support of her
petition. See Exhibit 2. And in proceedings held over the next few months, Judge Marra ordered
that the NPA be made available to the victims. Unable to reach a stipulation with your office, in
425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax
EFTA00210758
Wilfredo A. Ferrer
January 29. 2015
Page 2
March 2011, Jane Doe No. I (and Jane Doe No. 2) filed a detailed motion for summary
judgment, making a series of detailed allegations about the NPA and Government efforts to
conceal it from the victims. See Exhibit 3.
In light of the course of litigation, it is now appropriate for Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe
No. 2 to amend their petition to reflect the existence of the NPA and the current theories being
pursued (by both sides) in this case. As you know, Federal Rule of Civil 15 allows for an
amended pleading to be filed, either on consent of the opposing party or with permission of the
Court. The rule also provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice
so requires."
In compliance with Rule IS, Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 are seeking your
consent to file the attached, two-page amended petition that conforms to the evidence and
theories that have developed since their initial filing. See Exhibit 4. As you know, the case is
still in a discovery phase. Your Office has not yet completed production of documents in the
case. None of the allegations in the proposed amended complaint go beyond the victims'
existing pleadings. See, e.g., Exhibit 3. We don't see any good faith basis for you to withhold
consent to the victims' first request to amend their petition to conform to the evidence. We hope
that you will consent.
2. Motion to Add Two New Parties.
A separate question is presented by Jane Doe No. I and Jane Doe No. 2's request to add
two new parties into the case. We had previously asked your consent for a motion by Jane Doe
No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 to join the case. You declined to provide consent, and that matter is
now in litigation. Compare DE 280 (victims' motion to join) with DE 290 (government's
opposition).
We are now asking your consent for a Rule 15 amendment of the existing petition that
would add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 into the case. In particular, we are asking for
your consent to add nine words in the (proposed) First Amended Petition — i.e., the underlined
words in the following sentence: "Petitioners Jane Doe No. 1, Jane Doe No. 2, Jane Doe. No. 3,
and Jane Doe No. 4 (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the petitioners"), now adults, were as
minor girls the victims of federal sex crimes committed by Jeffrey Epstein ...."
As you know, in 2008 your Office did not object to adding Jane Doe No. 2 into this
litigation, recognizing that she was a victim of Epstein's crimes and had interests at stake in the
case. We continue to be perplexed that you are not extending the same consideration to Jane
Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4.
We are aware that your Office recently filed a pleading raising a technical objection to
Jane Doe No. 3 entering the case. The pleading argued that Jane Doe No. 3 had failed to comply
with a six-year statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401 for tort claims against the
Government. DE 290 at 5. Curiously, however, that same pleading acknowledged that the
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos Et Lehrman, P.L.
425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax
EFTA00210759
Wilfredo A. Ferrer
January 29, 2015
Page 3
CVRA enforcement action is an "ancillary criminal proceeding[]," DE 290 at 2, presumably not
covered by a statute of limitations applicable to a "civil action commences against the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).
Even more surprising to us was your Office's failure to discuss the second sentence in §
2401(a), which provides that the six-year rule is not applicable to "any person . . . beyond the
seas at the time the claim accrues . . ." Your Office sent FBI agents to Australia to interview
Jane Doe No. 3 in 2011, and clearly was aware that she was "beyond the seas" — and thus, under
the plain language of the statute, not obligated to file within six years. We don't see any good
faith basis for your Office maintaining that the six-year provision applies in light of its
knowledge that she hiding from Epstein in Australia.
But to avoid further unnecessary litigation about such subjects, we hope that you will
agree to a Rule 15 amendment to simply add Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 into the case.
A Rule 15 amendment obviates statute of limitations concerns, because it "relates back to the
date of the original pleading" by "assert[ing] a claim . . . that arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the original pleading." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(c)(1XB). Jane Doe No. 1's initial petition plainly mentioned other victims. The
initial petition alleged that, "[u]pon information and believe, [Jeffrey Epstein] is engaged in plea
negotiations with the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida
concerning federal crimes which he is alleged to have committed against minor children,
including [Jane Doe No. 1]." DE 1 at 1-2. Jane Doe No. l's petition went on to allege that the
Government was violating not only her rights but the rights of other similarly-situated victims:
"On information and belief, rough the same crimes were committed [by Epstein] against several
other young females. These victims, too, are in danger of losing their right to confer under the
CVRA." DE 1 at 7 n.2 (emphasis added).
After a Government response admitting that he had reached a secret plea deal, Jane Doe
No. I filed a reply in support of her petition, which again very directly mentioned other victims.
The reply stated: "This deferred prosecution agreement was reached without conferral with [Jane
Doe No. 1] — or, indeed, with the many other young victims of [Epstein's] crimes." DE 9 at 1
(emphasis added). The reply went on to explain that the agreement "remarkably allowed the
defendant — a billionaire with extraordinary political connections — to escape all federal
prosecutions for dozens of serious federal sex offenses against minors." Id. at 1-2. The reply
continued to explain relief sought, specifically that "[t]he Court should therefore declare the
proposed non-prosecution agreement an illegal one, since it was reached in violation of the
CVRA, and order the Government to confer with Petitioner and the other victims in this matter
before reaching any disposition in this case." Id. at 2 (emphasis added). The petition asked the
Court to "hold that [Jane Doe No. 1] and the other victims in this case had the right to confer
with the Government before it reached its non-prosecution agreement." Id. at 8 (emphasis
added); see also id (the Government kept Jane Doe No. 1 "and the many other victims of
[Epstein's] federal sex offenses . . . in the dark about the fact that the Government was planning
to reach a deal . . . ."); id at 10 (the Government did not use "its `best efforts' to protect the
rights of [Jane Doe No. 1] (and the other victims) in this case when it failed to confer with her
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos ft Lehrman, P.L.
425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax
EFTA00210760
Wilfredo A. Ferrer
January 29, 2015
Page 4
about the non-prosecution agreement."). Jane Doe No. 1 asked for the "obvious remedy" — i.e.,
that the court "declare the non-prosecution agreement illegal and direct that the Government
proceed to negotiate a new agreement . . . in a process that respects [Jane Doe No. 1's] (and the
other victims) rights." Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
After filing the complaint, Jane Doe No. 1 and Jane Doe No. 2 followed up with a
summary judgment motion, on March 21, 2011, which raised very specific allegations about Jane
Doe No. 3, i.e., that "Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one underage girl on his private jet for the
purpose of forcing her to have sex with him and others. Epstein forced this underage girl to be
sexually exploited by his adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, businessmen, and
professional and personal acquaintances." DE 48 at 4 (citing Complaint, Jane Doe No. 102 v.
Epstein, No. 9:09-cv-80656-ICAM (S.D. Fla. May 1, 2009) (complaint filed on behalf of Jane
Doe No. 3, identified as "Jane Doe No. 102")).
In light of all these facts, we believe that a Rule 15 amendment adding Jane Doe No. 3
and Jane Doe No. 4 is clearly proper and would "relate back" to the original filing, thereby
eliminating time-consuming litigation about statute of limitations issues. Courts have commonly
allowed Rule 15 amendment that relate back in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Andujar v.
Rogowski, 113 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing addition of new plaintiffs even after a
statute of limitations had expired).
We write to you about this request, hoping that you will consider it not as an adversary of
Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4, but rather as their ally. As you know, the CVRA obligates
all prosecutors to use their "best efforts to see that crime victims are . . . accorded the rights [in
the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(cX1). We have come up with a Rule 15 amendment as a way to
accord Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 their rights. We are, of course, open to your best
efforts to find other ways that might achieve the same goal.
We realize, of course, that you may have some factual dispute about whether or not your
Office fully protected their rights during the course of the Epstein investigation and ultimate non-
prosecution. But the point of this letter is not to ask to you to agree that any rights have been
violated — that issue can await litigation on the merits. Our request is a much narrower one: We
merely want your assistance to help Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4 get their "day in court."
We hope that you will agree to that narrow request through the narrow, nine-word Rule 15
amendment we propose.
3. Motion to Intervene.
As a fallback position to the pending motion to join and the proposed Rule 15 motion, we
are also writing to ask for your non-opposition to Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4's motion
to intervene in the case. As you know, Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
intervention on two grounds: Mandatory intervention is allowed where a putative intervenor
"claims an inter relating to the . . . transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated
that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos Ft Lehrman, P.L.
425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax
EFTA00210761
Wilfredo A. Ferrer
January 29, 2015
Page 5
protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest." Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(a). Permissive intervention is allowed where an intervenor "has a claim or defense that shares
with the main action a common question of law or fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Jane Doe No. 3
and Jane Doe No. 4 obviously have common issues associated with the current litigation. In
particular, they are seeking invalidation of the NPA to the extent that it bars prosecution of
crimes committed against them. They clearly meet the requirements for intervention.
