STATEMENT OF

STATEMENT OF IN RESPONSE TO APRIL 2, 2019 LETTER FROM JEFFREY R. RAGSDALE To the extent possible, I have provided all information relevant to your inquiry, including applicable documents. Due to the passage of time, updates to various software and hardware, and the crash of my work laptop several years ago, I no longer have every piece of relevant material and my memory may be imperfect.' I have organized the response to conform with the April 2, 2019 letter from Jeffrey R. Ragsdale to Jonathan Biran. Please note that there were numerous oral and written communications between others at the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Justice Department with counsel for Mr. Epstein. While in some cases I was told of the communications or cc'ed on emails or letters summarizing the communications, for many conversations, meetings, and emails, I do not have knowledge of what occurred. Introduction The investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and I series of co-conspirators, named "Operation Leap Year," officially began in May 2006. In theory, it was supposed to conclude on September 24, 2007 with the signing of I "Non-Prosecution Agreement" ("NPA").2 As will be discussed below, the investigation presented several issues of first impression and challenges related to obtaining evidence and securing the coo eration of witnesses. Nonetheless, I felt certain that the agents, my co-counsel, and I had built ve strop case against Mr. Epstein and three of his rsonal assistants — and The case was presented for federal investigation by the Palm Beach Police Department after they felt that Jeffrey Epstein's legal team had put inappropriate pressure on the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office to file only misdemeanor charges. Allegations of misconduct had been leveled against the local detective and the Police Chief and they reported being followed and harassed. As described below, the defense attorneys employed the same tactics at the federal level against myself and the FBI. With regard to the exhibits, whenever possible, I have used copies of original documents or "scanned" originals that were made at the time. In some cases, all that I have are the electronic documents (i.e., the Word Perfect letter that was printed, signed, and mailed or faxed). Because our computers no longer have Word Perfect, I have used "Quick Print" which has distorted the formatting. If I am providing something that I know is I "draft," I note that either in the text or in the exhibit list. The fact that something does not contain I signature does not mean that it is draft, it just means that it was printed from the electronic version and I no longer have (or never had) copy of the original. For example, I often drafted letters for the signatures of Jeff , and Alex Acosta. Their assistants would have maintained the signed originals. In some cases, I would be provided with copies and sometimes I would not. I would usually notate my electronic files with "final" to know which was the final version, or the last- modified version. 2 For reasons set forth below, the investigation continued due to Epstein's post-NPA conduct. Page 1 of 58 EFTA00225044 Once the USAO opened the file, Epstein took the same approach that had been used with the State — at each level of review, he hired an attorney with I personal connection to the MUSA/13OJ Attorney who was conducting the review. The attorneys raised I series of challenges to the veracity of the victims and the veracity of the state investigators, as well as quasi- Petite-policy arguments. When those failed, more formal legal analysis and federalism policy arguments were presented. Throughout this process, I wanted to keep my investigation as confidential as possible. For example, I did not see the benefit of telling Epstein's counsel that we had uncovered additional victims, that we had been able to corroborate victims' accounts, or the legal theories that we were pursuing. My objections to malS these disclosures were all overruled. Also, unbeknownst to me, at least one supervisory was engaging in plea discussions with counsel for Epstein without consulting with me, the agents, or the victims. These discussions led to the creation of the NPA — an agreement that allowed Epstein to plead guilty to state charges in exchange for immunity for federal prosecution by the USAO for the Southern District of Florida. After the NPA was signed on September 24, 2007, when I attempted to notify the victims and enforce the agreement, the attacks became more personal. Epstein's attorneys raised the same policy arguments — which could have been raised prior to signing the NPA — as high as the DAG's Office, and coupled them with claims of prosecutorial misconduct. As these attacks occurred, the USAO — U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta and later First Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeff offered Epstein the option of simply "unwinding"3 the NPA — after all, he had never performed any part of it. In my mind it was unfathomable that Epstein would be allowed to spend months attacking not just the validity of our investigation and the validity of the NPA, but also making false allegations of prosecutorial misconduct against myself and FAUSA and still be allowed the benefit of what was, in my opinion, an unreasonably favorable agreement. Since everyone from the U.S. Attorney down to me agreed that the case was headed for I trial, the investigation continued, including identifying additional victims, conducting interviews, issuing grand jury subpoenas, drafting revised indictment packages, and presenting testimony to the grand jury. Epstein's clear intent to go to trial was on display during this period as he deposed victims identified only through the federal investigation in the guise of taking discovery in the state case. On June 23, 2008, en the DAG's Office issued his letter denying Epstein's final appeal. While USA Acosta allowed Epstein the benefit of the NPA, Epstein still tried to avoid several key parts of the NPA's terms, and would have escaped them but for my insistence. On June 30, 2008, Epstein entered his guilty plea in state court and was sentenced to 18 months' in the county jail in accordance with the terms of his state plea agreement and the NPA. Not long thereafter, I learned that Epstein had applied for work release and the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office had granted the application. Prior to Epstein's guilty plea, the issue of work release had been specifically discussed with Epstein's counsel and they informed us that Epstein would not seek work release. The agents and I also met with the Sheriffs Office in advance of the plea and had been told that Epstein would not be eligible for work release. Accordingly, I provided my Notice of Breach, but was told by defense attorney Roy Black that, despite those specific conversations, USA Acosta himself agreed that Epstein would be eligible for any program 3 "Unwinding" was USA Acosta's term for mutual rescission — the USAO could file its charges and Epstein would have no obligations to plead guilty in state or federal court. Page 2 of 58 EFTA00225045 that the state offered, including work release. Because of this, I had to withdraw the Notice of Breach and could only write I letter to the Sheriff's Office pointing out all of the false statements contained in Epstein's application for work release and letters to the victims informing them that Epstein was in work release status. The Sheriff's Office never responded to or acknowledged my letter. On June 9, 2009, I prepared what I believe was the last Memorandum requesting authorization to issue I Notice of Breach and to indict Epstein. The Office authorized issuance of the Notice of Breach, and the Indictment Packages was re-reviewed, a roved, and signed, with arrest warrants for Jeffrey Epstein, and . The Notice of Breach was served on June 12, 2009 at I hearing on Epstein's Motion to Dismiss one of the civil suits filed by one of the victims identified during the federal investigation. Once again, Epstein was allowed to "cure" his breach, and we were not allowed to file the indictment. There were strong internal disagreements on I number of subjects, including: the handling of the meetings with Epstein's counsel; plea negotiations; the NPA generally; the failure to consult with the victims; continuing plea negotiations in the face of Epstein's clear bad faith; the refusal to defend me against personal attacks from Epstein's attorneys; the agreement to put off seeking Epstein's computer equipment; the consultations with Epstein's attorneys regarding victim notifications; the handling of the "appeals" to Washington; allowing delays during those "appeals," while Epstein's attorneys were harassing the victims and their family members; attempts by Epstein to renegotiate the term of imprisonment; attempts by Epstein to renegotiate the payment of damages to the victims and attorneys' fees to their attorney representative; allowing Epstein to participate in the work release program after specifically discussing it during plea negotiations; and repeatedly allowing Epstein to "cure" intentional breaches of the NPA. These were kept internal as I tried to deal professionally with opposing counsel. In the midst of all of the post-NPA back-and-forth with Epstein, was the Jane Doe. United States litigation.4 Despite the Office's request to be recused from the case, the Justice Department decided that there was no conflict of interest and I was tasked with serving as co-counsel. The Office asserted attorney-client, executive, work product, and deliberative process privileges, so all of the internal disagreements, pros memos, and indictments were not disclosed while all of my communications with opposing counsel (often at the behest of supervisors) were disclosed. After an initial flurry of filings, Brad Edwards, as counsel for the named plaintiffs, stated on the record that he believed that setting aside the NPA would not benefit his clients, and he sued Epstein on behalf of I number of victims under the NPA. I did what I could to assist Mr. Edwards, other attorneys, including Mr. Josefsberg, the attorney selected by the Special Master, and the Court, to locate victims, provide signed copies of the NPA, and answer questions. After all of the civil suits between Epstein and the victims were settled through the spectre of breaching the NPA, Mr. Edwards re-initiated the Jane Doe United States litigation, asserting that his clients wanted to 4 1 few days after Jeffrey Epstein entered his guilty plea in state court, attorney Brad Edwards filed suit on behalf of one of the victims identified in the federal investigation (later expanded to include I second victim who had been identified in the state investigation), alleging violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. The suit, which is still pending, is captioned Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 21 United States, 08-80736-CV-KAM. Page 3 of 58 EFTA00225046 set aside the NPA and see Mr. Epstein federally charged due to violations of the Crime Victims' Rights Act. In response to your questions, I have attempted to distill the past 13 years of emails, letters, research, pleadings, and conversations into I coherent document and attach the most relevant items. Given the sheer volume of materials involved here and the passage of time, while I have worked diligently to answer your questions as fully as possible, I certainly could have missed something amongst the thousands of pages of emails, drafts, and hard copy and electronic documents. If there are additional items or topics that need further explanation or more documentation, I can delve further. The Non-Prosecution Agreement 1. Describe the circumstances under which the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein was referred to the USAO, including when, why, how, and by whom the referral was made. Explain why the USAO decided to initiate I federal grand jury investigation into this matter, including what federal interests were perceived to be involved, and identify the individuals participating in the decision. Some time in early 2006, FBI Special Agent E. approached me about an investigation being conducted b the Town of Palm Beach Police Department ("PBPD"). I do not know how or when A was first contacted about the matter. The first mentions of the investigation were just jpassing comments during meetings on other matters. and I were working on I number of different child exploitation matters at the time, along with ICE Special Agent David Malone. I remember generally that SA mentioned an investigation of I wealthy man who lived on Palm Beach and recruited minors for sexual activity. During these casual conversations, I do not believe that Mr. Epstein's name was mentioned. If it was mentioned, it held no significance for me. I recall that Si mentioned that PBPD had reached out to her because the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office was leaning towards not charging the case at all or letting the defendant lead to I misdemeanor charge of solicitation of prostitution. At some point I told that, if PBPD wanted to look into federal charges, I would need more information about the allegations and I encouraged her to set up I meeting. I recall Si telling me that PBPD wanted to give the State Attorney's Office the opportunity to properly charge the case before presenting it for federal investigation and prosecution. In May 2006, I met with Si and PBPD Detective Joe in the 4th Floor Conference Room at the U.S. Attor Office in West Palm Beach. I do not recall whether Si Malone was present. Detective summarized the investigation into state criminal sexual conduct involving Epstein and his personal assistants. Briefly, Epstein, through his personal assistants, recruited girls and young women — mainly from I local high school — to travel to his residence on Palm Beach to perform erotic massages. Although they had no massage training, the 5 I use these terms deliberately. "Girls" refers to females under the age of 18 and "young women" refers to females over the age of 18. When I refer to both groups jointly, I will use the term "females." Page 4 of 58 EFTA00225047 girls and young women were coached to massage Mr. Epstein in various states of undress. The sexual activity varied and included: Mr. Epstein masturbating himself at the end of the massage; having the females masturbate him; Mr. Epstein fondling the females' breasts and genitalia; using sex toys on the females; digital penetration of the females; sexual intercourse with Mr. Epstein; and Mr. Epstein observing while one of the girls had sex with one of his assistants. At the end of each "massage" session, Mr. Epstein or one of his assistants would pay the female involved. If the female involved in the massage was brought to Mr. Epstein's residence by I "recruiter," then the "recruiter" also would be paid. Detective did not have any information regarding an of the females traveling interstate or internationally to engage in sexual activity, but Det. reported that Mr. Epstein and his assistants traveled in and out of the Palm Beach International Airport on Epstein's private airplane. Det. stated that flight logs he had seen sometimes referred to passengers as "females," without names or ages, so it was possible that could have been on board, but Det. had not been able to confirm that. Det. stated that I search warrant had been executed on Mr. Epstein's residence and evidence had been seized, including message pads showing calls from females confirming that they would be coming to "work," which was the euphemism used for iving I "massage" — another euphemism for engaging in sexual activity for money. Det. also reported that it had appeared that Mr. Epstein had been "tipped off' about the coming search warrant because all of the computer CPUs had been removed from the residence — the keyboards and screens were still in place, just the CPUs had been taken. Det. also reported that some surveillance cameras were in place but they had only recovered I limited amount of surveillance video. Det. stated that between 20 and 30 females had been identified [NB: I believe that he told me the exact number, I just don't recall that number now]. and Det. asked me whether there were federal criminal charges that could be pursued. I remember getting up from the conference room, walking to my office, and getting my code book and walking back. I looked through 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422 (enticement of minors into prostitution/illegal sexual activity) and 2423 (travel for purposes of engaging in illegal sexual conduct).6 We talked through those statutes and the additional investigation that would be required to prove that they had been violated, but I told them that, if the evidence was there, it was I case that could be prosecuted federally. Det. then told me that his boss - PBPD Chief Michael — was still pressing the State Attorney's Office to arrest Epstein. Det. had prepared series of probable cause affidavits for the arrests of Jeffrey Epstein, and Haley Robson, charging I large number of state criminal violations. Chief had asked the Palm Beach County State Attorney, Barry to authorize the arrests and he had refused. According to Det. MI pressure had been brought to bear on SA bilg es attorneys, who included Gu Fronstin and Jack Goldberger twopersonal friends of ), and Alan Dershowitz. Det. stated that he and Chief were concerned that Epstein would be charged only with misdemeanor or perhaps would not be charged at all. 6 As the investigation progressed, I looked into other federal crimes, but at that first meeting, I only remember looking at §§ 2422 and 2423. Page 5 of 58 EFTA00225048 I recommended that we begin the rocess of investigatin er there was I jurisdictional basis for federal charges, and Si and Det. concurred. Det. asked that Chief be given an additional opportunity to convince the State Attorney to charge Epstein.? I explained that opening I case file and beginning I federal investigation would not preclude the State Attorney from charging Epstein. I then prepared the paperwork to open I file. The investigation was dubbed "Operation Leap Year" because there were approximately 29 young women and girls who had been identified through the State investigation. There were several aspects of the case that involved federal interests. First, as to the substantive crimes that Epstein was accused of committing, they involved the victimization of minor females through the use of facilities of interstate commerce (telephones and airports); and Epstein was traveling interstate and internationally to come to the Southern District of Florida to commit those offenses. During the course of the investigation, I often said that, if there were trial, I would tell the jury that Jeffrey Epstein traveled to Florida to use Royal Palm Beach High School as his personal brothel. Second, the removal of the computer equipment from Epstein's home prior to the execution of the search warrant suggested possible public corruption at the Palm Beach County courthouse (where the search warrant application was signed) and also raised the possibility that Epstein may have been involved in the manufacture and/or possession of child pornography. Eradication of child pornography was I particular focus of Project Safe Childhood; its production and storage on computer equipment involved the use of items produced in interstate and foreign commerce; and child pornc ty was often distributed through facilities of interstate and foreign commerce. Third, Det. was suggesting that political or other pressure was being placed on an elected official (the State Attorney) to avoid or minimize criminal exposure for person who committed numerous state crimes related to the exploitation of girls and young women. Setting aside the issue of prostitution, the sexual activity involving girls under the age of 16 could be charged as sex battery in the state. Ignoring those crimes suggested possible public corruption or, at the least] miscarriage of justice. With regard to the logistics of opening the case file, the opening of files in West Palm Beach is relatively informal. In instances where an agent approaches line directly (either because it is duty matter or because the investigation is within the area of expertise), the line will give his or her assistant the details of the case for the LIONS file-opening paperwork and then give I brief oral explanation of the case to his/her supervisor along with the paperwork. If the supervisor agrees that I file should al ;vned, he or she will normally sign the LIONS form on the spot and hand the file back to the In this case, I prepared I file jacket; my assistant did the LIONS paperwork; I signed the conflict form; briefed my supervisor, ; and she signed the LIONS paperwork assigning the case to me. This all occurred either on the day of the meeting with Detective and SI or within I few days thereafter. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is the file opening paperwork and file jacket showing that the case was opened in LIONS on May 23, 2006. I do recall that at some time relatively soon after the file was opened, I did something that I had never done before or since. I initiated I meeting with the U.S. Attorney and the First 7 .1111 I did not know it at the time, on May I, 2006, Chief sent I letter to State Attorney asking to consider recusing himself from the case. (Exhibit 1.) Page 6 of 58 EFTA00225049 Assistant, Alex Acosta and Jeff where I traveled to Miami and told them about the case. I recall that I explained the case and how the PBPD believed that Epstein had used political or other pressure to avoid serious punishment in Palm Beach County state court. That possibility troubled me greatly; hence, my request to meet with executive mans ement. Messrs. Acosta and had the same reaction that I had the first time tha told me about Mr. Epstein — if I have never heard of him, how much influence could this person have? I remember specifically saying to them that I expected the case would be time and resource-intensive and I did not want to invest the time and the FBI's resources if the Office would just back down to pressure at the end. Messrs. Acosta and assured me that, if there was sufficient evidence to support the case, Mr. Epstein would be charged appropriately.8 2. Describe in detail your role, and the role of each other person in the USAO, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and elsewhere within the Department of Justice — collectively herein "the government" — who was involved in the assessment of the viability and strength of the federal case against Mr. Epstein and in the decision to negotiate I pre-indictment resolution of the case. My Role I was the line assigned to the case. In conjunction with the case agents, I handled all aspects of the grand jury investigation — deciding what subpoenas to issue; whom to interview; whom to call to testify before the grand jury; what lines of inquiry to pursue to support various legal theories; I conducted legal research to support charges; I reached out to others throughout the Department and the federal government for information on previous investigations of Mr. Epstein, and for legal guidance on various aspects of the case (e.g., OEO, CEOS, SEC, SDNY, and AFMLS); along with the FBI agents and the FBI Victim-Witness Coordinator, I had direct contact with victims via interviews, meetings, and consultations regarding safety/privacy/mental health concerns; and I handled all court proceedings related to the investigation. When I felt that sufficient evidence had been collected to prove Mr. Epstein's guilt beyond I reasonable doubt, I drafted I prosecution memorandum, indictment, and related documents. I revised those documents in response to comments from those in the supervisory chain of command and, as explained below, after additional evidence was secured. I participated in some (but not all) of the meetings between members of the USAO and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein. I prepared briefing materials for management in preparation for those meetings and in response to issues raised during those meetings. Normally the assigned line handles plea negotiations, and I recommended that I enter into negotiations that would result in joint federal and state resolution (i.e.,I plea to federal charges in federal court and I plea to state charges in state court). I was reprimanded for doing so. 8 I do not have I contemporaneous