We are making this request for non-opposition to Jane Doe No. 3 and Jane Doe No. 4's
motion to intervene recognizing that just a few days ago your Office did not oppose a motion to
intervene in the case by Alan Dershowitz. See DE 294 ("The Government does not oppose the
Motion for Limited Intervention by Alan M. Dershowitz.").
If your Office is not going to
oppose a motion by a suspected co-conspirator of Epstein's to intervene in the case, we trust that
you will extend the same courtesy to young woman who is alleging that he repeatedly sexually
abused her. We ask for this courtesy particularly in light of our strong belief that your Office
possesses evidence that will help corroborate her allegations — evidence about which your Office
has studiously remained silent.
Thank you in advance for your assistance on each of these three requests.
If you are
unwilling to agree to any of these requests, the victims would request a telephone conference call
with you personally so that they could bring their concerns to your attention.
Very truly yours,
Bradley J. Edwards
Paul G. Cassell
S.J. Quinney College of Law at the
University of Utah•
BJE: mwk
Enclosures
This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is
not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah
Farmer, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos Et Lehrman, P.L.
425 North Andrews Avenue • Suite 2 • Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
954.524.2820 office 954.524.2822 fax
EFTA00210762
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 EllackiLlt of DJ D.C.
ELE
08-80736-Civ-MARRA/JOHNSON
CASE NO.:
Petitioner.
JULY 7, 2008
S.D. or FLA. • MIAMI
Etners ewe y VICTIM'S PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT, 18 U.S.0 . SECTION 3771
COMES NOW the Petitioner, JANE DOE (hereinafter "Petitioner"), by and through her
undersigned attorneys, pursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771
(`•CVRA"), and files this Petition for Enforcement in the above styled action as follows:
1.
Petitioner, an adult, as a minor child was a victim of federal crimes committed by
JEFFREY EPSTEIN (hereinafter "Defendant").
These crimes included sex trafficking of
children by fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, use of a means of interstate commerce to
entice a minor to commit prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422, as well as wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The Defendant committed these crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Southern District of Florida in Palm Beach County, Florida.
I
Upon information and belief, the Defendant is the subject of a federal criminal
investigation conducted by the United States of America in the Southern District of Florida. The
Defendant has recently been prosecuted and pleaded guilty, on June 30, 2008, in the Circuit
Court for Palm Beach County to various similar state offenses including solicitation of minors
for prostitution.
3.
Upon information and belief, the Defendant is engaged in plea negotiations with
the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Florida concerning federal
Id w
EFTA00210763
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 2 of 10
crimes which he is alleged to have committed against minor children, including the Petitioner.
Such negotiations may likely result in a disposition of the charges in the next several days.
4.
Under the CVRA, before any charges are filed against the Defendant, the
Petitioner has the rights (among others) to notice of her rights under the CVRA, to confer with
the prosecutors, and to be treated with fairness. As soon as charges are filed, the Petitioner has
the rights (among others) to timely notice of court proceedings, the right not to be excluded from
such proceedings, the right to be heard at such public proceedings regarding conditions of
release, any plea, and any sentence, the right to confer with the attorney for the government, the
right to restitution, and the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for her dignity and
privacy.
5.
The Petitioner has been denied her rights in that she has received no consultation
with the attorney for the government regarding the possible disposition of the charges, no notice
of any public court proceedings, no information regarding her right to restitution, and no notice
of rights under the CVRA, as required under law.
6.
The Petitioner is in jeopardy of losing her rights, as described above, if the
government is able to negotiate a plea or agreement with the Defendant without her participation
and knowledge.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons outlined above, the Petitioner respectfully requests this
Court to grant her Petition, and to order the United States Attorney to comply with the provisions
of the CVRA prior to and including any plea or other agreement with the Defendant and any
attendant proceedings.
2
2 Oa
EFTA00210764
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 3 of 10
MEMORANDUM
I.
THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT MAKES CRIME VICTIMS
INDEPENDENT
PARTICIPANTS
THROUGHOUT
THE
In October 2004, Congress passed and the President signed into law the Crime Victims'
Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2251 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3771). Because this
appears to be the first case involving the Act to come before this Court, a bit of background may
be in order.
A.
The CVRA Gives Crime Victims Rights to Participate in the Criminal Justice
Process.
Congress passed the CVRA "to give crime victims enforceable rights to participate in
federal criminal proceedings." Opinion at 14. Congress was concerned that in the federal system
crime victims were "treated as non-participants in a critical event in their lives. They were kept
in the dark by prosecutors too busy to care enough ... and by a court system that simply did not
have a place for them." 150 CoNG. REC. S4262 (Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
To remedy this problem, Congress gave victims "the simple right to know what is going on, to
participate in the process where the information that victims and their families can provide may
be material and relevant ... ." Id.
The CVRA gives victims of federal crimes a series of rights, including the right to notice
of court proceedings, to be heard at plea and sentencing hearings, and to reasonably "confer with
the attorney for the Government in the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a). Victims also have a "right
of access to the terms of a plea agreement ... ." In re Interested Party I, 530 F.Supp. 2d 136,
2008 WL 134233 at •7 (D.D.C. 2008). The CVRA also assures victims broadly that they will
"be treated with fairness." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(aX8).
3
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 4 of 10
Of course, these rights would be of little use to most crime victims unless they were told
about them. To ensure that victims are notified of their rights, the CVRA directs employees of
the Justice Department "and other departments and agencies of the United States engaged in the
detection, investigation, or prosecution of crime" to use their "best efforts to see that crime
victims are notified of... the rights described [in the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1) (emphasis
added).1
B.
The CVRA Gives Victims Rights During the Investigation of a Crime.
The CVRA gives victims rights during the investigation of a crime. The Fifth Circuit
recently reached this conclusion, holding:
The district court acknowledged that Itihere are clearly rights
under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway."
BP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at *11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893,
at *36. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment of
victims' "reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
Government." 1$ U.S.C.
3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of
this case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other
situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable
way to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and
to ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea
bargain.
In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 394 (5i)1 Cir. 2008).
The position that CVRA rights apply before charges have been filed is consistent with the
Justice Department regulations under the CVRA, which explain that government officials "must
advise a victim [about their rights under the CVRA] ... at the earliest opportunity at which it may
be done without interfering with an investigation." A.G. GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS
I Further supporting this requirement is another statute, 42 U.S.C. § I0607(0(3). which directs government officials
to provide victims with "the earliest possible notice of," among other things, "the filing of charges against a
suspected offender."
4
4o110
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 5 of 10
NWP
ASSISTANCE 23 (May 2005). And the plain language of the CVRA undergirds this conclusion, as
it applies not simply to prosecutors but to government agencies "engaged in the detection (and]
investigation ... of crime ... ." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(c)(1). Indeed, if there were any doubt, the plain
language of the CVRA extends victims' right to situations "in which no prosecution is
underway." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(dX3).
II.
PETITIONER IS A "VICTIM PROTECTED BY THE CVRA.
Under the CVRA the crime victim is defined as "a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of a Federal offense ... ." 18 U.S.C. Section 3771(e).
In
particular, Defendant called Petitioner when she was a minor over a telephone (a means of
interstate communication) requesting that she perform a massage in exchange for payment. As
Defendant well knew, that request was fraudulent, as he not only intended to receive a massage,
but also intended to have her perform sexual acts in exchange for a cash payment to Petitioner.
Only when Petitioner arrived at a Defendant's mansion as directed by Defendant, did Defendant
reveal his true purpose of obtaining sexual favors in exchange for payment. This conduct
violated 18 U.S.C. § 2422, which forbids using a means of interstate commerce to knowingly
"induce" or "entice" a minor "to engage in prostitution." In addition, this conduct was both a use
of "fraud" to obtain a commercial sex act, in violation of 18 U.S.0 § 1591, and use of wire
communications to perpetrate a "scheme and artifice to defraud," in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1343.
It appears obvious that Petitioner was "directly and proximately" harmed by these crimes,
thereby making her a victim under the CVRA. It should be emphasized that the CVRA "was
designed to be a 'broad and encompassing' statutory victims' bill of rights." United States v.
5
5 el 10
EFTA00210767
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 6 of 10
Degenhardt, 405 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1342 (D. Utah 2005) (quoting 150 Cong. Rec. S4261 (daily
ed. Apr. 22, 2004) (statement of Sen. Feinstein)). Congress intended the CVRA to dramatically
rework the federal criminal justice system. In the course of construing the CVRA generously, the
Ninth Circuit observed: "The criminal justice system has long functioned on the assumption that
crime victims should behave like good Victorian children -- seen but not heard. The Crime
Victims' Rights Act sought to change this by making victims independent participants in the
criminal justice process." Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal, 435 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.