memorandum and cannot find the date of the meeting. In I July 13, 2007 email exchange between myself and Criminal Chief = I describe the meeting as follows: "I summarized the case and the State Attorney's Office's handling of it. I acknowledged that we needed to do work to collect the evidence establishing I federal nexus, and I noted the time and money that would be required for an investigation. I said that I was willing to invest that time and the FBI was willing to invest the money, but I didn't want to get to the end and then have the Office be intimidated by the high-powered lawyers. I was assured that that would not happen." (See Exhibit 3.) Page 7 of 58 EFTA00225050 Thus, as will be discussed in more detail below, I played no role in the decision to enter into I Non-Prosecution Agreement in exchange for Jeffrey Epstein's entry of I guilty plea to I state charge requiring I sentence of 18 months' imprisonment or Epstein's plea to federal charges resulting in I maximum sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (as will be explained below, Epstein's counsel repeatedly changed their minds about whether to take the federal route or the state route). Although I was tasked with drafting the agreements and Information, all of the documents were repeatedly and substantively revised by various supervisors, and I was responsible for incorporating those edits. I also was asked to sign the Non-Prosecution Agreement. When Epstein sought to have the Non-Prosecution Agreement set aside by "appealing" the matter to CEOS, the AAG, and the DAG, I handled the continued investigation of Epstein, including working with the FBI to identify additional victims, issue additional grand jury subpoenas, and prepare an updated indictment package. At the request of the U.S. Attorney, I also responded to inquiries from CEOS, the AAG, and the DAG's Office and drafted submissions on behalf of the USAO in response to arguments raised by Epstein's attorneys. I believe that I prepared I first draft of the Addendum to the Non-Prosecution Agreement, but others took the laboring oar on that document. I drafted numerous victim notification letters and responded to defense objections to those letters. I drafted the letter to the Special Master with the USAO's recommendations for the qualities to look for in the attorney representative for the victims. I monitored Epstein's compliance with the Non-Prosecution Agreement and served several breach notices. U.S. Attorney's Office Personnel (now retired): was my direct supervisor. She reviewed indictment packages and other court-related matters and provided guidance and served as I "sounding board" for many of my concerns. As will be explained below, did not participate in many of the meetings between the USAO and Epstein's counsel because Epstein's counsel "skipped her" in the chain of command, directing their communications to MAUSA9 , Criminal Chief First Assistant Jeff and U.S. Attorney Alex Acosta. did participate in meetings with the Palm Beach Sheriff's Office about Epstein's work release and several conference calls with defendant attorney Roy Black and others about Epstein's breaches of the Non-Prosecution Agreement. MAUSA (now in private practice): MAUSA was my second- line supervisor and head of the West Palm Beach office. Over the objection of myself and my co-counsel, he granted the request of Epstein's attorneys to meet to allow Epstein's attorneys to argue that the USAO should decline the matter. That began the series of meetings between all levels of the USAO and Epstein's counsel. MAUSA reviewed my work; asked me to conduct some specific research; and reviewed drafts of our responses to legal arguments raised by Epstein's counsel. MAUSA also participated in 9 The Managing Assistant U.S. Attorney ("MAUSA") is the head of the West Palm Beach Office. Page 8 of 58 EFTA00225051 conversations with the State Attorney, and directly participated in negotiations of the language to be used in the Non-Prosecution Agreement, federal Plea Agreement, and Information. He had numerous conversations with counsel for Epstein outside of my presence when they objected to my refusal to agree with their changes. MAUSA also communicated with the U.S. Attorney about the negotiations. He would then communicate changes from the defense and the U.S. Attorney to me to incorporate. Later, when E stein's attorneys appealed to AAa., Mr. was on detail as AAG Chief of Staff and facilitated the meeting between Epstein's counsel and the AAG. AAG Fisher's written response was issued while MAUSA was still her Chief of Staff. I do not know who drafted the written response. Acting MAUSA (still with the USAO): When MAUSA was on detail with AAG Fisher's Office, was named the Acting MAUSA. He participated in at least one meeting with Epstein's attorneys and the State Attorney. Mr. also was involved in some of the negotiations regarding the language of the Non- Prosecution Agreement. He later reviewed at least one of the iterations of the indictment package and signed the indictment that was supposed to be presented to the grand July in June 2009. Criminal Chief Matthew (now in private practice): Criminal Chief- was the third line supervisor of the matter. Generally, West Palm Beach indictments are reviewed and approved by the MAUSA and are not reviewed by Miami. However, unusual or especially significant indictments are reviewed by the Criminal Chief. Criminal Chief reviewed and commented on the first proposed indictment package. His comments were incorporated into I revised indictment, and he possibly reviewed those changes. Criminal Chief participated in numerous meetings on the case, and had private conversations regarding resolution of the matter with Lilly counsel to Mr. Epstein. Ms. had formerly served as Deputy Chief in the Major Crimes Section at the USAO while Mr. was Chief of Major Crimes. As discussed below, on July 26, 2007, Criminal Chief announced to the investigative team that U.S. Attorney Acosta had decided to offer I two-year plea to Mr. Epstein. On August 3, 2007, Mr. sent I letter to Ms. regarding that plea offer. Mr. left the U.S. Attorney's Office on that date to become partner at Kobre & Kim in New York. First Assistant Jeffrey (now in private practice): FAUSA (later U.S. Attorney was involved in telephone calls and meetings with counsel for Mr. Epstein; when Epstein's attorneys were dissatisfied with my proposed language for the Non-Prosecution Agreement, victim notification letters, letters to the Special Master, etc., they would frequently contact FAUSA directly to complain. FAUSA handled the bulk of the negotiations of the Addendum to the NPA. Epstein's attorneys later complained that FAUSA was biased because his daughter had been the victim of I crime. One of Epstein's attorneys also falsely accused FAUSA (and me) of promising money to l victim in exchange for her willingness to accuse Epstein. Page 9 of 58 EFTA00225052 U.S. Attorney R. Alexander Acosta (now Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor): USA Acosta served as the head of the U.S. Attorney's Office throughout the investigation of Jeffrey Epstein, including the decision to enter into I Non-Prosecution Agreement, negotiation of its terms, and attempts to enforce its terms. When Epstein's attorneys were dissatisfied with answers they received from me, MAUSA M, and FAUSA they would frequently contact USA Acosta directly. USA Acosta was directly involved in reviewing and revising the documents, including sending exact wording that he wanted incorporated into the agreement. There were some communications between USA Acosta and counsel for Epstein that I was not aware of at the time. For example, I did not know, until after I had sent I breach notice, that USA Acosta agreed that Epstein could be considered for work release. At some point after the NPA was signed, USA Acosta was recused from the Epstein matter. (still at USAO): Early in the investigation, I asked if he would serve as co-counsel on the case. Before I joined the West Palm Beach Office, had handled the bulk of the child exploitation cases in West Palm Beach. He and I discussed how to structure the investigation and he joined me in opposing meeting with Epstein's attorneys prior to the completion of the investigation. He attended some of the meetings with Epstein's attorneys. When the Office overruled our positions and when it appeared that the case was not going to be charged, decided that he should focus on other cases. (now U.S. Magistrate Judge): as my office neighbor and colleague. At one point early in the investigation (I be ievebefore I asked to serve as co-counsel), I sought counsel on strategies for how to handle Epstein's personal assistants — whether they should be charged or if we should seek immunity for them. Not long thereafter, came to me and said that he was best friends with one of Epstein's attorneys, Jack Goldberger, and accordingly could not discuss the Epstein case with me any further. left the U.S. Attorney's Office for private practice and later represented one of Epstein's assistants in the civil suits filed by Epstein's victims. ow retired): Asset Forfeiture assigned to the Epstein case. I had I ewbrief meetings with to talk about the asset forfeiture aspects of the case. We discussed the char es under consideration and Epstein's assets that could be subject to forfeiture. ad direct contact with the agents and the FBI's asset forfeiture coordinator about information/evidence that she needed to pursue forfeiture. provided the asset forfeiture language in the proposed indictments. ill at USAO): SLC was not directly involved in the Epstein investigation or negotiation of the NPA, but he has been lead counsel in the Jane Doe I United States litigation. SLC IN had contact with USA Acosta regarding his recusal, and Page 10 of 58 EFTA00225053 with FAUSA and myself regarding self-reports to OPR about accusations of misconduct raised by Epstein's counsel. I also had contact with SLC regarding Florida Bar Complaint filed by I civil attorney for some of the victims who complained that my victim notification letters amounted to inappropriate business referrals to the attorney selected by the Special Master. lo Appellate SLC (still at USAO): SLC was not directly involved in the Epstein investigation or negotiation of the NPA. It is my understanding that USA Acosta asked SLC to check my legal analysis. I also understand that Criminal Chief contacted SLC about moving me to Appeals after I pointed out actions that I considered to be in violation of the Ashcroft memo and victims' rights legislation. I also understand that SLC ma have knowled e of USA Acosta providing my prosecution memorandum to Main Justice. (still at USAO): My legal assistant during most of the Epstein investigation and its aftermath. She assisted with preparing indictment packages, victim notification letters, grand jury subpoenas, travel, expert witness contracts, and other items. la still at USAO): Executive assistants to Acosta and FAUSA . They compiled correspondence between the USAO and counsel for Epstein; scheduled meetings; and dealt with inquiries from the press and DOJ. They may have information related to correspondence or communications between the Executive Division and Epstein's counsel that I am unaware of. FBI Personnel (retired from FBI): Lead case agent on Operation Leap Year. She presented the case to the USAO, handled the bulk of the interviews, served subpoenas, and testified before the grand jury. She communicated directly with victims and hand- delivered the original victim notification letters. SI also participated in meetings with some of the members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein. SI Jason (still at FBI): Co-case agent with . Became lead case agent during the post-guilty plea period (i.e., the interview of responding to FOIA requests, etc.). He conducted interviews, prepared reports, analyzed 1° The Florida Bar determined that my victim notification letters, which are included in the exhibits and advised the victims that they had the absolute right to select another attorney if they so desired, were not inappropriate solicitations and did not violate the Florida Bar Rules. The attorney who filed the complaint, Jeff Herman, later resigned from the Florida Bar due to disciplinary action taken against him. Page 11 of 58 EFTA00225054 records, and communicated directly with victims. Si also participated in meetings with some of the members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein. ill at FBI): Co-case agent with SI until he was transferred to DC. He conducted interviews, including the original telephone interview with where she asked that the FBI have no further contact with her. He S/As andliiiso He also participated in meetings with some of the members of the USAO and counsel for Epstein. the July 26, 2007 meeting where Criminal Chief offer. She attended announced the two-year plea SI Christina : participated in the interview of in Australia. Sr't (still at FBI): =imbiner was the case agent on Operation Stolen Globe, which involved the investigation of Alfredo Rodriguez (Jeffrey Epstein's butler), who tried to sell evidence to Brad Edwards. Supervisor etired from FBI): replaced GS s hea ng the post-guilty plea period. He supervised S/As Victim-Witness Coordinator : Ms. sent letters to victims, met with them in person, and assisted in finding counseling and other services for them. Justice Department Personnel CEOS Deputy Chief Alexandra (still at DOJ): Ms. was part of the team that reviewed the case and the NPA when Epstein "appealed" to DOJ. Ms. also is familiar with my work from I prior case that she and I worked on together as well as other PSC cases where I have consulted with her. CEOS Chief Drew (now private in-house counsel): Mr. reviewed and opined on the case and the NPA when Epstein "appealed" to DOJ. He also attended meetings in the SDFL with myself, the case agents, USAO supervisory staff, and counsel for Epstein. I conferred with Mr. about charging, staffing, and victim- related issues. Page 12 of 58 EFTA00225055 CEOS Trial Attorney (now at I non-profit): I first had contact with Ms. when conducting research regarding some of the legal issues raised by the case (she was the CEOS Duty Attorney on the day that I called). After left the case, I contacted Mr. about having I CEOS Trial Attorney co-chair the case and asked if Ms. was available. She participated in interviews, discussed case strategy, and reviewed pros memos and indictments. Millina At various times, I have heard that USA Acosta provided my pros memo to Chiel and asked her to review my legal analysis. I have never asked Chief whether this actually occurred. SLC may know whether this occurred. ERMINIIIPINit (now in private practice): After CEOS rejected the "appeal" from Mr. Epstein's attorneys, they asked for further review by She met with the attorneys and prepared I written opinion rejecting Epstein's arguments. Associate De utv Attorney General Snow private in-house counsel): Following Epstein's attorneys asked for review by the DAG. I do not know whether Epstein's counsel met with the DAG, but they did present arguments to Mr. Roth, who was Chief of Staff/Sr. Associate Deputy Attorney General. It vrote letter rejecting Epstein's arguments. (now in private practice): -was the Deputy Attorney General to whom Mr. Epstein's arguments were addressed. As noted above, I do not know if met with Epstein's counsel, or if the meetings were only held with Mr. Roth. Others Whose Counsel I Sought During the Case: till an in Seattle): was not involved in the Epstein investigation. During the pendency of the Epstein investigation, she began investigating David Copperfield, who was I friend of Epstein, and we conferred with each other about strategy. I informed linof the difficulties in convincing the Office to prosecute Epstein. is I friend from my days at orseyWhitney. e join e usticeDepartment e ore I did and we have stayed in contact over the years. She had experience with USA Acosta when he was the head of the Civil Rights Section at Main Justice so I turned to her for advice in handling the Epstein situation. Assistant U.S. Attorney S. (still at DOJ): Mr. and I were dating at the time of the Epstein investigation. (We are now married.) He was I more who Page 13 of 58 EFTA00225056 was familiar with some of Epstein's counsel. I sought his advice on some of the issues — legal and non-legal — that arose during the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney (still at the USAO): Ms. and I are friends from my time in Miami. She was' supervisor in Miami although not in my chain of command. I would often speak or email with her just for advice. 3. Explain fully the process and circumstances leading to the decision to resolve the case through I non-prosecution a reement (sometimes referred to by defense counsel and the government as I deferred prosecution agreement, but described herein as the non-prosecution agreement). Ex lain why the government initially prepared to resolve the case through federal plea agreement, but ultimately did not require Mr. Epstein to enter plea in federal court. The explanation should identify the parties involved in the decision, the individual(s) responsible for all final decisions regarding the non-prosecution agreement and its terms, and the basis for the decision to resolve the case through I non-prosecution agreement. Let me preface with some background on how I normally handle investigations and prosecutions. When undertaking investigations, my normal practice is to meet with agents, confer with them about an investigative plan, and work together until the case is ready for indictment. I update my supervisors along the way, seek advice or guidance from supervisors and colleagues if an issue is especially complex or novel, and get approval for actions as required by the USAM, but I have always focused on learning as much as possible about the subject area, the defendant, and the facts related to the alleged crime — I want to be the subject matter expert in the courtroom. Then, once all of those items are completed, I prepare I comprehensive prosecution memo and proposed indictment, which are submitted for review. I believe strongly that investigations — especially child exploitation investigations - should be conducted as covertly as possible in order to protect the victims' privacy; to avoid harm to the accused's reputation if the accusation is determined to be false; and to maintain the sanctity of the investigation. In Mr. Epstein's case, these concerns were heightened for several reasons. First, victims identified during the state investigation had expressed fears of Epstein and building trust with them would require assurances that Epstein would not find out that they were talking with federal investigators. Second, the victims were between the ages of approximately 15 and 20" -- ages when women and girls might minimize or deny sexual abuse to avoid being labeled as "skits." Third, Epstein had made allegations in the state case that the victims were only after money and that investigators were only after fame. Maintaining the investigation's confidentiality would delegitimize both of those allegations. It also would avoid interference/intimidation by Epstein and his counsel. My confidentiality rule extends to pre-indictment communications with defendants and their attorneys. In cases where defendants are considered I flight risk, I generally have no contact pre-indictment. If proven, the crimes under investigation created I statutory presumption that the " They had been 14 to 17 years old at the time of the sexual activity, but time had passed. Page 14 of 58 EFTA00225057 defendant was I risk of flight and I danger to the community, and Epstein had virtually unlimited resources to flee.12 Our effort to maintain the confidentiality of the investigation was thwarted almost immediately by PBPD Chief . On July 24, 2006, Chief sent letters to some of the victims identified in the state investigation informing them that the State Attorney's Office had decided to proceed on I single charge of solicitation of prostitution. (Exhibit 6.) Chief encouraged the victims to contact the State Attorney's Office with any complaints about the handling of the matter. Chief then felt the need to disclose that he did "not feel that justice has been sufficiently served by the indictment that has been issued. Therefore, please know that his [sic] matter has been referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine if violations of federal law have occurred." (Id.). While Chief did not mention the USAO, stein's counsel certainly understood that engaging the FBI meant engaging the USAO. Chief actions were published in the local newspaper. (Exhibit 7.) Because the federal investigation had been exposed by Chief = there was no ability to operate covertly, so we began serving subpoenas on persons and entities affiliated with Epstein. Beginning on August 2, 2006, 1 number of grand jury subpoenas were issued for bank information, information related to travel on Epstein's airplanes, school attendance records, rental car information, and other information that would corroborate statements made by victims (see Exhibit I 1). I subpoena also was issued for all of the evidence collected by the PBPD (see id.). Victim notification letters also were prepared that contained my contact information for the federal agents to provide to the victims identified during the PBPD investigation. (Exhibits 12 & 13.) As victims were interviewed by the federal agents, they would be provided with I copy of the notification letter. As additional victims were identified throughout the investigation, more letters were prepared. (Exhibits 19 & 30.) Subpoenas also were prepared for testimony and evidence from some victims who were believed to possess physical evidence that could corroborate contact with Epstein. (See Exhibit .1.) One of the subpoenaed victims was Individual #28, who is referred to as Jane Doe #2 in the Jane Doe. United States litigation. When approached for an interview, Individual #28 refused to speak with the agents, and I remember telling me that she felt that Individual #28 had tried to run over her foot as Individual #28 drove away. Individual #28 contacted Epstein when she received the letter and subpoena; Epstein put her in touch with his attorney, Jack Goldberger; and Goldberger had his friend, Jim Eisenberg, serve as Individual #28's lawyer while Epstein paid Eisenberg's fees. Individual #28 later told Brad Edwards that someone (Epstein, Goldberger, or Eisenberg) told her that "the government" planned to take away her baby. I don't know if that is true, but Eisenberg insisted that Individual #28 would not speak to us without 6001 immunity. (Exhibit 9.) Once it was granted, Individual #28 spoke of Epstein in glowing terms and in I way contradicted by other witnesses and evidence. The hiring of Eisenberg, the insistence on 6001 immunity — something that I had never faced before or since for I child victim — and the false exculpatory statements — all showed me how the defense would be approaching this case. 12 To minimize the risk of flight, I conducted research on extradition and the FBI placed travel watch Epstein, but especially in light of Epstein's ownership of an airplane capable of intercontinental travel and his foreign residences, the investigative team considered Epstein to be I substantial flight risk. Page 15 of 58 EFTA00225058 The subpoenas and interviews apparently concerned Epstein because soon after I began trying to set up Individual #28's testimony, Epstein hired former U.S. Attorney Guy Lewis, who began contacting me by phone and email, asking to meet with me. I declined to meet because it is my policy not to meet during the pendency of I child exploitation investigation. Mr. Lewis expressed his client's willingness to cooperate with the investigation. (Exhibit 10.) When Mr. Lewis was unable to set I meetin , Epstein hired Lilly , another former from the Miami USAO. Ms. began calling and emailing me in early November 2006. (Exhibit 11). Ms. also expressed Epstein's interest in "cooperating" with the investigation. I knew that feigned cooperation would be used to ask for pre-trial release, so I tested the veracity of the offer of cooperation l sking for documents that would disprove many of Epstein's defenses.13 Sure enough, Ms. objected to the requests as "overbroad." I politely declined the request for I meeting and then delayed settingihe r uested meeting so that I would have time to complete the investigation. My co-counsel, and