2006). Accordingly, because the CVRA is remedial legislation, courts should interpret it
"liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and intent."
Elliott Industries Ltd.
Partnership v. BP America Production Co., 407 F.3d 1091, 1118 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting
remedial legislation should be "interpreted liberally to facilitate and accomplish its purposes and
intent"). The CVRA itself suggests this conclusion by requiring that courts must treat crime
victims with "fairness." United States v. Patkar, 2008 WL 233062 at •3 (D. Flaw. 2008) (citing
United States v. Turner, 367 F.Supp.2d 319,335 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
Not only must the CVRA as a whole be interpreted liberally, but its definition of "crime
victim" requires a generous construction. After reciting the direct-and-proximate-harm language
at issue here, one of the Act's two co-sponsors -- Senator Kyl -- explained that "Mills is an
intentionally broad definition because all victims of crime deserve to have their rights protected
." 150 Cong. Rec. S10912 (Oct. 9, 2004) (emphasis added). The description of the victim
definition as "intentionally broad" was in the course of floor colloquy with the other primary
sponsor of the CVRA and therefore deserves significant weight. See Kenna, 435 F.3d at 1015-16
(discussing significance of CVRA sponsors= floor statements).
6
6010
EFTA00210768
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 7 of 10
'ter
Noir
The definition of "crime victims" must thus be construed broadly in favor of Petitioner.
She obviously qualifies as a "victim" under the CVRA.
III.
Because Petitioner is a "victim" under the CVRA, she has certain protected rights under
the Act. Most important, the Act promises that she will have an opportunity to "confer with the
attorney for the Government in the case." To date, Petitioner has not been given that right. This
raises that very real possibility that the Government may negotiate and conclude a plea agreement
with the Defendant without giving Petitioner her protected rights.2
Petitioner is entitled to have this conference with prosecutors before any final plea
agreement is reached. The Fifth Circuit reached exactly this conclusion in a very recent case. In
In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5ih Cir. 2008), the Government negotiated a plea agreement with the
well-heeled corporate defendant without conferring with the victims. When the Government's
failure was challenged in the Fifth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Government had
indeed violated the CVRA. The Fifth Circuit observed: "In passing the [CVRA], Congress
made the policy decision-which we arc bound to enforce-that the victims have a right to inform
the plea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached."
Id. at 394.
This Court is obligated to protect the rights of Petitioner. The CVRA directs that "[i]n
any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the
2 On information and belief, roughly the same crimes were committed against several other young females. These
victims, too, are in danger of losing their right to confer under the CVRA.
7
7 al 10
EFTA00210769
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 8 of 10
crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(bX1). The
CVRA also confers on crime victims the right to "assert the rights described in [the CVRA)." 18
U.S.C. § 3771(O1). Therefore, this Court has its own independent obligation to intercede and
ensure that the Government respects the rights of Petitioner under the CVRA.
CONCLUSION
The Petitioner requests the intervention of this Court to ensure that her rights are
respected and accorded, as promised in the Crime Victims' Rights Act.
DATED this 7th day of July, 2008.
Respectfully Submitted,
ASSOCIATES, LLC
Brad Edwards, Esquire
Attorney for Petitioner
Florida Bar #542075
2028 Harrison Street
Suite 202
Hollywood, Florida 33020
Telephone:
954-414-8033
Facsimile:
954-924-1530
8
o 010
EFTA00210770
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 1 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/07/2008 Page 9 of 10
vI
Net
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing h
provided by United States mail and via facsimile to:
United States Attorney's Office, 500 South Australian Avenue, Suite 400, West Palm Beach,
Florida 33401, this 7th day of July, 2008.
Brad Edwards, Esquire
Attorney for Petitioner
Florida Bar No. 542075
9
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EFTA00210772
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 1 of 17
CASE NO.: 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON
Petitioner.
FILED by —
- D.C.
JUL 11 1 2101
51555N M. LAMM /RE
CLERK V.S. 0150 CT.
5.0. OF FLO, -
05
VICTIM'S REPLY TO GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PETITION
FOR ENFORCEMENT OF CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 3771
AND OBJECTION TO GOVERNMENT'S MOTION FOR SEALING OF PLEADINGS
COMES NOW the Petitioner, JANE DOE, by and through her undersigned attorney,
pursuant to the Crime Victim's Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. Section 3771 ("CVRA"), and files this
Reply to the Government's Response to her Emergency Petition for Enforcement and Objection
to the Sealing of the Pleadings in this matter as follows:
INTRODUCTION
Four days ago (July 7ib), Petitioner filed in this Court a motion seeking enforcement of
(among other rights) her right to "confer" with the prosecution before a plea arrangement is
reached disposing of the criminal charges involving her — a right promised to her in the Crime
Victims Rights Act (CVRA). See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5) (victims of crime have the "reasonable
right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case"). Two days later (July 91h), the
Government sent her a notice that, in light of defendant, Jeffrey Epstein's entry of guilty pleas to
various state charges and 18-month jail sentence, the Government had agreed to defer all federal
prosecution — including any federal prosecution for the federal crimes committed against ler.
This deferred prosecution agreement was reached without conferral with Petitioner — or, indeed,
with the many other young victims of the defendant's crimes. And the agreement remarkably
EFTA00210773
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 2 of 17
al owed the defendant — a billionaire with extraordinary political connections -- to escape all
federal prosecution for dozens of serious federal sex offenses against minors.
On July 9th, the Government also filed with this Court a response to the Petitioner's
petition for enforcement of her CVRA rights. In its response, the Government argues that it did
not need to confer with Petitioner because there was no formal "court proceeding" pending at the
time the Government negotiated this non-prosecution agreement. This position ignores the plain
language of the CVRA - which extends the right to confer to any "case," not any "co ort
proceeding" — and flies in the face of the Fifth Circuit's recent decision that is squarely on point -
In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (51" Cir. 2008). Perhaps in recognition of the weakness of its position,
the Government goes on to argue that it used its "best efforts" to comply the CVRA. But the
Government never conferred with Petitioner about the agreement — so the Government's efforts
fall well short of affording Petitioner her right to confer. Finally, the Government claims that it
disclosed some of its activities to Petitioner in this case (identified as "C.W." in the Government's
pipers). But neither Petitioner nor undersigned counsel were ever notified of the proposed non-
prosecution agreement.
To the contrary, undersigned counsel was advised that a federal
indictment was in the works. For all these reasons, the Government's response lacks merit. The
Court should therefore declare the proposed non-prosecution agreement an illegal one. since it
was reached in violation of the CVRA, and order the Government to confer with Petitioner and
the other victims in this matter before reaching any disposition in this case.
The Government also apparently proposes to keep its activities in this case secret, by filing
documents under seal. It bears emphasizing that none of the pleadings in this matter discloses,
either directly or indirectly, the identity of a minor victim. In light of this fact, the Government
2
EFTA00210774
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 3 of 17
bears a heavy burden in deviating from the ordinary rules, a burden it has not carried. There is no
sound basis for keeping the pleadings in this matter sealed. Moreover, the matter is one of
exceptional public interest — involving what appears to Petitioner to be a "sweetheart" non-
pr3secution agreement for multiple sex crimes against children committed by a well connected
billionaire. Accordingly, the papers in this case should be lodged in the Court's public file.
I.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO "CONFER"
The Crime Victims' Rights Act promises Petitioner that she will have "(t)he reasonable
right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(5)
(emphasis added).
To justify its failure to confer here, the Government's lead argument in its
response is that there was no "court proceeding" in this case that triggered Petitioner's right to
confer. Gov't Response at 1-2. The Government's position flouts the plain language of the
CVRA. The CVRA guarantees to Petitioner the right to confer with prosecutors "in the case' —
not in a "court proceeding." Indeed, the fact that (as the Government notes) the drafters of the
C`/RA used the term "court proceeding" elsewhere in the statute makes it obvious that they
intended to give victims a right to confer that extended beyond simple court proceedings -- that is,
the right to confer about "the case."
Obviously there was "a case" going on in this matter for some time.
Indeed, the
Government sent notice to Petitioner more than a year ago that 'your case is under investigation?'
See Letter from A. Marie Villafatia to C.W. at 2 (June 7, 2007) (attached to Governmen'.'s
Response) (emphasis added). The notice went on to tell Petitioner that "as a victim and/or
witness of a federal offense, you have a number of rights." Id. at 1. Of course, she would not
have had those rights if she was not covered by the CVRA. Interestingly, the letter also advised
3
EFTA00210775
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 4 of 17
Petitioner that "if you believe that the rights set forth above [e.g., the right to confer and other
CVRA rights] are being violated, you have the right to petition the Court for relief." Id. at I.