I agreed that I meeting at this early stage offered no benefit for us and only benefitted the defense. When Ms. could not set I meeting with me, she skipped my immediate supervisor and contacted MAUSA whom she knew from their time together in Miami. MAUSA Lefcourt. and I told MAUSA and me that he had agreed to meet with Ms. and Gerald told that we had made I conscious decision not to meet with Epstein's attorneys and that we were opposed to I meeti.was the first of many disagreements between management and the line AUSAs. MAUSA told us that we were "non-strategic thinkers" (his words) and that the meeting would result in convincing and Gerald Lefcourt to bring Epstein in for an interview. It was condescending and, in our opinion, showed I lack of understanding of sex offenders generally and I lack of knowledge of this case. Gerald Lefcourt has represented Martha Stewart — the last thing he would do is bring his client in to face I possible "perjury trap." In the middle of this period, which started in November 2006 and ran through January 2007, USA Acosta and I traveled to Washington, DC at the beginning of December 2006 for the inaugural Project Safe Childhood Conference. Although I did not attach much significance to this at the time, in preparing this response, I began wondering whether the following event was orchestrated by Epstein and his counsel. During one of the first presentations at the conference, I was in I large auditorium and the speaker asked the audience I question. I man in the row in front of me introduced himself as the State Attorney from Palm Beach County (Barry and answered the question. I had never met Mr. . After the seminar ended, USA Acosta came over and we all introduced ourselves. Mr. proceeded to deride PBPD Chief and the victims in the Epstein case — referring to them by name and talking about how some were paid thousands of dollars, used alcohol and drugs, and looked over 18. I tried to guide the two out of the auditorium to I more private area because I did not think it was I conversation meant for public consumption but they would not move. As the PSC Coordinator, I had overseen the invitations 13 For example, Epstein claimed that the massages were legitimate "medical" massages, so I wanted to see if he was taking tax deductions for medical expenses and getting other complementary medical treatment. Epstein also claimed that he was traveling to Florida to visit family and to maintain Florida residency. I asked for calendars and other documentation. Page 16 of 58 EFTA00225059 for the law enforcement representatives from the S.D. Fla., and Mr. had not been on the list. So I now wonder whether this "random" meeting was staged by Epstein. As you will see from the timeline (Exhibit .1), in late January 2007, I created I file folder entitled "Research re NPAs and 6001 immunity." (Exhibit 15.) This was not research related to Non-Prosecution Agreements in connection with resolving the case against Epstein. In November and December 2006, subpoenas were served on two other Epstein employees — Janusz Banasiak and Mucinska. Both initially asked for immunity. After speaking with Banasiak's attorney, Mr. Banasiak was satisfied with I standard Kastigar letter, but Ms. Mucinska's attorney was insistent on formal immunity, and as noted above, so was Individual #28. I don't believe that, prior to this investigation, I had ever prepared' request for 6001 immunity, so I was researching the process. The meetingwith Ms. and Mr. Lefcourt was set for February 1, 2007. As noted above, despite Ms. statements of Epstein's willina to cooperate, she complained that my document requests were "overbroad," so MAUSA and I drafted I more specific list (Exhibit 14).14 Ms. also asserted that Epstein had hired attorneys for all of his current and prior employees, but refused to provide me with I list of those employees and attorneys, wanting me to give her essentially I roadmap of my investigation. I refused (Exhibits 14 and I-1). Instead, the agents and I continued to press forward with our investigation and I continued my extensive legal research in preparation for the meeting with and Lefcourt. Although materials were supposed to be provided in advance, the "talking points" for the meeting with and Lefcourt did not arrive until the morning of the February 1, 2007 meeting (Exhibit 14 at 8-32). The main themes were: I. the PBPD investigation was biased; 2. the conduct at issue was "entirely local"; 3. Epstein did not know the victims were under 18; 4. none of the girls traveled in interstate commerce; 5. Epstein's travel was not for the purposes of engaging in illegal sexual activity; 6. victim and witness credibility issues weighed against filing charges; and 7. the Petite policy precluded prosecution (id.). While the letter covered all of these topics, I recall the meeting was focused primarily on challenges to the victims' credibility (e.g., one victim's MySpace page showed her smoking marijuana and posing provocatively); allegations of police overreaching; and the lack of evidence that Epstein knew the victims were under the age of 18. MAUSA , and I were unpersuaded by the letter and the presentation, but I agreed that I should carefully review transcripts of the recorded statements given to PBPD for Brady issues.15 Since witness credibility was clearly at the fore, I undertook efforts 14 The requested documents and items were never provided. 15 As the investigation continued and we located and identified more victims, we eventually made I strategic decision that the initial indictment should exclude the group identified by the PBPD and save them for I superseding indictment, if needed. At this point, however, the investigation was focused mainly on the same group. Page 17 of 58 EFTA00225060 to corroborate our victim statements and to undermine Epstein's potential defenses through subpoenas for I wide variety of documents (see Exhibit &I). Subpoenas also were issued to some victims for photographs, gifts, and other records of direct or indirect contact with Epstein (see id.). Presentation of background information to the grand jury began in February 2007 (Exhibits 17, 18, and 20). I continued to research potential charges against Epstein. Again, knowin how Epstein's attorneys would likely approach any trial in this matter, I wanted to prepare both I strong offense — by including all relevant charges for jury consideration and possible plea negotiations — and strong defense — by including charges that would allow the admission of the widest range of relevant evidence. With that mindset, I researched money laundering and racketeering offenses in Chapter 95 because I knew that prostitution was I racketeering offense (see Exhibit 56). In addition to the IRS, I conferred with an attorney at the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section in DC who opined that Epstein's conduct could be l violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and 2 or another currency offense because he caused the interstate transmission of funds related to prostitution (see Exhibit 57).16 The investigation continued at brisk pace with Epstein's attorneys frequently seeking reviews from Messrs. and (see, e.g., Exhibit 58). [NB: They completely excluded my immediate supervisor, throughout the process.] Because of this, and because the grand jury was very interested in the case, I tried to keep the Miami office up to date on what was happening. There also had been little feedback from Miami to the proposed indictment that had al irovided in late April/early May. So, for example, on May 14, 2007, I emailed and about Epstein's travel and asked whether I would be permitted to present the indictment the following day or proceed by way of criminal complaint (Exhibit 26 at I). Mr. made clear that neither would be allowed (id.). That Friday, May 18, 2007, I emailed Chief again, notifying him that we had learned that the computers missin from Epstein's home at the time of the execution of the state search warrant were removed by I private investigator working for attorney Roy Black. After conferring with CCIPS, the Witness Immunity Unit at OEO, and my immediate supervisor, I planned to issue hrand jury subpoena for the equipment (id. at 2). I explained why the request was different than I subpoena to an attorney and how I would avoid seeking privileged information (id.). I specifically asked Mr. if he had any comments or concerns but received no response (id.)17 On Monday, May 21, 2007, I wrote to Chief and FAUSA for "guidance" and ". sense of the direction where we are headed" (id. at 3). Again, no response. On that day, having heard nothing in response to my 5/18/2007 email, I issued the subpoena to the private investigator (Exhibit 59). 16 I mention this because my efforts to collect financial documents to support potential money laundering charges —and also to corroborate victim statements — were later used as evidence of my "overreaching." 17 Again, I mention this because it would later be used — by Epstein's counsel and Chief — as evidence of overreaching. Page 18 of 58 EFTA00225061 The following day, May 22, 2007, Mr. Lefcourt sent I letter to MAUSA stating: I understand from you that in the next month or two I decision will be made by your office whether to seek an indictment of Mr. Epstein. This will confirm that, prior to any such decision being made, I and other attorneys on behalf of Mr. Epstein will be given an opportunity to meet with you. Additionally, . . . if our meeting does not resolve the matter, we would like an opportunity to make I presentation first to Matthew , Chief of the Criminal Division, and Jeffrey First Assistant United States Attorney, and then, again, if no resolution is reached, the opportunity to meet with United States Attorney Alexander Acosta. (Exhibit 28.) and I were not part of the conversation where MAUSA disclosed the timeline to Mr. Lefcourt, so I was surprised by the letter, which sought multiple opportunities to meet with members of the Executive Division. Mr. responded, again, without meeting with or me, stating: "I think we are on the same page . . . I did say that if you want to meet with me again, I am ready to do so. The wording of your letter, however, suggests implicitly that I agreed to contact you before I decision is made to seek an indictment of Mr. Epstein. If that was your understanding, then please allow me to clarify. Our investigation is ongoing and if we decide to seek an indictment, we don't intend to call Mr. Epstein's representatives to let him know that. Of course, in the interim, if you would like to make presentation to us, we are willing to listen. ..." (Id.). I strenuously objected and drafted an email setting forth the reasons why (id. . I shared it with my supervisor and she advised me not to send it. I orally advised MAUSA that I objected to meetings, delays, and strategic disclosures in I case like this one — I child exploitation case with I large number of victims. Nevertheless, the meeting was set for June 26, 2007. As I predicted, the defense asked Mr. for I list of our legal theories. I told him that I did not ... want to share them, and Mr. directed me to give the defense the list anyway. On June 18, 2007, I sent I letter to Gerald Lefcourt listing all the charges under investigation (Exhibit 53). On June 14, 2007, I emailed the supervisory chain an addendum to the prosecution memo, asked about whether they wanted me to revise the indictment, and asked what materials they wanted prepared in advance of the June 26, 2007 meeting (Exhibit 31 at 1). I don't believe I received any responses. On June 21, 2007, I emailed Chief again asking who would be attending the June 26, 2007 meeting and how I could best prepare (id. at 3-4). I noted that he had been communicating directly with Ms. about the meeting (id.). On June 25, 2007, Gerald Lefcourt provided written arguments for why Epstein should not be charged federal) Exhibit 32). The following day, Alan Dershowitz, Roy Black, Gerald Lefcourt, and Lilly M presented their arguments to FAUSA and Chief Sil her supervisor, and I also attended (Exhibit 5). At some point during the meeting, Chief told the defense attorneys that they needn't address the money laundering statutes. I think he referred to them as "silly," without even having the benefit of my