If there were any doubt that the drafters of the CVRA intended for its rights to extend to
pre-indictment situations, they disappear in light of the CVRA's instruction that a crime victim
wio seeks to assert rights in pre-indictment situations should proceed in the court where the
crime was committed: The rights described in subsection (a) [of the CVRA] shall be asserted in
the district in which a defendant is being prosecuted for the crime or, (j no prosecution is
undentuy, in the district court in the district in which the crime occurred." 18 U.S.C. §
3771(d)(3) (emphasis added).
Petitioner noted the importance of this language in her opening
Petition, see Emergency Victim's 5, but the Government chose not to discuss it in its reply.
In a case remarkably similar to this one, the Fifth Circuit has recently held that victims
have a right to confer with federal prosecutors even before any charges are filed. In In re Dean,
527 F.3d 391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008), a wealthy corporate defendant reached a generous plea ckal
with the Government — a deal that the Government concluded and filed for approval with the
district court without conferring with the victims. When challenged on a mandamus petition by
the victims, the Fifth Circuit held:
The district court acknowledged that "[t]here are clearly rights
under the CVRA that apply before any prosecution is underway."
BP Prods., 2008 WL 501321 at *11, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12893, at •36. Logically, this includes the CVRA's establishment
of victims' 'reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
Government." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). At least in the posture of
this case (and we do not speculate on the applicability to other
situations), the government should have fashioned a reasonable way
to inform the victims of the likelihood of criminal charges and to
ascertain the victims' views on the possible details of a plea bargain.
/a. at 394.
4
EFTA00210776
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 5 of 17
As we understand the Government's response, it asks this Court to decline to follow the
Fifth Circuit's holding and create a split of authority on this important issue. See Gov't Response
at 2-3. Notably, the Government does not cite any cases supporting its position. Instead, the
Government would have this Court deviate from the Fifth Circuit's well-reasoned opinion because
the Circuit's "discussion of the scope of the right to confer was unnecessary because the co Jrt
ultimately declined to issue mandamus relief" Gov't Response at 2 (citing Dean, 527 F.3d at
395). This is simply untrue. The Fifth Circuit faced a petition for mandamus relief from The
victims in that case, asking that a proposed "binding" plea agreement negotiated under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(c)(l)(C) (i.e., a plea agreement obligating the judge to impose a specific sentence) be
rejected. The victims asked for that relief because of the Government's failure to confer with
them before the charges and accompanying plea agreement were filed. The Fifth Circuit held t tat
the victims' rights had been violated in the passages quoted above. It then went on to remand .he
waiter to the district court for further consideration of the effect of the violations of the victims'
rights:
We arc confident, however, that the conscientious district court will fully consider
the victims' objections and concerns in deciding whether the plea agreement should
be accepted.
The decision whether to grant mandamus is largely prudential. We conclude that
the better course is to deny relief, confident that the district court will take heed
that the victims have not been accorded their full rights under the CVRA and will
carefully consider their objections and briefs as this matter proceeds.
527 F.3d at 396. Obviously, the Fifth Circuit could not have instructed the District Court to "take
hed" of the violations of victims' rights unless it has specifically held, as a matter of law, that tie
victims' rights had been violated.
The Government's next effort to deflect the force of the Fifth Circuit's decision is that the
5
EFTA00210777
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 6 of 17
Circuit did not directly quote three words found in the CVRA's right to confer — the words "in
the case." See Gov't Response at 2. But the Fifth Circuit had received briefs totaling close to
100 pages in that case and was obviously well aware of the statute at hand. Indeed, in the very
paragraph the Government claims is troublesome, the Fifth Circuit cited to the district co art
opinion under review, which had quoted all the words in the statute. See United States v. SP
Producis, 2008 WL 501321 at •7 (noting victims right to confer "in the case"), cited in In re
Dean, 527 F.3d at 394.
The Government finally notes that the Fifth Circuit properly stated that its ruling about the
Government violating the right to confer applied "in the posture of this case." 527 F.34 at 394.
Bit the posture of this case — at least in its relevant aspects -- is virtually identical to the posture
there. The Fifth Circuit held that the Government had an obligation to confer with the victims
before charges ;sere filed and before a final plea arrangement Has reached. Without giving the
victims a chance to confer before hand, the plea agreement might be fatally flawed because it did
not consider the concerns of the victims. Thus, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the need to confer
with victims before any disposition was finally decided: "The victims do have reason to believe
that their impact on the eventual sentence is substantially less where, as here, their input is
received after the parties have reached a tentative deal. As we have explained, that is why ..ve
conclude that these victims should have been heard at an earlier stage." Id. at 395. The posture
in this case is exactly the same — the Government should have conferred before the parties
"reached a tentative deal." The fact that the deal reached here is slightly different than the deal
reached in the Dean case (a non-prosecution agreement versus a plea agreement) is truly a
distinction without a difference. If anything, the facts here cry out for conferral even more than in
6
EFTA00210778
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 7 of 17
that case. At least the defendant there agreed to plead guilty to a federal felony. Here, the
wealthy defendant has escaped all federal punishment — a plea deal that Petitioner would have
strenuously objected to . .. if the Government had given her the chance.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Dean has been cited in one very recent District Court
decision, which provides further support for Petitioner's position here. In United States v. Rubin,
2008 WI. 2358591 (E.D.N.Y. 2008), the victims argued for extremely broad rights under the
CVRA. After citing Dean, the District Court agreed that the rights were expansive and could
apply before indictment, but subject to the outer limit that the Government be at lean
"contemplating" charges:
Quite understandably, movants perceive their victimization as having begun long
before the government got around to filing the superseding indictment. They also
believe their rights under the CVRA ripened at the moment of actual victimization,
or at least at the point when they first contacted the government. Movants rely on
a decision from the Southern District of Texas for the notion that CVRA rights
apply prior to any prosecution. In United States v. BP Products North America,
Inc., the district court reasoned that because § 3771(d)(3) provided for the
assertion of CVRA rights "in the district court in which a defendant is being
prosecuted for the crime or, if no prosecution is underway, in the district court in
the district in which the crime occurred," the CVRA clearly provided for "rights ...
that apply before any prosecution is underway." (United States v. BP Products
North America, Inc., Criminal No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321 at *11 (S.D.Tex.
Feb.21, 2008) (emphasis in original), mandamus denied in part, In re Dean, No.
08-20125, 2008 WL 1960245 (5ib Cir. May 7, 2008). But, assuming that it was
within the contemplation and intendment of the CVRA to guarantee certain
victim's rights prior to formal commencement of a criminal proceeding, the
universe of such rights clearly has its logical limits. For example, the realm of cases
in which the CVRA might apply despite no prosecution being "underway," cannot
be read to include the victims of uncharged crimes that the government has not
even contemplated. It is impossible to expect the government, much less a court,
to notify crime victims of their rights if the government has not verified to at least
an elementary degree that a crime has actually taken place, given that a
corresponding investigation is at a nascent or theoretical stage.
Id. at •6. Here, of course, the criminal investigation went far beyond the "nascent or theoretical
7
EFTA00210779
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 8 of 17
stage" — to a point where the Government determined that crimes had been committed and that
the defendant should plead guilty to either a state or federal offense.
For all these reasons, the Court should follow the Fifth Circuit and hold that Petitioner and
the other victims in this case had the right to confer with the Government before it reached its
non-prosecution agreement.
II.
THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT USED ITS "BEST EFFORTS" TO COMPLY
WITH THE CRIME VICTIM'S RIGHTS ACT.
The Government next argues that it has somehow used its "best efforts" to comply with
the CVRA in this case. Gov't Response at 3. The bulk of the Government's arguments concern
varous notices that it sent to victims.
Buried in the middle of these arguments is the
Government's stark concession that proves Petitioner's claim: "[TJhe specific terms of thn
negotiation here not disclosed prior to a final agreement being reached because the Government
believed doing so }maid jeopardize and prejudice the prosecution in the event an agreement
could not be made." Gov't Response at 6 (emphasis added). In other words, Petitioner — and the
many other victims of the defendant's federal sex offenses — was deliberately kept in the dark
about the fact that the Government was planning to reach a deal that would permit the defendant
to escape all federal punishment in favor of an 18-month county jail sentence. This bald decision
to conceal from the victims what was happening violated the basic premise of the Crime Victim's
Rights Act: that victims deserve to know what is happening in their cases.
Congress was
concerned that in the federal system crime victims were "treated as non-participants in a critical
event in their lives. They were kept in the dark by prosecutors too busy to care enough ... and by
a court system that simply did not have a place for them." 150 CONG. REc. 54262 (Apr. 22.
2044) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). To remedy this problem, Congress gave victims "the simple
8
EFTA00210780
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 9 of 17
right to know what is going on, to participate in the process where the information that victim
and their families can provide may be material and relevant ... ." Id.