conversations Page 19 of 58 EFTA00225062 with IRS and AFMLS and my legal research.18 So Epstein's counsel focused on the child exploitation statutes. They falsely insisted that the use of the intemet was needed for 12422(b) charge and that some sort of force, fraud, or coercion was required for 11591 charge because 16- and 17-year-old girls were "adults." They stated that there was no federal law prohibiting sex with children and one would be unconstitutional. After the meeting, MAUSA and I analyzed the materials (Exhibit 32). We both concluded that the defense had overstated the strength of their position (id.). MAUSA felt that the 2422(b) charges were stronger than the 2423(b) charges because we would need proof that having I sexual massage was I motivation for Epstein's travel (id.). My research showed that different circuits had different standards on the "purpose of travel" element (id.). I never received any feedback from Chief or FAUSA regarding Lefcourt's written presentation, but after the June 26, 2007 meeting, I was left with the impression that we were continuing towards indictment. On July 3, 2007, at 6:26 M., I sent an email to Jeff and advising them about calls I had received from Lilly seeking to delay subpoena responses and their plans to present our Office with additional analysis as well as their planned resolution with the State Attorney's Office (Exhibit 3). I informed eve one my proposed response regarding the subpoenas and that I intended to invite Lilly to call me to discuss I resolution of the federal investigation that could include concurrent time, i.e., I plea to I federal charge with I recommendation that the federal sentence would run concurrently with the state sentence (See id.) I asked whether anyone had had different conversations with any attorneys for Epstein so that there would not be any miscommunication. Later that afternoon, MI sent me an email (using Jeff Blackberry) that I read, "I told Lily that state plea with jail time and sex offender status may satisf the usa. It was non-starter for them Id. Because I was in trial, I did not see Mr. email, so aproposed email to Ms. , went out on July 4th at 4:07p.m. (Id.) After my email to Ms. email, and I responded with I vehement objection, telling him that I believed his plea offer was "completely unacceptable to the FBI, ICE, the victims, and me [and that these] plea negotiations violate the Ashcroft memo, the U.S. Attorney's Manual, and all of the various iterations of the victims' rights legislation." (Id.) I asked for the opportunity to make I presentation addressing the strengths of the case and the points raised by Epstein's attorneys - I felt that it was unfair that Epstein had been given numerous opportunities to meet with the management of the USAO and the victims had never had I similar chance (Id.) Mr. responded by reprimanding me, stating, "[Es you well know, the US Attorney has not even decided whether to go forward with I prosecution in this matter, thus you should have respected his position before engaging jr, negotiations." (Id.) I had not engaged in any plea negotiations, Mr. had. Mr. also wrote, directly contrary to what USA Acosta and FAUSA told me at the initial meeting in Miami, "it was made clear to you by the US Attorney and the First Assistant from the time when you were first authorized to investigate Mr. Epstein that the office had concerns about taking this case because of petit [sic] policy and number of legel issues. Despite being told these things, you reared I pros memo and indictment that included I definitive date for indictment." (Id.) Mr. also told me that my arguments IS Epstein's lawyers seized on this later. Page 20 of 58 EFTA00225063 that he had violated the Ashcroft memo, the USAM and other policies were not well taken because, as "Chief of the Criminal Division, I am the person designated by the US Attorney to exercise appropriate discretion in deciding whether certain pleas are appropriate and consistent with the Ashcroft memo and the USAM — not you." (Id.) Mr. also told me that I could not dictate I meeting. (Id.) On July 6, 2007, Gerald Lefcourt sent another letter further explaining why Epstein should not be charged with violations of § 2422(b) (Exhibit 33). Most of the letter raised policy arguments and the letter ended by expounding on Mr. Epstein's good works (id.). On July 13, 2007, after I finished my trial, I responded to Mr. reprimand, noting my frustration over the Office's failure to provide me with any guidance on its position on the matter." I pointed out that I had handled this case the same as I had handled all of my other cases, by working with the agents to gather evidence and preparing an indictment package that established not just probable cause but proof beyond I reasonable doubt. I re-iterated that I was "asking to have the same courtesy that was extended to the defense attorneys extended to the FBI and an Assistant in the Office. . [And,] my first and only concern in this case .. . is the victims. If our personality differences threaten their access to justice, then please put someone on the case whom you trust more, and who will also protect their rights." (Id.) Mr. never responded; nor did he allow me to make my r ,iet sted presentation to USA Acosta. I do not know whether he shared my request with FAUSA or USA Acosta. Also on July 13, 2007, I received Fetter from Roy Black complaining about the grand jury subpoena seeking Epstein's computer equipment (Exhibit 34). I shared the letter with MAUSA (his handwritten notes appear on the Exhibit) and together we drafted letter in response (Exhibit 32 at 4). On July 16, 2007, Lilly sent my letter to Mr. writing that "Gerald Lefcourt and I would like to speak to you further regarding [my letter] since we do not believe that letter was responsive to the issues raised by Roy Black." (Exhibit 32 at 1). Mr. and I had I conference call with Ms. and Mr. Lefcourt and informed them that they would have to file I motion to quash the subpoena. We then advised Mr. of the history (Exhibit 62). On July 19, 2007, I sent an email to MAUSA and Chief asking for permission to serve target letters on three of Epstein's personal assistants and for guidance on language to be used in the target letters (Exhibit 63). Mr. responded that he was out of the District "but let's hold off on these until we decide what course of action we are going to take on epstein which should happen next week" (id.). After these exchanges and being reprimanded by Criminal Chief for raising those objections, I was not consulted again about I pre-indictment plea. On July 26, 2007,i,ts and supervisory personnel from the FBI and I traveled to I scheduled meeting with Chief in 19 For example, on May 21, 2007, I wrote to Chief and FAUSA : "I have time set aside with the grand jury tomorrow, and I am wondering if you have sense of the direction where we are headed — i.e., approval of an indictment something like the current draft, complaint to allow for pre-indictment negotiations, an indictment drastically different from the current draft? I am concerned about confusing the grand jury, which is never I good thing. Any guidance?" (Exhibit 54). I did not receive I response. Page 21 of 58 EFTA00225064 Miami. That morning, before departing for Miami, I sent an email to Mr. and MAUSA that read, "in advance of our meeting this afternoon, I wanted to let you know my thoughts about some of the recommended changes [to the indictment] that we had discussed the last time I was in Miami . . ." (Exhibit 64). The FBI agents, their supervisor, their ASAIC, and I met with Mr. . Criminal Chief entered the meeting and announced to us that "Alex [Acosta] has decided to offer I two-year state plea." We were not asked our opinions and the meeting ended soon thereafter (see Exhibit 5). I remember feeling stunned. I don't remember saying anything at the meeting. In an attempt to provide some benefits to the victims and protections to the public, I asked that two terms be added to this two-year deal: (1) that the victims be provided compensation via 18 U.S.C. § 2255 as I substitute for restitution because Epstein was pleading to state charges; and (2) that Epstein be required to plead guilty to an offense requiring sex offender registration. The Office agreed to add these two terms. On July 31, 2007, I finalized I term sheet, entitled "CONFIDENTIAL PLEA NEGOTIATIONS: TERMS OF EPSTEIN NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENT." (Exhibit 4.) On the same date, it was rovided to counsel for E stein. Present at the meta 11! for the government were FAUSA Jeff Criminal Chief MAUSA M, Jason and myself, and for Epstein were Roy Black, Gerald Lefcourt, and Lilly . (See Exhibit 5.) At the meeting, counsel for Epstein stated that their client would not consider plea that required state jail time. During the meeting, suggested I plea to I federal charge that would allow Epstein the opportunity to serve his sentence in I federal facility. I was told that USA Acosta did not want to do I federal plea that bound the court to I two- year prison term, so I would have to find charge or charges that resulted in I two-year statutory maximum. On August I, 2007, Mr. advised that the counter-offer that Epstein's attorneys had promised did not arrive, and I told him that I had found I federal charge that could result in 2-1/2 year statutory maximum (Exhibit 65). On August 2, 2007, Lilly sent I counter-proposal directly to Criminal Chief and, in her email, stated that copy would also be hand-delivered to USA Acosta (Exhibit 8.) The counter-proposal essentially called for home confinement, no sex offender registration, and an agreement to pay damages via 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Exhibit 40). Ms. also asked for I meeting with the U.S. Attorney (id.). On August 3, 2007, Mr. sent I letter rejecting the counter-proposal, advising that I minimum of two years' imprisonment was needed to vindicate the federal interest, and that USA Acosta was not inclined to have I meeting (Exhibit 41). Mr. provided I deadline for August 17, 2007 to accept the plea offer (id.). That was Mr. last day of employment with the USAO before he entered private practice in New York. Mr. Epstein's attorneys were incensed that USA Acosta had set I deadline of August 17, 2007 and would not meet with them, so they demanded I meeting with CEOS Chief Drew (Exhibit 43). Mr. agreed to travel to Florida to meet with USA Acosta and Epstein's attorneys (id.). Mr. also traveled to West Palm Beach to meet with the agents and myself to go through the evidence and our analysis of the statutes (Exhibit 5). Before he came to West Palm Beach, I advised Mr. that I had worked with CEOS Trial Attorney on some of the legal issues and that, if there were I trial, I was hoping she might be able to assist (Exhibit 43). Page 22 of 58 EFTA00225065 In preparation for the planned meeting on September 7, 2007, FAUSA emailed me to ask what the status of the plea negotiations were. I wrote: Here is the term sheet and guidelines calculation that we provided at the last meeting. Information charging 371 conspiracy, with I Rule 11 plea with I two-year cap, but I think M must have asked Alex about it and it was nixed. Just to be prepared for tomorrow, I was just starting to draft I Rule 11 Plea agreement in case Alex changes his mind and I formal non-prosecution agreement containing the state plea terms. . . . There are three concerns that I hope we can address tomorrow. . . . [including] that the agents and I have not reached out to the victims to get their approval, which as Drew politely reminded me, is required under the law. (Exhibit 44). On September 7, 2007, USA Acosta, FAUSA , CEOS Chief and I met with Kenneth Starr, Jay Lefkowitz, and Lilly Ell (Exhibit 5). At the meeting, Mr. Starr focused primarily on federalism/policy arguments, and Mr. Epstein's background. I remember Mr. Starr thanking me for bringing § 2255 to their attention and that it would allow I state resolution that still provided the equivalent of federal restitution. Following the meeting, there were communications between Gerald Lefcourt, USA Acosta, and MAUSA that I was not privy to. The fact of the conversations was mentioned in later emails. Based upon those communications, on September 10, 2007, I was asked to send Mr. Lefcourt