The CVRA required the Government to confer with Petitioner and consider her views
about the proposed arrangement in this case. Indeed, the Government's own regulations require
prosecutors to "consider victims' views about prospective plea negotiations." U.S.DEP'T OF
WITNESS ASSISTANCE 30 (2005). Congress obviously intended for victims to have a meaningfil
role in the criminal justice process.
The Fifth Circuit recently confronted — and rejected — a very similar claim from the
Government that it did not need to meaningfully confer with crime victims.
There, tire
Government's purported justification for failing to confer was the risk of pre-trial publicity to the
defendant. The Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed that argument, holding: "Congress made the
policy decision -- which we are bound to enforce -- that the victims have a right to inform the plea
negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached." Id. a
395. In this case, too, this Court is "bound to enforce" Congress' decision that prosecutors
confer with victims before reaching a plea agreement.
The Government is not entitled to pick and choose which particular cases it will give
victims the right to confer. In support of its remarkable position, the Government cites a
provision in the CVRA that provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to impair
the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction." 18 U.S.C.
§ 377I(c)(6). But the Government made the same argument in the Dean case - and lost. The
Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court decision that enforcing the right to confer might impair
9
EFTA00210781
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 10 of 17
prosecutorial discretion with the following statement: "[Giving the right to confer to victims] is
not an infringement, as the district court believed, on the government's independent prosecutor al
ditcretion, . . . instead, it is only a requirement that the government confer in some reasonable
wry with the victims before ultimately exercising its broad discretion." 574
Moreover, the Government's asserted justification for failing to confer is transparently
flimsy. It asserts that, if the victims had been told that the plea agreement gave them advantages
in civil litigation against the defendant, then that would have "provid[ed] Epstein the means of
impeaching the victim witnesses . . . ." Gov't Response at 5. But obviously the victims were
already subject to impeachment on that ground — even if no plea agreement was ever reached.
The defense attorneys presumably would have asked all of the victims at any criminal trial ahoat
the possibility that they could pursue civil litigation against the defendant if he was convicted.
The plea agreement did not change the obvious fact that a criminal conviction - whether by plea
agreement or by jury trial - would facilitate civil claims by the victims of the defendant's crimes.
In light of all this, this Court should reach the obvious conclusion: The Government did
not use its "best efforts" to protect the rights of Petitioner (and the other victims) in this cane
when it failed to confer with her about the non-prosecution agreement.
III.
The Government finally makes a factual argument about the state of negotiations in this
cate. The brief discussion (see Gov'ts Response at 7-8) is somewhat vague. One short passage
in the response, however, seems to assert that Petitioner was given some sort of notice about tF.e
plea agreement about nine months ago. Gov't Response at 7 ("in October 2007, C.W. was not
represented by counsel. . . . She was given telephonic notice of the agreement, as were three other
to
EFTA00210782
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 11 of 17
victims.").
If the Government is asserting that Petitioner was told that a non-prosecution agreement
had been reached with the defendant as early as October 2007, Petitioner strongly disputes this
alleged "fact." To the contrary, undersigned counsel was told by federal prosecutors within the
last 60 days that a federal "indictment" was under consideration.
Petitioner does not believe that the Government is truly asserting that she was told about a
non-prosecution agreement because, elsewhere in its brieC the Government makes the opposi:e
assertion: IT/he specific terms of the negotiation here not disclosed prior to a final agreemex
being reached because the Government believed doing so Mould jeopardize and prejudice the
prosecution in the event an agreement could not he made." Gov't Response at 6 (emphasis
added).
Because of the confusion about what the Government is truly asserting, Petitioner
requests an opportunity to address the facts directly with the Court at the hearing. If necessary,
Petitioner also requests leave of Court after the hearing to provide whatever supplemental
infbrmation (by way of affidavit or otherwise) that would be needed to prove that she was never
told that the Government was considering a federal non-prosecution agreement with the
defendant, much less given a chance to confer with the Government on this extraordinarily lenient
disposition.
IV.
For all these reasons, it is obvious that Petitioner's right to confer was violated in this
cast. The question then arises as to the appropriate remedy. The obvious remedy is to declare
EFTA00210783
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 12 of 17
the non-prosecution agreement illegal and direct that the Government proceed to negotiate a new
agreement -- in a process that respects Petitioner's (and the other victims') rights.
The non-prosecution agreement here violates federal law.
As described by tie
Government (the victims have not been even given the courtesy of a copy of the agreement), tie
agreement prevents federal prosecution of the defendant for numerous sex offenses. Yet Cie
agreement was reached without giving Petitioner her right to confer — a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
3771(O5).
When other plea arrangements have been negotiated in violation of federal law, they have
been stricken by the courts. For example, United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1990,
held that where a sentence on a new crime could not run concurrently with a probation revocation
the defendant was then serving — contrary to the assumption of the parties to the plea agreement —
the defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement.
The Court
explained that the case was one "in which the bargain is vitiated by illegality . . ." Here, of
course, exactly the same is true: the non-prosecution agreement is vitiated by illegally — namely,
the fad that it was negotiated in violation of the victims' rights. Other cases reach similar
conclusions. See. e.g.. United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995) (prosecutor agreed
to recommend probation, but it now appears that would be an illegal sentence in this case, and
thus the only adequate remedy is to allow defendant to withdraw the plea); Craig v. People, 986
P.2d 951 (Colo. 1999) (because "neither the prosecutor nor the trial court have authority to
modify or waive the mandatory parole period," such "is not a permissible subject of plea
negotiations," and thus, even if "the trial court erroneously approves of such an illegal bargain"
such plea is "invalid" and thus will not be specifically enforced). Nor can the defendant claim
12
EFTA00210784
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 13 of 17
some right to specific performance of an illegal non-prosecution agreement. See State v. Garcia,
582 N.W.2d 879 (Minn. 1998) (plea agreement for 81 months sentence, but court added 10-year
conditional release term because, under facts of case, a sentence without such release term was
"plainly illegal," and thus the remedy of specific performance not available); State v. Will, 348
N.C. 671, 502 S.E.2d 585 (1998) (plea agreement was for sentence to be concurrent with one not
yet completed, but state statute mandates consecutive sentence on facts of this case; "defendant is
not entitled to specific performance in this case because such action would violate the laws of this
stale"); Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); (where "the plea bargain seemed
fair on us face when executed, it has become unenforceable due to circumstances beyond the
cortrol of [the parties], namely the fact that one of the enhancement paragraphs was
mischaracterized in the indictment, resulting in an illegal sentence far outside the statutory range,"
proper remedy is plea withdrawal, as "there is no way of knowing whether the State would have
offered a plea bargain within the proper range of punishment that he deemed acceptable"); State v.
Marzone. •
W.Va. 368, 572 S.E.2d 891 (2002) (where plea agreement was that defendant
would plead guilty to 2 felony counts of felon in possession of firearm and prosecutor would
dismiss the remaining 6 counts re other offenses with prejudice, and all parties erroneously
believed these 2 crimes were felonies, lower court "correctly resolved this unfortunate
predicament by holding that a plea agreement which cannot be fulfilled based upon legal
impossibility must be vacated in its entirety, and the parties must be placed, as nearly as possible,
in the positions they occupied prior to the entry of the plea agreement").
This Court is obligated to take steps to protect Petitioner's rights. Under the CVRA, "[i]n
any court proceeding involving an offense against a crime victim, the court shall ensure that the
13
EFTA00210785
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 14 of 17
crime victim is afforded the rights described in [the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)( I ). The
CVRA also confers on crime victims the right to "assert the rights described in [the CVRA]." 18
U.S.C. § 3771(d)(I).
Obviously there is now a court proceeding before this Court in which
Petitioner is asserting rights under the CVRA. This Court must therefore protect her rights 3),
declaring the non-prosecution agreement invalid.
V.
THE PUBLIC IS ENTITLED TO SEE THE GOVERNMENT'S EXPLANATIONS
FOR
ITS
EXTRAORDINARILY
LENIENT
NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENT.
The Government has also filed its pleadings in this matter under seal. There is no sound
rerson for concealing from the public the Government's explanations in this matter. Accordingly,
the Government's pleadings should be unsealed.
The Government offers two explanations for sealing its pleadings. First, the Government
clams that the pleading would reveal correspondence with minors. Gov't Motion at 1. But the
Government has redacted the names of the minors involved (including Petitioner's name), so thee
is no good basis for sealing. (Counsel does respectfully request that the Government double-
check its redactions to make sure that no name has been overlooked.) Indeed, the very statute
that the Government cites (18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2)) envisions that minors' names will be redacted
and then the remaining pleadings made available to the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(d)(2) ("The
person who makes a filing [involving a minor] shall submit to the clerk of the court . . . the paper
with the portions of it that disclose the name of or other information concerning a child redacted,
to be placed in the public record') (emphasis added).