an office response to Lefcourt's counterproposal (see Exhibit 47 ("Gerry: As per your discussion with U.S. Attorney Acosta, I have attached the Office's written counterproposal.")). I sent Mr. Lefcourt I Non-Prosecution Agreement that required Epstein, inter alia, to: (1) plead guilty to three state felony offenses, including lewd and lascivious battery on child; solicitation of minors to engage in prostitution; and engaging in sexual activity with minors at least sixteen years of age; (2) make I binding recommendation (with the State Attorney's Office) for the Court to impose I thirty-month sentence consisting of 20 months in prison followed by 10 months of community control; (3) waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence; (4) concede that victims identified by the United States were victims for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2255; and (5) plead guilty by September 28, 2007 and be sentenced by October 15, 2007. (Exhibit 66). The following day, FAUSA forwarded to me USA Acosta's email with USA Acosta's revisions to the NPA (Exhibit 46). At FAUSA request, I incorporated the changes and sent the new version to Mr. Lefcourt (Exhibits 47 and 67). On September 12, 2007, MAUSA , = and I met at the State Attorney's Office with State Attorney , ASA Belohlavek, Jay Lefkowitz, Gerry Lefcourt, and Jack Goldberger (Exhibit 5). The purpose of the meeting was to finalize and coordinate the terms of the state and federal agreements. Mr. Lefkowitz still expressed some interest in having Epstein serve his time in I federal facility, Page 23 of 58 EFTA00225066 rather than I state one, and I remember Mr. Goldberger saying that because Mr. Epstein's home was on Palm Beach Island and touching the Intracoastal Waterway, it was somehow in "international waters" and federal jurisdiction. Other items that were discussed were: (1) that the state crime that Epstein agreed to plead guilty to was one requiring sex offender registration; and (2) that Epstein would be incarcerated 24-7 during the 20-month period of imprisonment. We left the meeting with an understanding that Epstein's counsel would contact us about whether Epstein wanted to plead to federal charges pursuant to I plea agreement or proceed with the Non- Prosecutifltement. With that in mind, oSmber 13, 2007, I sent an email to USA Acosta, FAUSA MAUSA and advising them that I had researched three potential federal charges that could be used for Epstein, but they would all result in I 24-month maximum. If Epstein's counsel rejected those charges because of the 24-month exposure, I recommended reconsidering I binding Rule 11 plea "rather than try to create violations out of whole cloth" (Exhibit 46 at 19). I provided I proposed plea agreement and information containing two counts of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 403. Mr. wrote to me later on September 13, 2007, "He is going to give us an assault on the plane or we can do conspiracy"2° (Exhibit 46 at 21). I responded, "It would still have to be conspiracy to commit an assault on I plane. I just want to make sure that we have something that is factually accurate. Just trying to plan ahead" (id.). At Jay Lefkowitz's request, MAUSA and I scheduled conference call with him for early on the morning of September 14, 2007 (id. at 25). Mr. did not attend the conference call, and on the call, Jay Lefkowitz asked me to consider allowing Epstein to plead to charges that required only 12 months' imprisonment. I recommended 24 months' imprisonment. Lefkowitz said his client I would to obstruction of witness and one count of assault on an airplane (id. at 29). Despite Mr. earlier agreement to the assault on an airplane charge, he then decided that the "assault sounds like I stretch and factually sort of silly" (id. at 31). I then went back to Mr. Lefkowitz with four options: (1) I plea only to state charges with 18 months' imprisonment; (2) federal and state pleas with I recommendation for concurrent time so that Epstein could serve his time in I federal facility; (3) I § 371 plea with I binding recommendation of 20 months' imprisonment (if USA Acosta approved it); or (4) an agreement that had I plea to one federal charge followed by one state charge (id. at 33). We continued to negotiate issues about how to provide restitution to the victims, and each iteration of the agreements seemed to move us further apart. As shown in Exhibit 46, each time Mr. Lefkowitz tried to reduce the period of incarceration; he tried to replace the state charge with one that did not require sex offender registration; and he kept changing the damages/restitution provisions to make it more difficult for the victims to obtain compensation; he removed the appeal waiver; he included an agreement that we would recommend an incorrect calculation of the guidelines. It was simply bad faith negotiations. I would point out how terms that were specifically rejected were re- inserted, and the Office would just send me back to the table. The agreement was finally completed and signed on September 24, 2007. 4. Explain fully the process and circumstances leading to the development of the following terms of the non-prosecution agreement: 20 This somehow resulted in 18 months' imprisonment. I do not recall how the prison term was decreased from 20 months on September 11, 2007 to 18 months on September 13, 2007. Page 24 of 58 EFTA00225067 an 18-month period of incarceration in I state facility, including the basis for the determination that it sufficiently satisfied the federal interest in the case; As noted above, the only information that I received was from Mr. announcement that USA Acosta had decided to offer I two-year state deal. I do not know how Messrs. and Acosta determined that two years' incarceration sufficiently satisfied the federal interest in the case. During one meeting, Epstein's attorneys raised the possibility of I state-court plea with home confinement. USA Acosta specifically rejected the suggestion, noting that confinement in Mr. Epstein's home was not equivalent to incarceration. As discussed above, the 24-month term was reduced to 20 months and then, finally, to 18 months. b. victim restitution, including why and how to address victims' rights through 18 U.S.C. § 2255; The federal crimes that were under investigation all called for mandatory or discretionary restitution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A.2I Alexandra and Drew from CEOS are experts in this area, but as PSC Coordinator, I knew that restitution in child exploitation cases was I hot-button issue at the time. The District of Alaska USAO had multi-victim child exploitation case with I wealthy % defendant (Boehm) where they had set u trust fund with I bank and I trustee. With Drew help, I ex lored setting up I similar situation in the Epstein case (Exhibit 48), in connection with using I guardian ad litem ("GAL") for the victims,22 if there had been I plea to federal charges. In cases like the Epstein cases, using I GAL seemed the most prudent course because, to the extent that the victims' interests ever diverged from the government's, the GAL could advocate on behalf of the victims. Thus, there are several emails between myself and Jay Lefkowitz about the appointment of I GAL and the possibility of I restitution trust fund similar to the Boehm case out of Alaska. I obtained the trust fund agreement and spoke with the in Alaska. The trust fund a reement was very complex and required I bank to agree to serve as the holder of the corpus and I trustee to oversee the administration of the trust, as well as the Court to 21 Mandatory restitution under § 3663A requires I conviction for I "crime of violence, as defined in [18 U.S.C. §] 16." At the time, these cases would have been considered crimes of violence because sex trafficking, even via fraud or coercion, would likely be considered to "involve[] I substantial risk that physical force against the person . . . or another may be used in the course of committing the offense." 18 U.S.C. § 16(b). Post-Johnsonl United States, U.S. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), I court might decide differently. See, e.g., Menendez,. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 467 (9th Cir. 2018). Even if not I crime of violence, I Court has the authority to impose an order of restitution when sentencing I defendant convicted of any offense under title 18 for any losses sustained by I victim as I result of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 36631(l)U), (B)(i)(I). And the court also can order restitution to persons other than the victim of the charged offense if the parties so agree. 18 U.S.C. § 36634)(1)4. 22 I had been the first prosecutor in the S.D. Fla. to apply to the court for guardians ad litem for victims in child exploitation cases, so I was familiar with the procedure. Page 25 of 58 EFTA00225068 enter an order setting up the trust and I mechanism for resolving disputes amongst beneficiaries or between I beneficiary and the trustee. In light of the amount of details and the number of victims involved, and the simple fact that, if there was only I state plea, there would be no federal judge to undertake the process, I knew that there was no way to accomplish I trust fund like Boehm within the confines of the NPA. In the Boehm case, there was I much smaller number of victims and, if I remember correctly, the victims were younger. The Alaska was able to confer with Boehm's victims and obtain their consent to the trust agreement procedure in advance of entering into the plea agreement. The Alaska also obtained the defendant's agreement to proceed ex pane. Our situation was quite different. There were more victims with disparate interests. In my emails, I made it clear that I could not bind the victims to such I procedure because I did not represent them. For example, how would the USAO decide on the size of the corpus of the trust? Would the USAO hire expert sychologists to evaluate the victims and economists to qLtantify their losses? If the USAO picked I number, would that preclude I victim from bringing I state tort claim? Would every victim receive the same amount? This is not how criminal restitution works — normally after I guilty plea, the Court's Probation Office works with victims to calculate losses, and issues are litigated at sentencing or within 90 days after sentencing. Lefkowitz was asking the USAO to pick I number virtually out of thin air to use as the corpus of the trust for I group of victims who were not clients of the USAO. We also would have to locate an independent bank to serve as the hold of the corpus. Given how difficult negotiating simple plea terms had been, I believed that creating an agreement of this sort was legally and logistically impossible. When Epstein's attorneys approached USA Acosta in December 2007 and suggested that I rejected the Trust proposal for nefarious reasons, I outlined all of the concerns that I had previously expressed to Mr. Lefkowitz (Exhibit 55). Once I was instructed that Epstein would be allowed to plead to state charges, I wanted to do what I could to place the victims and the community in the same position where they would have been in Epstein had pled to I federal offense. If Epstein had led to one of the federal offenses under investigation, he would have been required to register as I sex offender and pay restitution to all victims of the federal offense. With regard to the restitution piece, I knew that the state investigation had not included all of the girls and young women whom we had identified and I was concerned that Epstein would avoid his restitution obligations if not forced to pay.23 As part of my duties as PSC Coordinator, on September 26, 2006, I had prepared I memo to management summarizing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the "Adam Walsh Act") (Exhibit 16). One of the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that I noted was an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2255: "Section 2255 has been expanded to allow I person who, while I minor, was I victim of various child exploitation offenses, to pursue I civil action for personal injury damages — regardless of when the personal injury occurred. It also raises the presumptive damage amount to $150,000." (Id. at 7.) Although this was an amendment, I was unaware of § 2255 prior to preparing this September 2006 memo. The first few times I brought it 23 In fact, the State Attorney's Office did not seek or obtain restitution for any victims in the state case, not even the two victims that were the basis of the state charges. Page 26 of 58 EFTA00225069 to the attention of others, they thought I was mis-citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and I had to explain that there actually was an 18 U.S.C. § 2255, which was I civil provision within the criminal code. I do not know when I first discussed the possibility of using § 2255 as I replacement for the victims' lost restitution benefits, but I know that I conducted research on § 2255 cases on July 27, 2007 (Exhibit 37). That was the day after the meeting where Criminal Chief had announced that USA Acosta had decided to offer Epstein I two-year state plea (Exhibit 5). Language regarding § 2255 was included in the plea agreement term sheet provided to Epstein's counsel on July 31, 2007 (Exhibit 38). The issue must have been raised in advance of the meeting, because that was the first meeting attended by Ken Stan, and.ifically thanked me for bringing§ 2255 to their attention. On August 2, 2007, Lilly sent I letter to Criminal Chief makin series of counterproposals including: "Application of 18 U.S.C. § 2255" (Exhibit 40 at 2). Ms. went on to explain: 18 U.S.C. 2255 provides that any minor who suffers injury as I result of the commission of certain offenses shall recover actual damages and the cost of any suit. It is important to note that Mr. Epstein is prepared to fully fund the identified group of victims which are the focus of the Office — that is, the 12 individuals noted at the meeting on July 31, 2007. This would allow the victims to be able to promptly put this behind them and go forward with their lives. If given the opportunity to opine as to the appropriateness of Mr. Epstein's proposal, in my extensive experience in these types of cases, the victims prefer I quick resolution with compensation for damages and will always support any disposition that eliminates the need for trial (id. at n.1). Thus, the use of § 2255 as I replacement for restitution was not controversial — it was promoted by Epstein's own attorneys, including Mr. Starr. At one point during negotiations, Mr. Lefkowitz started advocating for I trust fund like the one used in Boehm, mostly, I believe, to try to place I cap on his damages exposure. I offered some potential solutions, including asking the federal court to appoint I guardian ad litem who could work with Epstein's counsel to see if the victims would be willing to agree to I Trust Fund, and I would facilitate those efforts, but I simply would not agree to something that I legally could not promise — I binding resolution for victims whom I did not represent. Eventually, Mr. Lefkowitz made some changes to the § 2255 language but it remained quite close to the original proposal contained in the July 31, 2007 term sheet. c. immunity for co-conspirators, including unidentified co-conspirators; and In looking through the drafts of the agreements, the immunity provision does not appear in any of the federal plea agreements that I drafted. Its first appearance is in I version of the NPA proposed by Jay Lefkowitz along with I proposed promise that the government would not seek immigration sanctions against any of the co-conspirators. It was initially rejected, and then after several iterations, Lefkowitz revised it to the language that appeared in the final NPA. The final language was: "In consideration of Epstein's agreement to plead guilty and to provide compensation in the manner described above, if Epstein successfully fulfills all of the terms and conditions of this agreement, the United States also agrees that it will not institute any Page 27 of 58 EFTA00225070 criminal char es a ainst any potential co-consgtors of E stein, including but not limited to M, Lesley Groff, or ' (Exhibit 52 at 5). To the extent that there was "criminal organization," the Office and the investigators considered Epstein to be the head of that organization. He was certainly the most culpable individual, and we did not foresee any scenario where we would defer prosecution against Epstein but proceed to prosecute his subordinates. Also, while the agreement included the language "including but not limited to," at the time that the NPA was signed, with the possible exception of Ghislaine Maxwell, the investigation had not disclosed any co-conspirators other than those listed. I recall that there was extensive discussion of Lefkowitz's proposed immigration language, but I do not recall much discussion of this language for the reasons stated above. d. the October 2007 addendum, including its purpose. During the negotiation of the NPA, I had been admitted to the hospital for surgery. After the surgery, I returned to the office almost immediately to try to complete the negotiations. When the NPA was signed, I sought permission to take I leave of absence to address my health concerns. While I was away, the Addendum was negotiated. While I conducted some of the drafting, I believe that FAUSA handled the bulk of the negotiations and drafting. My understanding was that the USAO wanted to formally assign its right to select the attorney representative for the victims to I Special Master. The NPA stated that the USAO would select the attorney representative in consultation with and subject to the good faith approval of Epstein's counsel. I had provided Epstein's counsel with I list of attorneys, none of whom I had ever met, that I had culled from consulting with one of the district judges24 and some AUSAs, including Mr. , who I was dating at the time. After getting that list of names, I did my own research to determine who would be good fits for the type of litigation that I expected they would face — both in terms of the tactics of Epstein's lawyers and the special challenges of dealing with emotionally fragile victims. I provided that culled list to Jay Lefkowitz and disclosed that, although I had no financial interest, the list included I friend of I good friend of mine (I did not describe Mr. as my "boyfriend"). Even with that disclosure, Mr. Lefkowitz selected Mr. friend. Before the matter went any further, FAUSA decided that the Office should use Special Master to make the selection, rather than pick anyone — even I panel of attorneys leaving the final selection to Epstein's counsel. Despite that, Mr. Lefkowitz and Guy Lewis — who knew both Mr. and his friend — claimed that there was I financial interest and that I had tried to create the procedure for financial gain.25 24 Epstein's lawyers suggested that I had ex parte communications with I judge. I simply asked for recommendations from 'judge that I was friendly with; I did not disclose anything about the background of the case. 25 Mr. Lewis knew that Mr. also was an and, therefore, was not partners with another lawyer. When that was patently obvious, Epstein's lawyers falsely claimed that they were "law school roommates." Both had graduated from law school more than fifteen years before, and had not been roommates. Ironically, one of the reasons why Epstein's legal team approved the selection of Robert Josefsberg was that Josefsberg and Alan Dershowitz were law school classmates - somehow there was no "financial interest" attributed to them. Page 28 of 58 EFTA00225071 Rather than simply elect to use I Special Master to exercise its right to make the attorney representative selection, the USAO believed that it should formalize the assignment in writing. 5. To the extent not evidenced in e-mails or other correspondence, identify and describe all interactions with defense counsel — such as phone conversations, meetings, or communications by private e-mail — that you or any other member of the government had regarding the investigation, potential prosecution, or negotiation of I resolution of this case. If at any point you became concerned about the nature of any member of the government's interaction with defense counsel, describe the interaction and explain when and why you became concerned. My communications with opposing counsel occurred primarily via email. Most of those communications were via office email, and some were from my home email. All of my home emails were collected and produced as part of the Jane Doe litigation. Negotiations were occurring at nights, on weekend, and while I was recuperating from surgery, and this occurred during I time when out of office access to email was very limited. I believe that only supervisors had Blackberry devices at that time. The meetings that I attended are catalogued on the meeting timeline (Exhibit 5). I believe there was one other meeting soon after Epstein entered his guilty plea, when I went to Jack Goldberger's office and met with him and Mike Tein (Guy Lewis' law partner) about the victim list. Other than that, I do not recall any in-person meetings. I had I couple of telephone conversations and Guy Lewis at the start of the investigation that were very brief. Jeff and/or was on some of these. I had telephone conversations later during the investigation with Lill • Lefcourt, Roy Black, and Nate Dershowitz about subpoena responses. and were on some of those calls. I had tele,m conversations with Jay Lefkowitz about plea negotiations and scheduling meetings. M, and Jeff were on some of those calls. I had numerous calls with Roy Black and Jack Goldberger about breaches of the NPA. was on most of those telephone calls. From emails and conversations, I know that Messrs. Acosta, , and had numerous emails and conversations (mostly via telephone and possibly some in person) with members of the defense team. USA Acosta had contact with Ken Starr, Jay Lefkowitz, Gerry Lefcourt, and Alan Dershowitz. FAUSA had contact with Alan Dershowitzi • Lefcourt, and Lilly . Criminal Chief had contact with Lilly and Gerry Lefcourt. There may have been other meetings that I was unaware of. I was concerned about the level of contact and the lack of consideration of the sanctity of the investigation. It was imperative to keep the investigation confidential to protect not just the victims' privacy rights, but to keep them from the harassment of overly aggressive lawyers. I felt that there were leaks of case-related facts and strategy, as well as personal matters that undermined my ability to deal with the defense and that ultimately was used by the defense to defame me and Mr. with members of the Department of Justice. Page 29 of 58 EFTA00225072 6. Provide I detailed description of all settlement negotiations conducted in this matter in which you took part or of which you were otherwise aware, including all terms of settlement that were discussed, considered, and rejected during the negotiations. Identify all individuals who participated in those negotiations, including government personnel and defense counsel. In each case, identify all participants and describe the discussions that occurred. Please see my response to Question .3. 7. Describe the interactions by you, or anyone else within the USAO, with any employees of the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office concerning the federal or state investigation of Mr. Epstein, the terms of I proposed resolution of the case, and the terms of the federal non-prosecution agreement, including the terms of Mr. Epstein's incarceration. As noted above, my first interaction with anyone from the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office about the Epstein case was at the Project Safe Childhood Conference in Washington, DC, when State Attorney Barry introduced himself to USA Acosta and me and started railing against the victims and the case. My next interaction was with ASA Belohlavek at some later date. I was in her office, I believe on another matter, and I mentioned the case. She said that she "hated" the case and that she "hated" prostitution cases. She stated that some of the girls were not really victims because they had been paid "thousands of dollars." I was I bit taken aback because Ms. Belohlavek was the supervisor of the division charged with prosecuting child sex offenses, including child prostitution cases and, by definition, child prostitutes receive money. Although