Second, the Government asserts that its pleading should be kept under seal "to maintain
the confidentiality of the agreement reached with an interested party." Gov't Motion at 2.
14
EFTA00210786
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 15 of 17
Petitioner believes exactly the opposite is true — confidentiality will undermine public confidence
in the federal criminal justice system.
This case involves a non-prosecution agreement with a politically-connected billionaire
that has drawn considerable public attention. See, e.g., Palm Beach Post.Com, Banker Epstein
Pleads in Prostitution Case. Gets 18 Months (June 30, 2008) ("He lives in a Palm Beach
waterfront mansion and has kept company with the likes of President Bill Clinton, Prince Andrew
and Donald Trump, but investment banker Jeffrey Epstein will call the Palm Beach County jail
hone for the next 18 months").
The public is entitled to know all of the circumstancas
surrounding this federal (non) prosecution. The public may well wonder — as Petitioner does in
this case — why a defendant who committed multiple sex crimes over an extended period of time
against numerous minor victims is receiving only an 18-month jail sentence and a "free pass" fro n
the federal government. If the Government had conferred with Petitioner, she would have
explained why this proposed disposition did not begin to reflect "the seriousness of the offense "
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that the district courts must make substantial findings
before sealing records in cases before it. For instance, in United States v. Ochoa-Vasque, 428
F.3d 1015 (10 Cir. 2005), it reversed an order from this Court that had sealed pleadings in a
criminal case, emphasizing the importance of the public's historic First Amendment right of access
to the courts. To justify sealing, "a court must articulate the overriding interest along with
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was
properly entered." Id. at 1030.
The Government has not discussed the controlling court
authority on sealing orders, much less attempted to prove that there is an "overriding interest*
15
EFTA00210787
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9
Entered on FLSD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 16 of 17
justifying sealing. For this reason, the Government's attempts to keep secret what has been done
in this case should be rejected and its motion for scaling of its response denied.
CONCLUSION
The Petitioner requests the intervention of this Court to ensure that her rights arc
respected and accorded, as promised in the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The Court should enter
an order finding the non-prosecution agreement in this case was negotiated in violation of the
CVRA and therefore is illegal and invalid. The Court should also deny the Government's motion
to seal its pleadings in this case.
DATED this Ilth day of July, 2008.
Respectfully Submitted,
ASSOCIATES, LLC
Brad Edwards, Esquire
Attorney for Petitioner
Florida Bar #542075
2028 Harrison Street
Suite 202
Hollywood, Florida 33020
Telephone:
954-414-8033
Facsimile:
954-924-1530
16
EFTA00210788
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 9 Entered on Ft..SD Docket 07/11/2008 Page 17 of 17
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has born
provided by hand delivery in open court to the Attorney appearing on behalf of the United States
Attorney's Office, this I I h day ofJuly 2008.
Brad Edwards, Esquire
Attorney for Petitioner
Florida Bar No. 542075
17
EFTA00210789
Case 9:08-cv-80736-I<AM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 1 of 42
Case No. 08-80736-Civ-Marra/Johnson
JANE DOE #1 and JANE DOE #2
v.
UNITED STATES
JANE DOE #1 AND JANE DOE ff2'S MOTION FOR FINDING OF VIOLATIONS OF
THE CRIME VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON
COME NOW Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (also referred to as "the victims"), by and
through undersigned counsel, to move for a finding from this Court that the victims' rights under
the Crime Victims Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771, have been violated by the U.S.
Attorney's Office, and to request a hearing on the appropriate remedies for these violations.
The victims have proffered a series of facts to the Government, which they have failed to
contest. Proceeding on the basis of these facts,' it is clear that the U.S. Attorney's Office has
repeatedly violated the victims' protected CVRA rights, including their right to confer with
prosecutors generally about the case and specifically about a non-prosecution agreement the
Office signed with the defendant, as well as their right to fair treatment.
See 18 U.S.C.
3771(a)(5) & (8).
It is now beyond dispute, for example, that in September 2007, the U.S. Attorney's
Office formally signed a non-prosecution agreement with Jeffrey Epstein that barred his
The victims are contemporaneously filing a motion to have their facts accepted by the
Court.
1
EFTA00210790
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 2 of 42
prosecution for numerous federal sex offenses he committed against the victims (as well as
against many other minor girls). Rather than confer with the victims about this non-prosecution
agreement, however, the U.S. Attorney's Office and Jeffrey Epstein agreed to a "confidentiality"
provision in the agreement barring its disclosure to anyone — including the victims. For the next
nine months, as Epstein was well aware, the U.S. Attorney's Office assiduously concealed from
the victims the existence of this signed non-prosecution agreement. Indeed, the Office went so
far as to send (in January 2008) a false victim notification letter to the victims informing them
that the "case is currently under investigation." In fact, the U.S. Attorney's Office had already
resolved the case three months earlier by signing the non-prosecution agreement. Again on May
30, 2008, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent yet another victim notification letter to a recognized
victim informing her that the "case is currently under investigation" and that it "can be a lengthy
process and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation."
Then in June 2008, on the eve of consummating Epstein's state guilty plea that was part of the
non-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office asked legal counsel for the victims to
send a letter expressing the victims' views on why federal charges should be filed — not
disclosing to the victims' legal counsel that this was a pointless exercise because the non-
prosecution agreement had already been signed some nine months earlier.
These actions and many more like them constitute clear violations of Jane Doe #1 and
Jane Doe #2's rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act, including the right to confer with
prosecutors and the right to fair treatment The only argument that the U.S. Attorney's Office
advances is that the CVRA does not apply because no indictment was formally filed in this case.
But this position is inconsistent with both the CVRA's plain language, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2
EFTA00210791
Case 9:08-cv-80736-1<AM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 3 of 42
3771(c)(1) (Justice Department agencies involved in the "detection" and "investigation" of
federal crimes covered by CVRA), and with persuasive case law, see, e.g., In re Dean, 527 F.3d
391, 394 (5th Cir. 2008) (victims should have been notified before pre-indictment plea reached).
Moreover, the U.S. Attorney's Office itself was fully aware of its obligations to notify the
victims in this case, as e-mails from the Office and other evidence make perfectly clear. The
only reason that the Office concealed the existence of the non-prosecution agreement from the
victims was not to comply with some legal restriction, but rather to avoid a firestorm of public
controversy that would have erupted if the sweetheart plea deal with a politically-connected
billionaire had been revealed.
The Court should accordingly find that the U.S. Attorney's Office — in coordination with
Jeffrey Epstein -- has violated the Act and set a briefing schedule and hearing on the proper
remedy for those violations.
Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 offer the following statement of undisputed material facts.
If the Government disputes any of these facts, the victims request an evidentiary hearing to prove
each and every one of them:2
1. Between about 2001 and 2007, defendant Jeffrey Epstein (a billionaire with significant
political connections) sexually abused more than 30 minor girls at his mansion in West Palm
2 The Court should accept all these facts as true for reasons the victims explain in their
contemporaneously-filed Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2's Motion to Have Their Facts Accepted
Because of the Government's Failure to Contest Any of The Facts. The Court should also direct
the Government to produce all evidence that it possesses supporting these facts, for reasons the
victims explain in their contemporaneously-filed Jane Doe NI and Jane Doe #2's Motion for
Order Directing the U.S. Attorney's Office Not to Withhold Relevant Evidence.
3
EFTA00210792
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 4 of 42
Beach, Florida, and elsewhere. Among the girls he sexually abused were Jane Doe #1 and Jane
Doe #2. Epstein performed repeated lewd, lascivious, and sexual acts on them, including (but
not limited to) masturbation, touching of their sexual organs, using vibrators or sexual toys on
them, coercing them into sexual acts, and digitally penetrating them. Because Epstein used a
means of interstate commerce and knowingly traveled in interstate commerce to engage in abuse
of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 (and the other victims), he committed violations of federal law,
including repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2422. See, e.g., Complaint, E.W. v. Epstein, Case
No. 50 2008 CA 028058 XXXXMB AB (15th Cir. Palm Beach County, Florida); Complaint,
L.M. v. Epstein, Case No 50 2008 CA 028051 XXXXMB AB (15th Cir. Palm Beach Count,
Florida).
2. Jeffrey Epstein flew at least one underage girl on his private jet for the purpose of
forcing her to have sex with him and others. Epstein forced this underage girl to be sexually
exploited by his adult male peers, including royalty, politicians, businessmen, and professional
and personal acquaintances. Complaint, Jane Doe No. 102 v. Epstein, No. 9:09-CV-80656-
KAM (S.D. Ha. May 1, 2009).
3. In 2006, at the request of the Palm Beach Police Department, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation opened an investigation into allegations that Jeffrey Epstein and his personal
assistants had used facilities of interstate commerce to induce young girls between the ages of
thirteen and seventeen to engage in prostitution, among other offenses. The case was presented
to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, which accepted the
case for investigation. The Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was also investigating
EFTA00210793
Case 9:O8-cv-8O736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 5 of 42
the case. See generally U.S. Attorney's Correspondence, Exhibit "A" to this filing (hereinafter
cited as "U.S. Attorney's Correspondence" and referenced by Bates page number stamp).
4. The FBI soon determined that both Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were victims of
sexual assaults by Epstein while they were minors beginning when they were approximately
fourteen years of age and approximately thirteen years of age respectively. Jane Doe #1, for
example, provided detailed information about her abuse (and the abuse of Jane Doe #2) to the
FBI on August 7, 2007. Exhibit "B."
5. More generally, the FBI through diligent investigation established that Epstein
operated a large criminal enterprise that used paid employees and underlings to repeatedly find
and bring minor girls to him. Epstein worked in concert as part of the enterprise with others,
including Ghislane Maxwell and Jean Luc Brunel, to obtain minor girls not only for his own
sexual gratification, but also for the sexual gratification of others. The FBI determined that
Epstein had committed dozens and dozens of federal sex crimes against dozens of minor girls
between 2001 and 2007. They presented information to the U.S. Attorney's Office for criminal
prosecution. See Exhibit "B"; U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 47-55.
6. On about June 7, 2007, FBI agents hand-delivered to Jane Doe #1 a standard CVRA
victim notification letter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its
"best efforts" to protect Jane Doe #1's rights, including "(t]he reasonable right to confer with the
attorney for the United States in the case" and "to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding
in the district court involving .
plea . ..." The notification further explained that "fejt this
time, your case is under investigation." That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane
Doe #1 as a victim of a federal offense and as someone protected by the CVRA. Jane Doe #1
5
EFTA00210794
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 6 of 42
relied on these representations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these
rights and keep her informed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit "C."
7. On about August 11, 2007, Jane Doe #2 received a standard CVRA victim notification
letter. The notification promised that the Justice Department would makes its "best efforts" to
protect Jane Doe #2's rights, including "[t]he reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the
United States in the case" and "to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district
court involving ... plea .. .." The notification further explained that "[a]t this time, your case is
under investigation." That notification meant that the FBI had identified Jane Doe #2 as a victim
of a federal offense and as someone protected by the CVRA. Jane Doe #2 relied on these
representations and believed that the Justice Department would protect these rights and keep her
informed about the progress of her case. See Exhibit "D."
8. Early in the investigation, the FBI agents and an Assistant U.S. Attorney had several
meetings with Jane Doe #I. Jane Doe #2 was represented by counsel that was paid for by the
criminal target Epstein and, accordingly, all contact was made through that attorney.
9. In and around September 2007, plea discussions took place between Jeffrey Epstein,
represented by numerous attorneys (including lead criminal defense counsel Jay Lefkowitz), and
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida, represented by Assistant U.S.
Attorney A. Marie Villafafia and others. The plea discussions generally began from the premise
that Epstein would plead guilty to at least one federal felony offense surrounding his sexual
assaults of more than 30 minor girls. From there, the numerous defense attorneys progressively
negotiated more favorable terms so that Epstein would ultimately plead to only two state court
6
EFTA00210795
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 7 of 42
felony offenses and would serve only county jail time. Many of the negotiations are reflected in
e-mails between Lefkowitz and the U.S. Attorney's Office. See generally Exhibit "A."
10.
The evidence supporting these
charges was overwhelming, including the interlocking consistent testimony of several dozen
minor girls, all made automatically admissible in a federal criminal sexual assault prosecution by
operation of Fed. R. Evid. 414. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 4.
12. The correspondence also shows that the U.S. Attorney's Office was interested in
finding a place to conclude a plea bargain that would effectively keep the victims from learning
what was happening through the press. The Office wrote in an e-mail to defense counsel:'
The
7
EFTA00210796
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 8 of 42
U.S. Attorney's Office was aware that most of the victims of Epstein, including Jane Doe #1 and
Jane Doe #2, resided well outside the Miami area in the West Palm Beach area. The Office was
also aware that the chances of press coverage of a case filed in Miami would be significantly less
likely to reach the;Palm Beach area. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 29.
13. On about September 24, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Jay
Lefkowitz, criminal defense counsel for Epstein, regarding the agreement. The e-mail stated that
the Government and Epstein's counsel
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 153 (emphases added).
14. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz
stating:
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 156.
15. On about September 26, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent an e-mail to Lefkowitz
in which she stated: illiMallan
8
EFTA00210797
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48 Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 9 of 42
Apparently the lillegreed
to between the Government and Epstein's
defense counsel was that no mention would be made of the non-prosecution agreement between
the U.S. Attorney's Office and Epstein, as no subsequent mention was made to the victims of the
non-prosecution agreement and a confidentiality provision was made part of that agreement (as
discussed below). U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 359.
16. On about September 25, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Jefkowitz
in which it suggested that the victims should be represented in civil cases against Epstein by
someone who was not an experienced
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 157. The U.S. Attorney's Office continued to
push a different attorney in part because it would reduce publicity, explaining that
Id.
17. On about September 24, 2007, Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office formally
reached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of
prosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office accordingly entered
into a "Non-Prosecution Agreement" (NPA) reflecting their agreement. Most significantly, the
NPA gave Epstein a promise that he would not be prosecuted for a series of federal felony
offenses involving his sexual abuse of more than 30 minor girls. The NPA instead allowed
Epstein to plead guilty to two state felony offenses for solicitation of prostitution and
9
EFTA00210798
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 10 of 42
procurement of minors for prostitution. The NPA also set up a procedure whereby a victim of
Epstein's sexual abuse could obtain an attorney to proceed with a civil claim against Epstein,
provided that the victim agreed to limit damages sought from Epstein. To obtain an attorney
paid for by Epstein, the victim would have to agree to proceed exclusively under 18 U.S.C. §
2255 (i.e., under a law that provided presumed damages of $150,000 against Epstein — an
amount that Epstein argued later was limited to $50,000). The agreement was signed by Epstein
and his legal counsel, as well as the U.S. Attorney's Office, on about September 24, 2007. Non-
Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit "E."
IS. Epstein insisted on, and the U.S. Attorney's Office agreed to, a provision in the non-
prosecution agreement that made the agreement secret. In particular, the agreement stated: "The
parties anticipate that this agreement will not be made part of any public record. If the United
States receives a Freedom of Information Act request or any compulsory process commanding
the disclosure of the agreement, it will provide notice to Epstein before making the disclosure."
By entering into such a confidentiality agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office put itself in a
position that conferring with the crime victims (including Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2) about
the non-prosecution agreement would violate terms of the agreement — specifically the
confidentiality provision. Indeed, even notifying the victims about the agreement would
presumably have violated the provision. Accordingly, from September 24, 2007 through at least
June 2008 — a period of more than nine months -- the U.S Attorney's Office did not notify any of
the victims of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement. Epstein was well aware of this
failure to notify the victims and, indeed, arranged for this failure to notify the victims. Id.; U.S.
10
EFTA00210799
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 11 of 42
Attorney's Correspondence at 270; Transcript of Hearing in this case on July 11, 2008, at 4-6,
18-19, 22-23, 28-29 (hereinafter cited as "'Tr. July 11, 2008").
19. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the U.S. Attorney's Office — pushed
by Epstein — wanted the non-prosecution agreement kept from public view because of the intense
public criticism that would have resulted from allowing a politically-connected billionaire who
had sexually abused more than 30 minor girls to escape from federal prosecution with only a
county court jail sentence. Another reasonable inference is that the Office wanted the agreement
concealed at this time because of the possibility that the victims could have objected to the
agreement in court and perhaps convinced the judge reviewing the agreement not to accept it.
20. The Non-Prosecution Agreement that had been entered into between the U.S.
Attorney's Office and Epstein was subsequently modified by an October 2007 Addendum and a
December 19, 2007, letter from the U.S. Attorney to Attorney Lilly Ann Sanchez. The U.S.
Attorney's Office did not confer with any of the victims about these modifications of the
agreement (or even notify them of the existence of these modifications) through at least June
2008 — a period of more than six months. See Supplemental Declaration of A. Marie Villafafia
(doc. #35, at 1); U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 234-37; Tr. July 11, 2008, 18-19, 22-23, 28-
29.3
21. In October 2007, shortly after the initial plea agreement was signed, FBI agents
contacted Jane Doe #1. On October 26, 2007,
n
et in person with Jane Doe #1. The Special Agents explained that Epstein would
3 On about August 14, 2008, Epstein's defense counsel told the U.S. Attorney's Office
that they did not consider the December 19, 2007, letter to be operative.
1!
EFTA00210800
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 12 of 42
plead guilty to state charges involving another victim, he would be required to register as a sex
offender for life, and he had made certain concessions related to the payment of damages to the
victims, including Jane Doe #1. During this meeting, the Special Agents did not explain that an
agreement had already been signed that precluded any prosecution of Epstein for federal charges
against Jane Doe #1. The agents could not have revealed this part of the non-prosecution
agreement without violating the terms of the non-prosecution agreement. Whether the agents
• themselves had been informed of the existence of the non-prosecution agreement by the U.S.
Attorney's Office is not certain. Because the plea agreement had already been reached with
Epstein, the agents made no attempt to secure Jane Doe #1's view on the proposed resolution of
the case. Exhibit "E," Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23.
22. Jane Doe /Ws (quite reasonable) understanding of the Special Agent's explanation
was that only the State part of the Epstein investigation had been resolved, and that the federal
investigation would continue, possibly leading to a federal prosecution. Jane Doe #1 also
understood tier own case was move forward towards possible prosecution. Tr. July 11, 2008, at
4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 28-29.
23. On about November 27, 2007, Assistant U.S. Attorney
sent an e-mail to
Jay Lefkowitz, defense counsel for Epstein. The e-mail stated that the U.S. Attorney's Office
had an obligation to notify the victims
12
EFTA00210801
Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 13 of 42
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 255 (emphasis rearranged).
24. On about November 29, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a draft of a crime victim
notification letter to Jay Leflcowitz, defense counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. The notification letter
would have explained:
The letter then would have gone on to explain
that Epstein would
The
letter would not have explained that, as part of the agreement with Epstein, the Justice
Department had previously agreed not to prosecute Epstein for any of the numerous federal
offenses that had been committed. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 256-59.
25. Because of concerns from Epstein's attorneys, the U.S. Attorney's Office never sent
the proposed victim notification letter discussed in the previous paragraph to the victims.
Instead, a misleading letter stating that the case was "currently under investigation" (described
below) was sent in January 2008 and May 2008. At no time before reaching the non-prosecution
agreement did the Justice Department notify any victims, including for example Jane Doe #I,
about the non-prosecution agreement. The victims were therefore prevented from exercising
their CVRA right to confer with prosecutors about the case and about the agreement. Epstein
13
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Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 48
Entered on FLSD Docket 03/21/2011 Page 14 of 42
was aware of these violations of the CVRA and, indeed, pressured the U.S. Attorney's Office to
commit these violations. Tr. July 11, 2008, at 9.
26. On about December 6, 2007, Jeffrey H. =,
First Assistant U.S. Attorney sent a
letter to Jay Lefkowitz, noting the U.S. Attorney's Office's legal obligations to keep victims
informed of thellEll==MI
The letter stated:
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92 (emphasis added).
27. Despite this recognition of its obligation to keep victims
about the non-prosecution agreement, the U.S. Attorney's Office did not follow through and
inform the victims of the non-prosecution agreement. To the contrary, as discussed below, it
continued to tell the victims that the case was "under investigation." Tr. July 11, 2008, at 4-5,
18-19, 22-29.
28. On December 13, 2007, the U.S. Attorney's Office sent a letter to Jay Lefkowitz,
defense counsel for Epstein, rebutting allegations that had apparently been made against the
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AUSA handling the case by the Epstein defense team. (The Justice Department concluded the
allegations were meritless.) The letter stated that a federal indictment against Epstein a t
The letter also recounted
that
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 269.
29. The December 13, 2007, letter also reveals that the Justice Department stopped
making victim notifications because of
U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 270 (emphasis added). It was a
deviation from the Justice Department's standard practice to negotiate with defense counsel
about the extent of crime victim notifications.
30. The December 13, 2007, letter also demonstrates that the Justice Department was well
aware of who the victims of Epstein's sexual offenses were. The Justice Department was
prepared to make notifications to the victims, but suspended those notifications only because
objections from defense counsel. Id.
31. The December 13, 2007, letter reveals it would have been possible to confer with the
victims about the Non-Prosecution Agreement. The U.S. Attorney's Office was fully able to
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confer with Epstein's counsel about the parameters of the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but
refused to confer with Epstein's victims about the Agreement. Id.
32. Following the signing of the Agreement and the modifications thereto, Epstein's
performance was delayed while he sought higher level review within the Department of Justice.
See U.S. Attorney's Correspondence passirn. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that
Epstein used his significant political and social connections to lobby the Justice Department to
avoid significant federal prosecution. The Justice Department has in its possession internal
documents (i.e., phone logs, emails, etc.) that would reveal the event of those lobbying efforts.
The Justice Department, however, has refused to make these materials available to the victims.
33. On January 10, 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 received letters from the FBI
advising them that "[Obis case is currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process
and we request your continued patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Exhibits
"F" & "G." The statement in the notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false. The case
was not currently "under investigation." To the contrary, the federal cases involving Jane Doe
#1 and Jane Doe #2 had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement entered into by Epstein
and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Moreover, the FBI did not notify Jane Doe
#1 or Jane Doe #2 that a plea agreement had been reached previously, and that part of the
agreement was a non-prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of Florida. Exhibit "E." Whether the FBI was aware of this fact at this time is unclear.
In any event, the FBI was acting at the direction of the U.S. Attorney's Office, which clearly did
not confer with Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 about the case and, by concealing the true state of
affairs, and failed to treat Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 with fairness. Epstein was aware of
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these actions of the U.S. Attorney's Office and, indeed, solicited these actions of the U.S.
Attorney's Office. U.S. Attorney's Correspondence at 191-92, 270.
34. Jane Doe NI and Jane Doe #2 relied on the representations of the U.S. Attorney's
Office to their detriment. Had they known the true facts of the case — i.e., that Epstein had
negotiated a non-prosecution agreement — they would have taken steps to object to that
agreement. Tr. July 11, 2008 at 4-6, 18-19, 28-29.
35. Undersigned counsel believes that the FBI was lead to believe that their investigation
of Epstein was going to lead to a federal criminal prosecution and that the FBI was also mislead
by the U.S. Attorney's office about the status of the case.
36. In early 2008, Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 believed that criminal prosecution of
Epstein was extremely important. They also desired to be consulted by the FBI and/or other
representatives of the federal government about the prosecution of Epstein. In light of the letters
that they had received around January 10, they believed that a criminal investigation of Epstein
was on-going — including investigation into Epstein's crimes against them — and that they would
be contacted before the federal government reached any final resolution of that investigation. Tr.
July 11, 2008, at 4-6, 18-19, 22-23, 2.8-29.
37. On January 31, 2008, Jane Doe #1 met with FBI Agents and AUSA's from the U.S.
Attorney's Office. She provided additional details of Epstein's sexual abuse of her. The
AUSA's did not disclose to Jane Doe #I at this meeting (or any other meeting) that they had
already negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Epstein. Exhibit "H."
38. On about February 25, 2008,
sent an e-mail to Jay
Lefkowitz, Epstein's criminal defense counsel, explaining that the Justice Department's Child
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Exploitation Obscenity Section (CEOS) had agreed to review Epstein's objections to the
proposed plea agreement that had been reached with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of Florida. The letter indicated that, should CEOS reject Epstein's objections to the
agreement, then
U.S. Attorneys Correspondence at 290-91.
39. On May 30, 2008, another of Mr. Edwards's clients who was recognized as an Epstein
victim by the U.S. Attorney's Office, received a letter from the FBI advising her that "folds case
rs currently under investigation. This can be a lengthy process and we request your continued
patience while we conduct a thorough investigation." Exhibit "I." The statement in the
notification letter was misleading and, in fact, false.
The case was not currently "under
investigation." To the contrary, the case had been resolved by the non-prosecution agreement
entered into by Epstein and the U.S. Attorney's Office discussed previously. Exhibit "E."
40. In mid-June 2008, Mr. Edwards contacted the AUSA handling the case to inform her
that he represented Jane Doe #1 and, later, Jane Doe #2. Mr. Edwards asked to meet to provide
information about the federal crimes committed by Epstein against these victims, hoping to
secure a significant federal indictment against Epstein. The AUSA and Mr. Edwards discussed
the possibility of federal charges being filed. At the end of the call, the AUSA asked Mr.
Edwards to send any information that he wanted considered by the U.S. Attorney's Office in
determining whether to file federal charges. Because of the confidentiality provision that existed
in the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards was not informed that previously, in September 2007, the
U.S. Attorney's Office had reached an agreement not to file federal charges. Mr. Edwards was
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also not informed that resolution of the criminal matter was imminent. This concealment
prevented Edwards from (among other things) exercising his clien